the review of

metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

articles

books received

philosophical abstracts

announcements

The *Review of Metaphysics* is devoted to the promotion of technically competent, definitive contributions to philosophical knowledge   Not associated with any school or group, not the organ of any association or institution, it is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into root questions, regardless of the writer's affiliations

Institutions supporting the *Review* as sustaining institutions are listed on the back cover

The *Review* offers below-cost subscriptions to foreign libraries and scholars unable to pay its standard rates, a service made possible in part by donations and by subscriptions of sustaining institutions

Volumes 1 to 25 can be purchased from the A M S Reprint Company, 56 East 13th St , New York, New York 10003

Microfilms of complete volumes of the *Review* are available to regular subscribers only, and may be obtained at the end of the volume year from University Microfilms, 313 North First St , Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Articles appearing in the *Review of Metaphysics* are indexed in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Philosopher's Index*, the *Repertoire Bibliographique de la Philosophie* and the *Book Review Index*

The thirteenth, revised edition of the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* is the *Review's* authority on matters of style   Contributors are requested to follow the *Manual* or a recent issue of the *Review* in preparing their manuscripts A style sheet for articles is available upon request

Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor, and all other correspondence to the manager, *Review of Metaphysics*, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064 USA   Material submitted for publication must be accompanied by return postage

A notification of change of address should be received six weeks in advance Replacement of unreceived issues must be requested within a year's time

the review of
metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

articles

books received

THE CONCEPT OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH

GIAN-CARLO ROTA

LIKE ARTISTS WHO FAIL TO GIVE an accurate description of how they work, like scientists who believe in unrealistic philosophies of science, mathematicians subscribe to a concept of mathematical truth that runs contrary to the truth

The arbitrariness of the accounts professionals give of the practice of their professions is too universal a phenomenon to be brushed off as a sociological oddity   We shall try to unravel the deep-seated reasons for such a contrast between honest practice and trumped-up theory   We shall not focus on the psychological aspects of the problem   We shall look instead for the philosophical source of this state of affairs.

We shall firmly take a view of mathematical activity drawn from observed fact, in opposition to the normative assertions of some recent philosophies of mathematics   An authentic concept of mathematical truth must emerge from a dispassionate examination of what mathematicians do, rather than from what mathematicians *say* they do, or from what philosophers think mathematicians *ought* to do

I

The description of mathematical truth that is nowadays widely accepted is roughly as follows. A mathematical system consists of axioms, primitive notions, a notation, and rules of inference   A mathematical statement is held to be true if it is correctly derived from the axioms by applications of the rules of inference   A mathematical system consists of all possible true statements that can be

derived from the axioms.   The truth of the theorems of mathematics is seldom seen by merely staring at the axioms, as anyone who has ever worked in mathematics will tell you   Nevertheless we go on believing that the truth of all theorems can "in principle" be "found" in the axioms   Terms like "in principle" and "found" are frequently used to denote the "relationship" of the theorems of mathematics with the axioms from which they are derived, and the meaning of such terms as "found," "relationship," and "in principle" is glibly taken for granted   Discussions of the conditions of possibility of such "relationships" are downplayed; what matters is to arrive by the shortest route at the expected conclusion, decided upon in advance, which will be the peremptory assertion that all mathematical truths are "ultimately" tautological

No one, fortunately, will go so far as to confuse tautology with triviality   The theorems of mathematics may be "ultimately" or "in principle" tautological, but such tautologies more often than not require strenuous effort to be proved   The definitive proof of any major mathematical theorem calls for the collective effort of years of work of successive generations of mathematicians.   Thus, although the theorems of mathematics may be tautological consequences of the axioms, at least "in principle," nonetheless, such tautologies are neither immediate nor evident.

But what is the point of the word "tautology" in this discussion? Of what help to the understanding of mathematics is it to assert that mathematical theorems are "in principle" tautological? Such an assertion, far from clearing the air, is a way of discharging the burden of understanding what mathematical truth is onto the catchall expression "in principle "

What happens is that the expression "in principle" is carefully cooked up to conceal a normative term, namely, the word "should " We say that mathematical theorems are "ultimately," "in principle," "basically" tautological, when we mean to say that such theorems *should* be evident from the axioms, that the intricate succession of syllogistic inferences by which we prove a theorem, or by which we understand someone else's theorem, is only a temporary prop that *should,* sooner or later, *ultimately* let us see the conclusion as an inevitable consequence of the axioms

The role of the implicit normative term "should" in what appears to be no more than a description has seldom been brought out

into the open   Perhaps it will turn out to be related to the sense
in which the word "truth" is used in the practice of mathematics

II

We shall establish a distinction between the concept of truth
as it is used by mathematicians and another, superficially similar
concept, also unfortunately denoted by the word "truth," which is
used in mathematical logic and has been widely adopted in analytic
philosophy

The narrow concept of truth coming to us from logic may more
properly be called "verification " The logician denotes by the word
"truth" either the carried-out verification of the correctness of der-
ivation of a statement from axioms, or else its semantic counterpart,
the carried-out verification that this statement holds in all models.

This concept of truth is a derived one, that is, it already pre-
supposes another concept of truth, the one by which mathematicians
tacitly abide   To realize that the concept of formal truth is hope-
lessly wide off the mark, perform the following eidetic variation
Imagine a mathematics lesson   Can you envisage a good mathe-
matics teacher training his or her pupils *exclusively* in their ability
to produce logically impeccable proofs from axioms?   Or even (to
take a deliberately absurd exaggeration) a teacher whose main con-
cern is his or her students' efficiency in spotting the consequences
of a "given" set of axioms?

In the formal concept of truth, axioms are not questioned and
the proving of theorems is viewed as a game in which all pretense
of telling the truth is suspended.   But no self-respecting teacher
of mathematics can afford to pawn off on a class the axioms of a
theory without giving some motivation, nor can the class be expected
to accept the results of the theory, the theorems, without some sort
of justification other than formal proof.   Far from taking axioms
for granted and beginning at once to spin off their consequences,
any teacher who wants to be understood will instead engage in a
back-and-forth game—what is known in philosophy as a hermeneu-
tic circle—where the axioms are "justified" by the strength of the
theorems they are able to prove, and, once the stage is set, the theo-
rems themselves, whose truth has previously been made intuitively

evident, are finally made inevitable by formal proofs which come almost as an afterthought, as the last bit of crowning evidence of a theory that has already been made plausible by nonformal, nondeductive, and at times even nonrational rhetoric   A good teacher who is asked to teach the Euler-Schlafli-Poincaré formula giving the invariance of the alternating sum of the number of sides of a polyhedron, for instance, will acknowledge to his or her class that such a formula was believed to be true long before any correct definition of a regular polyhedron was known, and will not hide the fact that the verification of the formula in a formal topological setting is an afterthought. The teacher will insist that the class shall not confuse such formal verification with the factual/worldly truth of the assertion. It is such a factual/worldly truth that motivates all formal presentations, not vice versa, as formalist philosophies of mathematics dishonestly pretend to be the case

Thus, what matters to any teacher of mathematics is the teaching of what mathematicians in their shoptalk informally refer to as the "truth" of a theory, a truth that has to do with the concordance of a statement with facts of the world, like the truth of any physical law. In the teaching of mathematics, the truth that is demanded by the students and provided by the teacher is such a factual/worldly truth, not the formal truth that one associates with the game of theorem-proving. A good teacher of mathematics is one who knows how to disclose the full light of such factual/worldly truth before students, while at the same time training them in the skills of carefully *recording* such truth. In our age, such skills happen to coincide with giving an accurate formal-deductive presentation

Despite such crushing evidence from the practice of mathematics, there are influential thinkers who would claim that discussions of factual/worldly truth should be permanently confined to the slums of psychology   It is more comfortable to deal with notions of truth that are prescribed in a *pensée de survol,* and which save us from direct commerce with mathematicians

The preference for the tidy notion of verification, rather than the unkempt notion of truth that is found in the real world of mathematicians, has an emotional source   What has happened is that the methods that have so brilliantly succeeded in the definition and analysis of formal systems have failed in the task of giving an account of other equally relevant features of the mathematical enter-

prise   Philosophies of mathematics display an irrepressible desire
to tell us as quickly as possible what mathematical truth *ought* to
be, while bypassing the descriptive legwork for the truth by which
mathematicians live.

All formalist theories of truth are reductionistic   They derive
from an unwarranted identification of mathematics with the axi-
omatic method of presentation of mathematics   The fact that there
are only five regular solids in three-dimensional Euclidean space
may be presented in widely differing axiomatic settings, no one
doubts its truth, irrespective of the axiomatics which is chosen for
its justification.   Such a glaring example should be proof enough
that the relation between the truth of mathematics and the formal
axiomatic truth which is indispensable in the presentation of math-
ematics is a relation of *Fundierung*

Nevertheless, in our time the temptation of psychologism is
again rearing its silly head, and we find ourselves forced to revive
old and elementary antipsychologistic precautions.   No state of
affairs can be "purely psychological" the psychological aspects of
the teaching of mathematics must of necessity hearken back to a
worldly truth of mathematics   Viewing the truth that the math-
ematics teacher appeals to as a mere psychological device is tan-
tamount to presupposing a worldly mathematical truth while re-
fusing to thematize it.   In the words of Edmund Husserl, there is
no *Real* without a *reell* counterpart   *Nihil est in intellectu quod
prius non fierit in mundo*, we could say, murdering an old slogan

Mathematical truth is no different from the truth of physics or
chemistry   Mathematical truth results from the formulation of
facts that are out there in the world, facts that are unpredictable,
independent of our whim or of the whim of axiomatic systems.

III

We shall now argue *against* the thesis we have just stated, again
by taking some events in the history of mathematics as our guide
We shall give an example that displays how observation of the prac-
tice of mathematics leads to a more sophisticated concept of truth
than the one we have stated

Our example is the history of the prime number theorem   This result was conjectured by Gauss after extensive numerical experimentation, guided by a genial intuition   No one seriously doubted the truth of the theorem after Gauss had conjectured it and verified it as far as his calculations could carry   However, mathematicians cannot afford to behave like physicists, who take experimental verification as confirmation of the truth   In mathematics, only a formal proof may be taken as confirmation of the truth   Thanks to high-speed computers we know today what Gauss could only guess, that conjectures in number theory may fail for integers so large as to lie beyond the reach of even the best of today's computers, and thus, that formal proof is today more indispensable than ever.

The proof of the prime number theorem was obtained simultaneously and independently around the turn of the century by the mathematicians Hadamard and de la Vallée Poussin. Both proofs, which were very similar, relied upon the latest techniques in the theory of functions of a complex variable   They were justly hailed as a great event in the history of mathematics   However, to the best of my knowledge, no one verbalized at the time the innermost reason for the mathematicians' glee   An abstruse theory which was at the time the cutting edge of mathematics, namely, the theory of functions of a complex variable, having been developed in response to geometric and analytic problems, turned out to be the key to settling a conjecture in number theory, an entirely different field.

The mystery as well as the glory of mathematics lie not so much in the fact that abstract theories do turn out to be useful in solving problems, but in that wonder of wonders, in the fact that a theory meant for one type of problem is often the only way of solving problems of entirely different kinds, problems for which the theory was not intended.   These coincidences occur so frequently that they must belong to the essence of mathematics.   No philosophy of mathematics can be excused from explaining such occurrences.

One might think that, once the prime number theorem was proved, other attempts at proving the prime number theorem by altogether different techniques would be abandoned as fruitless But this is not what happened after Hadamard's and de la Vallée Poussin's discovery.   Instead, for about fifty years thereafter, paper after paper began to appear in the best mathematics journals that provided nuances, simplifications, alternative routes, slight gener-

alizations, and eventually alternative proofs of the prime number theorem. For example, in the thirties, the American mathematician Norbert Wiener developed an extensive theory of Tauberian theorems that unified a great number of disparate results in classical mathematical analysis. The outstanding application of Wiener's theory, widely acclaimed throughout the mathematical world, was precisely a new proof of the prime number theorem

Confronted with this episode in mathematical history, an outsider might be led to ask: What? A theory lays claim to be a novel contribution to mathematics by proudly displaying as its main application a result that by that time had been cooked in several sauces? Isn't mathematics supposed to solve *new* problems?

To allay suspicions, let it be added that Wiener's main Tauberian theorem was and still is viewed as a great achievement   Wiener was the first to succeed in injecting an inkling of purely conceptual insight into a proof that had heretofore appeared mysterious   The original proof of the prime number theorem mysteriously related the asymptotic distribution of primes to the behavior of the zeros of a meromorphic function, the Riemann zeta function   Although this connection had been established some time ago by Riemann, and although the logic of such an improbable connection had been soundly tested by several mathematicians who had paved the way for the first proof, nevertheless, the proof could not be said to be based upon obvious and intuitive concepts. Wiener succeeded in showing, by an entirely different route than the one followed by his predecessors, and one that was just as unexpected, that there might be a conceptual underpinning to the distribution of primes.

Wiener's proof had a galvanizing effect   From that time on, it was believed that the proof of the prime number theorem could be made elementary

What does it mean to say that a proof is "elementary"? In the case of the prime number theorem, it means that an argument is given that shows the "analytic inevitability" (in the Kantian sense of the expression) of the prime number theorem on the basis of an analysis of the concept of prime, without appeal to extraneous techniques.

It took another ten years and a few hundred research papers to remove a farrago of irrelevancies from Wiener's proof, and the first elementary proof of the prime number theorem, one that "in

principle" used only elementary estimates of the relative magnitudes
of primes, was finally obtained collaboratively by the mathemati-
cians Erdos and Selberg   Again, their proof was hailed as a new
milestone in number theory.   Unfortunately, elementary proofs are
seldom simple   Erdos and Selberg's proof added up to a good fifty
pages of elementary but thick reasoning, and was longer and harder
to follow than any of the preceding proofs.   It did, however, have
the merit of relying only upon notions that were "intrinsic" to the
definition of prime number, as well as on a few other elementary
facts going back to Euclid and Eratosthenes.   In principle, their
proof showed explicitly how the prime number theorem could be
boiled down to a fairly trivial argument, once the basic notions had
been properly grasped.   But only in principle.   It took another few
hundred research papers, whittling down Erdos and Selberg's ar-
gument to its barest core, until, in the middle sixties, the American
mathematician Norman Levinson (who, incidentally, was Norbert
Wiener's only student) published a short note bearing the title "A
motivated introduction to the prime number theorem "   This note
was published in the *American Mathematical Monthly,* a journal
whose readership consists largely of high school and college teachers
in the United States.   Despite its modest title, Levinson's note gave
a full, purely elementary proof of the prime number theorem, one
that can be followed by careful reading by anyone with no more
knowledge of mathematics than that of undergraduates at an av-
erage American college

     After Levinson's paper, research on proofs of the prime number
theorem dwindled   Levinson's proof of the prime number theorem,
or one of several variants that have been discovered since, is now
part of the curriculum of an undergraduate course in number theory

     What philosophical conclusions can we draw from this fragment
of mathematical history?

     When one leafs through any of the three hundred-odd journals
that publish original mathematical research, one soon discovers that
few published research papers present solutions of as yet unsolved
problems, fewer still are formulations of new theories   The over-
whelming majority of research papers in mathematics is concerned
not with proving, but with re-proving; not with axiomatizing, but
with re-axiomatizing, not with inventing, but with unifying, with
streamlining, with adding marginal results to known theories, in
short, with what Thomas Kuhn calls "tidying up "

In the face of this evidence, we are forced to choose between two conclusions   The first is that the quality of mathematical research in our time is lower than we were led to expect   But what kind of evidence could have led us to such expectations?   Certainly not the history of mathematics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries   Publication in mathematics in these centuries followed the same pattern we have described, as a dispassionate examination of the past will show

Only one other conclusion is possible   Our preconceived ideas of what mathematical research *should* be do not correspond to the reality of mathematical research   The mathematician is not a person who, by staring in rapt attention at a piece of blank paper, grinds out solutions to problems like a complex machine delivering a finished product   Nor is the mathematician the possessor of the secrets for inventing imaginative theories that will unravel the mysteries of nature

We hasten to add that the opposite opinion of the mathematician's activity is equally wrong: it is not true that mathematicians do *not* solve problems or do *not* invent new theories.   They do, in fact, they make their living by doing so.   However, most research papers in mathematics are not easily classified in regard to their originality   A stern judge would classify all mathematics papers as unoriginal, except perhaps two or three in a century, a more liberal one would find a redeeming spark of originality in most papers that appear in print   Even papers that purport to give solutions of heretofore unsolved problems can be severely branded as either exercises of varying degrees of difficulty, or more kindly as pathways opening up brave new worlds.

The value of a mathematics research paper is not deterministically given, and we err in forcing our judgment of the worth of a paper to conform to objectivistic standards   Papers which only twenty years ago were taken as fundamental are nowadays viewed as misguided.

Newer theories do not subsume and expand on the preceding theories merely by quantitative increases in the amount of information   The invention of theories and the solution of difficult problems are not processes evolving linearly in time.   Never more than today has the oversimplification of linearity been off the mark.   We witness today a return to the concrete mathematics of the nineteenth century after a long period of abstraction; algorithms and techniques

which were once made fun of are now revalued after a century of interruption   Contemporary mathematics, with its lack of a unifying trend, its historical discontinuities, and its lapses into the past, is a further step on the way to the end of two embarrassing Victorian heritages the idea of progress and the myth of definitiveness

IV

We have sketched two seemingly clashing concepts of mathematical truth.   Both concepts force themselves upon us when we observe the development of modern mathematics

The first concept is similar to the classical concept of the truth of a law of natural science   According to this first view, mathematical theorems are statements of fact, like all facts of science, they are discovered by observation and experimentation   The philosophical theory of mathematical facts is therefore not essentially distinct from the theory of any other scientific facts, except in phenomenological details.   For example, mathematical facts exhibit greater precision when compared to the facts of certain other sciences, such as botany   It matters little that the facts of mathematics might be "ideal," while the laws of nature are "real," as philosophers used to say some fifty years ago   Real or ideal, the facts of mathematics are found out there in the world, and are not artificial creations of someone's mind   Both mathematics and natural science have set themselves the same task of discovering the regularities in the world.   That some portions of this world may be real and others ideal is a remark of little relevance.

The second view seems to lead to the opposite conclusion   Proofs of mathematical theorems, such as the proof of the prime number theorem, are achieved at the cost of great intellectual effort   They are then gradually whittled down to trivialities   Doesn't this temporal process of simplification that transforms a fifty-page proof into a half-page argument betoken the fact that the theorems of mathematics are nothing but creations of our intellect?   Doesn't it follow from these observations that the original difficulty of a mathematical theorem, the difficulty that we struggle with when we delude ourselves in having "discovered" a new theorem, is really due to human frailty alone, a frailty that some stronger mind will at

some later date dissipate by displaying the triviality that we had failed to acknowledge? Every mathematical theorem is eventually proved trivial   Every mathematical proof is a form of debunking, wrote the mathematician G H Hardy. The mathematician's ideal of truth is triviality, and the community of mathematicians will not cease its beaver-like work on a newly discovered result until it has shown to everyone's satisfaction that all difficulties in the early proofs were spurious, and only an analytic triviality is left at the end of the road. Isn't the progress of mathematics—if we can speak of progress at all—just a gradual awakening from *"el sueño de la razón"*?

The way I should like to propose out of the paradox of these two seemingly irreconcilable views of mathematics will use an argument originally from Edmund Husserl   The same argument is useful in a large number of other philosophical puzzles, and justly deserves a name of its own   I should like to baptize it by the name "the *ex universali* argument"

Let us summarize the problem at hand   On the one hand, mathematics is undoubtedly the recording of phenomena which are not arbitrarily determined by the human mind. Mathematical facts follow the unpredictable a posteriori behavior of a nature which is, in Einstein's words, *raffiniert* but not *boshaft*   On the other hand, the power of reason sooner or later reduces every such fact to an analytic statement amounting to a triviality   How can both of these statements be true?

But observe that this duplicitous behavior is not the preserve of mathematical nature alone   The facts of other sciences, of physics and chemistry, and someday (we firmly believe) even of biology and botany, exhibit the very same duplicitous behavior

Any law of physics, when finally ensconced in a proper mathematical setting, turns into a mathematical triviality   The search for a universal law of matter, a search in which physics has been engaged throughout this century, is actually the search for a trivializing principle, for a universal "nothing but." The unification of chemistry that has been wrought by quantum mechanics is not differently motivated   And the current fashion of molecular biology can be attributed to the glimmer of hope that this glamorous new field is offering biology, for the first time in the history of the life sciences, to finally escape from the whimsicality of natural randomness into the coziness of Kantian analyticity.

What is true is that the ideal of all science, not only of mathematics, is to do away with any kind of synthetic a posteriori statement and to leave only analytic trivialities in its wake   Science may be defined as the transformation of synthetic facts of nature into analytic statements of reason

Thus, the *ex universali* argument shows that the paradox that we believed we have discovered in the truth of mathematics is shared by the truth of all the sciences.   Although this admission does not offer immediate solace to our toils, it is nevertheless a relief to know that we are not alone in our misery.   More to the point, the realization of the universality of our paradox exempts us from even attempting to reason ourselves out of it within the narrow confines of the philosophy of mathematics   At this point, all we can do is turn the whole problem over to the epistemologist or to the metaphysician, and remind them of the old injunction *hic Rhodus, hic salta* [1]

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

---

[1] Reprinted with permission from *The Mathematical Scientist*

CONCEPTUAL IDEALISM REVISITED

NICHOLAS RESCHER

Some TWENTY YEARS AGO I wrote a small book entitled *Conceptual Idealism*, which ultimately saw the light of print in 1973[1] In the wake of its appearance, a considerable number of reviews were published in the philosophical literature, and their perusal, as well as discussions with various colleagues, brought home to me how easy it is to misunderstand and misconstrue a position which, to its exponent, seems quite clear and straightforward In due course, I have come to think it useful to exploit the benefit of distant hindsight to try to restate the position more clearly and to try to safeguard it against various misunderstandings that have come to view The present essay is the result of this endeavor

Idealism, broadly speaking, is the doctrine that reality is somehow mind-correlative or mind-coordinated However, the specifically *conceptual* idealism which concerns us here stands in contrast to an *ontological* doctrine to the effect that mind somehow constitutes or produces the world's matter Instead, it maintains that an adequate descriptive characterization of physical ("material") reality must make implicit reference to mental operations—that some commerce with mental characteristics and operations is involved in explanatory exposition of what is at issue "the real world " The central thesis of this position is that the mind is responsible for nature-as-we-understand-it, through making not nature itself, to be sure, but rather the mode-and-manner determining categories in whose terms we conceive of it On its approach, the constitutive role of mind is accordingly to be thought of neither in ontological nor in causal terms, but hermeneutically by way of concept-explication

---

[1] *Conceptual Idealism* (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1973)

I

The characteristic capacity of the mind is not representation—that is, modeling—which, after all, physical models can also do Rather, it is *conceptualization*· the ability to consider things in the light of self-provided conceptions   This ability to traffic in ideas is a capacity of minds alone   It is a talent the mind puts to work throughout the sphere of information processing. Seeing, for example, is always seeing-that. we never experience seeing something without seeing what is at issue *as* such-and-such and so seeing *that* it is such-and-such. Symbolism is one key paradigm. not only symbols *per se* (A, a, and the like) but everything that we apprehend is grasped by us in terms of meaningful conceptions—and *meaning* is, of course, the fundamental category of mind   However, what is noteworthy is that the concepts in terms of which the mind processes its information about the real standardly include some element of reflexivity—some admixture of ideas based on the mind's view of its own role in the scheme of things

Against this background, conceptual idealism's central thesis is that certain key properties ascribed to physical things in our standard conceptual scheme are fundamentally *relational* properties, with some facet of "the mind" (or of minds-in-general) as one term of this relation. Specifically, it holds that the conceptual scheme we standardly use to construe our experience ascribes to "material" objects properties and characteristics that involve some reference to mental operations within the very meaning of the terms at issue Even the physical properties of things are yet mind-involving in the analytic sense that their explicative conceptual unpacking calls for a reference to minds and their capabilities

Conceptual idealism demands attention to the important distinction between conceptual mind-involvingness and explicit mind-invokingness, illustrated in the contrast between a book and a dream. To characterize an object of consideration as a dream or a worry is explicitly mind-invoking. For dreams and worries exist only where there is dreaming and worrying, which, by their very nature, are the sorts of things that belong among the thought-processes of mind-endowed creatures. where there are dreams or worries, there must be mind-equipped beings to do the dreaming and worrying

A book, by contrast, seems at first sight entirely nonmental books, after all, unlike dreams or worries, are physical objects   If

mind-endowed beings were to vanish from the world, dreams and worries would vanish with them—but not books! Even if there were no mind-endowed beings, there could certainly be naturally evolved book-like objects, objects *physically indistinguishable from books as we know them* Nevertheless there could not be *books* in a world where minds had never been in existence. For a book is, by definition, an artifact of a certain purposive (that is, communicative) sort equipped with pages on which "reading material" is printed Such purposive artifacts all invoke goal-directed processes of a type that can exist only where there are minds. To be a book is to have writing in it, and not just marks. And writing is inherently the sort of thing produced and employed by mind-endowed beings. To explain adequately what a book is we must thus make reference to writing and ultimately to minds The point is not that the book is mentalesque as a physical object, but rather that to explicate what is involved in characterizing that object as a book we must eventually refer to minds and their capabilities A world in which there are not nor ever have been minds can contain objects physically indistinguishable from our books and nails, but books and nails they could not be, seeing that only artifacts created for a certain sort of purpose can currently be so characterized

And so, while physical objects are (of course) not mind-dependent as such, their conceptualization or characterization can nevertheless be—and, as is here maintained, standardly is—cast in mind-involving terms of reference This conception of the mind-involving (as contrasted with the mind-invoking) will be central in these deliberations

The overall message of conceptual idealism is, accordingly, that we standardly think of reality in mentalesque terms It rests on two basic theses:

(1) that *our* world is—inevitably—the world *as we conceive it to be*, and

(2) that the concepts (thought-instrumentalities) that we standardly use in describing the world contain in their makeup, at some point, a reference to the operations of mind.

Observing that our "standard conception" of the world we live in is that of a multitude of particulars, endowed with empirical properties and positioned in space and time and interacting causally, conceptual

idealism goes on to maintain that all of the salient conceptions operative here—particularity, spatiotemporality, causality, and the possession of empirical properties—are mind-involving in exactly the sense explicated above.

It is axiomatic that reality, insofar as apprehended by intelligence at all, can be apprehended only through the mediate employment of conceptual mechanisms of representation   As conceptual idealism sees it, these mechanisms as we have them here and now are inherently mind-referring   It holds that the conceptual instrumentalities we use for the characterization of "the real world" are committed in their ideational content to an involvement with actions and accomplishments that minds also can realize   Its pivotal contention is that our world-model, the world as we depict it in thought and cognition, is a mental artifact that is constructed (in part) in mind-referential terms—that the nature of the world as we conceive it reflects the nature of mind   For the salient thesis of conceptual idealism is that we must recognize as mind-involving all of the standard elements of our usual coordinating world-picture, namely·

   —particularity/individual identity
   —causality and process
   —property possession
   —space-time emplacement

It is sometimes said that idealism is predicated on a confusion of objects with our knowledge of them and conflates the real with our thought about it   But this charge misses the point   The only reality with which we inquirers can have any cognitive commerce is reality as we conceive it to be, our only informational access to reality is through the mediation of our mind-devised representations of it, and we achieve this devising by means that are not only mind-supplied but also mind-patterned

Conceptual idealism's thesis is not the trivial one that mind makes the *idea* of nature.   It is not open to Santayana's complaint against Schopenhauer that "he proclaimed that the world was his idea, but meant only (what is undeniable) that his *idea* of the world was his idea."   Rather, what is at issue is that mind-patterned conceptions are built into our idea of nature, that the way we standardly conceive of nature is in some crucial respects patterned on our mind

Of course, in speaking of mind-involvement or mind-invocation, no reference to any particular mind is at issue   The mental aspect operative here is not private or personal it is not a question of *whose* mind, of this or that mind rather than another   The dependence at issue is wholly generic and systematic in nature.

Again, the mind-relatedness in view is not something voluntaristic, something over which persons have power and which can be changed around by their thinking ("wishful" or otherwise). To say something (for instance, a color) is mind-involving[2] is not to say that it is illusory or delusory or otherwise "unreal", it is not to say that it is psychological in any subjective, person-relative sense, it is certainly not to say that it is arbitrary, choice-related, or changeable by human discretion   The idealist view of reality is not a do-it-yourself position that lets us shape the world in any way we please Historically, idealists have never made reality a matter of wishful thinking that lets thought shape the world without objective constraints   Constraints have always been recognized God (by Berkeley), the faculty-structure of the mind (by Kant), biological and perhaps ultimately Darwinian considerations (by Bergson)   Conceptual idealism correspondingly acknowledges the restrictive role of an objectively given conceptual scheme   Thus the items we characterize as "mind-dependent" can be perfectly interpersonal and objective, they need not be subjective at all—let alone be something over which people have voluntary control

This *conceptual* idealism sees mind not as *causal source* of the materials of nature, but as furnishing some of the *interpretative mechanisms* in terms of which we understand them. It maintains that we come to cognitive grips with nature on our own terms—that is, in terms of concepts whose makeup involves some reference to minds and their operations   Conceptual idealism is predicated on the view that reality as we standardly conceive it—in terms of material objects characterized by empirical properties and relations with one another in a setting of space and time—is actually in some respect involved in making reference to the operations of mind   As *this* sort of idealism has it, the mind understands nature in a manner

---

[2] Phenomenal colors are mind-involving in that they have to do with the *looks* of things, and only mind-equipped beings can perform looking in a literal sense, the language of looking is only figuratively applicable to mirrors or receiving instruments

that in some ways reflects its own operations in some fundamental respects.

It cannot be emphasized sufficiently that such a conceptual idealism does not take the form of spiritualism or panpsychism, it need not and does not maintain that only minds exist and that all there is is somehow the work of mind in any productive or causative sense Rather, this idealist position sees our characterizations of the real as proceeding in mind-referring terms   The position rests squarely on the classical idealistic doctrine that mind contributes essentially to the constitution—as well as the constituting—of our knowledge of reality, achieving this by characterizing things *in its own terms*, in using inherently mentalistic conceptions and categories

The conceptualistic idealist sees mind as an explicative paradigm for our understanding of the real, rather than as a productive source in the causal order of its genetic explanation   This position does not see mind as the causal source of reality, but as making a formative contribution to the shape—as well as the shaping—of its characterization of the real

There may well be a realm of mind-independent reality   Indeed, a commitment to its existence is undoubtedly part and parcel of our standard conceptual scheme for thinking about the real.   But this mind-independent reality is not something about whose *nature* as such we can secure any descriptive information   Reality as we know it is cognitively accessible only through the mediation of our concepts, it is an empirical reality because it is accessible to us through experience alone, and this experience is always *interpreted* experience.   There just are no mind-untouched experiential building blocks that the mind first receives and then assembles, because mind from the very start touches and pervades everything experiential   The mind-untouched reality underlying the world of our experentially grounded knowledge is something to whose existence (whose *that*) we stand committed but about whose nature (whose *what*) we neither do obtain nor can obtain any knowledge.

II

Let us begin the survey of conceptual idealism's main theses by considering particularity.   To be a particular is to be identifiable as an individual item with an identity of its own· to be distinguish-

able as one discrete item in contradistinction to others   In its very nature, particularity consists in identifiability, distinguishability, and discriminability   But all of these processes (identifying, distinguishing, discriminating) are fundamentally mind-involving; each involves the sort of thing that mind-endowed beings, and only mind-endowed beings, can do

The impact of this argument that identification is mind-involving is tempered by the following line of objection

> Let it be granted that your argument has shown that to say "*X* is *identified*" is to make a mind-referential claim   But this does not mean that "*X* is *identifiable*" is mind-involving   Your approach slurs the crucial distinction between actuality and possibility   Consider the pairs described/describable, mentioned/mentionable, indicated/indicatable, and identified/identifiable   If one grants that the first member of such a pair is mind-involving, one does not thereby concede that the second member is   Thus, saying that a certain particular is *identified* may well carry a covert reference to a mind, but this does not show that its *identifiability* is mind-dependent   Consequently, since generic particularity demands only identifiability, and not actual identification, your argument·that actual identification is mind-involving does not show that *identifiability* is, and so does not suffice to establish the conclusion that particularity is

This objection is to some extent well taken, specifically insofar as its aim is to make the point—a surely correct one—that *actual* identification is not a necessary requirement for being a particular, since there is no contradiction in saying that there are particulars which are not identified (though obviously one cannot give an example of one)   But the harmfulness of the objection can be deflected by recognizing the fundamental difference between identification on the one hand, and description, indication, and the rest on the other. Identification is, in the present context, entirely unique and *sui generis* in a way that impedes straightforward application of the analogy of actual and potential on which the objection rests   It makes perfectly good sense to say of something that it is describable but not described or indicatable but not indicated.   The actual/potential distinction is indeed operative in these cases   But this is not so with identification: we cannot in principle meaningfully say of something that *it* is identifiable but not identified, because to say this is literally nonsense.   One would be saying explicitly that one doesn't know of what one is speaking   Until it has been identified (however imperfectly) we simply are not dealing with a particular individual thing, we cannot appropriately be held to say anything

about "it"—not even that it is identifiable. To say this is not, of course, to deny that we can speak of otherwise unspecified particulars, as in a statement like "One of the trees in this forest has treasure buried beneath it." But cases of this sort pose no difficulty for our position Note that if indeed there is treasure under just one tree, then we have, in effect, succeeded in making an identifying reference to it (as "the tree that has treasure beneath it"), but if there are several trees above the treasure (or none) at all, then there just is no "it" about which we can be said to be speaking our purportedly identifying reference fails to refer, so that our statement becomes—under these circumstances—semantically unviable

It is useful at this stage to recall once more the distinction between *ontological* mind-dependency (mind-invokingness) and *conceptual* mind-dependency (mind-involvingness) Granted, only identification is mind-dependent in the strong sense of mind-involvingness, and not identifiability But this does not prevent identifiability from being *conceptually* mind-involving—as it indeed is To say of something that it is related to minds in a certain way (specifically in the way of admitting being identified by them) is obviously to characterize it in conceptually mind-referring terms (even as describing it as *visible* would be to characterize it in conceptually sight-referring terms of reference)

Again, consider the following objection: "It goes without saying that a critical distinction exists between the thing identified on the one hand, and the identification of the thing on the other Your argument overlooks this key distinction. Surely, to establish the mind-involvement of the *identification* of the thing does not show the mind-involvement of the identified thing as such " This objection hits wide of the mark. It rests on a wholly improper comparison. There is a crucial disanalogy between identifying on the one hand and seeing or describing on the other, for we can only consider "the thing identified" once some "identification of the thing" has been given: *any* possible entertainment of the former (the thing identified) is contingent upon the latter (the identification of the thing). The conceptual viability of "the thing identified" as an item of consideration is inextricably bound up with the identification of the thing at issue By contrast, nothing whatever about the describability of something rests upon the description of this thing. The hypothetical removal of its identification removes the thing in view in a way that the hypothetical removal of its description would not. This critical disanalogy is fatal to the objection

Of course, any such talk of specific things still leaves open the issue of *generic* identifiability It obviously makes sense to say generically that "*Something* is identifiable but not identified" even though it can be admitted that one cannot meaningfully say (specifically) of *something* that *it* is identifiable but not identified. And this point is relevant to our purposes, because the task of the present discussion is not to maintain merely that the actual identification of particulars is mind-dependent, but that particularity in general is But since it is conceptual mind-involvingness that is here at issue, the fact that identification is a mind-invoking process suffices to show that identifiability (that is, admitting to the possibility of identification) is also of this nature

The key fact is that individuatability is not a somehow incidental feature of a thing but is crucial to its very existence as an individual thing. Consequently, to show that mind-invocation enters in *at this specific point* is to establish that the very standing of a thing *as the individual particular it is* rests upon a resource the very concept of which involves essential reference to the workings of minds

To summarize only two conceptual routes lead into the realm of the particular, that of actual identification and that of potential identifiability The former—identification—is conceptually mind-invoking because identification is an attention-directing, and thus overtly mental, process The latter—identifiability—is implicitly mind-involving both because of the mentalesque nature of identification itself, and also (to foreshadow) because of the mind-involving nature of possibility as such

The mind-dependence of particularity has far-reaching consequences, for not only does it affect particular things/substances, it also affects particularity in other categories Specifically, consider the following

—the attribution of a *particular* physical property to something
—the attribution of a *particular* spatiotemporal feature (for example, shape)
—the specification of a *particular* cause or effect
—the specification of a *particular* process

Each of these involves a fundamentally mind-invoking transaction, because in each case the particularity at issue is enmeshed in an invocation of mind that is of just the same general sort that is at issue in item-identification.

K D 107

III

Reality and causality are inseparably coordinated. To be physically real is to be a part of the world's causal commerce   But the conception of causality itself is, quite obviously, inseparable from that of causal principles or laws   Now, causal laws are more than mere generalizations.   They have counterfactual force and characterize not just what does happen when but what would happen if. The element of causal necessity and counterfactual force is inherent in their nature, and they encompass not only the actual but the hypothetically possible as well.   But this realm of mere possibility— of what is not present as part of nature's realities but accessible only via supposition, assumption, and hypothesis—is part and parcel of the realm of mind-involvingness   For hypothesizing and its cognates (supposing, assuming) are one and all things that mind-endowed beings alone can do.   Reality is simply factual and actualistic. Figuratively put, it talks the language of *is* and knows nothing of *maybe*   It contains no mere possibilities and admits of no element of the merely hypothetical (over and above comprising mind-endowed beings who can project hypotheses)   The only access route to the purely possible is that of supposition, assumption, and hypothesis—all of which call for mind-endowed beings to come upon the scene.

One salient argument for the mind-involvingness of mere possibilities runs as follows

> To explain what a *mere* possibility is, one has to contrast it with a *real* possibility   A real possibility is one that can come to be realized through developed processes producing changes in real things (the possible oak tree that may emerge from this acorn)   A mere possibility is one that cannot come about (be realized) through the machinations of the real, it can only be assumed (supposed, hypothesized) The concept of a mere possibility is accordingly mind-invoking in the standard, explanatory ordered sense of that term   Possibilities as such can be either real or mere, it is the mereness of a mere possibility that is conceptually mind-invoking

To explicate what it is to be (merely) possible we thus need to involve the operation of minds, for the merely possible is not a part of the world's furnishings; it is something that can only be imagined, supposed, conjectured, hypothesized   That is, it is by its very nature something whose status is correlative with something that only

minds can do.[3]   The concept of the "merely possible" is accordingly
an instance of a mind-invoking conception.   Its adequate explanation
requires a reference to the sort of thing that only minds can do.

Real possibilities are possibilities *de re*· "It is possible for Felix
the cat to be on the mat " Hypothetical possibilities are *de dicto*
possibilities: "It is possible for a cat (even a merely hypothetical
cat) to be on the mat " Their status and condition in the explanatory
nature of things is based on assumptions, suppositions.   To explain
adequately what mere possibility (in contrast to that of a real pos-
sibility) is all about, we must bring mental operations (assuming,
supposing, hypothesizing) into the discussion.   In view of this, hy-
pothetical possibilities are inherently mind-involving   And this has
important consequences for laws.

Consider the following exposition of one of conceptual idealism's
key theses offered by one acute critic·

> Rescher's argument here rests on two points   First, he maintains
> that fictional [i e , nonexistent, "merely hypothetical"] things must
> exist in some sense because they are said to be real possibilities, and
> then he argues that the only sense in which they could be said to exist
> is as the object of certain mental processes such as imagining or sup-
> posing [4]

There is a substantial misunderstanding here   The position at issue
is not the old Parmenidean/Platonic doctrine that even nonexistents
must "exist" in some sense because they can be talked about (as-
sumed, supposed, and so on)   Our theory does not propose to es-
tablish the link between fictionality and mind-dependency by using
existence as a middle term as in the argument

1 Fictional objects must have an existence of some sort
2. The only sort of existents that fictional objects can have is
   a mind-correlative one

Therefore: Fictional objects have a mind-correlative existence

---

[3] The point is not that only the merely possible be supposed (assumed,
conjectured), it is that the merely possible can only be supposed—it cannot
be positioned in reality's scheme of things in a mind-independent way

[4] Dennis Temple, "Conceptual Idealism and Unrealized Possibility,"
Philosophy and Culture   Proceedings at the XVI World Congress of Philosophy
(Montreal Congress Publications, 1988), 44–50, see p 46.

This sort of *ontological* argumentation is not at issue in the conceptual idealism envisioned here   For the fact is that the linkage between a fictionality (that is, assumptive or suppositional or hypothetical status) and mind-involvingness is not enthymematically mediated but immediate, because fictionality (and its assurative cognates) are inherently mind-invoking in their conceptual makeup   The point is that to make proper use of "merely possible objects" we must characterize them as fictions, and thereby characterize them in mind-referring terms of reference, seeing that fictions are, of necessity, the creatures of a mind

But does not conceptual idealism's thesis that hypothetical possibilities are mind-invoking run into difficulty because of a failure to distinguish between what is *supposed* (the hypothetical possibility in question) and the *supposing* of it—this latter alone being mind-invoking?   Are we not committing with reference to *supposition* the same old error that Berkeley committed with reference to *perception*, by refusing to distinguish what is perceived with the perceiving of it?   By no means!   The cases are quite disanalogous.   With existents we are (*ex hypothesi*) at liberty to distinguish the thing at issue from the perceiving of it   Precisely because it exists it is (*ex hypothesi*) there to be so distinguished   But with nonexistents this prospect is all too plainly absent.   Berkeley was wrong; with *existents* we cannot maintain that to be is to be perceivable (let alone perceived) by us, simply because there can or might be actual things existing entirely outside our *perceptual* reach (gravity waves, for example).   But with *nonexistents* the case is very different; here, to be is to be conceivable exactly because the item itself, being nonexistent, is no more (but also no less) than an object of assumption or supposition, and is constituted as the thing it is through the assuming or supposing of it   In this domain, to be is indeed to be conceivable

To make the transit from the mind involvement of mere possibility to that of laws we have to note that laws encompass the realm of possibility at large   There are three distinct sorts of possibilities

1. real potentialities of actually existing things (if circumstances are favorable, that acorn will grow into an oak tree)
2 fictive possibilities for actually existing things (if that acorn were a cat, it would have a backbone).

3. mere possibilities (if a bolt of lightning hit here—not a re-
   positioning of any of the actual ones, but a somehow addi-
   tional one—then a thunderclap would sound here) [5]

But laws of nature apply to the sphere of possibility across the board,
as the case 3 example shows   And it is crucial to their status as
genuine laws that their application outruns the limits of the real
into the realm of the merely hypothetical   (If a supposed "law" did
not admit type 3 implementation, we would have to reject it as such)
If it is indeed a law of nature that mice have tails, then this will
still hold good when I imagine (assume, suppose) that there is a
mouse in my pocket   For if it is indeed a *mouse* that is there, then
a tail has to be there as well.   But to explain and expound *this*
absolutely essential feature of laws (that they support counterfac-
tuals relating to mere possibilities) we will have to bring assump-
tions (suppositions) into it—we will have to make use of conceptions
that relate quite explicitly to the operating of minds   Again, the
thesis that "Oak trees are (lawfully) deciduous"—that is, "Oak trees
have to be deciduous" in a sense that warrants "If that pine were
an oak, then it would be deciduous"—does not deal with actuality
alone, but frames its claims about "the facts" in such a way as to
bring in a realm of the hypothetically possible which, by the very
nature of the hypothetical, is inherently mind-involving

      To be sure, mere regularity calls for no more than a universal
generalization of the type·

(1) All X is Y.

But genuine lawfulness goes well beyond this to call for stipulations
of the form

(2) All X is Y, and if any Z that is not an X were an X, then Z
    would be a Y.

Here (1) is simply an issue of existential fact   if it is in fact the case
that "All (pure) mercury solidifies at −150°F," then this circum-
stance could continue to be operative even if one abstracted from
all reference to minds, overt and covert alike   But a type (2)
generalization—a lawful generalization—would fare differently
Its reference to Z's which are not X's having to have certain

---

[5] The first two sorts of possibilities are unproblematically *de re*, but
the third has to be cashed in through an ultimately *de dicto* reformulation

characteristics if they were X's involves claims outside the domain
of ontological fact, claims of which sense can be made only by the
use of mind-invoking conceptions of possibility. The mind's ability
to use its concept-apparatus to project the specification of entities
that, as it fully recognizes, have no standing in the world's scheme
of things is one of its characteristic capacities—one that is crucial
to operate the conception of lawfulness as we have it. The implicit
projection of merely hypothetical possibilities is crucial to lawfulness
and represents an element of intellectual artifice that is among the
most obviously self-provided constructions the human mind af-
fords us

But, as another critic complains,[6] does not a law simply char-
acterize *what does* happen in this world irrespective of any reference
to mere possibilities? The answer is neither yes nor no. A law of
nature indeed characterizes what does happen in the world, but it
does so in terms of what *must* happen in the world—and thus does
not effect its characterization without reference to possibilities.
Laws are—and *qua* laws have to be—more than mere generaliza-
tions. For the crucial point is that laws support counterfactuals,
they not only hold for the real things of this world but also for those
mere possibilities which we project into it by means of suppositions,
hypotheses, and assumptions.

*Lawfulness is the product of the well-founded imputation to em-
pirical generalizations of nomic necessity and hypothetical force,
whose nature is inherently (albeit implicitly) mind-involving* Both
pivotal factors, the essentially factual element of well-foundedness
and the essentially decisional element of imputation, are necessary
to laws. Well-founding is essential because the very spirit of the
scientific enterprise demands reliance only upon *tested* generaliza-
tions that have a solid observational or experimental basis But
the element of imputation is also essential since—as emphasized
above—we can only observe what *is*, that is, what forms parts of
the realm of the actual, and not what corresponds to the modally
necessary or the hypothetically possible The nomic necessity and
hypothetical force characteristic of lawfulness thus represent factors
that a generalization cannot conceivably earn for itself on the basis
of observational or experimental evidence alone it has to be *endowed*

---

[6] Baruch Brody, "[Review of] *Conceptual Idealism*," *The Philosophical
Review* 84 (1975) 580–2, see p 581

with these factors   The basic aspect of a lawful proposition is on
this view not the *qualitative* aspect of being-a-law but the *relational*
aspect of being-maintained-as-a-law   Lawfulness is in the final
analysis a relational rather than an absolute and purely descriptive
feature with minds playing a key part in the relationship at issue,
although, to be sure, a part only.   Lawfulness involves possibility,
and the gulf between the actual and the merely possible is one that
can be bridged—and can *only* be bridged—by minds [7]

There is a crucial difference between a claim's being a descrip-
tive truth about the real world as such and its being of the sort
which—like a law—in its very meaning and purport goes beyond
the real world   Descriptive statements about the real are embodied
in assertions that do indeed appertain only to the real world   But
statements about what is necessary or what is (merely) possible
have to be construed in terms of reference to the domain of mere
possibility as well   That something is necessary (holds in all [phys-
ically] possible worlds) or that it is merely possible (holds in some
other [physically] possible world) are claims which by their very
nature transcend the descriptive characterization of the real   The
truth conditions of *such* facts do not turn simply on the descriptive
constitution of the actual world, but invoke reference to the situ-
ation in "other possible worlds" as well—worlds to which our only
mode of entry lies (in the very nature of the situation) only through
the route of supposition, assumption, and hypothesis.   It is clearly
only through thought—through the imagination as deployed in as-
sumptions, suppositions, and hypotheses—that we can get cognitive
access to other possible worlds.

It is necessary to face one rather immediate consequence of the
doctrine of the mind-involvement of lawfulness, namely, that *cau-
sality* will stand on exactly the same footing.   To speak of causation
is to invoke (however tacitly) the operation of causal laws   (That
heating the water *caused* it to boil can only be maintained on the
basis of some thesis of the general type of the causal law "Water
boils when heated to 100°C at sea-level altitudes ")   That any dis-
cussion of causation in the scientific context is coordinate with an

---

[7] While laws are indeed man-made, they are—of course—not thereby
made as man *wants* them to be.   In maintaining that the necessity and
hypotheticality of lawfulness are matters of imputation, we thus have no
wish to suggest that the issue is one of indifferent conventions or arbitrary
decisions

at least implicit reference to causal laws is a part of general agree-
ment among present-day philosophers of science. The very idea of
a causal connection between events is deployed in a generalized way
that envisions their relationship as governed by a law, a causal law.
In this way, the argument inherent in our analysis of lawfulness as
conceptually mind-dependent leads inexorably to an acceptance of
the traditional idealistic view that causality is mind-dependent.
Thus relative to our standard conceptual scheme, the mentalistic
resource of counterfact is required, *via* lawfulness, for our concep-
tualized apprehension of the realm of causally interrelated fact   In
somewhat Kantian terms, our experience of the real as a network
of causality involves and presupposes a wider realm governed by
the category of possibility   To consider a relationship among actual
occurrences within the space-time framework in terms of a *causal*
linkage is to regard it in a setting of powers and potentialities that
inevitably ramify into the fact-transcending and mind-involving
sphere of "what would happen if "   If lawfulness is consensually
mind-involving, then so is causality   Here, then, is the picture of
what conceptual idealism carries over to its main points.

IV

What sorts of things are at issue when we ascribe properties
to things?   There are two principal prospects here (1) The property
at issue may be an empirical property that is ascribed in virtue of
the way in which things affect us—how they impact on our own
senses or their instrumental extensions, or (2) the point at issue is
a dispositional one that serves to explain how things affect (or appear
to affect) one another   But both roads to property-ascription are
mind-invoking
In the former, sensory (phenomenal) case, the situation with
respect to mind-involvement is clear since only mind-endowed beings
can have *experiences*   By an "*empirical* property" we shall here
understand—quite in the literal sense of this term—one whose as-
cription to something reports the result of experiential contact (be
it direct or indirect) with this item.   Such properties by their very
nature indicate how experiencing agents or the instrumentalities
they employ normally or standardly react to or interact with the
thing to which the property is ascribed in observation and analogous

processes   A manifest color predicate like "red" affords a paradigm example, because quite clearly any predicate that states how a thing standardly looks (feels, smells, and the like) is patently mind-referential   But not only these "predicates of sense-observation," as we may call them, but those of any mode of "observation" whatsoever, however complex the procedures and instrumentalities involved may be, are of this sort   All such predicates that embody a claim as to how something is standardly-observed-to-be are clearly mind-referential, because of the inherently mind-referential nature of observation *per se*   Observation, after all, is in its essential nature a process of interaction in which a mind is necessarily one of the items involved   it is inherent in the very concept that "observing" is an *interaction* between a mind and some sector of reality   Thus even, apart from the fact that complex modes of observations are (like measurement) dispositional and law-correlative—and so mind-involving—they are *also* mind-invoking because by their very nature they report the results of experiential interaction

   We turn now to *dispositional* properties that react to the capacities of things to elicit characteristic responses from others   By their very nature, all such dispositional properties are law-correlative and consequently mind-involving (in accordance with the preceding argument that dispositionality and lawfulness in general represent mind-involving conceptions)   And so, while theoretical descriptive terms may, admittedly, fail to be directly observational (and so not mind-invoking in the dispositional manner at issue above), they are still inherently dispositional   since scientific predicates are inevitably applied only to characterize some lawfully *interactional* aspect of things [8]

   The mind-involvement of *dispositional* properties as inherently lawful suffices also to establish at once the mind-involvement of *all*

---

   [8] Note that with *people* we might well draw a distinction between those properties they have "in themselves" (for instance, being intelligent or Spanish or music-loving) and those properties that merely indicate their impact upon others (such as being confidence-inspiring, repulsive, amusing, or likeable)   This clearly carries over into our talk of things (a statue can be bronze and Venus-representing on the one hand and life-like and awe-inspiring on the other)   Now the point is that those scientific predicates that are not essentially classificatory (*felix leo*) or composition-indicative (carbon, gold) are for the most part of the sort that indicates an impact upon other things (conductor, acid, predator)

of our standard groupings of classification with respect to the lawful behavior of things. This has vast repercussions as regards the groupings of the classificatory system we standardly employ in our thought about nature. Thus the ascription to particulars of such classificatory features as "being made of ıron," "being made of glass," "being a lion," or "being a maple" is just as dispositional (and hence mind-invoking) as being malleable, being fragile, or being a conductor.[9] The conceptual mind-involvement of dispositions is the "thin end of the wedge" that can be used to establish the comparable status of all the empirical properties of the things of our ordinary, conceptual scheme that represent classifications linked essentially to lawful behavior.

V

To have a position in space and time is to be *locatable* in space-time—to be relatable to other things in terms of placement (above, below, right, left), distance (nearer, more remote), and timing (now, earlier, later) But all *positioning* of things (be it in relating them to one another observationally or with reference to a coordinate-placement scheme of some sort) involves a mental process. The very idea of location and placement in particular identifiable positions is conceptually mind-ınvoking. To locate something is to note or indicate its spatial or temporal placement in relation to something else, and this clearly involves identifying things and their positions, which, as we have seen, is something that is inexplicably bound up with the machinations of mind Whenever a structure of *particular* (identified or identifiable) positions is at issue, mind-involvingness comes upon the scene once again. If particular-identification is geared in mind-invoking (as we have seen), then so is space-time positioning

Moreover, spatial and temporal positioning by their very nature involve measurement. But observational mensuration of *all* sorts—chronometric included—requires the specification of concrete individuals. It is crucial that in the measuring process we deal at each given stage with one selfsame measuring implement, with the *same*

---

[9] Cf K R Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York Basic Books, 1962), 387.

measuring rod or the *same* clock (or other periodic mechanism), reidentifying it and its parts as particulars   And, of course, such *reidentification* demands and indeed surpasses the demand for the identification of particulars.   Thus if our case for the mind-involvement of particular-identification has any merit, it works also to establish the mind-involvement of mensuration in general and chronometry in particular

VI

It may seem plausible to object to conceptual idealism with the following contention

> How can one sensibly maintain the mind-dependency of matter as ordinarily conceived, when all the world recognizes that the operations of mind are based on the machinations of matter?   (As Mark Twain asked "When the body is drunk does the mind stay sober?")   To be an idealist in the face of this recognition is surely to be involved in a vicious or at least vitiating circle

This objection simply gets things wrong   There is simply no question of any real conflict when the proper distinctions have been drawn, because altogether different sorts of dependencies or requirements are at issue in the following two theses:

(1) Mind is *causally* dependent upon (that is, causally requires) matter, in that mental process demands *causally* or productively the physical workings of matter.

(2) Matter (conceived of in the standard manner of material substance subject to physical law) is *explicatively* dependent upon (that is, *conceptually* requires) mind, in that the conception of material processes involves *hermeneutically* or semantically the mentalistic working of mind

We return once again to the crucial distinction between the conceptual order with its essentially hermeneutic or *explicative* perspective upon the intellectual exposition of meanings, and the causal order with its *explanatory* perspective upon the causal rationalization of physical processes   In the hermeneutic framework of consideration, our concern is not with any facets of the causal explanation of intellectual processes, but upon understanding them from within, on their own terms.   The issue is not one of causal explanation at all,

but one of the understanding to be achieved through an analysis of the internal meaning-content of concepts and of the semantic information conveyed by statements in which they are operative   Because of the fundamental difference between these two perspectives, any conflict in the dependency relations to which they give rise is altogether harmless from the standpoint of actual inconsistency The circle breaks because *different* modes of dependency are involved: we move from mind to matter in the conceptual order of understanding (of *rationes cognoscendi* or rather *concipiendi*) and from matter to mind in the explanatory order of causation (*rationes essendi*)   Once all the necessary distinctions are duly heeded, any semblance of vicious circularity disappears   No doubt, this calls for a certain amount of care and subtlety, but then so do many issues of intellectual life.

Conceptual idealism's view is that the sphere of matter is mind-involving in that the concept of material objects, located in space and time and interacting with one another, is shot through with mind-invoking conceptions   But this entire argument that mind is basic for matter is carried through in the conceptual order, based on the idea that a mind-invoking conception is one whose ultimate analysis demands a reference to minds or their capabilities. The "mentalistic" or mind-referring sector of a conceptual framework is accordingly spanned by those of its conceptions whose rational exposition can only be accomplished in ultimately mind-invoking terms, that is, by means of concepts relating to characteristically mental capabilities.   Conceptual idealism stakes no claims to priority of mind over matter in the causal order; its position leaves open entirely the prospect that mind could hinge on matter in point of causation

Accordingly, the conceptual idealist's thesis that one specific direction of dependence (that of the physical upon that of the mental) is built into the view of reality at issue in our standard conceptual scheme must not be seen as conflicting with the debatable (but by no means thereby negligible) prospect that the scientific explanation of causal relationships might envision a reversal in the direction of dependence   When different perspectives are involved, seemingly conflicting theses are perfectly compatible   (I can say without conflict that my car is economical in point of gas mileage and uneconomical in point of maintenance costs.)

But even if no vicious circle arises, do we not arrive at an equally vicious infinite regress that altogether precludes understanding? For is understanding not ruled out from the outset if an adequate understanding of mind requires reference to its causal origins in matter and an adequate understanding of matter requires reference to its functional presuppositions of a mind-invoking sort? The answer is negative. Avoiding regress would be necessary only if one adopted an essentially linear model of understanding But this is quite inappropriate in the case of *coordinated* concepts such as the present instance of mind/matter or the simpler case of cause/ effect To say that we cannot fully understand the cause until we understand its effect, and that we cannot fully understand the effect until we understand the cause, is not to show that there is a vitiating regress with the result that we cannot understand either one. All it shows is that two such coordinated and interrelated concepts cannot be set out through a sequential explanation but must be grasped *together* in their systematic unity.

An analogy may be helpful at this point Take a knife and its blade If that object is to count as a knife, then that shiny thing attached to the handle must be a blade, but this thing cannot count as a blade unless the whole it comprises together with that handle is a knife. The two items stand in conceptually symbiotic apposition X cannot be properly characterized as X unless it is duly related to Y and Y cannot be properly characterized as such unless it is duly related to X. We cannot pick up either end of the stick in separation from the other, but must grasp the whole in one fell swoop. Just such a cognitive *coordination* of mentalistic and materialistic concepts holds with respect to our present analysis of their mutual interdependencies By maintaining proper distinctions, any collapse into vicious circularity or vitiating regress can be avoided

Conceptual idealism is thus even compatible with a causal materialism maintaining that matter is basic to mind in the causal order. On the causal issues of the origins of mind, conceptual idealism is silent and so compatible with various theories, materialism itself not excluded Conceptual idealism is not an *explanatory* theory regarding the causal mechanisms of the mind's processes or mode of origination, it is an *analytical* theory regarding the nature of the conceptual mechanisms of the categories of understanding It can thus coexist with *any* theory of mind that is articulated along

strictly *causal* lines, be it a materialistic view that sees the causal origin of mind in matter of a Cartesian-style dualism of reciprocal influence or even an epiphenomenalism

The conceptual idealist thus has no vested interest in denying that mind and its functioning may be somehow causally emergent from the processes of matter. His point is simply that our standard rational account of the world—its material sector specifically included—is given in terms of reference that are at bottom mind-involving It is the analytical issue of *how* we think of the world, not the explanatory issue of its causal occurrences, that constitutes the focus of concern. This position does not need to be argued through an attack upon causal materialism; it is quite compatible with the idea that mental functioning has its material basis and causal origins in the realm of physical process.

Another critic has offered the following objection

> [Rescher's] argument [for the compatibility of materialism and conceptual idealism] is that, for the materialist, there is a *causal* dependence of mind on matter, whereas for the conceptual idealist there is a *conceptual* dependence of matter (reality-as-we-know-it) on mind But I wonder if the issue is as clear as the simple recourse to a conceptual-causal distinction would suggest If "matter" bears the same sense in both dependency claims, then the matter on which mind causally depends is itself conceptually infested with mind Now, it is often said that, to make a genuinely causal claim, cause and effect must be independently describable But if Rescher is right, then of course matter cannot be wholly described in terms independent of its supposed effect, mind [10]

The fly in this objection's ointment lies in its construing of the "independent describability" of cause and effect The validity of the causal thesis hinges on independent characterizability in the *causal* sense of independence But any purely *conceptual* dependency will be quite immaterial as long as it does not intrude upon causal matters—as purely conceptual relationships would surely find it difficult to do A purely conceptual role ("infestation") of mind in matter is accordingly quite perfectly innocuous

But what of an "identity theory of mind" that identifies mental processes with the operation of certain material configurations,

---

[10] David-Hillel Ruben, "[Review of] *Conceptual Idealism*," *Mind* 85 (1976) 138-40, see p 140

namely, our brains? Is our conceptual idealism not incompatible
with such a theory? Not necessarily. It depends upon whether the
identity is seen as a factual one (like the identity of the morning
star with the evening star or that of the tallest man in the room
with the poorest man in the room), or as a conceptually necessary
one (like that of Smith's only brother with Smith's only male sibling).
Our idealism will encounter no difficulties with a thesis of *contingent*
identity   An incompatibility will arise only if the identity theory
of the mental with the material is taken to obtain in *conceptual*
terms, as holding the essentially concept-relative thesis that men-
talistic talk is eliminable, in that it can be translated without con-
ceptually viable residue into talk about the behavior of matter. Such
a conceptually eliminative reductionism is incompatible with con-
ceptual idealism   For if "mentalese" were analytically altogether
reducible to materialistic discourse, then mind could not be concep-
tually basic to matter in the sense of our theory   But, of course,
since our theory is based on an analysis of the *ordinary* conceptual
scheme, this goes no further than to show that this ordinary scheme
is incompatible with a conceptually reductive materialism, and *this*
upshot is perhaps not surprising   (If we point out to the reductive
materialist that he violates the ordinary conceptual scheme, he may
well reply that he is only too ready to do so. In taking this stance
he is, to be sure, not inconsistent, but he does cut himself off from
participation in those discussions that take place within the men-
talistic framework of our standard conceptual scheme)

Conceptual idealism pivots on the fact that the conceptual in-
struments that the mind uses in forming its representations of real-
ity are seen not only as *mind-made* (this point, though true, is
altogether trivial), but also in various respects as *mind-patterned*,
and so reflective of their mentalistic origin   The conceptual devices
mind deploys for constructing its view of reality are themselves
heavily imbued—in the final analysis—with reference to the work-
ings of mind. It is this fact of the *analytical* fundamentality of
mind-invoking conceptions, and not any considerations regarding
its causal origins, that renders mind basic to matter *in the concep-
tual order*

One critic complains as follows·

If, as Rescher seems to imply, it is just a matter of fact that we have
experience of our own minds, then why should we find our factual

experience of "mind-endowed individuals" more intelligible than that
of non-mental particulars, or of "mind-inaugurated agency" more in-
telligible than that of non-mental causes?[11]

The difficulty that this objection poses is readily met   As Cicero
noted (*Egomet mihi proximus sum*) and Descartes reemphasized, we
are experientially closer to our own selves.   A philosophy that re-
spects the standpoint of empiricism in emphasizing the primacy of
experience clearly does well to begin here with our own selves,
with the mental processes that are the stuff and substance of our
thought-life

VII

The most common objection to idealism in general centers on
the issue of the mind-independence of the real   "Surely," runs the
objection, "things in nature would remain substantially unchanged
if there were no minds.   Had intelligent creatures never evolved on
the earth, its mountains and valleys would nevertheless be much as
they are, and the sun and moon remain substantially unaffected "
This contention is perfectly plausible in one aspect, namely, the
causal one—which is just why causal idealism has its problems
But it is certainly not true *conceptually,* for the objector must face
the question of specifying *just exactly what* it is that would remain
the same.   "Surely roses would smell just as sweet in a mind-de-
nuded world!"   Well   . yes and no   Agreed the absence of minds
would not *change* roses.   But rose-fragrance and sweetness—and
even the size and shape of roses—are features whose character
hinges on such mind-invoking operations as smelling, scanning,
measuring, and the like   For something really to be a rose it must,
unavoidably, have various capacities to evoke mental responses   It
must admit of identification, specification, classification, and prop-
erty attribution, and these, by their very nature, are all mental op-
erations.   The situation is substantially the same with respect to
those "objects" we call the *sun* and the *moon*   To be sure, the role

---

[11] Leon Pompa, "[Review of] *Conceptual Idealism*," *The Philosophical
Quarterly* 25 (1975). 85–7, see p. 87

of mind is here *hypothetical*   ("*If* certain interactions with duly
constituted observers take place, *then* certain outcomes will be
noted ")   But the fact remains that nothing could be discriminated
or characterized as a definite particular "object" in a context where
the prospect of performing suitable mental operations is not pre-
supposed   Even in projecting a (hypothetically) mindless world we
still make reference to the mental when we characterize a situation
in mind-involving terms—in depicting things, for example, in terms
of how minds would respond in interacting with them   And so a
conceptual idealism remains in order

On conceptual idealism's telling, there is something indelibly
anthropomorphic (man-patterned) or, more accurately, *noomorphic*
(mind-patterned), in the way in which we think about the world
Against this view, someone may urge the objection that, "Surely,
this does not show anything about the world itself, but rather about
us."   However, this objection loses sight of the fact that there is no
clean and sharp separation between reality and the domain of
thought, because our only possible route to cognitive contact with
"the real world" is through the mediation of our conceptions about
it, so that, for us, "the world" is inevitably "the world as we conceive
of it."   And in consequence, *how* we conceive of the world (namely,
in noomorphic terms) has to be seen as a fact not just about us, but
about "the world" as well.

To be sure, all that our specifically *conceptual* idealism shows—
and all that it is by its very nature in a position to show—is that
reality as we standardly conceive of it is conceived of by us in mind-
involving terms of reference.   It is a doctrine regarding our *con-
ception* of reality rather than one about the *constitution* of reality
per se, about its descriptive rather than substantive makeup

The conceptual idealism envisioned here is accordingly not a
transcendental thesis about how matters must stand in general and
in abstract.   It does not maintain that *any* possible way of conceiving
nature must proceed in mind-invoking terms of reference (difficult
though it is for us to imagine how things could be otherwise)   Its
mission, rather, is to discern and characterize the role of mind-
invocation operative in the *standard* conceptual framework that we
in fact use to recognize and interpret our experience

Conceptual idealism is not a doctrine about any and every *pos-
sible* conception of reality, but only one regarding what has here

been characterized as "our standard conception of reality." Its strictures need not and will not apply to other possible conceptions of the real   Specifically, it does not apply to a contingent regularity view of the world that dispenses both with laws (and thus lawful processes) and with the disposition-demarcated particulars to whose conception lawfulness is indispensable. And while it is not easy to conceive in detail what such a kaleidoscopic reality that dispenses both with particulars and with laws would be like, nevertheless, that does not render it impossible   All this must be conceded

Is this concession damaging? Does it mean that conceptual idealism, with its focus in the ideational mechanisms in whose terms "we standardly think" of the real, really has no more than a sociological significance? The answer is clearly negative   For while how we *act* is simply a reflection of sociological matters, how we *think* of things is, clearly, an issue of deeper and more far-reaching ontological ramifications. There is, ultimately, no way of limiting the consequences of "how we think of things" to appertain merely and wholly to facts about *us* rather than facts about *them.*

Still, must not a genuine idealism ask for more? Must it not argue transcendentally that every possible conceptual scheme for exploiting experience to form a picture of objective reality must be mind-involving? Can it rest content with what is so *standardly* rather than *inevitably?* As one critic has objected:

> Rescher tries to handle the problem by an appeal   to   the standard conceptual framework   But   the real and unavoidable problem is to determine the conditions of the possibility of *any* conceptual framework whatsoever [12]

A splendid Kantian ambition, this—but very much misguided. We surely cannot use the mechanism of our conceptual scheme to project from within the confines of that very conceptual scheme what the essential lineaments of other, different conceptual schemes must of necessity be. No state of science, no genre of art, no style of life or framework of thought can possibly manage to encompass all the rest. This sort of necessitarian thought-imperialism is just not in the cards   Our own cognitive position cannot at one and the same

---

[12] Robert E Innes, "[Review of] *Conceptual Idealism," Foundations of Language* 14 (1976) 287-95, see p 294

time be—as it must—just one position among others while *encom-passing* them by embracing their essential features   A state of knowledge or doctrinal position can never find the grail of self-transcendence; it can never transmute itself into being more than something that has been presumed to be just one particular alternative among others.   The envisioned quest for a self-transcendingly transcendental basis of "conditions under which alone conceptualization is possible" must accordingly be seen as a futile endeavor destined to failure from the very outset   (Why the implications of this fact are, for us, innocuous and in fact something positive rather than skeptically nihilistic will have to remain the object of discussion for another day [13])

     That standard concept-scheme of ours has to be taken at face value   No doubt, it is, in theory, simply one alternative among others, without any inevitable foothold in the very structure of human intellect   No doubt, its status is the product of natural and cultural evolution.   Let all this be as it may   Still, *for us* the fact remains that this scheme is what we have and is all that we have.   What matters in the end is that *this* alternative is *our* alternative   Our intellectual dependence on it is as absolute as our physical dependence on the air we breathe   For us there are no options.   If this is "mere contingency" we have to make the most of it

<div align="center">VIII</div>

     As long as one is prepared to draw the Kantian distinction between *actual* reality as such (reality as characterized descriptively by the *real* truth) and our putative or *empirical* reality, reality-as-we-think-of-it (reality as characterized by the presumptive truth of our *opinions* about it), then the present conceptualistic perspective has a useful and informative role to play   In particular, it precludes our embarking on the hopeless task of discussing "things in themselves" as a peculiar and mysterious *sort* of objects   They do not exist as a separate category that imposes on us the trouble of a

---

[13] The issue is treated in Nicholas Rescher, *The Strife of Systems* (Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985)

separate consideration. To be sure, we *can* ask "What can be said (appropriately and warrantedly) about the realm of existing things as we know it when we adopt the self-denying ordinance of abstaining from using any of the terms associated with the sorts of concepts we have characterized as mind-invoking. individuality, experientially accessible properties, causality, spatiotemporal features, and so on?" This is a meaningful question that demands an answer   And the answer is that we can say precious little   We can—perhaps even must—presume *that* there is existence in such a domain, but we cannot say *what* it is like   With all of our standard descriptive categories in abeyance, we are pretty well rendered mute with respect to the characterization of this realm—once we have presumed its existence and its existential essentiality to our familiar world. We are, in sum, in just about the position that Kant is in with respect to the thing-in-itself

The point, of course, is not what we can do for Kant, but what Kant can do for us, namely, provide us with a conception essential to formulating a sensible idealistic approach   For as Kant stressed, the reflexive "I think" is able everywhere to accompany our representations. We know full well that whatever information we have about the world's arrangements is information that has come to us through the workings of the mind—that our knowledge of the world's facts is inevitably and invariably mediated by mental operations In the final analysis we cannot avoid altogether facing the implication of the fact that, in our case, this mediation proceeds via concepts which, while inevitably mind-supplied, are also *de facto* implicitly mind-referring.

But is an idealism worth having if, like our *conceptual* idealism, its endorsement does not preclude one's being a causal materialist? The answer here depends very much on one's standard of what counts as worthwhile   If antimaterialism is one's prime standard of philosophical acceptability, then, clearly, such an idealism is not worth bothering about   But if one is sympathetic to idealism in its traditional sense of stressing the primacy of mind in the larger scheme of things, then conceptual idealism's emphasis on the centrality of mind is something one can regard as both illuminating and acceptable

In sum, then, conceptual idealism as here understood maintains the mind-involving nature of the concept-scheme we standardly em-

ploy in the characterization of physical reality.   But its stress is on the hermeneutic rather than the causal role of mind   Its claim is staked not to the transcendental mind-involvement of every possible concept-scheme for characterizing the real, but to the *de facto* mind-involvement of our *standard* scheme   Its necessities are not categorical but conditional, geared to how things have to be relative to and conditional upon certain basic *de facto* givens.   It is the mundane realities of our ordinary concepts that this mode of idealism addresses, and not the ethereal region of necessary and inescapable "conditions under which alone."   And this circumstance is something which, though deserving of remark, requires no apology.   To quote Cicero once more, *Ridiculum est quaerere quod habere no possumus* [14]

The University of Pittsburgh

---

[14] "It is absurd to ask for what we simply cannot have "

PLATO'S LINE REVISITED THE PEDAGOGY OF COMPLETE REFLECTION

ROBERT E. WOOD

T HE PLATONIC DIALOGUES are not treatises in disguise. They are protreptic and proleptic instruments, positioning the reader dispositionally and providing hints for the work of completing the direction of thought by attending to "the things themselves," the phenomena to which human beings, properly attuned, have native access   Plato, I would contend, is a protophenomenologist whose dialogues yield significant coherent results when approached from that point of view.

In this paper, I will focus on the center of one dialogue, the Line of Knowledge in the middle of the *Republic*. It contains a set of assertions or "poetic proclamations" and is embedded in a context of what seem to be even more arbitrary assertions concerning the Good as the object of philosophic study. Paul Shorey goes so far as to say that they belong "to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics "[1] Properly understood (and, of course, that means understood in the way this paper will attempt to clarify), the Line allows us to cash in on the proclamations   It is a pedagogical device that not only invites reflection, but that leads us to a connected sequence of ever more comprehensive levels of reflection, culminating in what the medievals called a *reditio completa subiecti in seipso*,[2] an anticipatory catching up with the fundamental orientation of human being as directed toward the whole, an orientation that is completely hidden in Socrates' purged city. Everything is contained within such complete reflection, including an awareness of the initial situation where one is not aware of the fundamental orientation of human existence. The Line lays out the eidetic field of

---

[1] Paul Shorey, *The Republic* (Cambridge, Mass · Harvard University Press, 1969), vol 2, p 104, note c

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q 84, a 6

conscious human operation and discerns its fundamental teleology. It contains the art of the *periagōgē*, the turning around of the soul.[3]

I

Let us begin by laying out the relevant preliminary assertions

Well, then," I said, "say that the sun is the offspring of the good, I mean—an offspring the good begot in a proportion with itself as the good is in the intelligible region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so the sun is in the visible region with respect to sight and what is seen

Say that what provides the truth to things known and gives the power to one who knows is the idea of the good   And as the cause of the knowledge and truth, you can understand it to be a thing known, but, as fair as these two are—knowledge and truth—if you believe that it is something different from them and still fairer than they, your belief will be right

I suppose you'll say the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with generation, growth, and nourishment although it itself isn't generation

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power [4]

What Socrates provides us with here is a set of initially poetic proclamations, visionary pronouncements to which we may or may not respond favorably, depending upon the character of our basic disposition, our fundamental attunement to this poetic word   But Socrates is a philosopher, and for a philosopher (to employ a later expression) *quod gratis assertur, gratis negatur*, "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied "   Socrates the philosopher-pedagogue ought to lead us to ground such assertions and thus test their claims   It will be my contention that this is precisely what he attempts to do with the development of the Line of Knowledge The Line is an introductory delineation of the fundamental structures of the field of experience as a hierarchy of ever more encompassing reflections, culminating in the *reditio completa subiecti in*

---

[3] *Republic* VI, 518c   Henceforth reference to this work will be made only by book and line numbers   All translations are from *The Republic of Plato*, trans Allan Bloom (New York Basic Books, 1968)
[4] VI, 508c–509c

seipso, the complete return of the subject to itself   The structure
of this field in its hierarchical character provides the grounds for
testing the character of all poetic proclamations in terms of how
adequately they do justice to that field

Let us first of all list the various claims involved in the citations
above and then indicate their basis as that is brought to light in the
course of our exposition of the Line:

1 The Sun is created by the Good as an analogy of itself
2. The Good provides truth (*alētheia*) to things known and the
   power (to know) to the knower
3 The Good is fairer than knowledge and truth.
4 Existence (*einai*) and being (*ousia*) are in things because of
   the Good.
5. The Good is beyond being (*epekeina tēs ousias*)

Socrates' task is to ground these assertions

II

Let us first attend to the initial delineation of the space of So-
crates' inquiry by backing up in the text of the *Republic*   Socrates
introduced the notion of the Good when he attempted to show what
a philosopher is and what the object of philosophic study is   He
initially approached the two questions together by saying that, in
contrast to the lovers of beautiful things that had been cultivated
in the preceding books, the philosopher is a lover of the vision of
Beauty Itself.[5]   Hence we have an anticipatory drawing of the Line
When Socrates goes further and designates the study of the Good
as the object of philosophic inquiry, he further articulates the space
carved out by drawing a line between beautiful things and Beauty
Itself according to the following parallel

Figure 1

---

[5] V, 476b–c, VI, 508c

That space is further articulated by the actual Line—and here begins
the grounding of all these assertions.   Socrates says, "Take a line
cut in two unequal segments, one for the class that is seen, the other
for the class that is intellected—and go on and cut each segment in
the same proportion."[6]   So, draw a vertical line, AE (see Fig 2).
Divide the line into four equal units (numbering the divisions and
ends 1-5) and, assuming the proportion of 3 to 1, put the first cut
(C) at the top of the first unit (1-2) from the bottom, so that we have
a bottom segment (AC) of one and a top segment (CE) of three
units—an example of the unequal segmentation with which Socrates
asks us to begin   To secure the required proportionate segmentation
of the two segments, begin with the bottom (AC).   Divide it into
four equal subunits and cut the line in turn after the first unit (AB)
from the bottom of that segment, giving us another 3 to 1 ratio.
The bottom subunit (AB) is then ¼ of the original unit, making the
next division (BC) ¾.   Considering the lıne from the bottom, we
have a ¼ subunit (AB) followed by a ¾ subunit (BC).

Figure 2

Next, consıder the line (CE) above the first original unit: it is
composed of three original units, 2-3, 3-4 and 4-5   To divide it by

------

[6] V, 509d.

a ratio of 3 to 1, divide the three original units by 4, yielding .75 or ¾ as the sub-unit for this whole section (CE)   Draw a line (D) at the top of the bottom unit of CE.   That gives us three subunits of ¾ or a total of 2.25 for DE.   The four segments in order, then, from bottom to top are .25, .75, .75 and 2.25   What is pertinent to see is that the two central segments are thus equal

Let us try again, using a nine-unit line (again, AE) divided by a 2 to 1 ratio (see Fig. 3)   The first division (AC) will then be between the third and fourth units, leaving six units for CE and three for AC.   The bottom segment of three units will divide into segments of two (BC) and one (AB) units.   The six-unit top (CE) will divide, according to the chosen 2 to 1 ratio, into segments of four (DE) and two (CD) units   So we have our four segments, reading from bottom to top, as 1 (AB), 2 (BC), 2 (CD) and 4 (DE)   Again, the central segments are equal.

Figure 3

One could make several other attempts at it, continuing the process of geometrical induction.   What emerges is that the line Plato asks us to construct, once we reflect upon it, shows itself as an instance of a geometric theorem: Any line, divided by any given proportion and subdivided by the same proportion, will yield four segments so related that the two central segments are always equal. (Incidentally, we could make a similar observation about each of our examples: Any line, of a given length, divided by the chosen ratios, will always yield the same subdivisions as we indicated in each example.)   Now "any" and "always" seem extreme claims   We really have what Plato calls in the *Meno alēthē doxa*, or "manifest

appearance," direct insight into universal relations, as distinguished from *orthē doxa*, or "correct appearance," on the one hand and false opinion on the other   *Orthē doxa*, from the point of view of the one holding it without insight, only "happens" to be correct—perhaps he memorized the answer without any insight whatsoever, like a tape recorder   In both cases, one must ultimately go further, "tethering" or "chaining down" the *doxa* by reasoning to and from the axioms of (Euclidean) geometry [7]   One proceeds to demonstrate what induction has suggested, thus grounding the unrestricted generality referred to by the suspect terms "any" and "always"[8]   These considerations initially fill in for us what Plato means by the *noēta*, or the intelligibles.

The peculiar relations between the various segments of the visible line led us first to a mode of reflection which we term "geometrical induction."   The suggestions of unrestricted generality pointed further to "geometrical deduction" or demonstration in the strict sense of the term   Reflection in both cases terminated in rendering explicit what was only implicit in the visibility of the proportionally drawn line   But it is important to see that the very character of the visible invited reflection upon the universal relations it exhibited.

III

The proximate reason why the line was introduced (to lead us to understanding something of the Good on analogy with the Sun) leads us further still to a third level of even more encompassing reflection, rendering explicit a more comprehensive level of what is implicit in our mode of access to the visible   Through metaphoric (poetic) reflection, Plato employs the line further as a device for indicating more encompassing types of reflection by arbitrarily letting its four segments represent the nonarbitrary relations involved in what the line itself represents literally and nonarbitrarily (When referring to the line in this its symbolic employment, we will henceforth capitalize it)   Socrates lets the bottom two segments together represent the visible (*horaton*) or the changing realm of

---

[7] *Meno* 98a

[8] For a proof, see Jacob Klein, *Commentary on Plato's* Meno (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 119, n 27

particulars and their relations, while the top two segments represent the intelligible (*noēton*) or the changeless realm of universal relations.[9]

Let us contrast now the character of the visible as such and the *noēta* to which the visible led us by giving rise to reflection. Here we are not dealing with the particular visible line, but with visibility as such—indeed, ultimately with the "as such" as such, with universality   The lines we drew according to prescription could have been, in principle, of any length   And any particular length chosen could be replicated any number of times and in many different places This is so because the line illustrates a principle, the authentic *noēton*, object of *noēsis*, translated into Latin as *intellectus*, from *intuslegere*, to "read within" the sensible its intelligibility [10] Any of these lines likewise illustrates visibility or the visible as such. Any visible object is a particular thing, appearing under the limitations of a biologically conditioned perception, at a particular region in space and at a particular moment of time. Again, it came into being at a particular moment of time and will pass out of being   Finally, it only approaches the absolutely exact character of the metric relations it represents, since the character of our instruments for drawing it are exact only relative to our purposes

By contrast, the intelligible relations, though they came into and will eventually pass out of my awareness, nonetheless present themselves as independent of my or any individual awareness, having an unalterable character in themselves   Even if no one ever thought of them and even if everyone were to forget them once they are thought of, the relations would still hold. They would do so because, contrasted with the visible relations, the intelligible relations stand beyond the here-and-now of this particular line as present in this particular act of awareness: they apply to space and time as a whole and for any intellect in principle because they are transspatial, trans-temporal, and thus trans-subjective   Plato calls the region of intelligible relations the realm of *ousia*, of essence or being.[11] An object in this realm is an *eidos* or *idea*,[12] literally something seen, but only in "the mind's eye " Now, by contrast, Socrates

---

[9] VI, 509d, cf VII, 524c
[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c 11
[11] VI, 509b
[12] VI, 507d and 511c

presents the realm of *genesis*,[13] which can be spoken of as a synthesis of being and non-being (*on* and *mē on*).[14] The being of this realm is the presence of intelligible form; its non-being is its temporality, caught in the flow from the no-longer to the not-yet, and its spatiality, caught in the otherness of one visible instance to another of an intelligible relation.

Taken now symbolically, the Line divides into two parts at C, so that AC represents the visible and CE the intelligible   Socrates thus returns to the earlier opening of the field of inquiry as the region of the intelligible governed by the Good and the region of the visible governed by the Sun   The visible is divided literally into visible things and their images or shadows [15]   (We will see that this too has a metaphoric usage, giving rise to a double metaphor or a metaphor reflected back upon itself.)   The first level of the intelligible is said to represent mathematics, while the second represents Forms   Reflection upon the visible line led us into mathematics by geometrical induction and pointed further to the possibility of deduction, placing us at the third level.   But the aim of that reflection is to lead us to meta-reflection upon the contrasting characteristics of the visible and the intelligible   When we see that, we are no longer in the geometrical realm, but already in the meta-realm of those forms that constitute the framework of geometry, and indeed of human experience as such.   So we are following the movement from the third (CD) to the fourth (DE) level of the Line now taken figuratively.   So taken, the line folds back upon itself like a sardine can.   The literal line, reflected upon geometrically, leads us to the third level of the Line taken metaphorically; and reflection upon the framework of geometry leads us to the fourth metaphoric level or philosophy as examination of the frameworks presupposed in all our dealings.

We might add here that the equality of the middle segments may also have a metaphoric point, as suggested by *Timaeus*: the intelligibility of physical things lies in mathematical relations.[16]

But let us look at the whole context more closely.   We are not concerned here simply with the differing ontological status of geo-

---

[13] VI, 525b
[14] *Sophist* 237a
[15] VI, 510a
[16] *Timaeus* 53ff

Figure 4

metrical objects and their empirical instantiations   We are ulti-
mately, within the overall context of the *Republic*, concerned with
the good life, with what justice itself might be, with whether justice
is better than injustice, and with the final Good   We are concerned
with the fundaments of human existence   At this point we can link
the original metaphoric triplet, comparing the Good with the Sun,
to the Line.   Hence there is a twofold division of the Line   a hor-
izontal division and a vertical division (see Fig 4)   The horizontal
division represents the two great ontological regions of the visible
and the intelligible   The vertical division represents the division
between states of mind (*pathēmata*) and types of objects [17]   The two
represent the visible-intelligible relation and the subject-object re-
lation respectively, and together they represent the fundamental
structure of the field of human experience   Hence there is another
type of reflection called for here   What we have carried on thus

---

[17] VI, 511d.

far might be called "object reflection," with its three strata of in-
duction, deduction, and meta-reflection upon the contrasting char-
acteristics of the objects involved in the move from the given visible
line to geometry   The further type of reflection might be termed,
by contrast, "subject reflection," or reflection upon various mental
acts correlated with differing object-types   Socrates lists the var-
ious mental states that ground the four levels of appearance of ob-
jects as (from bottom to top) *eikasia* correlated with images and
shadows, *pistis* correlated with things, *dianoia* with mathematics
and *noēsis* with Forms [18]   The voyage of discovery here is a voyage
of self-discovery—though not in any subjectivistic sense   It is the
discovery of the structure of the human subject as subject of aware-
ness, which comes to its own fuller self-awareness as it uncovers
ever more encompassing regions of objects and reflects further upon
itself as the locus of the manifestness of those regions

Apprehension of the immanent form of vision and of intellection
leads us to grasp the distinction and relation between seeing and
intellection as immanent in, and transcendent of, the here-and-now
respectively   Our human mode of being present to the here-and-
now sensorially given is simultaneously a transcendence of the here-
and-now of our own bodiliness by being present to the overarching
intelligibility that situates the sensorially given within the whole
of what is and that thereby allows us to attend to the sensorially
given as what it is.   The play of this fourfold constitutes the un-
alterable frame of human existence and is implicit in all our wakeful
life, underpinning both the ordinary life-world and the various
realms of scientific endeavor.   Plato provides a fundamental phe-
nomenological inventory of the basic framework of the field of ex-
perience.   It is an initial opening up of a field for reflective explo-
ration in its fuller complexity, but it sets up fundamental distinc-
tions that are not theoretical in the modern sense of tentative, but
are theoretical in the ancient sense of directly intuitable and invari-
antly given

Socrates does not directly fill in the fourth level of the Line
except by indicating that it is the region of operation of *noēsis* whose
vehicle is dialectic [19]   He also has precious little to say about dialectic

---

[18] VI, 511d
[19] VI, 511b

except that it starts from the assumptions of the other sciences and moves toward their ultimate presuppositions;[20] it grasps the reason for being of each thing (*ton logon tēs ousias*);[21] and it involves an overview (*synopsis*) of relations between various regions.[22] But when we reflect upon what Socrates has been doing throughout the dialogue, we are able to anchor these three rather bald assertions in actual procedure.

Socrates began the dialogue with an examination of common opinions on the nature of justice (giving what is due, giving benefits to allies and harm to enemies, and obeying the laws which are made, in the self-interest of the stronger)[23] Dialectic here consisted in placing each of these definitions in a broader context to see how they worked in that expanded framework.[24] It consisted further in showing that what a given definition excluded was presupposed in its own operation (the self-interest of the crime syndicate boss required that he be fair to those who worked for him as partners in crime).[25] It also consisted in making explicit what was implicit in the interlocutor's understanding of the proffered definition.[26] Broader contextualization, explicitation, and self-inclusion are all ways of rendering more comprehensive the context within which understanding occurs, thus permitting intelligent criticism of any claim Now that is just what the Line is calculated to achieve to establish the basic, all-encompassing context out of which human beings necessarily operate, but which for the most part remains only implicit in what they do and which, when rendered explicit, shows that what they do often contradicts the basic structures involved in that context The Line awakens *noēsis* to a reflective explicitation of its own eidetic features and leads it to discover its own immanent teleology The fourth level is at least partially filled in by grasping the eidetic features presented in the Line The Line

---

[20] VI, 511b

[21] VII, 534b

[22] VII, 537c

[23] I, 331e–354c

[24] For example, the context of the criteria for determining real friends and enemies (I, 334c), real benefit and harm (I, 339d)

[25] I, 351c

[26] For example, that what is due is not something which harms the one to whom it is *prima facie* due (I, 332b)

as drawn exists in the cave of the visible, the Line's exposition re-
peated without a grasp of its necessity exists in the cave of opin-
ion; the Line itself as understood in its necessity exists at its own
fourth level

It is, however, also important to note that, when Socrates re-
capitulates the Line at the end of his exposition of the levels of
education in explaining the parable of the Cave, he speaks only of
the states of mind along with the great regions of *ousia* and *genesis.*
About the particular regions of objects he is silent, claiming that
that would involve us in too long an exposition.[27] I suggest this is
so because the exposition of the objects is the history of *philo-sophia*
itself, the enduring quest for the manifestness of the whole to which
we are directed by the ever manifest but usually only implicitly
given character of our own immanent structure. The object of our
natural quest is manifest as a whole and will always remain so
manifest "only to God."[28] The irremovable, ever enduring character
of the field of awareness sets the conditions for dialogical life.

IV

Plato has Socrates carry further the two forms of reflection we
have called object-reflection and subject-reflection. On the object
side, Socrates reflects upon the grounds for the possibility of geo-
metric knowledge which proceeds "downwards" from the relative
fewness of axioms to the increasing plurality of theorems demon-
strated in terms of their coherence within the geometric network
generated by deduction and perhaps also suggested by induction
Now we are asked to focus, not upon the presupposed framework of
geometry, but upon geometry's internal mode of procedure   So-
crates has us consider the possibility of moving in the other logical
direction, "upwards" from the relatively few, but still multiple,
principles of geometry, toward an even more basic region of prin-
ciples.[29] A concept gathers individuals and classes of things together
into an intelligible unity; a geometrical system gathers a region of
classes together into a deductive unity, reflection upon the frame-

---

[27] VI, 537e
[28] *Apology* 23a
[29] VI, 510b-c, cf 525d

work of experience laid out in the Line unifies the field of experience
But all these forms of unity, gathered together in ever more simple
principles, point towards that which is simply one   Elsewhere Plato
calls it the One [30]   If it were known, one might deduce all intelli-
gibility from it, and not only the quantitative aspects considered in
(Euclidean) geometry.   Geometry itself results from a search for
the mirroring of the One in the many, for that high type of unity
compatible with multiplicity which we call intelligible coherence.
"In the light of" the One which is not directly known but to which
nous aspires, we come to understand anything that we understand,
for understanding in general, whether in the life-world or in the
various sciences, is the grasping of coherence in what might oth-
erwise appear as a meaningless plurality

Keeping in mind the level of reflection that moved from de-
scribing the contrasting features of the visible and the intelligible
to laying bare the structural features of awareness, namely, seeing
and understanding, what is at stake in the upward movement to the
One is an aspiration toward a unification, not simply of the world
of objects, but of the total field of operation of the subject-object
relation.   The notion of the One as intelligible light is thus not the
notion of another intelligible object, it is rather the notion of the
ground of the subject-object relation in its all-encompassing char-
acter   Hence it is "beyond *ousia*" (claim 5 from above), though it
is at the same time also designated as *tou ontos phanotaton*, the
brightest region of being [31]   The Good, Socrates says, provides man-
ifestness (*alētheia*) to things and enables the mind to be the locus
of that manifestness, of the uncovering of the intelligible-visible
relation implicit in all things encountered (claim 2) because the Good
is for all things the source of existence (*to einai*)—that they are at
all—and essence (*ousia*) (claim 4)—what or how they are   The
ground of mind and things is a common ground that lets things lie
open to mind, that makes it such that mind is no stranger to things
and things to mind, as if the mind were observing some foreign
region where it had no real place   Observation is part of the same

---

[30] VI, 524d

[31] VI, 518c.   *Ousia* is thus best translated as "essence" since *on* (neuter
participial form of *to einai*, "to be") is used here as a generic term covering
ousia and the Good (*agathon*)   The correlate to essence is intellect (*nous*),
while the correlate to *agathon* is *erōs*

system as the observed. Mind and things belong together, they are grounded in their mutual referentiality which neither of them establishes on its own. According to the old adage of Parmenides, which began Western metaphysics, "Thought and being are one."[32] The One/Good is neither subject nor object, but the ground of their relation of manifestness, their *alētheia,* their truth, by being the ground of their being. The One/Good is ground of the play of the fourfold of vision and object of vision, of intelligible and power of understanding. It is indeed truth in this originary sense of *alētheia* to which Heidegger repeatedly called attention. *Alētheia* is that which makes possible truth in the secondary, derived sense of *orthotēs,* or correctness of propositions, by which we come to correspond intellectually to the lineaments of what is.[33] Thought that moves in the direction of the ground of objective truth involves even more comprehensive reflection than reflection upon the fourfold framework of human experience, since it surmounts that framework to attend to the ground of the possibility of the comprehensive region of intelligible manifestness

The question "Why?" leads first to an indication of empirical regularities in the visible realm, then to an indication of motives in the realm of everyday human relations   Pressed further under the impetus of a purely theoretical interest, it leads to demonstration in terms of fundamental principles in a given region, and further still into the conditions for the possibility of that region, both ontological and epistemological, both on the object and on the subject side   Ultimately one is led to the ultimate Why   Why are things such as to be manifest? The One/Good is the putative answer, but the term indicates a direction rather than a direct seeing, for what is that which is neither subject nor object? Socrates refers to the seeing of the Good as "my dream"[34] and elsewhere in the dialogue says that a dream, whether in sleep or in wakeful life, is an image of reality taken as reality [35] Elsewhere he says: "Let us not create darkness at noon by attempting to stare at the sun   Let us rather contemplate it in its images "[36] The Good as the sun of the intel-

---

[32] G S Kirk and J E Raven, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1966), frag 3 (344), p 269

[33] Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," *Martin Heidegger Basic Writings,* ed D Krell (New York Harper and Row, 1971), 117ff

[34] VII, 517b

[35] V, 476d

[36] *Laws* X, 897d

ligible world is only indirectly apprehensible in terms of the whole hierarchy of "images" which it illuminates by making understanding possible

Here we are at the limits of inquiry   What are we to do with such an ultimate nonobject?   Perhaps we must learn not to do, something with it, but to allow the power of its ultimacy to take hold of us, to learn to sense the strangeness of that ultimate oth-, erness that makes everything strange by prying us loose from the self-evidence of everydayness and the temptation to settle into re- gional satisfactions   But we are still not at an end of our exposition, of the Line

<div align="center">V</div>

Book VII of the *Republic* introduces us to the allegory of the Cave as our own image and as an image of our education   We are, says Socrates, like men chained from birth in a deep cave so we cannot turn our heads around   All we ever saw were shadows on a wall projected by a set of puppets manipulated by puppeteers be- hind whom is enkindled a great fire   One of the prisoners was un- chained, turned around and then dragged out of the cave where he gradually got accustomed to seeing the originals after which the puppets had been modeled and the sun which shines upon those originals   He then went back to the cave to attempt to persuade the incredulous prisoners [37]

By the time we are finished with Socrates' explication of the meaning of the parable, the bottom two levels of the Line have un- dergone a metaphorical shift   Earlier Socrates had designated the objects on the bottom two levels as visible things (the second level from the bottom) and their images or reflections or shadows (the bottom level)   The corresponding states of mind are *pistis*, or trust, and *eikasia*, or image-thinking, which were earlier simply labeled and not discussed   In discussing the Cave, Socrates indicates that that to which we are initially chained are not literally shadows or images but things like "images of justice in the lawcourts"[38]—the very things with which the dialogue began   "Images" in this sense are the socially conditioned interpretations, the stereotypical

---

[37] VII, 514a–517a
[38] VI, 493a

judgments that constitute what "they say " Their range extends
to the whole of our ordinary experience, to the life-world which is
always the world of culture in the broadest sense of the term. It
is the world of a people as a kind of second womb without which we
cannot grow up mentally, but from which we should eventually be
"born again " And the most fundamental aspect of our enchainment
is the realm of judgments about value and final reality

In his rehearsal of the levels of the Line at the end of his dis-
cussion of the Cave, the lower two levels are now levels of *doxa*, not
simply levels of seeing but of judging.[39] *Doxa*, I suggest, is not
simply a matter of free-floating opinions but modes of presence
Things appear in function of how they are taken up in judgments

Then why the focus on the visible if judgments are what is
involved here in the Cave? The Sun as the principle of the visible
rules this realm metaphorically because vision is our primary sense
As Augustine noted, visual metaphors govern all our cognitive vo-
cabulary "See" how this food tastes, how this cloth feels, how this
flute sounds, how this perfume smells—and not smell how this looks
or listen to how this smells or hear how this feels [40] The Sun is
now taken to stand for the principle of sense-perceptibility as the
proximate criterion of reality ("Unless I see for myself. . . "). And
as far as value is concerned, the proximate principle is, indeed, the
sensorially gratifying: food, drink, sex, relaxation, and the like. The
chaining to common opinions tends to be at the same time a chaining
to the sense-perceptible and the sensorially gratifying as the criteria
of reality and value respectively. Neither of these work as ultimate
criteria because the sensa need to be taken up into interpretation
and the-sensorially gratifying needs to be made coherent with the
whole of our lives, especially with that dimension of our lives given
to the interpretation of the place of the sensa in the whole—that is,

---

[39] VI, 534a, cf 476d on *doxa* as belonging to the lover of beautiful
things   At 534a *epistēmē* takes the place of *noēsis* on the earlier list of
levels of the Line (511e)   *Noēsis* is then assigned the generic place cor-
responding to *ousia*. (Cf the terms in parentheses in Fig 4) Both *dianoia*
as operative in mathematics and *epistēmē* involve eidetic intuition (*noēsis*)
into rational structures, but *epistēmē* transcends the "hypotheses" of
mathematics (511b) to stand upon (*epi-stēmē*) the firmer ground of the
framework presupposed by mathematics

[40] Augustine, *Confessions* (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University
Press, 1977), X, 54

both have to be seen in the light of the Good/One which grounds our distinctively human life

The second level of the Line, the level of *pistis* or trust, has to do with the reliability of both the empirical world and the repetitive behavioral forms of the community that constitute the factual adjustments of people to each other and to the natural environment, the regularities of which impose themselves upon us and demand and permit our adjustment

So there is a further step   Just when we thought we had performed the ultimate comprehensive reflection on the most basic and thus the most comprehensive theme, we are led to consider further that that to which the mind is referred in the mode of manifestness is not just the intelligible region, it is the Whole   The Good, Socrates says, is the *archē tou pantos*, the principle of the whole.[41] It is *epekeina tēs ousias*, not only in the sense of transcending the subject-object relation, but also in the sense that it grounds the relation between the realm of *ousia*, of changeless eidetic principles, and the realm of *genesis*, of becoming

Hence aspiration toward the Good does not only lead us, by a first series of acts of abstractive reflection, out of the Cave of culturally supported and/or privately sustained opinions and proclamations, it also leads us back, by a set of acts of recuperative, concrete reflection, into the Cave of everydayness as part of the whole.[42] The *reditio completa subiecti in seipso*, the complete return of the subject into itself, is not the involution of an abstractive intellect, but the return of the mind, mediated by the body, to the concrete presence of things in the visible world   The Good, Socrates says, creates for itself an image of itself in the visible (claim 1), namely, the sun which is the source not only of visibility but of becoming itself.   The *alētheia* of the whole is not simply the manifestness of intelligible relations, of *ousia* as essence; it is the manifestness of the play between the visible and the intelligible   In fact that is why we were able, in attending to the relations on the visible line, to move to the intelligible theorem which it instantiated   The return to the Cave involves the understanding that the Beyond is already

---

[41] VI, 511b

[42] Cf Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago Regnery, 1960), vol I, pp 95–126 and 260

Here in the intelligible depths carved out through and beyond the sensory surface by a process of reflection of an increasingly more comprehensive nature. To that reflection the pedagogy of the Line has led us. Its visible relations invite reflection and indicate that the visible "is" the image of the intelligible

The visible line, reflected upon literally, leads us to the intelligible theorem which it embodies. Reflected upon metaphorically, it folds back upon its own third level, that of *ta mathēmata*. This third level, in turn, understood as involving the interplay of the fourfold of the subject-states (*pathēmata*) of *dianoia* and *aisthēsis* on the one hand and their co-given visible and intelligible objects on the other, folds back upon its own fourth level, that of *noēsis* and its eidetic objects (here the *eidoi* of the interplay of the fourfold) Reflected upon in terms of the ground of the whole field of manifestness (*alētheia*), this subject-object interplay points to the Good as the final encompassment of the whole region of manifestness as the Whole   As such, the Line could be viewed as a circle that curves back from the "height" of the Good to the "depth" of the lowest level (sunk in the Cave of biology and culture) now not simply dwelt-in unreflectively but understood in its fuller cosmic context

VI

The initial *periagōgē*, the turning about of the soul, involves a turning away from secondhand opinions which may or may not be *orthai doxai*, or correct but indirect showings of what-is, attending, as we did, to clear relational features on the surface of things in order to arrive at *alēthai doxai*, or manifest and thus direct insights into rational possibilities. But the point of that turning is to move us beyond culturally induced and personally sustained values and claims to ultimate reality that affect our whole sense of being, in order to bring us out of the Cave of *doxa* and into the realm of ever more comprehensive reflection upon the rational constitution that underpins our life-world. Hence it is that Socrates speaks of a turning around of the "whole" soul, a "conversion."[43]   The employ-

---

[43] VI, 518c

ment of geometry is a device to bring us to the more comprehensive reflection that corresponds to the fundamental desire of the whole soul as geometry does not

This brings us to the real animating principle of the Platonic vision, the fundamental ground of that kind of manifestness that draws the soul upward and inward. the link between *erōs* and beauty, for *erōs* is the ground of the soul. Natural desire sets everything else in motion What everything human is, as Socrates reports Diotima's teaching in the *Symposium*, is the desire of the mortal for the immortal, the drive of living process, destined to die, for that which endures Brought to the level of an awareness aimed at the whole of being, *erōs* in us seeks identity with the undying whole. As object of *erōs*, the whole is manifest in its beauty.[44]

The *Republic* subtly nourishes the sense of beauty in its ascent from the first city dedicated to health up to the introduction of the philosopher-king and thus of the notion of the Good The luxurious city emerges out of the healthy city through Glaucon's desire for luxuries [45] Luxury is a surplus that testifies to a distinctively human need, the need for beauty. Luxury is, however, a confusion of the character of that need, locating it more in the sensory thrills that beauty provokes rather than in the character of beauty itself Hence the purged city focuses its education upon the appreciation of beautiful "things," turning the soul about from its tendency to wallow in fine feelings Glaucon is again the interlocutor, and not the more stolid Adeimantus, when Socrates turns from a consideration of the civic exemplarity of the referents of poetry to its pure aesthetic features, its meters, accompanying melodic forms and instrumental timbres [46] But even this initial conversion is insufficient to satisfy the true direction of the desire Socrates is nourishing. He introduces the philosopher, in contrast to those who love beautiful things, as one who loves the vision of Beauty Itself in which beautiful things share. Beauty Itself is no mere concept it is the real presence in beautiful things of an encompassing Presence, evoking a sense of the whole of what is [47] Beauty Itself appears in the *Republic* as occupying the region whose high point is the Good. Beyond essence

[44] *Symposium* 206b–212c
[45] II, 372c
[46] II, 398a
[47] *Phaedrus* 250d

and our knowledge thereof, "the Good is fairer than knowledge and truth" (claim 3). I would suggest that Beauty Itself is the radiance of the Good, the splendor of its manifestness [48]   The perception thereof is an index of the degree to which we have come to dwell in the Good and not simply to think, speak, and argue about it. It is only when we reach a sense of that more absorbing, encompassing aesthetic sensibility manifest in its first anticipatory instance in erotic experience that we can enter into the inward dynamism and felt texture of the Platonic ascent   In the *Phaedrus* Socrates says that, of all the Forms, Beauty alone has this privilege, that it is visible to the eyes, and that this is the basis for its intoxicating effect upon us. In Beauty the gap or separation between the abstract universality of the concept and the perceptible singularity of the individual is healed as vision and desire become one   The *reditio completa subiecti in seipso* to which the Line is calculated to lead us is not *completa* until it becomes identical with the desire for the whole of being that constitutes the ground of human nature.

In book VII Plato introduces the quadrivium overtly as a means for turning the soul through mathematics from becoming to being.[49] In the process of doing so, he initially omits stereometry to go on to astronomy. But then he backtracks we cannot study solids in motion until we study solids. What we are lacking is the "depth dimension," and we must make every effort to find one who can teach that dimension. After that strange admonition, Socrates tells Glaucon that he must now choose between the good of the city and the good of the soul.[50]   I have suggested elsewhere that Plato is engaged here in a series of symbolic moves to help us solve the central structural riddle of the dialogue, which is one with the riddle of human existence, that is, the delayed transition from what appeared to be "the height of the argument" at the end of book IV (445c) to the declining forms of order in book VIII   What was missing at the end of book IV, which wholly subordinated the soul to the city, was the dimension of the depth of the soul, its fundamental *erōs* which, in its relation to the overarching Good, essentially transcends the city [51]   Socrates goes on in book VII to add harmonics to

[48] Plotinus, *Enneads* VI, 9
[49] VII, 521c
[50] VII, 527e
[51] See Robert E Wood, "Image, Structure, and Content On a Passage in Plato's *Republic,*" *Review of Metaphysics* 40, no. 3 (March, 1987) 495–514.

astronomy, claiming that for this we need a new principle, no longer one of seeing but one of hearing.[52]   Following the suggestion of a symbolic reading, this brings to mind the "musical and loving nature" required for philosophy in the *Phaedrus* [53]   It also recalls the Seventh Letter where philosophy is enkindled as a spark that leaps from one person to another in philosophical conversation [54]   Hearing (not reading) the word, and thus essential relation to the presence of another human being, coupled with the rhythmic sensitivity of *mousikē* by which order and harmony sink deeply into the soul,[55] together bring us to the dispositional state wherein alone philosophy can free itself from contentiousness and partiality and install us completely in a lived fashion into the overarching order of the cosmos which is never wholly manifest but to which we can learn to be wholistically attuned.

There is another aspect of the real presence of Beauty in the visible. It is not only there in the harmonic proportions that lead us into mathematics and beyond. It is there in a special way in the look of the human other   The eyes of the other are not simply measurable mechanisms. They are, in the words of the *Phaedrus*, "the windows of the soul,"[56] the real presence in the visible of the locus of the manifestation of the Beyond, desire for the Encompassing, mediated, and thus supported and/or hindered by culture and choice   Not only hearing the words of this other, but the real, living presence of the dialogical partner, is the vehicle of Platonic ascent, the source of the spark that leaps from soul to soul in conversation about the Ultimate

The evoking of the sensibility to which we have referred can also be the result of another mode of reflection, one employed by the poets, the reflection that leads to the construction of images capable of speaking to the erotic center of the soul   A completed reflection learns this sensitivity to the power of images and thereby understands, in a more than abstract way, the passionate life of the soul. Plato understood this life in a more profound and concrete way than perhaps any other philosopher. He employed that understanding to construct images, parables, and myths of great power

---

[52] VII, 530d
[53] *Phaedrus* 248d
[54] *Seventh Letter* 341d
[55] III, 401d
[56] *Phaedrus* 255c

Figure 5 *Reditio Completa Subiecti in Seipso*

The *Republic* itself ends in book X, after having begun by relegating
the poets to the lowest fringe of reality,[57] with the construction of
just such a powerful myth.[58] In this way he concretely makes the
case for poetry, and indeed for all the arts, the door to which he had
left open by calling for the case to be made[59] (See Fig 5 for
a summary of the levels of expansive reflection we have pre-
sented here)

---

[57] X, 597e.
[58] X, 614a
[59] X, 607d

In the Line itself Plato has constructed a pedagogical device of marvelous complexity and extraordinary power   It leads us beyond "Plato's opinions" to the most fundamental insights available in the field of experience   It lays out the whole panoply of types of evidence to which we have always to recur in carrying out our constructive explorations of the whole.   The exposition of the whole set of these types of evidence in their togetherness provides the fundamental inventory of things that have to be explained and of the tools we must employ in our attempted explanations   It sets the fundamental direction of human existence   It teaches us how to return from our relative self-absence in the culturally mediated world of sensa to our most fundamental selfhood in order to participate in that world more intelligently and more appreciatively

University of Dallas

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICAN LAW I
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE[1]

ANDREW J. RECK

I

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IS DISTINGUISHED from other periods of his-
tory by two major characteristics. 1) the widespread belief that it
was superior morally and intellectually to all those periods which
preceded it, and 2) the conviction that human faculties, reason or
moral sense, are primarily responsible for this achievement. The
Enlightenment was marked, furthermore, by radical change in the
organization of society and by rapid progress in the applications of
scientific technology to the production of goods and services   Since
political and ecclesiastical authorities were challenged during the
Enlightenment, revolutions, both democratic and industrial, have
been its fruit   Inherited traditions and established institutions were
often overthrown or overhauled in order to release the human ener-
gies, ideas, and values which promoted the erection of new insti-
tutions.

The distinctiveness of the Enlightenment has often been shown
by contrast with the enveloping darkness fostered by political and
ecclesiastical tyrannies established in earlier periods.   Yet intel-
lectual historians have long been cognizant of the continuities in
thought and purpose between the Enlightenment and earlier periods
in Western civilization[2]   Nevertheless, the Enlightenment eroded
the credibility of existing institutions grounded in past tradition

---

[2] See Carl L Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Phi-
losophers* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1932)

and consequently undermined their stability and persistence.   In
this sense it may well be impossible to show that there was an En-
lightenment in America, or, to be more precise, in British America
The institutions which the Enlightenment assaulted were, after all,
left back in Old Europe, as the colonists settled a continent untram-
meled by those pernicious principles which had shackled the human
intellect and initiative elsewhere   Here no *ancien regime* prevailed
This is not to deny that the American colonial mind was affected
by many of the older, discarded principles, and that in some striking
cases leaders in the colonies sought to mold American practice and
experience in the antiquated ways.   No one can today read the ser-
mons of Jonathan Edwards, a contemporary of Benjamin Franklin,
without becoming sensitive to the continuance of an old-fashioned
religion and theology reconstructed on these shores against a more
enlightened and liberal philosophy   Yet in employing elements of
the Enlightenment philosophy of John Locke, Edwards was the
founder of a movement ironically labelled "the new lights " Of
course Jonathan Edwards was dismissed by his congregation, and
it is tempting to construe this dismissal as perhaps a sign of the
triumph of the Enlightenment in America.

The Enlightenment, however, should be understood not as much
in terms of contrast with what it stood against, but in its own terms
of human progress and capability.   Its impact on American thought
and culture has been well traced by Henry F May in his book, *The
Enlightenment in America*   According to May, prerequisite to un-
derstanding the Enlightenment in America is a grasp of the contours
of the Enlightenment in Europe, which he claims is divisible into
four categories   First is the Moderate (or Rational) Enlightenment
It "preached balance, order and religious compromise and was dom-
inant in England from the time of Newton and Locke until about
the middle of the eighteenth century."   Second is the Skeptical En-
lightenment   It developed in Britain and especially in France
around 1750.   Voltaire was its master, and wit its method, although
its systematic formulations may be found in Hume's epistemology
and Holbach's materialism   Third is the Revolutionary Enlight-
enment.   Beginning in Rousseau, it culminated in Paine and Godwin.
It stresses "the belief in the possibility of constructing a new heaven
and earth out of the destruction of the old."   Finally there is the
category which may be called the Didactic Enlightenment.   Opposed
both to skepticism and revolution, it was chiefly centered in Scotland,

represented mainly by Scottish commonsensism   In reaction to the
terrors of the French Revolution, it sought "to save from what it
saw as the debacle of the Enlightenment the intelligible universe,
clear and certain moral judgments, and progress "[3]

May's taxonomy of the European Enlightenment informs and
structures his illuminating inquiry into American intellectual his-
tory, providing principles of organization and interpretation for well-
known and lesser-known clergymen, politicians, and writers on the
American scene   However rigid his categorization of the Enlight-
enment may seem when scholars deal directly with the writings and
meanings he has audaciously assembled, classified, and analyzed, it
nonetheless proves useful in furnishing methods of coping with the
voluminous materials of American intellectual history.

More pertinently, May locates a set of concepts—reason, skep-
ticism, revolution, common sense—which are directive as we seek
an understanding of the most fundamental documents of American
law· the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill
of Rights   Especially influential in the creation of these documents
and the institutions they engendered are the categories of the En-
lightenment May designated "rational" and "revolutionary " I
should stress, however, that in dealing with the agents, actions, and
processes of history, the neat intellectual distinctions of scholars
are disfigured in mixture.   An idea from an earlier period may prove
fruitful in a later period, but in connection with other ideas and
events unimaginable to the original thinker, and which affect its
import   Within the whirl of ideas and events, nonetheless, the
meanings and values are discernibly focalized in documents   The
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights
are such documents   They are too important for philosophical
scholars to leave to historians, political scientists, and lawyers.
They incorporate the principles, bedrock and shifting sands, upon
which our society rests, and are fundamental to the construction of
the coming world civilization in which the community of nations is
presently engaged.   In my judgment these documents are the
crowning achievements of the Enlightenment in the sphere of pol-
itics and law, and what I intend to demonstrate is that within
them the best elements of Enlightenment thought and values are

---

[3] Henry F May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York Oxford
University Press, 1976), xvi

contained   In making this claim, I also intend to maintain that the greatest figures of the Enlightenment in America were not clergymen, nor literary and philosophical authors, but the statesmen whom we call the Founding Fathers   In the present paper I will devote my attention to the Declaration of Independence, and in subsequent papers to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

II

No one, not even Thomas Jefferson, claimed originality of thought or expression for the Declaration of Independence   John Adams carped in 1822 that there was not an idea in it "but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years before," and Richard Henry Lee charged that it had been copied from Locke.   Replying to Adams, Jefferson wrote "I know only that I turned to neither book nor pamphlet while writing it.   I did not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer no sentiments which had ever been expressed before " And in 1825, Jefferson again disclaimed any intention to be original to Lee, stressing that his aim had been:

> Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, nor merely to say things which have never been said before, but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent   Neither aiming at originality of principles or sentiments, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind .   All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, in printed essays, or the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc [4]

Jefferson's sources in the history of thought are numerous.   His intellectual heroes were three Enlightenment thinkers Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Isaac Newton   Jefferson was a voracious reader, and scholars have produced impressive accounts of his intellectual origins and development.[5]   In regard to the composition of the Declaration of Independence there is disagreement as to which

---

[4] Quoted in Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (New York Vintage Books, 1958), 24–6
[5] See *The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Gilbert Chinard (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1925), *The Literary Bible*

philosopher most influenced Jefferson. In a classic study the historian Carl Becker has unqualifiedly asserted that in regard to the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration, "Jefferson copied Locke and Locke quoted Hooker "[6] The philosophical scholar Morton White, who first contended that Jefferson's later references to the moral sense signified his abandonment of the moral rationalism in the Declaration of Independence,[7] a moral rationalism manifest in Jefferson's affirmation of self-evident truths, has himself reinstated the interpretation of "self-evident" in its Lockean meaning, although he now contends that the Swiss legal philosopher Jean Jacques Burlamaqui exerted equal if not greater influence on Jefferson's thought [8] On the other hand, the historian-journalist Gary Wills has argued that "self-evident" in the sense of John Locke or Thomas Reid will not suffice to establish the moral and political presuppositions Jefferson proclaims, so that he has located the major influence on Jefferson in the moral-sense doctrine of Francis Hutcheson.[9]

Locke, Hutcheson, and Burlamaqui differ in regard to moral epistemology, Locke stressing reason (the head) at one extreme and Hutcheson stressing moral sense or sentiment (the heart) at the other   They also disagree with regard to the balance between individual rights and the general good   Nevertheless, they contributed immensely to the evolution of natural law doctrine into a natural rights philosophy, and profoundly influenced the ideology of the American revolution.

John Locke, a staunch rationalist in moral epistemology, focused on individual rights   His *Second Treatise of Government* is a firm testament of the natural law philosophy on behalf of natural rights,

of Thomas Jefferson His Commonplace Book of Philosophers and Poets, ed Gilbert Chinard (Baltimore· The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), Adrienne Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York Columbia University Press, 1943), and Andrew J Reck, "Heart and Head The Mind of Thomas Jefferson," *Doctrine and Experience Essays in American Philosophy*, ed Vincent G Potter (New York Fordham University Press, 1988), 22–47

[6] Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, 79

[7] Morton White, *Science and Sentiment in America* (New York Oxford University Press, 1972), 55–70

[8] White, *The Philosophy of the American Revolution* (New York Oxford University Press, 1978)   See my review of this book in *Review of Metaphysics* 32 (1979) 572–3.

[9] Gary Wills, *Inventing America Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (New York. Doubleday, 1978)   See my review of this book in *Review of Metaphysics* 32 (1979) 573–4

with emphases on the right to private property, on limited, consti-
tutional government based on consent embodied in a social contract,
and on the right of the people to revolt and to establish new gov-
ernment in order to secure their lives, liberties, and estates—all
summed up in one word, "property "[10]

Francis Hutcheson is best known as an exponent of the moral
sense theory. He wrote "The word moral goodness denotes an idea
of some quality, apprehended in actions, which procures approbation
and love toward the actor from those who receive no advantage by
the action "[11] Yet he is counted as the first to formulate in the
English language the utilitarian standard for the evaluation of hu-
man action—in his own words, "that action is best which accom-
plishes the greatest happiness of the greatest number "[12] Thus
Adam Smith, who replaced moral sense with moral sympathy, which
he also equated with conscience, could claim for Hutcheson "the
merit of being the first who distinguished, with any degree of pre-
cision, in what respect all moral distinctions may be said to arise
from reason, and in what respect they are founded upon immediate
sense and feeling "[13] In the framework of this moral epistemology,
Hutcheson pertinently defined the basic notion of right as the power
"to direct our own actions either for the public or innocent private
good before we have submitted them to the direction of others."[14]
His full definition of right places it squarely within the context of
society where the general good is held as its test. Hutcheson wrote

> Whenever it appear to us that a faculty of doing, demanding, or pos-
> sessing anything, universally allowed in certain circumstances, would
> in the whole tend to the general good, we say that any person in such
> circumstances has a right to do, possess, or demand that thing And
> according as this tendency to the public good is greater or less, the
> right in question is greater or less [15]

---

[10] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed Peter Laslet (Cam-
bridge Cambridge University Press, 1960), 341   See Andrew J Reck,
"Natural Law in American Revolutionary Thought," *Review of Metaphysics*
30 (1977) 691-7
[11] Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue* (1725), in *Collected Works* (George Olms facsimile reprint,
Hildesheim, 1971), vol I, p 101.
[12] Ibid , 164
[13] Adam Smith, *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, 7, iii, 2, quoted in
Wills, *Inventing America*, 199
[14] Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, 257
[15] Ibid , 256 .

Whereas in Locke's text we may perceive the shift of focus from natural law to natural rights, in Hutcheson's pages we may discern the employment of a standard of utility—the public good—to ascertain whether a right is perfect or not   A right to do, possess, or demand a given thing essential to the general good is defined by Hutcheson as a perfect right.   It should be universally allowed. Rights to life and liberty are perfect rights, and they may be defended with private force even against governments when necessary

Furthermore, the natural right of liberty, illustrative of Hutcheson's theory of perfect natural rights, underscores the freedom of the individual to live as he chooses as long as he does not harm others   Hutcheson's theory marks a break with the tradition of classical republicanism which portrayed man as essentially a political animal whose essence can be realized only within the polis. By contrast, Hutcheson's conception heralds a modern republicanism which presents man with the freedom of choice to devote all his energies to political participation or to cultivate other activities conducive to his happiness so long as they are not inimical to the interests of others

Hutcheson wrote·

> As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own happiness and many tender affections toward others in some nearer relations of life, and granted to each one some understanding and active powers, with a natural right to exercise them for the purpose of these natural affections, it is plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, according to his own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all such industry, labor, or amusements as not hurtful to others in their persons or goods, while no more public interests necessarily require his labor or require that his actions should be under the direction of others   This right we call natural liberty [16]

In Hutcheson's account, property, placed first in Locke's theory of rights to indicate the absolute autonomy of the individual, is reduced to an imperfect right subject to social regulation

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui published his *Principles du Droit Natural* in 1747   Translated into English in 1752, it became the standard textbook in the field.   Holding that the ultimate end for man is happiness, he defined Right in general as "whatever reason

---

[16] Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1755), in *Collected Works*, vol 5, p 294

approves as a sure and concise means of acquiring happiness "[17] He
distinguished natural law from human (or positive, man-made) law,
contending that it is the standard for the latter   Irenic in method,
he allowed that natural law, from which natural human rights de-
rive, may be known by moral sense as well as by reason, and that
its sources reside in God's commands, in human nature, and in so-
ciety. Burlamaqui did not find these various claims inconsistent.
Rather, they seemed to him to comprehend the multifaceted con-
dition of individuals in relation to each other and to God in their
pursuit of happiness.

III

While these philosophers constituted the intellectual back-
ground for Jefferson's composition of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, they had also exerted considerable influence on the thinking
that was expressed in the voluminous pamphlet literature published
by both the patriots and the loyalists during the American revolu-
tionary period. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, enacted June
12, 1776, was also in the background at the time the Declaration was
composed. Jefferson knew this material, having indeed made con-
tributions to it   Hence there existed in 1776 a climate of opinion
upon which Jefferson drew and on the basis of which he could rightly
claim that the Declaration of Independence is "an expression of the
American mind "[18]

As a literary composition the Declaration of Independence is
divisible into four parts. The first is the opening paragraph, which
articulates the purpose of the document. The second part, presented
in the second paragraph, professes a general theory of rights and
of government. The third part, constituting half the entire Dec-
laration, enunciates the specific charges against the British monarch,
it adumbrates a particular theory of the British Empire held by the
patriots at the time of independence. The fourth part, concluding
the document, declares independence

---

[17] J. J Burlamaqui, *The Principles of Natural and Political Law* (Oxford
and London W Green, 1817), vol 1, pt 1, ch 5, #10, p 31   See Andrew
J Reck, "Natural Law in American Revolutionary Thought," 698–701

[18] See Andrew J Reck, "The Declaration of Independence as an
'Expression of the American Mind'," *Revue internationale de philosophie*
121–2 (1977) 401–37.

Enlightenment features are conspicuous throughout the Declaration. Its rhetoric is that of reasonable men addressing reasonable men. In logical form it is a compound practical syllogism, or practical *sorites* It contains an argument the first part of which articulates a general theory which specifies the conditions for radical action, and the second part of which details the particular facts which are the conditions that entail the radical action It assumes that the general theory is accepted by reasonable men. Since the facts were certain to be disputed, however, they are presented in crisp detail, and, further, are embraced under a specific theory of the British government which is left unstated, perhaps because, despite its acceptance by the patriots and their foreign friends, it was controversial elsewhere in the British Empire. The rhetoric, moreover, is redolent with phrases drawn from Enlightenment authors such as John Locke and Francis Hutcheson. These authors, too, were known and appreciated not only by the American patriots and their allies but also by the loyalists. In style and substance the Declaration of Independence stands out as a document of Enlightenment thought and political action

IV

The first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence expresses the need for justifying rationally and morally the dissolution of the political union between Great Britain and America The rest of the Declaration is designed to meet that need. In the first paragraph, moreover, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" are invoked. This invocation placed the American cause for independence squarely within the tradition of natural law. Whereas earlier advocates of various degrees of American independence had appealed to their rights as British subjects under the British constitution, still others had resorted to conceptions of fundamental law. In the eighteenth century, natural law, a concept derived from antiquity, became the core of fundamental law The Ciceronian definition of natural law as universal, as "right reason in agreement with nature,"[19] was widely held to be the best formulation of the traditional

---

[19] Cicero, *De republica*, III, xxii, trans C W Keyes (New York. Loeb Classical Library, 1928), 211

conception   While natural law had long been appealed to as the
basis for morality and the standard for the evaluation of positive
laws within individual states, it had become by the eighteenth cen-
tury, through the influence of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufen-
dorf, the basis for international law.   As international law, more-
over, natural law had become highly systematized, articulated in
accord with the criteria of reason as expressed in the mathematical
formulation of Newtonian physics

The conception of natural law was, therefore, entangled in an
ambiguity, connoting at once the physical and the moral   Thus as
early as 1766 Richard Bland, Virginia planter, burgess, and delegate
to the Continental Congress, presented the natural law philosophy
in a pamphlet, *An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies,*
which exploited this ambiguity.[20]   Citing Locke, he presented the
natural law-natural rights philosophy, but went beyond generalities
to attack the organization of the British Empire as contrary to nat-
ural law in both the moral and the physical senses   In the mid-
eighteenth century the British Empire was portrayed as a vast
physical system revolving around the government in London, with
the flow of all commerce and political power from and among the
colonies channeled through London   In a singular analogy borrowed
from Newtonian physics, Bland smashed this image   Considering
"the laws of attraction in natural as well as political philosophy,"
Bland objected to the established mode of organizing the British
Empire on the grounds that "bodies in contact, and cemented by
mutual interests, cohere more strongly than those which are at a
distance, and have no common interests to preserve   But this nat-
ural law is to be destroyed, and the colonies whose real interests
are the same, and therefore ought to be united in the closest com-
munication, are too disjoined, and therefore all intercommunication
between them disbanded "[21]

Bland's criticisms of the organization of the British Empire are
contained in the third part of the Declaration, where particular
charges are raised against the King   His general conception of
natural law in all its ambiguity envelopes the entire document   Still,
as Jefferson proceeded in the most often quoted next part of the

---

[20] See Reck, "Natural Law in American Revolutionary Thought," 704–
5
[21] Richard Bland, *An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies*
(Williamsburg, Va , 1766), 29

Declaration to expound the natural rights doctrine and the theory of government, it is pertinent to recall an observation by Clinton Rossiter "In the political theory of the American Revolution natural law was all but swallowed up in natural rights "[22]

<center>V</center>

Every American schoolboy and schoolgirl ought to know the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence·

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness —That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness [23]

The first clause of this paragraph illustrates the epistemology of self-evident truths, which may be traced to John Locke   Although Locke is best known as an empiricist for his rejection of innate ideas and his theory that all our ideas originate in experience, he defined knowledge as the agreement and disagreement of ideas, and after distinguishing various relations of agreement and disagreement, such as identity, contrariety, and coherence, he further differentiated degrees of knowledge, of which the highest are intuition and demonstration   For Locke, as for Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, the principles of morality and politics are self-evident in the same way mathematical truths are, they are intuitive or axiomatic in the first place in that their truth may be discerned by reason immediately by direct reflection on the meanings of the concepts they articulate, and, further, from these first principles certain demonstrations may be deduced.[24]   Alexander Hamilton shared this moral epistemology with Locke and Jefferson   In *Federalist* 31 he

---

[22] Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic* (New York Harcourt Brace & World, Inc , 1953), 375

[23] *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States* (Washington, D C   Government Printing Office, 1927), 22

[24] See John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk 4, ch 3, #18-20

esteemed the maxims of ethics and politics to be on a par with those
of geometry.   These "certain primary truths, or first principles,"
he wrote, "contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all
reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind.   Where
it produces not this effect it must proceed either from some disorder
in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong
interest, or passion, or prejudice "[25]

Without impugning the necessity and certainty of moral and
political principles, Jefferson's own thinking eventually moved out
of the orbit of Lockean rationalism toward the moral-sense philos-
ophy   Thus in a letter written from Paris on August 10, 1787, Jef-
ferson advised his nephew, Peter Carr, then headed for college, not
to waste his time attending lectures in moral philosophy, since the
rules of our conduct are not a matter of science but spring from our
moral sense   He wrote:

> The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg
> or arm   It is given to all human beings in a greater or less degree
> It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the
> body   This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance
> of reason, but it is a small stock which is required for this, even a less
> one than what we call Common Sense   State a moral case to a
> ploughman and a professor   The former will decide it as well, and
> often better than the latter [26]

The second clause of the second paragraph of the Declaration
is the affirmation of human equality, while the third clause, ex-
pressing the principle of "certain unalienable Rights," refers to these
as man's endowment from his Creator   Let us examine first the
rights, and return later to the principle of equality

The Declaration of Independence grounds human rights in "the
Laws of Nature and the Nature's God "   Basic human rights are
natural rights, embracing existential and moral meanings   They
are transparent to reason or perceived immediately by the moral
sense   Regardless of the actual social conditions of men, natural
rights are unalienable not in the sense that no individual or gov-
ernment can violate them, but in the sense that they are impre-

---

[25] *The Federalist Papers,* ed Clinton Rossiter (New York. New Amer-
ican Library, 1961), 193
[26] *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* eds Julian P Boyd et al (Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1950–82), vol xii, pp 14–15

scriptible human capacities that ought to be exercised. The word
"unalienable" bears primarily a normative import. In the Decla-
ration, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the fundamental
natural rights; they appertain to men as individuals prior to the
institution of government and thereafter as well   All other rights
are presumably derived from the three basic rights

What surprises many students of American thought is that the
phrase "pursuit of Happiness" replaced the term "property," es-
pecially since the right to property, central in the writings of phi-
losophers such as Locke who influenced the American patriots, was
also crucial in the political argumentation leading up to the Amer-
ican Revolution   Contrary to received opinion, however, Locke
taught that Happiness alone "moves desire" and introduced the
phrase "pursuit of our happiness."[27]   Nevertheless, it has been
tempting to suppose that in substituting "happiness" for "property"
the Founding Fathers favored human rights over property rights.
However, it is difficult to maintain that they could have imagined a
man happy who did not enjoy the right to property, although Ben-
jamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson apparently did hold that the
right to property is a civil rather than a natural right in that prop-
erty is subordinate to and definable by the laws established by the
political society in which it exists

Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the three basic rights
which the Declaration of Independence affirms, challenge us to elu-
cidate their meanings and to ascertain the role of government with
regard to them. As we seek to do so, we encounter problems of
vagueness and ambiguity and difficulties of practical application
which perplex and obstruct. Yet these rights, because of their gen-
erality—their "glittering" generality—coupled with their immediate
human appeal, have a permanent relevance to men in society and
under government, inviting us to re-examine them. They reveal,
in large measure, the import of the American Revolution for the
present and the future.

The right to life appears to be a clear natural right, directly
transparent to reflective thought   It allegedly springs from the
instinct of self-preservation which men share with brute animals,

---

[27] Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk 2, ch 47,
#41

although this instinct is so withered in certain individual cases that a correlative right to suicide has sometimes been claimed   Idiosyncrasies aside, however, it is not clear that government ought to guarantee the right to life absolutely   The last paragraph of the Declaration finds the signers pledging, among other precious things, their lives in support of American independence, and this has suggested to one critic that the signers were fundamentally inconsistent in first holding their rights to life to be unalienable and later in pledging their lives [28]   Furthermore, in practice American governments have subordinated the right to life to considerations of public utility in a fashion acceptable to the American patriots   Capital punishment for certain kinds of crime and military service with its individual hazards for the sake of national security relativize the right to life   But in general the demand that government secure the right to life has raised a standard relevant even in those cases where this right has seemingly been subordinated to other considerations   Hence there has been a decline of capital punishment in most liberal societies, as well as a growing suspicion about military action veiled by the mystique of national security

The right to liberty is even more problematic than the right to life.   In the Declaration of Independence and other major American political documents, the term "liberty" is not defined; nor in the Declaration are particular liberties specifically mentioned.   By contrast, in the constitutions and bills of rights of the individual states and of the United States, a list of particular liberties, such as the freedoms of thought, of speech, of press, of worship, of association, and of assembly, is often presented   The meaning of the American concept of liberty may further be researched in the judicial opinions of the federal, state, and local courts   The copious constitutional, statutory, and judicial interpretations of the right to liberty have embraced both negative and positive conceptions   Negatively, liberty has been understood, for example, to signify the freedom of speech and press, free *from* governmental suppression.   Positively, liberty has been affirmed, for example, to imply the right *to* free public education so that men may develop the capacities which enable them, among other things, to enjoy the rights of free speech

[28] R E Selden, *Criticism on the Declaration of Independence as a Literary Document* (New York, 1846), 17, quoted in White, *The Philosophy of the American Revolution*, 209

and press   Indeed, the detailed specification of the rights springing
from natural liberty has been an unending task for legislation, ad-
ministration, and adjudication   It will continue to be such a task
in the future

The right to happiness, already mentioned, has posed serious
questions of meaning and application   The Declaration of Inde-
pendence formulates this right as the right to pursue happiness
In his perceptive book, *Natural Rights*, David Ritchie has wittily
remarked that the right to happiness, so construed, is "quite com-
patible with the right to be left to suffer the effects of one's own
folly, though it might also suggest a right to be protected against
folly, as well as against the willful malice, of other people "[29]   At
least one distinguished American historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Sr , has sought to resolve these questions in a scholarly fashion by
marshalling evidence to support the thesis that in the eighteenth
century the phrase "pursuit of happiness" meant the practice of
happiness just as today when we say that someone is pursuing the
profession of law or medicine, we mean that he is practicing law or
medicine [30]   No scholar, however, has matched Howard Mumford
Jones in unravelling the diverse meanings of the conception of the
pursuit of happiness in American civilization   In his book, *The
Pursuit of Happiness*, Jones distinguishes three leading component
ideas in the eighteenth-century American conception alone·

> The first is the hypothesis that on American equivalents of the Sabine
> farm, gentlemen might find philosophic happiness in a life sufficiently
> remote from the vulgar, yet at decent and dutiful intervals returning
> to public life at their country's call   The second is the theory that
> the virtuous Christian by following both his religious ,and his com-
> mercial (or other) vocation, must become prosperous and happy, since
> to become both is promised to the righteous   The third, cogently
> phrased by Blackstone, is that the law of nature being itself the product
> of divine benevolence, must be the only model for human law, so that
> in proportion as human law mirrors universal reason, citizens obedient
> to its ancient sanctions must secure felicity [31]

Needless to add, the list of conceptions of happiness lengthened
as Howard Mumford Jones traced his theme from the eighteenth

---

[29] David G Ritchie, *Natural Rights* (London George Allen & Unwin,
1894), 272
[30] Arthur M Schlesinger, Sr , "The Lost Meaning of 'The Pursuit of
Happiness'," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 21 (1964) 325-7
[31] Howard Mumford Jones, *The Pursuit of Happiness* (Cambridge,
Mass Harvard University Press, 1953), 105

century through American history, law, judicial decisions, literature, philosophy, and general culture   Writing in the early 1950's, Jones found the latest American meaning of happiness to signify personal adjustment, social and psychological   This meaning persists even today, stressing hedonistic gratification with the added tang of adventurous affluence

The theory of rights proclaimed in the Declaration is not a utilitarian doctrine. Although rights include the pursuit of happiness and their exercise is conducive to happiness, their status transcends their being measured and modified by reference to happiness   They pertain to the very nature of man as created by God, who also created Nature and intended man's happiness, so that their possession and exercise, in conformity with the laws of nature, produce happiness   This theory of natural rights Jeremy Bentham ridiculed as nonsense on stilts, and John Lind, Bentham's disciple, published, perhaps at the behest of the British ministry, *An Answer to the Declaration of Independence*, which appeared in London in 1776. Examining mainly the charges leveled against the King, Lind dismissed the maxims and the theory of government professed in the second paragraph very summarily. Of them, he wrote, "I have taken little or no notice   The truth is, little or none does it deserve " He insisted that they needed to be refuted, not for their merits, but for the evil effects they have had. In brief, he declared that they "put the axe to the root of all government," because in every actual or possible government "some one or other of these rights pretended to be unalienable, is actually alienated "[32]

Clearly, however, the American patriots did not intend to destroy all government   The political creed which proclaims life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as basic natural rights is Lockean to the core   The end of government is to secure these rights. Hence government is conceived as resting on a contract with the governed who render consent to be governed on condition that their natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are secured. This is not to deny that violations occur but to insist that every person ought to dwell in any political state absolutely and snugly safe as regards these fundamental rights   Human beings ought to be vital

---

[32] John Lind, *An Answer to the American Declaration of Independence* (London, 1776), 117, 119, 120, quoted in Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, 229

and free, as Nature and/or God created them   They ought to exercise their powers and capabilities according to their own reason and sentiments to find their own happiness, as long as they do not interfere with others in analogous pursuits.   At its least, government does not interfere, at its best, it is an enabler.

Individual rights in the Declaration are related to a contractarian theory of government.   They are also linked with a fourth right, called "the Right of the People."   This right has two dimensions.   The first and better known dimension of "the Right of the People" consists in the right to resist oppression and to revolt   Unlike the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the right to resist oppression, or the right of revolution, is, in the Declaration of Independence itself, not attributed to the individual man as such.   Rather it is attributed to the people, and so pertains to the individual only so far as he is a member of the people.   It is a right to be exercised conditionally only.   Consequently, there is in the American Revolution no justification whatsoever of anarchy, or of radical cabals which resort immediately to violence.   An individual may of course protest against action by the established government when he regards it to be a violation of natural law and natural rights.   He may exercise his natural liberty to remonstrate with established authorities; failing in this regard, he may go farther in the exercise of his natural liberty—to think, to speak, and to write in protest against the established government   As a single individual, however, he cannot revolt or resist, although he may emigrate.   By natural right, moreover, he may associate with other like-minded individuals who, forming a body, exercise their rights of speech and press to arouse the People.   Such a course of joint-action climaxing in popular resistance and revolution against the British government had, in fact, transpired from 1761 to 1776.   This course was not only successful, it was, according to theory, *right.*

A dimension of the Right of the People more positive than the right of revolution is their right to institute new government in order to secure their basic rights.   Enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, where perhaps it is overshadowed by the basic rights of individuals and the right of the people to revolt, the Right of the People to institute new government is underscored in the so-called Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, summed up with the opening words "We the People "   Historically the exercise of this right preceded the Declaration of Independence   Not

only had individual colonies such as Virginia moved to establish governments under new constitutions prior to the actual fact of American independence, but also the Continental Congress itself in May 1776, on a motion introduced by John Adams, directed the colonies to erect new governments and everywhere to suppress royal authority   In this way resistance against British authority could be pressed, and the revolution could occur without the total collapse of American civil society into a state of nature with all the lawless violence and anarchy that would entail.

In the theory of natural rights expressed in the Declaration Morton White has correctly judged that the American revolutionaries were not utilitarians [33] However, White's claim is grounded on the mistaken view that an intuitionist moral epistemology cannot be utilitarian, despite the fact that the history of ethics contains ideal utilitarians such as Henry Sidgwick and G E Moore   Still there is a conceptual incoherence in holding both that rights are fundamental and that utility is the final standard.   In this conceptual incoherence White perhaps finds the germ of what he called "the ultimate ambiguity of the American revolutionary mind· its failure to come to a single conclusion on the role of government with regard to man's natural rights."[34]   Yet White's insinuation that in an open society not coming to a single conclusion on a fundamental issue once and for all is to be counted as a failure, is of course questionable.   That there is an ultimate ambiguity need not be doubted; indeed, it may be welcomed if it is fruitful   In the furtherance of clarity, however, it might be suggested by reference to John Rawls' work that through the employment of a method akin to the method of reflective equilibrium,[35] the American patriots also formulated two principles   The first stated the natural rights of human beings captured in Rawls' formulation. "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."[36]   But instead of Rawls' second principle, the American patriots resorted to the principle of utility for political arrangements, a principle which they subordinated to the first.

---

[33] White, *The Philosophy of the American Revolution*, 230ff
[34] Ibid , 256
[35] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1971), 46ff
[36] Ibid , 60

VI

The specific theory of the British Empire implicit in the Declaration of Independence is the rationale for the large part of the document which charged the King with tyranny and listed the particular infractions of which he was alleged to be guilty. In all there are nineteen paragraphs of charges against the King One of these paragraphs indicts the King for having conspired with Parliament to infringe the constitutional rights of the colonies in nine specific ways, of which only one, stated in seven words, is "imposing taxes upon us without our consent " In brief, the slogan of "no taxation without representation" had become subordinated to a general claim about the Constitution of the British Empire By 1776 the position of the American patriots had evolved into a conception of the British Empire as a league of states, each with its own Parliament, but all pledging allegiance to a common monarch This theory had been expanded in a pamphlet by James Wilson written during the Stamp Act crisis and published in Philadelphia in 1774 [37] It is also stated in Jefferson's *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* (1774). According to this theory, the British parliament had no authority over the colonies, and in failing to restrain parliament by means of the royal veto the king had permitted and participated in a long line of abuses and usurpations that justified the American revolution.

It is noteworthy, then, that in the implicit conception of the British Empire the American patriots had anticipated by nearly two centuries the idea of an international organization of states under the British monarch, an idea which in the twentieth century was realized as the British Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, one may find the germ of this idea in the Albany Plan of 1754 proposed by Benjamin Franklin According to Franklin's own account of this plan to unite the American colonies for their defense and other general purposes, "the general government was to be administered by a President General appointed and supported by the Crown, and a Grand Council to be chosen by the Representatives of the People

---

[37] James Wilson, *Considerations on the Nature and Authority of the British Parliament* (Philadelphia, 1774)

of the several Colonies met in their respective Assemblies."[38]   Commenting on its fate, Franklin remarked. "The Assemblies [of the colonies] did not adopt it as they all thought there was too much *Prerogative* [royal powers invested in the president general] in it; and in England it was judged to have too much of the *Democratic* [powers invested in the intercolonial legislature]."[39]   Even after the successful American revolution, Franklin expressed regret that his plan of union had not been adopted   In his *Autobiography* he related·

> The different and contrary Reasons of dislike to my Plan, makes me suspect that it was really the true Medium, and I am still of Opinion it would have been happy for both Sides of the Water if it had been adopted   The Colonies so united would have been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves, there would then have been no need of Troops from England, and of course the subsequent Pretense for Taxing America, and the bloody Contest it occasioned, would have been avoided   But such Mistakes are not new, History is full of the Errors of States and Princes.[40]

As regards the unfolding constitutional crisis between the colonies and the motherland, Franklin also recorded Lord Granville's words to him when he appeared in London to represent Pennsylvania in 1757 "You Americans have the wrong Ideas of the Nature of your Constitution; you contend that the King's Instructions to his Governors are not Laws, and think yourselves at Liberty to regard or disregard them at your own Discretion   .   They are [however] so far as relates to you, the *Law of the Land;* for THE KING IS THE LEGISLATOR OF THE COLONIES "[41]   Franklin responded that

> . . this was new Doctrine to me   I had always understood from our Charters, that our Laws were to be made by our Assemblies, to be presented indeed to the King for his Royal Assent, but that being once given the King could not repeal or alter them   And as the Assemblies could not make permanent Laws without his Assent, so neither could he make a Law for them without theirs [42]

Granville informed Franklin that he was mistaken   Although Franklin knew that Parliament had earlier rejected Granville's as-

---

[38] *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin,* ed. R Jackson Wilson (New York The Modern Library, 1981), 164
[39] Ibid , 165
[40] Ibid
[41] Ibid , 213–4
[42] Ibid , 214

sertion of royal prerogative, he ruefully added that while the Americans had originally "ador'd" Commons "as our Friends and Friends of Liberty," "by their Conduct toward us in 1765" (when they passed the Stamp Act and in 1766 when they repealed it and passed the Declaratory Act), "it seem'd that they had refus'd that Point of Sovereignty to the King, only that they might reserve it for themselves "[43]

The implicit theory of the British Empire contained in the Declaration of Independence, therefore, incorporated nearly a generation of thinking about the relations of the colonies to the motherland. In such thinking, diffuse and scattered among events, the American patriots and their allies in Great Britain and the Enlightened world were seeking modes of political organization on large scale which would not lose their republican character. Here they were on their own, the pages of the philosophers being vague. Here then may also be discerned some political novelties of the American revolution

VII

The patriots' conception of the British Empire was naturally denied by the loyalists. Thus the exiled royal governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, in his pamphlet, *Strictures upon the Declaration of the Congress at Philadelphia* (London, 1776), reprinted the text of the Declaration, and endeavored to refute it, especially in its specific charges against the king, almost line by line. Hutchinson rejected the Declaration's claim to justify the dissolution of the political bands tying together two peoples on the grounds that the assumption was mistaken. Rather, there existed from the beginning only one people subject to the same government   Hutchinson also sharply dismissed the natural law/natural rights philosophy proclaimed in the second paragraph of the Declaration   He wrote:

> I should therefore be impertinent, if I attempted to show in what case a *whole people* may be justified in rising up in oppugnations to the powers of government, altering or abolishing them, and substituting, in whole or in part, or in what sense all men are created equal, or how far life, liberty, and the *pursuit of happiness* may be said to be

---

[43] *Autobiography*, 214

unalienable, only I could wish to ask the Delegates of Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas, how their constituents justify the depriving more than a hundred thousand Africans of their rights to liberty, and the *pursuit of happiness*, and in some degree to their lives, if these rights are so absolutely unalienable, nor shall I attempt to confute the absurd notions of government, or to expose the equivocal or inconclusive expressions contained in the Declaration [44]

Ironically Hutchinson's critical stricture on the incompatibility of natural rights and slavery, and his thrust at the delegates of the slave-holding states, would have struck a responsive chord in Jefferson, for the author of the Declaration had attempted to make it an anti-slavery document stronger in final form than it became   In its original draft, Jefferson had included a charge against the king that

> he has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people, who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither   this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of *infidel* powers, is the warfare of the *Christian* King of Great Britain determined to keep open a market where *MEN* should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase the liberty of which *he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom* he has also obtruded them thus paying off former crimes committed against the *liberties* of one people, with crimes he urges them to commit against the *lives* of another [45]

While Hutchinson would, undoubtedly, have denied the factuality of the charge, he would nevertheless have appreciated part of Jefferson's explanation for its exclusion from the final draft of the Declaration   As Jefferson reported in his notes, "the clause too, reprobating the enslaving of the inhabitants of Africa, was struck out in complaisance with th [*sic*] South Carolina & Georgia, who never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it " Hutchinson, who had himself vetoed a bill prohibiting the importation of slaves into Massachusetts, however, would have found scant comfort in Jefferson's

---

[44] Thomas Hutchinson, *Strictures upon the Declaration of the Congress at Philadelphia* (London, 1776), 9–10

[45] Quoted in Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, 180–1

additional reflection: "our Northern brethren also I believe felt a little tender under those censures, for tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others "[46]

Thus it is paradoxical that a slave-holding society should have revolted against an established government in the name of liberty and equality   Any careful examination, however, of Jefferson's observations on the races, as in his *Notes on Virginia*,[47] can only conclude that the author of the Declaration of Independence, along with most of its signers, did not believe literally in the equality of human individuals and races as regards their physical, intellectual, and moral attributes.   Obviously by the proposition of human equality Jefferson meant something quite different from what we have come to think he meant or should have meant   In the original draft of the Declaration, after stating that all men are created equal, he added the now deleted phrase "and from that equal creation " Consequently, a proper interpretation of Jefferson's intent is that all men are created equally and independently, that, regardless of differences in the individuals and in their ethnic natures, they are equal in respect to their having been created by God who, at the moment of creation, gave them rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness   Jefferson repeatedly condemned slavery as an encroachment not upon the equality of blacks but upon their liberty, as in the deleted passage from the first draft of the Declaration quoted above.   Whatever Jefferson may have meant, however, has been transformed in the crucible of American history

VIII

The structure of the logical argument of the Declaration of Independence meets the requirement of the Enlightenment that political action should be reasonable—that is, in accord with rational principles

The second paragraph contains a general theory of government This theory defines the role of government in contractarian terms.

---

[46] Quoted in John H Hazelton, *The Declaration of Independence, its History* (New York Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1906), 171

[47] Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, ed. William Peden (New York Norton, 1972), 138

The end of government is to secure rights that are self-evident. The paragraph, moreover, articulates a hypothetical syllogism to the effect that, if these rights are violated, then the collective right of the people is triggered to overthrow it   Further, it specifies that this collective right can also establish a new government once it has struck down an old government

Subsequent paragraphs establish particular violations of the general theory of government articulated in the second paragraph. These violations trigger the collective right of revolution   However, an enthymeme, the hidden premise of which is the theory of the British Empire the patriots held in 1776, hovers over this part of the argument. The King is alleged to have violated the contract between the Throne and the colonies in sundry ways   Those violations constituted a breach of contract and turned his government into tyranny. In its particulars, this part of the Declaration presents the empirical arguments to demonstrate not only that the contractarian basis of the British Empire which the colonists held had been shattered, but also that the rights espoused in the general theory of man, nature, and government had been violated   Hence the practical conclusion is drawn—declare the independence which exists *de jure,* and enact it *de facto*

The practical conclusion is drawn in the fourth part of the Declaration   It consists of the final two paragraphs which close the document, stating and constituting the act of independence   The Act is undertaken by representatives of the several states in the name and by authority of the People   The representatives, in the last paragraph, pledge to each other their lives, their fortunes, their honor in support of the Declaration.

The political problematic in the Declaration may be highlighted by a juxtaposition of the first and the penultimate paragraphs   The first paragraph affirms dissolving political bands between one people (the American people) and another people (the British people). It also affirms the assumption of one people (the American) to a separate and equal station among the various earthly powers—Great Britain, France, Spain   Such a station is an entitlement by the only international law that prevails—"the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God " The penultimate paragraph identifies the signers as representatives of the United States of America, thirteen of them in 1776, and it is these former colonies which are absolved from allegiance to the British Crown and which henceforth enter the world as "free

and Independent States," with "full Power to Levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which Independent states may of right do." At the same time the signers as representatives of the States professed that they were acting "by Authority of the good People of these Colonies. ."

Within the Declaration, therefore, a polarity between thirteen separate and equal states, on the one hand, and a single People, on the other, is manifest. The dynamic qualities of this polarity reverberated throughout the United States of America from 1776 onwards. While immediately the act of independence marked the end of an era of dependence, it also initiated the beginning of a new era as the history of the American people moved from Revolution to Constitution.

Tulane University

HUSSERL AND THE JAPANESE

DONN WELTON

Freiheit ist ein Ausdruck fur das Vermogen und vor allem fur den erworbenen Habitus kritischer Stellungnahme zu dem, was sich, zunachst reflexionslos, als wahr, als wertvoll, als praktisch seinsollend bewußtseinsmaßig gibt, und zwar als Grundlage fur das daraushin sich vollziehende freie Entscheiden [1]

Der *autonome Mensch* will sich also *diese neue Welt* bauen, und letzlich fordert das eine prinzipielle Kritik und dazu eine letzte Besinnung uber letzte Prinzipien, selbst uber die Prinzipien, die Kritik moglich machen und die andererseits ein wahres Vernunftleben moglich machen [2]

Die Menschheit ist auf ihre Idee wie ein Kunstler auf seine gerichtet Die Idee wird stets bestimmt in der Vollendung [3]

WE CONTINUE TO BE SURPRISED that the only pieces of sustained philosophizing that Husserl published in the 15 years between *Ideas I* (1913)[4] and *Internal Time-Consciousness* (1928)[5] were three articles that appeared in *Kaizo*, a Japanese periodical, in 1923 and 1924.[6]

---

[1] Edmund Husserl, *Aufsatze und Vortrage (1922–1937)*, ed Thomas Nenon and Hans Sepp, Husserliana, Bd 27 (Boston Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 63   Hereafter, citations to this work will be given as "*A V (1922–1937)*"

[2] Ibid., 107.

[3] Ibid , 119

[4] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, Erstes Buch *Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie*, ed Walter Biemel, Husserliana, Bd. 3 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, First Book *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1983)   In all citations where pages of both the German original and the English translation are given, it is the latter that is being quoted

[5] *Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, ed Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, Bd 10 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, newly translated by John Brough (Boston· Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming)

[6] Of the three only the first was published in German and Japanese, the next two appeared only in a Japanese translation and thus were not

We also find well-written drafts of two other articles that were to follow in the series but were never completed and submitted.[7] We are even more intrigued when we realize that in these texts Husserl takes up themes never touched in publications before and not touched again until his very late work   While we know that his manuscripts contain continuous and extensive analyses of the essential forms of social and cultural life and of ethical normativity, the *Kaizo* articles build the only slender bridge actually published on these topics between his attack on "the new *Weltanschauung* philosophy" in his 1911 *Logos* article[8] and the 1934–37 texts surrounding the *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosphy*,[9] slender, indeed, when we think that the articles were published in Japan and that the second and third appeared only in Japanese translation.   Yet our intrigue is coupled with anticipation, for we have long wondered what Husserl would say to the Japanese, a society highly developed and yet not Western, a culture that does not have its beginnings in the Greek conception of science and knowledge and which clearly poses the question of cultural diversity.   And we have wondered how he could define ethical life in this context, how the analysis would proceed, and how the human and social sciences could play a role in the account that he gives.

---

even available in German until Nenon and Sepp's outstanding edition of Husserl's essays and lectures between 1922 and 1937, see *A V (1922–1937)*, 3–43.   Only the first has appeared in English translation as "Renewal Its Problem and Method," trans. Jeffner Allen, in *Husserl Shorter Works*, ed. P. McCormick and F Elliston (Notre Dame. University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 326–31   For the sake of continuity all translations of the *Kaizo* articles in this essay are my own
    [7] See editors' comments in *A V (1922–1937)*, xiv–xv
    [8] "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (1911)," *Aufsatze und Vortrage (1911–1921)*, ed Thomas Nenon and Hans Sepp, Husserliana, Bd 25 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 3–62, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans Quentin Lauer (New York· Harper and Row, 1965), 71–147   This attack is taken up again, but much more indirectly, in the 1931 lecture he gave to three different audiences entitled "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie," *A V (1922–1937)*, 164–81
    [9] See *A V (1922–1937)*, 184–244, see also the editor's introduction to Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, Bd 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), xiiiff., and the translator's introduction to *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans David Carr (Evanston Northwestern University Press, 1970), xivff.

I

What moves these texts beyond earlier formulations, what animates and gives them an urgency not found in previous publications,
is the fact that, written in the wake of the First World War, they
resonate as they respond to the threat of a shattered and broken faith.

It is true, of course, that Husserl's earlier work can be understood as a response to skepticism which, suggestively, grants to it
the reduction of perception to belief in order then to effect a restoration of *doxa*.   His first phenomenological account of truth is
one that not only describes the web of knowledge but also, in ordering
its various strands in terms of relations of dependence and independence and in terms of the various transformations by which some
strands support others, treats the perceptual world in all its relativity as an integral part of this web.   Husserl connects fields of
knowledge to fields of experience and then orders fields of experience
in such a way that they rest upon our ordinary and everyday engagement with things, what he freely calls belief   This initial notion
of belief, then, is not a notion of faith, which would carry us beyond
the pale of what can be naturally known   It is actually a belief in
the world, in the integrity of our everyday perceptual engagement
with the world.   His first writings effect an *epistemological* rehabilitation of belief and it is this that provides him with a reply to
the ever-recurring threat of skepticism.

In the texts before us, however, Husserl understands the loss
of faith not epistemologically but culturally, affecting not so much
the edifice of knowledge as the very city in which that edifice stands
It is his "present full of suffering" that wrenches Husserl out of his
earlier preoccupation with narrower cognitive issues and even out
of his concurrent interest in Fichte's ethical theory [10]   For the first
time he moves from a crisis in thought to a crisis in the entire
domain of European culture.

He writes as if Western culture has been stripped, exposing a
lack of redemptive powers·

> The war, which, since the year 1914, laid waste to [Europe] and, since
> 1918, found in place of military force the "more refined" force of

[10] Three lectures held during the war in 1917 and 1918, published in
Aufsatze und Vortrage (1911-1921), 267-95

> psychological torture and economic need, itself morally depraving, has disclosed the inner lack of truth and the senselessness of this culture [11]

And in two letters from 1920 we read

> What the war disclosed is the unspeakable not only moral and religious but also philosophical poverty of mankind [12]

> This war, the most universal and deepest sinful fall of mankind in all known history, has displayed all the guiding ideas in their impotence and inauthenticity [13]

But we quickly discover that this "sinful fall" is itself reinscribed into rationality   Husserl resists the views of many of his contemporaries for he does not find European culture itself to be an ephemeral if glossy surface beneath which dance the gods who determine our fate   Nor did he find it inherently impotent, a trickling stream lacking sufficient force to turn the heart of a people toward the path of peace and harmony   He is not even willing to view the powers of Western culture as mixed, as containing both wheat and tares, the seeds of both liberating ideals and of destructive impulses   The fall did not really reveal the limits or weaknesses of European culture *per se* but almost its opposite what Husserl ultimately sees in the recent barbarism is "the enchainment of its true, progressive power [*Schwungkraft*]"[14]   The liberating force of this culture was never released   The darkness surrounding us is not itself a power but rather a lack, a privation, an absence.   Correspondingly, the fall was into blindness, into an inability *to see* the generative powers inherent in cultural life

> A nation, a humanity lives and works in the fullness of power when it is borne by a belief, keeping it in motion, in itself and in the meaning, beautiful and good, of its cultural life [15]

> This belief, which lifted us and our fathers and which was delivered to nations, which nations such as the Japanese first embraced in the more recent era of the work of European culture, we ever so many people have lost [16]

It is because of this reinscription that Husserl's notion of faith bespeaks not salvation, as it did for Karl Barth's groundbreaking 1919

---

[11] *A V (1922–1937)*, 3

[12] Letter to William Hocking, quoted in *A V (1922–1937)*, xii

[13] Letter to Winthrop Bell, quoted in *A V (1922–1937)*, xii

[14] *A V (1922–1937)*, 3

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

commentary on the book of Romans,[17] nor revolution, as in Rosa
Luxemburg's work up to her death in 1918,[18] but rather "reform"[19]
or "renewal" making new, but without overturning, what has be-
come old, finding what has been lost, recovering what has been bur-
ied. What has "collapsed," Husserl argues, is not Western culture
but a vision of the potential inherent in Western culture

It is tempting to find in Husserl's comments here and in the
texts surrounding the *Crisis* a straightforward affirmation of the
integrity of Western civilization with its ideals. But what saves
Husserl from a simplistic strategy of counterposing is his argument
that the "formal universal structures"[20] of culture must be set in
contrast to the current state of European civilization,[21] presently in
disarray and itself the object of his own critical analysis His is a
complex analysis, for it recognizes the internal and dynamic rela-
tionship between such structures and the course of human action,
and insists that in this sphere the analysis of norms is necessarily
mediated by an analysis of the forms of such action We must
proceed carefully.

For Husserl, culture is society viewed as an interrelated cluster
of values.

> Animals live under mere instincts, mankind also under norms
> Throughout all the types of acts of consciousness there runs a nor-
> mative consciousness interwoven with them [22]

Culture, then,

> is not [just] a general multiplicity of social activities and achievements,
> coalescing into a general type and fusing into unities of developing
> cultural forms, but rather a unified norm guides all these formations,
> mints for them rules and laws And this norm is alive in the social
> consciousness itself, is itself progressively and historically shaped and
> objectivated as culture   [23]

---

[17] *The Epistle to the Romans*, trans Edwyn Hoskyns (London Oxford
University Press, 1933)

[18] *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed Dick Howard (New
York Monthly Review Press, 1971)

[19] *A V (1922–1937)*, 6

[20] Ibid, 10

[21] Ibid, 111

[22] Ibid, 59 Husserl is convinced that while animals have societies,
they do not have cultures for their actions are not guided by conscious
values, see p 97

[23] Ibid, 63

The notion of culture yields one of the most creative tensions we find in Husserl's writings. The phenomenology of the formal structure of culture will find its center in the analysis of the values and the normative ideal constitutive of a society And if these values and this norm can be rationally justified, we can speak of true culture. Yet culture is a historical, human complex, which means that the existing actions and interactions of a people create the norm that defines its essence It is this dynamic quality that leads Husserl to see values and the social norm as open:

> Should we wait to see if this culture does not become healthy by itself in its accidental interplay of value-productive and value-destructive forces? Should we let "the decline of the Occident" billow over us as a [finished] fact? This fact *exists* only if we act as passive observers [24]
>
> Mankind is directed toward its idea as an artist toward his The idea is continually determined in [the process of] being completed [25]

The very essence of culture involves the struggle by active, free subjects to realize clearly a norm which guides and justifies their actions, yet this norm is found only in those actions that, in turn, "create" it [26]

     This tension cannot be resolved by arguing that human action is human striving, that in its course we can find certain transcendent ideals leading the process, and that among the multiplicity of available ideals we find "the possibility of continuous ethical progress under the guidance of ideals of reason "[27] Husserl cannot simply present this as one among several options from which we can choose at will, for this would undercut its binding, normative status The ideal of an ethical life guided by "a true practical rationality"[28] must itself take on the character of an absolute ethical requirement.[29] Without this, Husserl is convinced, there could be no "rational reform of culture,"[30] no "rational science of human being and human society that would ground rationality in the areas of social and political practice and that would ground rational political technique "[31]

---

[24] *A V (1922–1937)*, 4.
[25] Ibid , 119
[26] Ibid , 4
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid , 6
[29] Ibid , 4
[30] Ibid , 5–6
[31] Ibid

But how are we to move from ethical values as cultural facts to values as binding cultural norms? Or, to cast the issue in terms of the question of phenomenological method, how can Husserl give a phenomenological account of normativity that incorporates the historical development of values into the account without making the mistake of appealing to a particular, factual historical configuration as normative?

II

Husserl approaches his task by taking a step backwards. Before we can speak of cultural life we need to describe the nature of the human spirit in general in a rigorous fashion   At first we find Husserl using familiar contrasts   Phenomenology is not an inductive science that produces, as do physical and biological studies of nature, empirical laws that are only probable. Induction will never yield the essential laws necessary for a grounded and rational account of phenomena in terms of values   Phenomenology is not an empirical human science but rather an "a priori" discipline that treats the individual and society "in pure formal universality "[32]

At this juncture a shift to a deeper level of analysis intervenes, something often found after *Ideas I.* he treats these stark contrasts between fact and essence, the contingent and the a priori, the relative and the absolute, only as a first introduction, almost as a heuristic device, enabling him to "place" his account in opposition to the tradition, before he then reframes the analysis and provides a description of how one effects a *transition* from fact to essence, from the contingent to the a priori, from the relative to the absolute   For the first time in his published writings, Husserl presents something more than an inexplicable *Wesensschau* to account for our apprehension of essences.[33]   He speaks of a twofold process of *Besinnung,*

---

[32] *A V (1922-1937),* 10

[33] Already the Third Book of *Ideas,* written some ten years before but never published, contains the seeds of this new analysis, see *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,* Drittes Buch *Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften,* ed Marly Biemel, Husserliana, Bd 5 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 101ff   The closest Husserl comes to the notion of eidetic variation in his published work before 1922 is found in Part Four of *Ideas I,* see *Ideen I,* 365-6, *Ideas I,* 357-8   But the concept of "ideation," which we can also find in yet earlier works, did serve as a placeholder for what becomes the theory of eidetic variation

of "drafting" the concept under consideration as clearly and precisely as possible,[34] and, then, of "free variation,"[35] even calling it "abstraction,"[36] which discovers an invariant structure throughout the course of changing exemplars, thereby enriching and determining the provisional concept under consideration In this way we turn our attention away from the accidental "empirical content" of the concepts in play to focus on what is general or universal. All empirical and factual differences, all "concrete circumstances of earthly life" become thereby "indeterminate," "freely variable."[37]

This expanded constitutive phenomenology actually incorporates three moments, what we might call "possibilizing," "essentializing," and "normalizing "

Step One "We orient our concept of the a priori on mathematics "[38] Mathematics may "use" empirical bodies or shapes but as it gains insight into mathematical concepts, such things serve as mere examples "In principle the mathematician refrains from any judgment about empirical realities. They count for him only as contingent examples that can be manipulated at will in free phantasy."[39] In fact, purely imaginary examples could serve equally well, for "the thematic sphere of pure mathematical thought is not real nature but possible nature in general "[40] Real objects or complexes, then, are treated not as actual but as *possible* real objects

Step Two Pure phantasy is not interested in "singular possibilities," which result from step one, but in *essential* possibilities, in "the pure 'idea' or 'essence' and 'essential laws' "[41] It thinks not the thing but its condition, such thinking Husserl calls the "intuition of the essence,"[42] which he now explains as the terminal point of the process of variation.

> Through free variation   we are aware of an open infinity of possible bodies   That which is fixed as identical in such variations, in running through and overviewing the open infinity of variations, is fixed in

---

[34] *A V (1922–1937)*, 10
[35] Ibid , 11
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid , 13
[39] Ibid , 14
[40] Ibid
[41] Ibid., 15
[42] Ibid

evidence *as a pervading identity*, as their general 'essence', their 'idea',
    .   their "pure concept"   [43]

Step Three   On the basis of such concepts, general laws or rules
(in mathematics, axioms) are produced.   Rational knowledge is
knowledge "out of principles," "knowledge of realities out of laws
of their pure possibility " Yet the comparison with mathematics
is used not to prescribe the form of explanation that is appropriate
to a science of human culture but rather to describe the kind of
insight that is involved and to substantiate the *contrast* between the
purely factual and the purely conceptual   Depending on the starting
point and what Husserl will begin to call the "interest"[44] under-
girding the study, we can have, as in the case of the natural and
human sciences, different regional analyses with paradigmatically
different models of explanation. "the particular method and the
whole type of the a priori theory must and can be quite different "[45]

To this "epistemic" account of the construction of concepts
Husserl proposes an "ontological" counterpart   The application of
essential laws "to factual reality rests on the fact that each reality
evidentially contains in itself pure possibilities "[46]   Indeed, each
natural complex contains countless possibilities in itself   To this
Husserl adds an even stronger thesis, drawing from his belief that
manifolds achieve unity only in that they approach a *single* limit,
that within a single discursive field "each reality has its pure 'es-
sence' as its rational content, each makes possible and demands its
rational ('exact') knowledge "[47]   In prescribing a rule for the unity
of an endless manifold and "the ideal possibility of its completeness"
within a defined field, the essence simultaneously prescribes a rule
for the "course" of the possible comprehension of that manifold
in ideas [48]

This breakthrough, this introduction of the notion of eidetic
variation, we must hasten to add, does not overturn but rather de-
velops the notion of constitutive phenomenology that Husserl first
proposed in *Ideas I*   Thus it supplements his first articulation of

[43] *A V (1922–1937)*, 15
[44] Ibid , 78
[45] Ibid., 18
[46] Ibid , 16.
[47] Ibid
[48] *Ideen I*, 366–7; *Ideas I*, 357ff

transcendental theory there. Yet its application to questions of culture and ethical norms does make visible certain tensions in that method.

Husserl clearly recognizes that the "starting point" of the process of eidetic variation will produce different ideas and different essential relationships.[49] The same natural complex can be apprehended as physical or lived-body, or as a social or a political unit depending on our point of orientation   The starting point, however, is not itself enclosed by the evidence or the intuition raising the analysis to the level of rigorous science.   It remains a surd, something in excess, necessary for the process but not itself covered by the notion of absolute evidence.   The perspectival nature of Husserl's analysis draws us to a theory of *interests* articulating the context in which a given regional discipline arises.   This stands in tension with Husserl's insistence on the closure and the *absolute* character of his analysis.

There is another aspect of this first difficulty.   Husserl recognizes that the process of variation must be "bound" (*Bindung*)[50] if it is to produce a true "differentiation" of an idea or essence   This means that variation is guided by insight into the essence for which it strives.   But how can we have such insight binding the process of variation *before* the "object" to be seen is produced?   How can insight into the essence guide the process of variation which first produces the essence?   Recourse to something like a notion of adduction is quite plausible, but to the extent that the provisional concepts do not merely enumerate their extensions but are themselves constitutive of the field under consideration, the absolute character of the analysis is rendered uncertain.

Furthermore, culture itself presents special problems for Husserl, for we are dealing with a kind of complexity quite different from that suggested by his standard characterization of appearances   Unlike a perceptual object, culture as a phenomenon is itself self-evolving and changing on the basis of principles internal to what it is in such a way that the theoretical representations of it become part of what appears and what it is.   This suggests that perhaps culture cannot be comprehended by a structural phenomenological analysis based on the correlational model of acts and profiles pre-

---

[49] *A V (1922–1937)*, 17
[50] Ibid., 19.

senting an object, precisely because culture is an intervening field of normalizing praxis that throws both consciousness, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, into a development that cannot be gleaned by a study of their particular correlational features.

Additionally, this first notion of eidetic variation actually excludes the social sciences from Husserl's account for the simple reason that he views them as "empirical" studies and thus as incapable of providing apodictic evidence   Except for psychology,[51] he did not envision the movement beyond empirical inductive studies to possible structural studies that utilize an analogue of his notion of constitution and thereby present phenomenology with analyses that call for incorporation   In place of a path through the social sciences into phenomenological analysis, Husserl gives raw, almost trivial pieces of conceptual analysis.   Applying free variation to human beings, for example, we derive the general idea of a "bodily-soulish being "   He claims that this notion is derived from "the freest variation of all moments capable of variation in the individual humans functioning as examples "[52]   A process of "differentiation" further breaks down the concept into, for example, occupational life, leisure life, and so on.   This process, we are told, works "exactly analogously" to the way the idea of a figure can be used to generate the ideas of closed figure, straight-lined figure, and so forth.   Somehow all of this, without a single anthropological, psychological, or sociological investigation, rests not on "empty word thoughts" but "insightful knowledge of essences "[53]

III

It would be possible, as Husserl did, to construct an ethical theory on the basis of the constitutive phenomenological method we have described thus far.   Roughly put, such an ethics would identify the values exhibited in social acts and actions, categorize them on the basis of their conceptual content, and organize them into an

---

[51] See *Phanomenologische Psychologie* (1925), ed Walter Biemel, Husserliana, Bd 9 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925), trans John Scanlon (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), on the development of "phenomenological psychology "

[52] *A V (1922–1937)*, 19

[53] Ibid

axiological system placing lower in relation to higher, limited in relation to unlimited, and dependent in relation to independent values.[54] But then the problems we have just raised would still come to haunt such a system.

What almost eludes us but then catches us by surprise and places the *Kaizo* articles at the threshold of a new breakthrough for Husserl is the fact that, beginning with the third article, the entire analysis is positioned on a different plane. We know from an important manuscript written in 1921, just one year before he began to compose these essays, that Husserl came to see the transcendental phenomenology of *Ideas I* as a piece of "static" phenomenological method.[55] He explicitly tells us that this method provides the framework of the first two articles and shapes his approach there to the study of cultural values.[56] But what we find in the third article is not a labor of "descriptive" but of "explanatory" phenomenology, not a piece of static but of "genetic" phenomenology, and it is named as such for the first time in Husserl's published writings.[57]

> Let us attempt to develop genetically the ethical form of life as an a priori and essential formation of possible human life, i e , out of the motivation leading for essential reasons to the ethical form of life [58]

Thus Husserl shifts his focus to the "genesis of renewal,"[59] to the question of not only what a human society is, but how its essence can be understood only "through development, through a becoming"[60] This method prevails in the unpublished fourth and fifth *Kaizo* articles as well.

> Thereby we note right away that all of this is not to be understood statically but dynamically and genetically   Strict science is not the

---

[54] For Husserl's earlier work on ethical theory see his *Vorlesungen uber Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908–1914,* ed Ullrich Melle, Husserliana, Bd. 26 (Boston Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988)

[55] The manuscript is published as "Statische und genetische phanomenologische Methode," in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926,* ed Margot Fleischer, Husserliana, Bd 11 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 336–45   The reference to *Ideas I* is on p 345

[56] Note the reference to the transcendental phenomenology of *Ideas I* on p 18 of *A V (1922–1937)*

[57] *A V (1922–1937),* 29   Cf *Passiven Synthesis,* 340

[58] Ibid , 29

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., 44

objective being but the becoming of an ideal objectivity, if it is such only in the process of becoming, then also the idea of true humanity and its method of giving shape to itself is such only in the process of becoming [61]

There is little doubt, then, that the third, fourth, and fifth articles carry out a task first projected in the 1921 manuscript on static and genetic method

> With all of this there is bound up the questions of the sense in which the genesis of a monad can reach into the genesis of another, and in which sense the unity of genesis can lawfully bind a multiplicity of monads on the one hand, there is the question of passive genesis, which, in the case of the constitution of an anthropological (or animalistic) world, points to constitutive physiological processes and the way in which they condition the unity of a physical world with a counterposed lived body, on the other hand, there is active genesis in the form of the motivation of my thinking, valuing, willing through the other   Thus the consideration of the individuality of the monad leads to the question of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, genetically bound with one another [62]

We have already seen that our texts define static analysis in terms of the interrelated processes of *Besinnung* and eidetic variation   Both work on something that they are not, on phenomena from which the ego performing the analysis has been methodically excluded, as it then extracts essential forms.   But a genetic phenomenology of society, which restores the tie between the activity of analysis and history, works on something which it itself is, for it is a process that is part of the human activity and its development submitted to analysis   As social activity it does not just reflectively view the social world but reflexively structures the world it views   What it becomes articulates what it is   To the extent that this activity sets itself in opposition to an existing social state with a view toward other possibilities, a genetic phenomenology of society transforms *Besinnung* into *critique*   Critique is the process of explicating as it itself embodies and exhibits the essential values latent in the actual and possible movement from one cultural complex to another.

The notion of critique combines with a second powerful thesis in these texts   In a move equally surprising, Husserl's application

---

[61] *A V (1922–1937),* 55
[62] *Passiven Synthesis,* 342

of genetic analysis to cultures (1) treats the essential traits of our human existence as "forms of life," (2) finds in one of those forms a "protoform" of ethical life, and (3) discovers in the *transformation* of the protoform to ethical life traits that establish its normative status   This analysis, which moves developmentally, bridges in praxis what *Ideas I* treats antithetically, for here the essence is one of the facts in the process of becoming [63]   The genetic account of ethical life is concerned not so much with a categorization of inter-related values but with the very *process* of *becoming* responsible ethical individuals

We can only briefly touch upon the way in which the notions of critique and of forms of life interlace in his genetic account.   Among the many essential features of human existence, ranging from different kinds of reflective awareness (self-consciousness, self-inspection, and self-evaluation) to reflective action (free action, striving for goals), Husserl isolates and then describes the form of self-regulation   We can overview our current life, both its actualities and possibilities, set goals for ourselves, and bring them under the control of a norm or a value that we have freely set [64]   Such a value takes on the character of a general goal and we feel that without attaining it we will not be satisfied.

Certainly, life-forms based on self-regulation (such as vocational goals) are a step beyond "animal naivety" in that we freely choose and actively follow such goals.   But it is possible to be caught in a second naivety in which a "critique of the goals and the paths we choose to reach them"[65] is missing.   At first, critique may be concerned only with individual cases and may be simply preoccupied with questions of avoiding further pain or maximizing future pleasure   But there is also the possibility that we will reach beyond particular goals and that critique will become part of a general striving for a full and complete life, a life that can order and justify all its activities.[66]   As humans we have the ability to "overview" our whole life, our possible activities, and their consequences   As a result

---

[63] On the opposition between fact and essence see *Ideen I*, 10ff , *Ideas I*, 5ff
[64] *A V (1922–1937)*, 26–7
[65] Ibid , 30
[66] Ibid

> there arises in the progress of individual development not only the
> multiplicity and the complexity of practical projects and the activities
> executing them but also, in increasing measure, the inner lack of cer-
> tainty of the person, the pressing care for authentic and abiding goods,
> for satisfaction that can be secured from all critique and exposure to
> devaluation [67]

Notice also that the notion of critique is *internal* to the very
notion of human life and that it is this which provides the crucial
transition to ethical life.   But in order to reach this transition sev-
eral other conditions must be described, for we are still not at the
level of "ethical man "   Husserl does propose two laws of "formal
pragmatics"[68] which will show that all values are interconnected,
but they are immediately connected to what I will call three laws
of transformation which attempt to present the life-form of ethical
life as normative by accounting for and thus grounding the trans-
formation of self-regulation into ethical life.

1. When multiple values offer themselves but their collective
realization at the same time is impossible, the good of the lesser
values is absorbed by the good of the higher values   This has the
consequence of making the choice of the lesser value "practically
bad" when competing for a higher practical good   Husserl calls
this the "law of absorption "[69]

2 Values chosen and realized are necessarily conjoined to other
values chosen and realized to produce a larger good than any one of
the particular values   Furthermore, this larger good is of "higher
value" than the particular goods contributing to it.   This is the "law
of summation "

3. The realization of particular limited or finite values will not
produce "an enduring satisfaction," for "satisfaction arises not from
particular satisfactions (even though they be pure and related to
true values) but is grounded in the certainty of the largest possible,

---

[67] *A V (1922–1937)*, 31   Notice that Husserl's account really is an anal-
ysis of the structure of human living, i e , we are clearly beyond the account
of consciousness and in the realm of what Heidegger will call "Dasein "
Heidegger will "break" the binding power of this striving for a full and
complete life by his introduction of death at precisely that point where
Husserl will place the ideal of Western Man   And Husserl, for his part,
will view death in a very different light (see p 98)   But nevertheless they
are dealing with the same phenomenological field
   [68] *A V (1922–1937)*, 31
   [69] Ibid

perduring satisfaction in the whole of life in general "[70]   We can call this the law of maximal value   The values appropriate to the *whole* of life will not be those guiding the limited goals of life but rather those that have survived the critique of the limited and belong to the realm of the unlimited, of "what is without end."[71]

4 The activity of submitting limited goals to criticism and of transcending them in favor of higher or larger goals "creates the awareness of responsibility," what Husserl also calls the "ethical conscience "[72]   Let us call this the law of responsibility.   In the process of critique we become aware of ourselves as creatures of reason and therewith as responsible for what is correct and incorrect in our activities.   We are unsatisfied when our activities lack correctness or reasonableness.   And this brings with it a general interest·

> Out of this there arises, as a possible motivation that can be understood, a wish and will to rational self-regulation   namely, a wish and will to shape anew the *whole* of our life with *all* of its personal activities according to reason [73]

5. Still, we are not yet clear as to just what these larger goals or values are, ones larger than, say, our choice of a career   Husserl argues that out of the above there arises the "possibility, not yet completely determined as to its content," of acting to the best of one's ability [74]   From this there comes "the form of life" of the rational person and the idea of true and authentic humanity   But to make this work Husserl needs what we can call a "law of completeness "   The key to this is found in the special form of self-reflection that occurs with persons in community   Operative in our forms of life and practice we discover a "limit," an "ideal border" that "rises above the relative ideal of completeness, an absolute ideal of completeness "[75]   This limit extends beyond the individual, for in critical self-valuation and determination "there arises the authentic and essential graduality of the completeness of man-

---

[70] *A V (1922-1937)*, 31
[71] Ibid , 32
[72] Ibid
[73] Ibid
[74] Ibid
[75] Ibid , 33

kind as such, from which all justifiable construction of ideals must draw."[76]

> This is the ideal of a person *as* subject *of all* personal capabilities crowned by absolute reason,   of a person,that would have, were we to think of him also as omnipotent and "all powerful," all the divine attributes [77]

A limit that is itself a "difference," the idea of God establishes the "absolute limit" beyond all finitude that is the pole of all true human striving, however frail and limited that might be [78]   This provides the *telos* the absolute idea of completeness, the idea of the autonomous individual.   And it transforms this one form into a universal norm.

With this Husserl effects closure.   On the one hand, "the absolutely rational person is *causa sui* in reference to its rationality "[79] Essence is defined by existence   On the other hand, it is the ideal of rationality that brings us as persons into the condition of being rational persons, that serves as the ideal of a process of *becoming* rational   Existence is defined by essence.   Husserl's ethical theory culminates in a self-referential ideal of autonomy "He is subject and, at the same time, object of his [ethical] striving, the work in an infinite process of becoming, whose craftsman he himself is."[80]

IV

The last section applied critique to the generation of ethical normativity, universal in scope and detached from the concrete development of given societies   Genetic analysis is still *abstract* in that it operates independently of the notion of culture   When Husserl takes up the question of culture, however, we find a significant reframing of both the nature and the scope of genetic analysis the developments that it traces are historical, its analyses are fashioned as historical critique [81]   Genetic analysis becomes *historical* in that

---

[76] *A V (1922-1937),* 35
[77] Ibid , 33
[78] Ibid
[79] Ibid , 36
[80] Ibid , 37
[81] This point has interesting implications for our understanding of Husserl's writings   It entails that his deeper response to Dilthey is not

culture is treated not as a "factor" but as a "field" of development; the possibilities it begins with are not unbound but are real historical configurations. At the same time we recognize that it is only with the expansion of phenomenology by genetic analysis that the scope of phenomenology can cover the field of culture.

At each step along the way we continually meet surprises. The first set of genetic analyses treated the person as a subject, as an individual "in general" that comes to ethical life on the basis of the structural development of certain forms of personal life. But now this study is supplemented by another, which recognizes that each person is drawn into and enveloped by a society:

> [T]he circumstance that his life is ordered into the life of a society has its consequences, which from the very outset determine ethical conduct and give further formal characteristics to what is categorically required [82]

In this account the treatment of society as a field of values is what provides the definition of culture.[83] It is suggestive that Husserl does not take his Cartesian way into the analysis of the other, with its machinery of empathy and introjective perception,[84] but simply takes up the person *in* social relations, in a culture His starting

---

found in the earlier 1911 *Logos* article "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" or in the later 1931 lecture "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie" for the simple reason that both remain on the plane of "constitutive phenomenology" (cf *AV*[*1922-1937*], 164) Of all the published work it is only these articles and the *Crisis* that, using the resources of his genetic phenomenology, provide a reply that appropriates and systematically integrates Dilthey's work into his phenomenology I think this explains his open attitude toward Dilthey in a letter responding to one from him after the *Logos* article

> Now I would like to refer to your attempt to point out, on the basis of the all too few suggestions in my article, the boundaries within which our philosophical views agree and in which they differ
> All things considered, I would much prefer not to acknowledge these boundaries, and it truly seems to me that there are no serious differences whatsoever between us I think a lengthy consideration would lead to our complete agreement ("The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence," trans Jeffner Allen, in *Shorter Works*, 205)

[82] *AV (1922-1937)*, 45
[83] Cf *AV (1922-1937)*, 48-9
[84] *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage*, ed S Strasser, Husserliana, Bd 1 (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 121ff, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans Dorion Cairns (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 89ff

point is not consciousness but life   In the *Kaizo* articles he does
not attempt a *reconstruction* of the pure evidence of other subjects
but, rather, a description of the social and cultural ties that exist
before we even come to raise the issue of evidence and justification.
If you will allow a distinction that cannot be maintained for long,
the bond is not epistemic but ethical.   At least we can say that it
is a bond not of theoretical perception but of "practical will," a bond
not of pure reason but of "true human life "[85]   Notice how Husserl
describes it.

> In the social relationship he sees that the other, in so far as he is a
> good, is also for him a value, not merely a use-value but a value in
> himself, he, accordingly, has a pure interest in the ethical self-work
> of the other .   the best possible being and willing and realizing of
> the other also belongs to my own being and willing and realizing, and
> so the other way around.[86]

"Zu meinem eigenen Sein," to what will be called "die Eigenheits-
sphare," the sphere of ownness in the *Cartesian Meditations*,[87] there
already belongs the other as *value in himself* and as ethically de-
veloping. In a way that completely reverses the priorities of his
Cartesian way, Husserl speaks of the individual or, more accurately,
the ethical form of individual life as having an absolute but yet only
a "limited" or "relative value"[88] compared to the "higher" value that
falls to a good society   "The entire plateau of value of the individual
[achievement] depends on that of the other."[89]   The priority of the
individual or of the ego required by a constitutive phenomenology
of intentional cognition is here displaced by the priority of the other
in a genetic phenomenology of social praxis.   The "abstraction" from
"all cultural predicates"[90] stipulated by Husserl's Cartesian way is
replaced by an emphasis on the irreducibility of the process of com-
munication, of "willfully coming to an understanding,"[91] which, in
turn, is internally linked to the definition of the ethical individual
"wherever practical clashes result in social practice in the same

---

[85] Cf *A V (1922-1937)*, 46
[86] Ibid
[87] *Cartesianische Meditationen*, 124ff.; *Cartesian Meditations*, 92ff
[88] *A V (1922-1937)*, 47
[89] Ibid , 48
[90] *Cartesianische Meditationen*, 127, *Cartesian Meditations*, 95
[91] *A V (1922-1937)*, 46

environment, then a process of coming to ethical understanding in-
tervenes "[92]

<div align="center">V</div>

The account of culture allows Husserl to draw together the
analysis of ethical norms and the account of science (*Wissenschaft*).
Coming to ethical understanding is a cultural process of bringing
issues in the jurisdiction of critical, normative inquiry, under the
domain of "rigorous science " Husserl's genetic analysis of cultural
normativity, as we will now try to show, is one that combines a
thesis concerning the structural historicity of science with one con-
cerning the historical priority of science in order to derive the nor-
mative priority of science   One of the most powerful results of this
effort is that science is defined not as a body of knowledge but as a
kind of human and cultural activity, as a mode of inquiry

The Structural Historicity of Scientific Inquiry.   Scientific in-
quiry plays an "ethical role" in discovering the normative principles
operative in all forms of individual and social activity and "therewith
handles the possible regions of culture and their normative forms "[93]
At the same time it also treats itself as one of those activities and
in so doing "first creates the practical possibilities of realizing the
form of strict science "[94]   Thus science as activity, culminating in
philosophy, has an essential historicity

> [T]he development of the universal theory of science (theory of reason
> and logic) is an organ and itself a consequence [*Zug*] of mankind's
> development, as mankind brings itself to higher self-realization   On
> the other side, the theory of science and the strict science coming
> about through this development is itself a basic component of higher
> culture in the objective sense, in the sense of the objective, spiritual
> world of value building itself up as the correlate of the development
> of the reason of mankind.[95]

Husserl thinks of the sciences as cumulative and progressive, as in
a process of change which moves closer to a fuller disclosure of the
truth.   But here he seems to tie the *norm* of a rational society to

---

[92] *A V (1922–1937)*, 46
[93] Ibid , 56
[94] Ibid
[95] Ibid

the *process* by which it is achieved and to allow even the content of such a norm to arise in the context of this process   We quote again what he says about the "form" and norm of being a true human·

> Thereby we note right away that all of this is not to be understood statically but dynamically and genetically   Strict science is not [an] objective being but the becoming of an ideal objectivity, if it is such only in the process of becoming, then also the idea of true humanity and its method of giving shape to itself is such only in the process of becoming [96]

The crucial issue will be, then, how Husserl understands this process of becoming

The Historical Priority of Scientific Inquiry. The actual development of Western culture comes from historical transformations both in the realm of religion and in the realm of scientific inquiry Husserl, like many contemporaries, thinks of culture as arising with mythic religions   But he resists the older positivist approach of devaluing this sphere that views science as the triumph of reason over fables   Rather, there is an internal development to religious awareness itself that complements and even contributes to the shape of science   For example, in the movement from the lower to the "higher level of mythic culture" in which forces become transcendent gods who, in turn, are understood as the prescribers of absolute norms, we find a remarkable form of development "which has in itself a unified idea serving as a goal that is objectively constituted in the consciousness of a society and that actively guides its development."[97]   These ideas or goals are not present in random fashion for we, "led by an axiological point of view, observe a progressive development of values [*Werterhohung*] and a culmination in a [certain] value-gestalt "[98]   Only when we come to the person of Jesus Christ do we find more of an eruption than a steady development in the course of history, a fundamental paradigm shift that shows

---

[96] *A V (1922–1937)*, 55
[97] Ibid , 61
[98] Ibid., 62   In saying that this is "an external point of view" (p 62), he frees his analysis from the metaphysical presumption that there is a spirit operating in the minds or the collective unconscious of a people "pushing" or "drawing" them toward this inevitable end   Indeed, other forms of religious culture are possible where the priest rules by arbitrary will and not a "consciously constituted goal-idea" and where the people are oppressed

deeper discontinuity than continuity with what came before,[99] for in Him we find an "individualized idea," a concrete universal unique in the course of our history,[100] to which we are related through a "fundamental religious experience,"[101] through "belief "[102] The Reformation, in turn, he understands not just as a reaction to the "hierarchical culture" of the Middle Ages but also as a "recovery" or a "restoration" of primary sources and of an originary religious experience[103] whose viability endures.   Yet even in the discussion of religion Husserl transposes and finds "a concealed rationality" and higher ideals than came before [104]

While belief undergirds religion, and while we find nascent rationality there, it is a different attitude that gives rise to science in the ancient Greeks   The "theoretical interest"[105] spawning Greek philosophy comes from curiosity or wonder, "which has its original place in natural life as an intrusion into the course of 'serious living'."[106]   Husserl tells us a fairly standard, if one-sided, story about the development of rigorous science in which he discusses Plato, but not Aristotle [107] "The tendency to universalization [universalistische Zug], running through mathematics and natural science from the beginning on, designates the general character of modern philosophy and science."[108] It is this tendency combined with the role of critique that finally draws religion under its domain

> The Reformation placed final authority, to which all norms are bound, in belief   For philosophy, however, belief is, at best, one of the sources of knowledge and, like all sources of knowledge, comes under free critique [109]

---

[99] *A V (1922-1937)*, 66, and esp Beilage IV, 100–103
[100] Ibid., 101
[101] Ibid., 66
[102] Ibid , 101
[103] Ibid , 72
[104] Ibid , 101
[105] Ibid., 78
[106] *Krisis*, 332, *Crisis*, 285
[107] *A V (1922-1937)*, 80-1   There are a few scattered references to Aristotle in a very late piece, see pp. 193ff
[108] Ibid., 93.
[109] Ibid., 91   He explains further "This 'modern' stance to belief does not mean overthrowing belief as religious experience, nor does it mean overthrowing its essential belief-content   But, obviously, the autonomy of reason does mean a rejection of the duty, itself exempt from [rational] decision, to accept the contents of belief on the basis of the authority of the church or the authority of belief itself prior to free critique" (p 92)

The Normative Priority of Scientific Inquiry. The essential historicity of science combined with its emergence historically as the crowning form of knowledge is what enables Husserl to argue for its normative priority:

> This means nothing less than that we grant to European culture—whose type of development we have described precisely as realizing [the transformation of itself and its world by pure autonomous reason, by scientific reason]—not just the highest position relative to all historical cultures, but rather we see in it the first realization of an *absolute* norm of development, one that is called to the task of revolutionizing all other cultures in the process of development [110]

For Husserl this entails critical distance from the bodies of knowledge of other cultures, a distance he seems quite willing to take without arguments based on any detailed historical investigations

> If one takes the concept of science and the concept of philosophy that originally coincided with it, then the ancient Greeks are the creators of philosophy, i.e, science   What one calls sciences among the Babylonians, Egyptians, Chinese, and even Indians may contain [elements of] knowledge that strict science can confirm, whose content it can take over, whose kind of method and attitude it can draw in, but basically we legitimately make a radical divide between the two and finally we must call the [very] same [elements of] knowledge and [attempts at] self-grounding prescientific or unscientific, on the one side, and scientific, on the other [111]

This passage is very close to one that we find in Husserl's Vienna lecture of 1935. Once again, Husserl distances himself from the sciences of other cultures, only a little more sympathetically:

> It is understandable that this mythical-practical world-view and world-knowledge can give rise to much knowledge of the factual world, the world as known through scientific experience, that can later be used scientifically   But within their own framework of meaning this world-view and world-knowledge are and remain mythical and practical, and it is a mistake, a falsification of their sense, for those raised in the scientific ways of thinking created in Greece and developed in the modern period to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy and science (astronomy, mathematics), i e, to interpret India, Babylonia, China in a European way [112]

---

[110] *A V (1922–1937)*, 73
[111] Ibid
[112] *Krisis*, 331, *Crisis*, 284–5

VI

It is always tempting, at this point, to bemoan the devaluing of other cultural traditions and what seems to be a program of cultural imperialism Husserl's *Kaizo* articles might be treated as mere tracts encouraging the Japanese "to join in the work of European culture "[113] Even more damning, they seem to devalue indigenous cultural and religious traditions and to be overt efforts to colonize the intelligentsia of a nation whose commercial sector was well-advanced in the process of adopting Western commercial and manufacturing techniques.

Yet we know from his short review of Neumann's translation of the sayings of the Buddha, published only two years (1925) after these articles, that this was not Husserl's attitude We find in these sayings, Husserl recognizes, a way of seeing the world "fully opposite" our European way.[114] Yet Buddhism can be "paralleled" with the "highest formations of the philosophical and religious spirit of our European culture."[115] He even senses that this text contributes to the ethical, religious, and philosophical "renewal of our culture "[116] As is always the case with a thinker as powerful as Husserl, we must look deeper if we are to find both the richness and the poverty of his approach

What Husserl deals with for the first time in these articles is the fact that systems of knowledge are wedded to culture, that they can even have a social consensus as to what counts as veridical, but that they can be mistaken, they can enchain rather than liberate. Keep in mind that Husserl clearly distinguished between European scientific culture and European civilization, and that science opens to scrutiny not just mythic-religious societies but the "imperialism"[117] and the accepted ideas of his own society What he means by scientific inquiry, to put it negatively, is a strategy for dismantling an *edifice* of beliefs In these texts Husserl realizes, perhaps for the first time, that the problem is not with particular claims or judgments but with the *context* of knowledge

---

[113] *A V (1922–1937)*, 3
[114] Ibid , 125
[115] Ibid., 126
[116] Ibid
[117] Cf Ibid , 53 and 90

> The intersubjective solidity and objectivity of such a science rests not on the fact that its confirmations are rooted in individually changing material or emotional motives but on the fact that they are rooted in general, deeply entrenched convictions coming from old, well-worked traditions   In particular, mythological and religious motives are determining and, in a given culture, are generally the decisive force [118]

The "absolute certainty" possessed by a particular system of knowledge he opposes to "evidence," to a confirmation that overturns the appeal to traditions and requires the "original givenness of facts and factual interconnections "[119]   Thus authentic science is much more than the "systematization" of judgments, for we find this already in prescientific systems of belief   "True knowledge is the fulfillment of a striving not for certainty in general but for certainty arising from and motivated by intuitive and self-given truth "[120] This joins the notion of critique to that of intersubjectivity.

> Factually motivated judgments are objectively valid, i e , intersubjectively shared validities, insofar as what I see others can see   Over and above all differences between individuals, nations, and   traditions, stand things that are had in common,   [stands] the common factual world, which is constituted in the exchange of experiences so that each can understand the other and each take recourse to what we all see [121]

Thus science is not the dominion of certainty but

> .   the kingdom of truth, which each can bring into view, which each can intuitively realize in himself, each from every circumscribed culture, friend and enemy, Greek or barbarian, child of God's people or child of the god of a hostile people [122]

The genuine strength of Husserl's account is found in his view of science or philosophy not as a set of results that others must purchase but rather as a style of inquiry, as a *procedure* of coming to the truth   Whatever the limitations of his actual view of how this is achieved, the focus seems legitimate, for it is only in a process of critical investigation that we can move beyond our traditions and blind convictions and attempt to settle conflicting accounts   Yet it

---

[118] *A V (1922–1937)*, 76
[119] Ibid
[120] Ibid
[121] Ibid , 77
[122] Ibid

is also true that the attack on treasured ideas can be deeply disrup-
tive.

> So the upheaval of national culture can proliferate, first of all when
> the advancing universal science becomes the common property of na-
> tions that were formerly alien to one another and the unity of a sci-
> entific community and the community of the educated spreads
> throughout the multiplicity of nations [123]

The diversity of beliefs, the plurality of the gods, then, is not
celebrated but overcome.   "In the concept of God the singular is
essential "[124]

But has Husserl really tied critique to a procedure of coming
to the truth rather than a specific content, a specific conception
of truth?

His account of critique assumes that historically similar values
converge on a single norm, that diversity is necessarily subordinate
to identity   The multiplicity of values, we saw above,[125] is under a
law of completeness, itself generated in the course of reflection.   It
is this that orders and then justifies the ideals we construct.   How-
ever, there are not different ideals for different individuals or so-
cieties but rather there is a *single* "absolute ideal," an absolute limit
normative for all   The essence of the person is clarified by the *telos*
of rational autonomy, or, to put it metaphorically, by the ideal of
becoming God.   When Husserl blends this account with that of his-
tory, we find that this general norm is none other than what is
specifically and uniquely embodied by Western science   Yet his law
of completeness might be mistaken even on his own grounds.

Completeness means (1) convergence of factual examples and
gradations upon ideal types, (2) the convergence of types upon ideal
limits, and (3) the transvaluation of one of the ideal limits into an
absolute norm, established by showing its ability to recursively enu-
merate and order in a closed system all other limits   Notice that
with (3), difference is controlled by identity, the relative is overcome
by the absolute, and, with the addition of the essential historicity
of science, many cultures are subordinated to the one culture forming
their *telos*: the many cultural worlds converge on a single world
framed as a *totality*, rending their diversity rationally intelligible.

---

[123] *Krisis*, 335, *Crisis*, 288
[124] Ibid.
[125] See above, 591–4.

I want to argue, working with a tension that can be found in Husserl's own thought, that the conception of the world as totality is a notion that in principle could function, if at all, only for the positive sciences, and that it stands in opposition to a phenomenological characterization of the world. What brings this tension to the fore is the fact that the *Crisis* recognizes that the conception of the world as totality, which makes possible the notion of a single *telos* toward which history tends, is itself a product of historical transformations. We must briefly trace this

Husserl views perceptual experience as teleological in a limited sense. Changes in perceived objects occur in an ordered fashion, that is, changes are uniform for all things of the same type   In the midst of changes a certain (repeatable) order produces an optimal presentation of the object   The optimal presentation is, given a certain interest, what the experience tends towards and thus is privileged or normative.[126] From this analysis of ordinary perception in ordered environments Husserl moves to an account of the objects of science and their one world   What are the changes that give rise to the world of physical and thus scientifically determinable objects?

The process of variation, just traced, is transformed by the process of "idealization "[127] To stay with the treatment of the "shape" or the spatial form of objects, "typical" things that appear are "like" or "the same as" other things   We can think about their shapes abstractly and compare various samples, asking how each compares to the abstract shape. "This gradualness can be characterized as that of greater or less perfection "[128] But we can also press beyond the typical:

> out of the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing toward the horizons of *conceivable* perfecting [in the] "again and again," *limit-shapes* emerge toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as toward invariant and never attainable poles   . Through a method of idealization   these limit-shapes have become acquired tools that

---

[126] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, Zweites Buch *Phanomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed Marly Biemel, Husserliana, Bd 4 (The Hague· Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 58–61, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Second Book *Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Boston Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 63–6
[127] *Krisis*, 22, *Crisis*, 25
[128] Ibid.

can be used habitually and can always be applied to something new—
an infinite and yet self-enclosed world of ideal objects as a field
for study [129]

This is more than a redescription of the everyday world   The very
idealization of objects as spatiotemporal shapes, as mathematizable
objects, entails a construction of the world as "an infinite *totality* of
ideal objects which are determinable univocally, methodically, and
quite universally for everyone "[130]   Thereby "nature itself is ideal-
ized under the guidance of the new mathematics; nature becomes—
to express it in a modern way—a mathematical manifold."[131]

Husserl's last studies recognize, however, that the conception
of the world as totality is, at best, an ontological characterization[132]
appropriate to the sciences

> What is new, unprecedented, is the conceiving of this ideal of a rational
> infinite totality of being with a rational science systematically mas-
> tering it   An infinite world, here a world of idealities, is conceived
> not as one whose objects become accessible to our knowledge singly,
> imperfectly, and as it were accidentally, but as one which is attained
> by a rational, systematically coherent method   In the infinite pro-
> gression of this method, every object is ultimately attained according
> to its full being-in-itself [133]

But this only raises the question of whether a guiding ideal for the
sciences is not uncritically adopted as the guiding ideal for phenom-
enological analysis.   If, indeed, the life-world is the "forgotten
meaning-fundament of natural science,"[134] then applying the notion
of totality to it immediately runs the risk of an unjustifiable trans-
position   Why should we assume that it, too, is a totality, especially
when any rigorous notion of totality would require our treating the
world as a mathematical manifold?

It was always the case that Husserl worked with a basic dis-
tinction, not that far from Dilthey's, between the methods of the
natural sciences and of the human sciences.   We can use this con-
trast to deepen the questions we are raising.   In a 1934 text that

---

[129] *Krisis*, 23, *Crisis*, 26
[130] *Krisis*, 30, *Crisis*, 32
[131] *Krisis*, 20, *Crisis*, 23
[132] Cf especially sect 51 of the *Crisis*
[133] *Krisis*, 19, *Crisis*, 22
[134] *Krisis*, 48, *Crisis*, 48

he sent to the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy in Pra-
gue, Husserl cautions against a reduction of "spirit" to "nature," of
the human sciences to the natural sciences, of the human world to
the natural world   He seems to anticipate our questions   If nature
and spirit are placed in the same world, he warns, the result is a
mathematization of the spirit.[135]   We must maintain a contrast be-
tween the world of the natural sciences and the "prescientific world."
While the natural scientist takes bodies as "indexes" of an ideal
that is mathematically rendered, the human scientist cannot view
his/her concrete descriptive work in the same terms [136]   The notion
of objectivity we find in the natural sciences cannot be generalized
to all domains   "One can no longer compose the world from nature
and spirit and thereby bring the sciences on either side into a single
dimension "[137]   His conclusion accents the question we are raising

> The world-problem in philosophy becomes questionable, for the sense
> of the world has become problematic   One cannot bring the intuitive
> world—"in" which a human being "lives" as ego, as active and suffering
> subject, as person—under mathematical-objective nature   One can-
> not treat the being of the person and of personal societies in this
> world   as natural facts in universal, objective-exact nature [138]

In fact, what Husserl proposes is just the opposite.   Having rejected
the reduction of the human world to "mathematical, objective na-
ture," he pulls the natural sciences into the domain of what he takes
to be the "subjective," into the prescientific world.   "This merely
subjective being is, thus, the a priori for the being of nature in the
exact sense."[139]   Its totality is relativized to the totality of the cul-
tural world.   The fatal difficulty, however, is that this character-
ization of the prescientific world is *not* a piece of transcendental
phenomenology.   Immediately Husserl recognizes that it belongs
to psychology[140] or anthropology [141]   Thus the difference between

---

[135] *A V (1922–1937)*, 195
[136] Ibid., 212
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid , 213
[139] Ibid
[140] Ibid
[141] Cf Ibid., 164, 180, 214

the scientific and the prescientific worlds—both framed as totalities—clearly lies within the province of the "positive sciences."[142]

We know that Husserl handles this difference between the natural and the human worlds not by placing one in the other but by placing the intentional and historical achievements by which the natural world is substructed in the life-world.[143] But if we are to avoid confusing phenomenological analysis with positive science, a different characterization of the world is required, one that carries us beyond the "painful oppositions of nature and spirit "[144] At one point in the Prague text he urges us to recognize the special nature of the world understood phenomenologically as *horizon*, defined not in the order of referents but in the order of meaning·

> This is not a collective Allness, not beings externally bound with one another and to one another, but an All whose unity is inseparable from their ties of meaning [*Sinnbezugen*] The universe is, however, for us a standing, endless open horizon of the pre-validity of beings, a horizon of the certainty of possible appropriation through experience and knowledge   [145]

What I am suggesting, then, is that the characterization of the world as totality is not a phenomenological but an ontological characterization. The treatment of the world as totality is *required* once the mathematization of the world, initiated in the hands of Galileo and completed by modern physics, brought together a notion of infinity with that of a finite and closed system of rules or laws that definitively characterize the endless number of true facts in the universe, and once the human world was construed positively as its "counterconcept,"[146] as a yet more encompassing totality.[147]

---

[142] *A V (1922–1937)*, 208
[143] Ibid., 224.
[144] Ibid , 219
[145] Ibid , 227
[146] Cf Ibid , 194
[147] Even here, even for an ontological analysis, one might be able to use Godel and Cantor's results to argue for a necessary incompleteness to any system that would attempt to include all possibly true facts or statements of facts and thus argue that the notion of totality is mistaken   All that is suggested here is that *if* the notion has application at all, then it will be only to the positive sciences   Our interest is in simply arguing, independent of theoretical problems with the notion of totality in an ontology of the world relevant to the positive sciences, that it is fundamentally different from the notion of the world as horizon

The phenomenological characterization of the world, however, attempts to articulate neither the whole of things nor the whole of culture but rather that order of significance that gives rise to the difference between nature and spirit

The world is the life-world, the nexus of meaning in and through which things have presence   Presence, however, is not given but *achieved*   In the interplay of intending and fulfillment, the profiles through which objects become present implicate as they resonate other profiles not yet given   The very act of fulfillment sets up protentions that follow several lines of significance, often "contradictory," at the same time.   As the nexus of significance the world is woven with strands of referential implications that cross different orders and thus cannot be reduced to a single set or to a set of all sets.   There can well be families of significance, even different orders of significance, without a rule-governed means of assimilating one to the other or of hierarchically ordering one under the other.   The world is thereby described as horizon.   What Husserl did not fully realize is that the horizon is such that it is always multiple, that it functions in cognitive syntheses not by a principle of unity but by an operation of deflection, that the necessary interplay of presence and absence that it makes possible means that it can never be captured as "phenomenon "[148]   The world as horizon is a nexus of meaning that itself lacks synthetic unity   The very notion of completeness and closure, then, cannot be applied to this notion of the world.   And with this is lost the possibility of overcoming in theory the plurality and diversity of the various cultural worlds by positing one of their operative ideals as the *single* rational norm for all cultures.

The genetic analysis of the world is precisely what shifts the analysis in the direction of a theory of interests and, thus, places not a single *telos*, not a single goal of autonomy before us, but rather the possibility of a process of norm-guided transformations that, lacking sufficient conditions, are nevertheless open to rational argumentation   The justification of values lacking a single guiding norm requires critique   In his last writings Husserl thought of critique as situated *between* the "natural attitude," serving the

---

[148] Cf *A V (1922–1937)*, 175

natural interest of life, and the "theoretical attitude," necessarily constitutive of the positive sciences [149]   Thus he speaks of critique as a new form of praxis, as

> the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have arisen out of the life of man, and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly [150]

Critique, precisely because it lacks completeness at the level of theory, strives for revaluation at the level of praxis by opening to view the rational interests that make renewal possible

The University at Stony Brook

---

[149] *Krisis,* 329, *Crisis,* 283
[150] Ibid

GLOSSES ON HEIDEGGER'S ARCHITECTONIC WORD-PLAY *LICHTUNG* AND *EREIGNIS*, *BERGUNG* AND *WAHRNIS*

THOMAS PRUFER

I

THIS TITLE PROMISES a gloss on Heidegger's words, more exactly, on four of his words, four words which are crucial to his thought after *Sein und Zeit.* These four words fall into two groups of two:

Lichtung and *Ereignis*
and
Bergung and *Wahrnis*

The promise of a gloss on these words is formulated as a provocative oxymoron, spanned between architectonic and play Kant tells us in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (B860ff) that "architectonic" means "the unity of a manifold under one idea, . . a common root" "the affinity of parts is from a single end which makes the parts into a whole " The parts, because of their relation to the end, are related one to another with necessity Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1451a30ff.) speaks of a necessity of the whole so stringent that nothing can be added and nothing can be taken away This necessity is called organic because the parts are related as the parts of an animal are related one to another all the parts together as a whole are ordered toward and by the to-be-achieved achievements of the animal (*telos, energeiai*) Contrasted with this systematic necessity is what Aristotle calls *sōros* (1040b8–9, 1041b11–12, 1044a4–5, 1045a8–14), a heap, and what Kant calls a mere aggregate or rhapsody, a being together which is open to arbitrary addition and subtraction

In speaking of Heidegger's word-play do we mean a lack of such unity of end and necessity of relation, something jerry-built, thrown together at random out of bits and pieces found lying around, a kind of punning, like "bark" having to do with dogs and trees and water, in contrast to "healthy," analyzed by Aristotle (1060b31ff.) as a

cluster of irreducibly different meanings nevertheless oriented to-
ward one end (*pros hen*), irreducibly different meanings organized
in terms of that one last end?

If we can speak at all of Heidegger's word-play as organized
toward such a privileged one, that one is certainly not something
which is exhaustively present, nor is it exhaustive presence itself
(*nous*), presence as distinguished from that-which-is-present; and
it is not something absent either, not even absence itself—nor is it
the interplay of presence and absence presence/absence (*Sein*).

Is there then an architectonic of these four crucial words, and
if not, are we left with the alternative, a jumble, at best a rhapsody,
the pastime of a child or a madman playing with fragments of the
tradition, heaping them together and smashing them apart at will?

II

Heidegger's use of the four crucial words is shot through with
reversal and ambivalence and with the troping or twisting of a usual
and ordinary meaning toward the unusual and extraordinary, which
nevertheless keeps its roots in the matrix of the usual and ordinary.

The verb *lichten* in ordinary usage has to do with clearing off
land and with lifting anchor. The noun *Lichtung* means light in
the sense of free of, not closed off or held down, not heavy, as in
"light as a feather," unencumbered by and thus open for   *Lichtung*
is the forest clearing in which is cleared away whatever would oc-
clude light from making visible what is there in the clearing to be
seen. Thus early on (*Sein und Zeit*, 14. Aufl., 133 and note a, 350–
1) Heidegger associates *Lichtung* with light in the sense of brightness
(*Licht, Helle*). But later there is a reversal, an emphatic disasso-
ciation of *Lichtung* from light in the sense of brightness and bringing
to light, and a focus on the sense of not held down by or bound to
or filled up with: *das Freie, das Offene*· the free and open.

The ordinary sense of *Ereignis* is event. Heidegger shifts from
this usual meaning toward two other meanings   The first shift or
trope returns to the root of the word *Ereignis. Auge*: eye. *Ereignis*
is indeed derived from *Er-aug-nis*, be-eye-ing, although today no
German ear hears that root in the word, the relation to *Auge*, eye,
is a sunken etymology   But Heidegger charges the word *Ereignis*
with another, second unusual meaning, hearing in the word, against

all etymology, the root *eigen,* own, so that the meaning different from the ordinary meaning, event, is ambivalent: the extraordinary meaning is not only eyeing but also owning. Heidegger approves *appropriement* (*Gesamtausgabe,* #15, 365; #65, 320, 489) as the French translation of *Ereignis* appropriation, coming into its own or taking to itself as its own

Both *bergen* and *wahren* (*bewahren, verwahren*) have the sense of save or protect   Jetsam from a shipwreck can be salvaged, *geborgen.* The place where luggage is left safely for a time in a railway station is the *Gepackaufbewahrung*   To hold out against opposition, preserving one's own, is *sich gegen etwas verwahren.*

But because *bergen* also means to hide (*verbergen*), to undo this hiding (*entbergen*) is to disclose, to display, to bring to light, to manifest. Manifestness is un-hidden-ness, Greek: *a-lēthe-ia,* truthing as the undoing of *lēthē,* hiddenness. And the ordinary word for true is *wahr* and for truth *Wahrheit*

Here we come up against another ambiguity. *Wahr(nis)* means *both* undoing hiddenness by manifesting, truth as display, *and* hiding or protecting against this undoing, protecting against this manifesting   And thirdly *Wahrnis* also means protection against the very interplay hiddenness/manifestness itself, protection against both poles of the interplay in their interrelatedness (*Gegenwendigkeit*). In this last sense *Wahrnis* means a coming into its own (*Ereignis*), free from and clear of (*Lichtung*) being bound into the interplay hiddenness (*Verbergung*)/manifestness (*Entbergung*).

Truth$_1$ is manifestation out of hiddenness, the undoing of hiddenness, un-hiddenness, display; truth$_2$ is hiddenness as protection (*Wahrnis$_1$*) against being assaulted by the demand for exhaustive manifestation out of hiddenness, truth$_3$ is withdrawnness from and protection (*Wahrnis$_2$*) against the hiddenness/manifestness interplay, whether the accent within that interplay fall on manifestation (truth$_1$) out of hiddenness or on hiddenness as protection (truth$_2$) against being assaulted by excessive demand for manifestation out of hiddenness

truth$_1$ *Wahrheit$_1$*
truth$_2$ *Wahrheit$_2$ Wahrnis$_1$ Un-Wahrheit$_1$* un-truth$_1$ not truth$_1$
truth$_3$ *Wahrnis$_2$ Un-Wahrheit$_2$* un-truth$_2$ not truth$_2$

Thus the four crucial words in the crisscrossing and the twisting and turning of their meanings, in the reversals, ambivalences, and

tropings, are an architectonic play, a playful architectonic, organized, it is true, toward one end, but toward an end which is neither present nor absent, an end which is not even presence/absence and manifestness/hiddenness themselves

III

1 *Lichtung* ("clearing [away], lightening [up], opening [up]" as other than "shining, brightening") and *Ereignis* ("appropriation clearing away the inappropriate, coming into its own, taking as its own" as other than "eyeing") are protection (*Bergung, Wahrnis*), protection against reduction to the interplay hiddenness/manifestness. That interplay, hiddenness/manifestness, is not the last space, that interplay takes place and is played out in the space called *Lichtung*, a space which comes into its own (*sich ereignet*) as other than the interplay hiddenness/manifestness.

2 *Lichtung* and *Ereignis* fall into hiddenness/manifestness. In this fall *Lichtung* becomes brightness (*Licht, Helle*), and *Ereignis* becomes eyeing (*Eraugnis*) (This fall is from beyond the interplay into one partner of the interplay manifestness: brightness for eyeing.) *Bergung* comes into the interplay *Verbergung/Entbergung* and *Verborgenheit/Unverborgenheit*, and *Wahrnis* comes into the interplay *Un-Wahrheit/Wahrheit₁*. (This fall is from beyond the interplay into the other partner of the interplay hiddenness: withdrawnness from view)

3 Hiddenness (*Verbergung, Verborgenheit, Un-Wahrheit₁* = *Wahrheit₂*) is protection against another reduction, reduction to manifestation understood as attack on hiddenness, war waged against hiddenness, wresting hiddenness into manifestness, rather than letting manifestness rest in an excess of hiddenness Hiddenness is thus *Bergung* and *Wahrnis* as protection against excessive demand for manifestness, protection against reduction to availability for representation (*Vorstellung, Gegenstandlichkeit*) and protection against reduction to availability for manipulation (*Ge-stell, Bestellbarkeit, Bestand*).

4. Manifestation is the process of manifesting out of hiddenness
Manifestation is translation of hiddenness into manifestness
of that-which-*is*(-manifest)   Because manifesting the mani-
festation of that-which-*is*(-manifest) turns manifestation it-
self into a that-which-*is*(-manifest), manifestation out of
hiddenness falls into that-which-is   Looking among the
characteristics of beings for what-it-means-to-be, we dis-
cover—nothing, no-thing, no that-which-is. Looking at that-
which-*is*(-manifest), we forget manifestness itself.

5 Because that-which-is is both hidden and manifest, there
can be false *doxa* (view: both the show itself and how we take
the show, what we take the show *as* being)   False *doxa* comes
about when that-which-is both shows itself ("is manifest")
and, because it is also being beyond the show ("is hidden"),
is taken *as* being other than it is.   The difference between
show and *as* is formulated when we say something *of* some-
thing   When there is one show (snub-nose) and two *as* (both
Theaetetus and Socrates), then error is possible we take the
shown snub-nosed one we see *as* being Socrates, but he *is*
Theaetetus   We say falsely "The snub-nosed one is So-
crates."   When there is one show and two *as*, two (both
Theaetetus and Socrates) having the same show (snub-nose)
in common, we can take the common show *as* being the show
of the other (Socrates) rather than of the one (Theaetetus):
we twist and falsely say something *of* something   Hidden/
manifest is thus reduced to saying incorrectly and, set against
and contrasted with this incorrectness, to saying correctly:
true assertion is assertion not twisted but in line with that-
which-is: true assertion corresponds to that-which-is

6. The fall$_1$ into the interplay hiddenness/manifestness, the fall$_2$
of hiddenness into manifestation, the fall$_3$ of manifestation
into that-which-*is*(-manifest), the fall$_4$ of the hidden/mani-
fest into the incorrectly/correctly said—all these falls are
not mistakes to be corrected; rather they are to be let take
place, to be let to come into their own out of *Lichtung* and
Ereignis, out of in the twofold sense of away from and owed
to.   What comes out of and thus turns away from somehow
still remains in what it is owed to

7 Manipulation and representation of that-which-*is*(-hidden/

manifest) and the interplay hiddenness/manifestation itself can turn around out of their fall, turn back toward letting come into its own (*Ereignis*) what they are always still owed to: the clearing (*Lichtung*) or space in which the interplay hiddenness/manifestness is let take place as protected against remaining fallen into that-which-*is*(-hidden/manifest) as represented and manipulated *

The Catholic University of America

---

* Some references

A *Lichtung Gesamtausgabe* (*GA*) (Frankfurt am Main Klostermann, 1975ff) #15, 262, cf #34, 59, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (*SD*) (Tubingen Niemeyer, 1969), 72, *Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens* (*FBSD*) (St Gallen Erker, 1984), 17, *Zollikoner Seminare* (*ZSem*) (Frankfurt am Main Klostermann, 1987), 16

B *Anwesen/Anwesendes, Sein/Seiendes Sein und Zeit* (*SZ*), 14 Aufl (Tubingen Niemeyer, 1977), 6, *GA* #9, 478-9, #26, 195, 252, #29/30, 405, #54, 223, *ZSem*, 229

C *nous SZ*, 33, *GA* #31, 73-109

D Plato, *Theaetetus GA* #34, 285-322

E. *SZ*, 36-7, *GA* #5, 264-5, #9, 332-3, 441-3, #12, 246-9, 253, note b, #15, 373, 403-7, 438, #34, 142-3, #63, 76, #65, 381, *SD*, 20-3, 58, 78-80, *FBSD*, 19, *ZSem*, 216; *Vortrage und Aufsatze* (Pfullingen Neske, 1954), 135, 276-9, *Was heißt Denken?* (Tubingen Niemeyer, 1954), 97, *Identitat und Differenz* (Pfullingen Neske, 1957), 24-5, *Nietzsche*, Bd 2 (Pfullingen Neske, 1961), 378, *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen Neske, 1962), 41-5, *Denkerfahrungen* (Frankfurt am Main Klosterman, 1983), 147-9, 175-9, *Von der Un-Verborgenheit Fridolin Wiplingers Bericht von einem Gesprach mit Martin Heidegger* (1972), aufgezeichnet von E Frantski (Pfaffenweiler. Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), 8, 14, 20, 21-2, 23, 31-42 (esp 34-6, 41-2), 46-7, 52-6 (esp 56), 58

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MARK M. HURLEY AND STAFF

ALMÁSI, Miklós *The Philosophy of Appearances* Translated by András
 Vitányi Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 106 Dor-
 drecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 xvii + 294 pp $79 00—
 This book is a translation of the original Hungarian edition published
 in 1971 It belongs in the tradition of Hegel, Marx, and Lukács, and
 would be of interest to those appreciative of that tradition The book
 begins with a discussion of the general distinction between appearance
 and reality ("essence"). According to the author, the distinction has
 at most a rudimentary application to nature below the social level,
 but is crucial for understanding society So the book is primarily
 concerned with social appearances, where the notion of "being-for-
 others" has a clear application and accounts for the fact that ap-
 pearances can have objectivity, a quasi-reality, and play a role in the
 process of historical development The author "hazards" the thesis
 that "the individual person in the present of every age necessarily
 orientates himself in 'false', illusory bodies of thought" (p 233) He
 criticizes the "bourgeois" phenomenological and neo-positivist notions
 of appearance as subjectivistic abstractions, divorced from social
 praxis "Man encounters first the individual mass of things rather
 than phenomena These data become phenomena only through prac-
 tical work, when, by the aid of practice, science and technological
 progress, a systematic division is achieved in which we can discern
 what is 'behind' the thing immediately in front of us, i e essence"
 (p. 36)
    The author proceeds to examine a variety of social illusions He
 rightly accords special attention to the nature of ideology It is a
 mistake (attributed by him to Stalin and generally to dogmatism, a
 code-word for orthodox Soviet Marxism) to think that ideologies are
 merely lies on a social scale The true conception of ideology is Marx's,
 according to which "ideological reflection was always closely connected
 with the objective logic of the social situation" (p 199) "[T]he pri-
 mary function of ideologies is to stimulate the objective process of

social praxis   They are integral parts of this process   " (p 201)
Falsehood is found in ideologies (as it must be, since the latter are,
after all, illusions) as a result of overgeneralization (p 209)   The
latter leads to distortion, as exemplified by the Stalinist period in the
development of Marxism   However, the "regenerative capacity" and
"internal vitality" of Marxism were demonstrated by the initiation
of a new era in its development after the Twentieth Soviet Party
Congress in 1956

In everyday life, social conditions present themselves in combination
with the "ambiguities" of the "pseudo-concrete" world   Examples
are play and art   "Every game creates a particular sphere of illusion
It shuts its participants   into an 'enchanted' world" (p 244)   But
a game involves no illusion in the ordinary sense   When children
make "cakes" out of sand and pretend to eat them, they do not even
think of really eating them   Yet the game is a real activity that
essentially involves also a certain unreality

The author displays great erudition in the history of philosophy as
well as in literature and the arts   But for several, not unrelated
reasons, it is difficult to evaluate what he says   First, any evaluation
would require an evaluation of his whole philosophical framework
Second, despite the many examples provided, the discussion is on an
unnecessarily high level of generality   Third, much depends on how
certain crucial terms are to be understood, but they are seldom given
a clear explanation —Panayot Butchvarov, *The University of Iowa*

ARMSTRONG, D M *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility*, Cambridge· Cam-
   bridge University Press, 1989   xiii + 156 pp   Cloth, $34 50, paper,
   $11 95—"Wherever possible," said Bertrand Russell, "substitute con-
   structions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities "
   Metaphysics in this style is the activity of formulating and applying
   a calculus   We are to supply a list of primitive ideas, with a speci-
   fication of the rules for combining them, and a sample of complexes
   created by combining these simples   Every obscure idea is to be re-
   formulated as the complex deriving from these simples   The values
   impelling us include economy, clarity, decidability, and fruitfulness

Possibilities are the inferred entities   Actualities are better known
D M Armstrong would have us explicate *possibility* in a way that is
parasitic upon our conception of actuality possible states of affairs
reduce, he says, to the fact that the actual individuals, properties, and
relations constitutive of our world can be recombined in ways different
from arrangements obtaining here   Possibility, this implies, is best
expressed by the counterfactuals telling what states of affairs would
be created if individuals, properties, and relations were rearranged

Armstrong does not discuss the counterfactual expression of pos-
sibilities   Nor is much said by way of characterizing the particulars,
properties, and relations acknowledged as recombinable atoms
Armstrong is, however, attentive to anything that might be an obstacle

to his combinatorial theory   There is, for example, the emphasis upon his "Distinct Existence Principle" every thing distinguishable is separable, where nothing is "by nature" disqualified from combining with something else   The mutual independence of particulars, properties, relations, and states of affairs is vital to the economy of Armstrong's constructivist theory, because a small inventory of atoms is to provide the terms for a denumerable infinity of possible states of affairs

Intensive properties and internal relations might seem to defeat this economy   Differences of color, for example, are intensive   We might extend the array of combinable properties to include the many different colors; but equally, we may argue that variations of color are differences of magnitude along the spectrum of electro-magnetic radiation   Internal properties, such as the fit of lock and key, are also problematic, because of restricting the freedom for recombining individuals, properties, or relations to generate different states of affairs   Armstrong generalizes his extensive analysis to these internal relations, as the relation of lock to key is the complex geometrical and mechanical (hence extensive) relation of facets on the key to the tumblers of the lock   Ontological economy is also the motive when Armstrong devotes considerable attention to higher-order, supervenient properties   Higher-order properties, such as those signified by the Pythagorean theorem, are emergent though their supervenience adds nothing to ontology, as a right triangle is comprised only of three connected line segments

How shall we decide if these economies are evidence for the truth of Armstrong's theory?   There are many notions that might serve as primitives, and many different rules that might be used to combine and reorder them   Obscure ideas that are clarified or reduced in one calculus might resist analysis and reconstruction in some other one. No one is satisfied if practical strategies or scientific hypotheses are recommended only because they are sober devices for organizing our thoughts   Shouldn't metaphysical hypotheses also be tested for their applicability to matters of fact?

One test of applicability is the evaluation of a theory's primitives do they signify real differences or entities in the world?   Armstrong's individuals are "thin," rather than bare, particulars every individual has at least one property   But what are these particulars apart from their single property or properties?   There is no actual thing that is more than the complex of its constitutent properties, including properties (mass and spatiotemporal position) which entify and individuate the thing   One suspects that Armstrong's particulars are a fiction postulated to serve as (intrinsically propertiless) bearers of properties, and as objects of linguistic or conceptual reference   *Possibility* was to be introduced by way of our claims about actuality, though now it seems that actuality itself is misdescribed

Is Armstrong's theory, nevertheless, a convincing if only schematic reduction of possibility to actuality?   Armstrong himself supplies the criterion for judging whether or not this is so   He considers and rejects the idea that there might be "alien" properties   These are properties satisfying two conditions they are nowhere instantiated

in our world, and they are not generatable from any combination of
the properties current here   Armstrong's care in addressing this
issue is an example of all that is meticulous and honest in his book
Still, his resolution of the question does not save his theory.   For
suppose that our world were one of those "contracted" worlds that
Armstrong discusses there are perceived sounds but no perceived col-
ors, or there are two spatial dimensions rather than three, or nothing
changes   Each of the missing properties could not be generated from
the ones remaining, even when Armstrong's extensive analysis of in-
tensive and internal properties is accepted   Accordingly, these ex-
amples satisfy Armstrong's criteria for being alien properties relative
to these contracted worlds   Significantly, these missing properties
are *logically possible* they are possible because they embody no con-
tradiction, not because of being generatable from properties acknowl-
edged as actual within a contracted world   These are possibles that
escape Armstrong's reduction of possibility to counterfactual claims
about the recombination of actuals

    Armstrong can defeat this implication only by supposing that every
logically possible property is *necessarily* either instantiated in our
world, or generatable by combining properties current here   For
otherwise, possibility will escape reduction to actuality when one or
more logically possible properties are neither instantiated nor gen-
eratable from properties which are instantiated   Armstrong is sen-
sitive to these issues; but nowhere does he demonstrate that every
logically possible property is and must be either instantiated in our
world, or generatable from the ones present here   Logically possible
but uninstantiated, ungeneratable properties do not fall to his analysis.
Their possibility does not reduce to actuality

    What status might these properties have?   It seems reasonable to
propose that uninstantiated properties are *universalia ante rem*, and
that their mode of existence is the one of possibility   Where the
presence of most properties in an actual world is a contingency (only
excepting the properties present in every possible, hence any actual
world), and where it is possible that no property should have been
anywhere instantiated, it follows that every property is, at its incep-
tion, a possibility only   We get Tractarian Platonism (with its pos-
sibilities in logical space), not Armstrong's Tractarian nominalism
We accept the obligation for telling what possibility is as a mode of
being, and how it relates to actuality   We also remark that Arm-
strong's extensional analysis of internal properties does not eliminate
the different qualifications for relatedness (the dispositions) of the
things having extensional properties   Accordingly, we distinguish
logical, eternal possibilities from the material possibilities current
within an actual world the locks and keys of our world qualify for
only such relationships as express the particular geometry instantiated
here, not for relationships appropriate to the many uninstantiated
geometries   We reintroduce, because a comprehensive description of
nature and being requires it, these parts of the *de re*, modal apparatus
which Armstrong has eliminated

    He intimates or discusses all of these issues (except the ones of the

last paragraph) This is metaphysics on a grand scale compressed within a book that is short and plainly written —David Weissman, *City College of New York*

BENITEZ, E E *Forms in Plato's* Philebus Assen Van Gorcum, 1989 x + 162 pp Paper, Dfl 42 50—This book is an attempt to meet the arguments of scholars who have denied that within the *Philebus*, generally recognized as a late dialogue, the theory of Forms of the middle dialogues is advocated or plays an important role Accordingly, instead of a commentary on the argument of the *Philebus* as a whole, Benitez presents a painstaking analysis of those passages that promise to shed light on Plato's metaphysical and epistemological views at the time of the writing of the *Philebus* The result is not for the casual reader, since much of the book is devoted to a careful examination of the Greek text and alternative interpretations Nonetheless this book will prove profitable for all who are interested in Platonic metaphysics, for Benitez concentrates on developing cogent interpretations of the One-Many problems and the Heavenly Tradition (14c–19a) and the Fourfold Classification (23c–27c), two of the most difficult and provocative passages in the Platonic corpus

Benitez's argument is as follows The One-Many problem of 15b-c does indeed present serious problems for the theory of Forms of the middle dialogues, Plato shows that he is aware that it is difficult to precisely state the relation generic forms have to those they subsume and the relation forms have to the sensibles participating in them But this is not evidence that the theory has been rejected For the first one-many problems, which deal with how a single subject can have a multiplicity of predicates, are dismissed by Socrates as trivial, yet for Plato can be solved only by appealing to the theory of Forms in question Socrates does not need to solve the serious One-Many problem, but to show that it does not threaten the possibility of philosophical discourse He does so in the Heavenly Tradition which, Benitez argues, is the familiar method of division The objects of division are both Forms and their sensible instances Plato's problematic examples of this method are dealt with by arguing that Plato did not distinguish between classification *per genus et differentiam* and by determinable and determinate

Benitez interprets the Fourfold Classification as a new expression of the theory of Forms of the middle dialogues The *apeira* (unlimited things) are the material substrates of sensible objects The *peras echonta* (limiting things) are Forms, the principles of number and measure which, when imposed on matter by the "cause," a divine mind, give rise to the "mixed things," which are sensible objects Benitez offers this interpretation of the Fourfold Classification as the only one compatible with the metaphysical views put forward elsewhere in the dialogue

Benitez further argues that within those passages in which Plato says that sensibles "are," Plato is employing the verb "to be" in a weak sense, as he does on occasion in the middle dialogues, and that the dialogue contains clear references to the familiar Being/Becoming and Knowledge/Opinion distinctions

I find Benitez's account largely convincing, but would like to indicate one problem area   A traditional problem has been what sense to give the terms *peras* and *apeiron* in both the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold Classification   According to Benitez's interpretation, in the Heavenly Tradition, *peiras* denotes what is quantitatively limited in respect to plurality, and *apeiron*, what is quantitatively unlimited in respect to plurality, while in the Fourfold Classification *peiras* denotes what is quantitatively limited in respect to degree and *apeiron* what is quantitatively unlimited in respect to degree   According to Benitez, in both passages each term has the same sense but is differently applied   But 23c is most naturally read as an assertion that the same *beings* are operative principles in both accounts   A related point is that Benitez's ,assertion that the Fourfold Classification is concerned ⌐ with the metaphysical makeup of sensibles alone and not Forms seems unwarranted   Benitez argues that to interpret the passage otherwise would entail interpreting Plato as here making the unprecedented assertion that Forms in some sense come to be   But at *Metaphysics* 1 6 987b34-5 Aristotle relates that Plato took certain intelligibles to be born (*gennasthai*) from an *apeiron*.   Benitez discounts the evidence Aristotle presents on the grounds that the *Philebus* can be understood entirely on its own terms   Nonetheless, some account ought to have been given of the striking parallels between the Fourfold Classification and Aristotle's testimony concerning the "unwritten doctrines "

Despite this criticism, I highly recommend *Forms In Plato's Philebus* for the important contribution it makes to the controversy over the development of Plato's thought, as well as its lucid treatment of difficult passages within the *Philebus* —Owen Goldin, *Marquette University*

CASTAÑEDA, Hector-Neri   *Thinking, Language, and Experience*   Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1989   xvi + 302 pp $29 50— This is an extensive and diffuse collection of essays (and even correspondence) woven together by a number of leitmotifs   It is a work by a technically virtuosic professional philosopher for readers with the same credentials, even many of the complicated examples use extensive insider information about the institution of professional analytic philosophy in the last half of the twentieth century in the United States (e g , "Goodman ought to present the Sellars-Chisholm award to Quine   ")   In the sequence of its chapters, we see a development that in some ways mirrors Castañeda's philosophical career and topics of active thought   Namely, Part 1 of the book, embracing

4 chapters, is devoted to linguistic phenomena—broadly to issues of reference, but with special attention to indexicals and what Castañeda has called "quasi-indexicals " It reads very difficultly for anyone not steeped in recent issues in the philosophy of language Many elements of this work (especially the phenomenon of quasi-indexicality), might seem at first a rather slender basis on which to found a broader philosophy of mind, experience, and the world in the tradition of modern philosophy But this is precisely what Castañeda has done in his career and in this volume. His earlier analyses of complex referential phenomena form the unlikely springboard for far-flung reflections in epistemology, phenomenology, metaphysics, and, especially, the philosophy of mind

Castañeda addresses in the first chapter methodology and overall considerations, he is, among contemporary philosophers, one of the most self-conscious methodologists and is especially concerned to practice philosophy that initially rejects reductions and instead initially considers the broadest remotely usable data and detailed, complex pretheoretical phenomena at something approaching face value Castañeda illustrates his methodological principles in the introductory chapter by some refined and critical observations on Putnam's Twin Earth example

The post-initial four chapters on proper names, singular descriptions, indexical reference, and attributing reference to others are likely to pose something of an obstacle to further reading in the volume for those not utterly fascinated by debates in contemporary philosophy of language Stylistically irritating is Castañeda's tendency to conduct extensive expositions and dialogue with many competing and alternative theories Some correspond to actual theories in the literature, others are variants of them, and still others are logically possible theories—all indicated with acronyms, numbers, asterisks, and so on As an alternative to this pseudo-dialogue on major (mostly) and minor (occasionally) points, one would have preferred a more extensive internal development of Castañeda's own theory, even if it required a risky commitment on the part of the reader to the writer's own idiosyncratic view of the world

The remainder of the book could be described as Castañeda's case for the position that all experience and thought takes place within the internal framework of the cognitive agent "The most radical forms of skepticism [e g , Descartes' arguments, to which Castañeda submits, restrictedly] force us into Metaphysical Internalism This is, very roughly, the view that all thought and talk about the world and the reality underlying it are internal to experience, whatever reality may be in itself beyond experience, indeed, even if there is no reality beyond experience" (p 160) This result is chiefly obtained from the work of earlier chapters, in which Castañeda had marshaled various arguments against objective, external theories of "unique" reference (such as we see in Frege), and thereby had risked being accused of "psychologizing" logical and semantic phenomena Castañeda gives us extensive resources for describing the techniques and inner structure of this framework

His chief tool for discussing this internal cognitive framework is "guise theory" a theory of the complexes in which our mental representations of thought and perception are couched   Guise theory is given, alas, no focused systematic exposition, and is instead strewn through other discussions   It is a subjectified Lockean theory of ideas (but more closely inspired by Leibniz), enriched by the notions of the intensional and the intentional of Frege, Brentano, and Meinong, and developed with the symbolism and standards of clarity and precision of the late twentieth century   A guise is, roughly, the description (although a mental, not an external representation) under which we contemplate or experience anything. Especially important for Castañeda—and here he sails beyond the complete-thought complexes of Locke and Leibniz—are diverse *kinds* of copula by which ideas may be joined and thought as propositions (and even as distinctive action-theoretic nonpropositions, practitions)   Among these are consubstantiation and consociation—the latter a "thinking together" of two properties weaker than, say, the serious joint attribution of them, and that occurs in speculative and fictional thought   An entire chapter is devoted to fiction and "ontological questions about literary experience."

Although there are chapters devoted to issues in the philosophy of religion (mainly to the indexicality of God's omniscience) and in action theory (a brief reiteration without argument of his claims on behalf of practitions—but to which two earlier books were devoted), these tend to be in this context useful only insofar as they illuminate and extend his theory of mind   The structure of mind and the mental, one might say, receives much attention in Castañeda's work—and this will interest not just philosophers of mind, but also cognitive scientists and those in artificial intelligence—but about more basic and possibly simplistic questions, such as "What is a mind?" as well as about basic ontological claims, such as "What is there?"   Castañeda is elusive — Randall R Dipert, *State University of New York, College at Fredonia*

CESANA, Andres   *Geschichte als Entwicklung?   Zur Kritik des geschichtsphilosophischen Entwicklungsdenkens*   Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, 22   Berlin and New York   Walter de Gruyter, 1988   x + 405 pp   DM 198—This thorough study in the field of the philosophy of history was accepted as a *Habilitationsschrift* (Basel, 1986)   There is, however, a problem with this type of book the author is supposed to give a display of his learning and mastery of the entire (mostly German) literature on the subject   As a result, the style and wording may become pedantic

Cesana first devotes one hundred pages to a clarification of the concept of development to deal next with three models of philosophical theories which consider history as evolving towards improved conditions   In the third part of his study Cesana examines the difficulties inherent in these models   Finally, in part four, he presents a critique as well as a justification of this type of philosophy of history

The term *historiae* was originally used in the plural, but since approximately 1750 it occurs as a singular noun, a development which Cesana believes opened up a new dimension "history" became a unified whole of individual histories   However, is there any basis for abstracting a common essence "history" other than in the sense of a succession of events?   Only if one believes in uninterrupted "progress" toward always greater perfection, but such a belief seems to be the secularized form of a tenet of Christian faith

Cesana points out that with Hegel "history" became its own subject (p 13) "history" also implies awareness of history, in this way the concept became even more important than that of nature   Cesana makes the unwarranted assertion that for the first time man became aware that he shares a common history with others (p 15)   History became analogous with biological growth   In reality, however, history is different   One can only say, "Things happen in succession, some influencing others"   The model of organic development does not fit (p 52)

Next, Cesana discusses Rickert's view of historical development it is not possible to write a general history of mankind because systems of values are different everywhere (pp 66ff)   E Troeltsch is quoted to the effect that history cannot be compared to the evolution of an organism.   One must abandon a scientifico-positivistic view of historical development in favor of a philosophical approach such as is found in Kant's, Herder's, or Hegel's (pp 107-209)   The theory of development is presupposed in the philosophy of Kant history must have a goal, or process would be in vain   This means that at the end of time man's capacity for thinking will be fulfilled   Following Kant, Herder sees history as a uniform development   With Hegel, "development" becomes a process of spirit which becomes free in becoming itself in the history of mankind   In the third part of his book Cesana lists the main difficulties of these theories there is a transition to a wholly different genus of reality, viz, from nature to human history, since everything changes, there is no absolute viewpoint in history and no way to systematize events   As Löwith shows, the theories of history as development depend on theological conceptions and are a transposition of the history of salvation

In the last section of his study Cesana nevertheless attempts a justification of the philosophy of history: according to Dilthey, individual man can reach a certain fulfillment and so history gets a meaning Heidegger argues that only man has a history and must make himself free, surrounded as he is by necessity   For Jaspers there is no comprehensive interpretation, we see only glimpses of a possible meaning Cesana himself arrives at the modest conclusion that the human intellect has a history and must understand itself as historical

Our sketchy summary does not adequately render the scholarly and valuable contents of this important book   However, despite the qualities of this study, two defects catch the eye it is much too long and often repetitious, more damaging is the almost total disregard of the Christian patristic and medieval theologies of history and their impact Cesana proceeds as if the German philosophers of the eighteenth century constitute an absolute beginning and their theories are the only ones that matter —Leo J Elders, *Rolduc, The Netherlands*

DE BRUYNE, Edgard   *La Estética de la Edad Media*   Translated by C
Santos and C Gallardo   La Balsa de la Medusa Series, vol 15   Ma-
drid Visor, 1988   263 pp n p —The author is well known for his
Études d'Estétique Médiévale in three volumes (1946) which are an
indispensable guide to the several orientations in medieval aesthetics
One year later de Bruyne published this work, a manageable, brief
version of the first one   As the author himself indicates in the "In-
troduction," the general conclusions of the *Etudes* are presented in
an accessible way   Quotations have been reduced and most references
refer to the longer work   Unfortunately, this makes the book com-
pletely dependent on the *Etudes*   For that reason this book offers an
interesting introduction not to the specialist or to the researcher but
to the reader who wants to enjoy the spirit that inspired medieval
aesthetics
　　The book is divided into six sections and is finally completed with
an index of names   The first section considers the sources from which
the medieval authors gathered their aesthetic definitions—the Bible,
the philosophical works, the technical manuals, and the Greek and
Latin Fathers   The author observes that the medieval mind did not
discover new, original definitions, but simply stated universally known
opinions taken from ancient times and from the Christian tradition
A form is beautiful inasmuch as it expresses a certain similitude with
divine beauty   The philosophic origin of medieval symbolism is neo-
Platonism passed through Pseudo-Dionysus and the Fathers   Beauty
implies harmony, softness, and proportion   The main source of the
aesthetics of proportion is to be found in Boethius' technical treatises,
while the aesthetics of light and color are developed by St Ambrosius
and the Arabic tradition.   The author points out that the early Middle
Ages were inspired by the empirical formation of the offices and the
transcription of the old scholar books   The masters of rhetoric, from
which the Middle Ages inherited the pedagogic intention of painting
and the importance of the moral content of a poem, were Cicero, Vic-
torinus, Quintilianus, and Fortunatus   The author concludes this
section by remarking that though the same ancient formulas are re-
peated in the Middle Ages, the great originality is represented by the
Christian spirit which had great influence on symbolism and philos-
ophy of art
　　The second section is devoted to revealing the constant features
that are present in most authors symbolism, allegorism, veneration
for proportion, and color brightness   The third section then describes
some aesthetic systems   The author observes that etymological fic-
tions usually explain verbal definitions   He distinguishes three de-
grees of aesthetics immediate sensible aesthetics, scientific-philo-
sophical aesthetics, and allegoric-mystical aesthetics   The fourth
section takes into account the feeling of beauty   The author points
out that there is a powerful current for the aesthetic value of every
sensible pleasure and asserts that it is in the thirteenth century that
the problem of superior and inferior senses arises   The fifth section
is devoted to art its definition, as a ruled and reasoned creation of
order, its metaphysical and psychological foundations, the Christian-
ization of its content and form, and the intellectual element implied

in it   In the last section arts are described as offices sculpture and
painting as well as sewing or shoe making   The author asserts that
there is no general systematic theory of art in the Middle Ages but
he thinks there is a critical spirit that applies absolute norms to judg-
ing office perfection, decent unity, and visual pleasure

This book is an interesting work which introduces the reader to a
fascinating lost world in which men's production, faith, and everyday
life were unified   Selected, abundant Latin quotations make it a lovely
piece —Beatriz Bossi de Kirchner, *Universidad de Barcelona, Spain*

DESMOND, William, ed   *Hegel and His Critics Philosophy in the Aftermath
of Hegel*   SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies   Albany State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1989   xi + 242 pp   Cloth, $39 50, paper,
$12 95—Philosophy in the "aftermath" of Hegel is an apt subtitle for
this collection of essays from the Ninth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel
Society of America (October 1986)   A dozen articles, most with com-
mentaries, show the healthy diversity of Hegelian summer crops
springing up after the seemingly devastating mowing of his system
by nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers   While the major
critics (Marx, Kierkegaard, Russell, Heidegger, and Derrida among
them) are given their due, the general consensus of these articles is
that Hegel's thought withstands their attacks

That subsequent philosophers have had to define themselves over
against Hegel is without doubt, but several of the more interesting
articles in this volume focus on Hegelian counterarguments drawn
from his published works   The dialectical-systematic structure of
Hegel's thought lends itself to both revealing the one-sidedness of a
philosopher's critique and incorporating the criticism within itself
This movement can be seen in William Maker's essay, "Hegel's Critique
of Marx The Fetishism of Dialectics "   Maker argues that Marx's
famous inversion of dialectics to provide a scientific basis for praxis
falls into the mystification trap that both Marx and Hegel sought to
avoid.   Marx's science is not self-grounding (and therefore lacks ne-
cessity) once his appeal to material conditions establishes an oppo-
sition between subject and object   Rather than demystifying the
subject, Maker's Hegelian argument continues, Marx succeeds in rais-
ing the product of thought, dialectics itself, to the position of a fetish
The result, as Leslie Mulholland points out in "Hegel and Marx on
the Human Individual," is a devaluation of living human beings

George L Kline's presidential address evaluates the reversals of
Hegel's notions in Nietzsche as well as Marx   Despite their different
aims, they both give priority to the future over past or present   Kline
focuses on the use of spatial language to show how Nietzsche and
Marx measure progress in time (upwards to the mountain peaks/
downwards to the masses)   Hegel uses temporal metaphors (bud/
blossom/fruit) to describe the relations of various historical cultures
This difference leads practically to the instrumentalizing of whole

cultures as well as persons and denies the positive rights of the present blossoming.

Otherness/difference is considered in two pairs of papers Robert R. Williams's "Hegel and Heidegger," with a commentary by Eric von der Luft, and Joseph C Flay's "Hegel, Derrida, and Bataille's Laughter," with a witty response by Judith Butler   Heidegger was in error about Hegel's notion of truth   Far from a simple correspondence theory, Hegel's evolving definition arrives at truth as a historical process of disclosure that must include the hiddenness of being as a necessary condition.   Williams maintains that otherness is not dissolved into sameness even in the context of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhS*)

Joseph Flay, on the other hand, notes that Derrida rightly argues that otherness is retained in the dialectics of dependence/independence   Bataille is more radical in laughing at *Aufhebung* itself Struck by the compelling myth of lordship and bondage, Derrida sides with Bataille in claiming that the myth is too serious in positing the absolute negativity of death   Flay thinks that the two philosophers neglect later transitions in the *PhS*, which are not motions of *Aufhebung*   The shift from self-consciousness to reason, for example, requires self-consciousness to give over mastery to find a ground in the transcendent

Butler responds further that *Aufhebung* has a little-noticed comic element that prevents it from being a totally appropriative function She compares the subject of the *PhS* with Cervantes' Don Quixote, who repeatedly (and prematurely) announces the arrival of the absolute   The flexibility of the subject's adjustment to a more complex reality delights us, even as we recognize the seriousness of the life and death struggle.

Questions of logic and of self-consciousness dominate the remaining essays   Carl G Vaught addresses nondialectical difference in the *PhS*   Walter Zimmerli provides a technical description of the continuing debate in Germany on the question is Hegel's *Logic* a logic? Tom Rockmore defends Hegel's profound critique of reason and his interest in epistemology against Husserl's uninformed view   David S Stern argues that Ernst Tugendhat's recent interpretation of Hegelian reflection leading to political quietism is based on the Cartesian subject-object model of self-consciousness   Stern agrees with Williams that Hegel is not a Cartesian, since self-consciousness is *not* an object even to itself

These essays demonstrate that Hegel's technical writings on logic still have a vital connection to self-identity, social structures, and political life   In short, while the authors' titles indicate wide-ranging concerns, they turn to constant themes that foster a conversation between them —Patricia M Locke, *St John's College, Annapolis*

DE SOUSA, Ronald   *The Rationality of Emotion*   Cambridge, Mass · MIT Press, 1987   xix + 373 pp $25 00—This is an extremely rich, wide

ranging book, filled with insightful discussions of a large number of
issues related to the general topic of the emotions   Its value lies not
in its conclusions but in the details, which do not lend themselves
easily to summarizing.   So it must be said at the outset that this
review will not do justice to the sublety, complexity, and wit of
this book

Many have thought of emotions as subjective and irrational, as
purely internal disruptions which only interfere with the rational and
moral conduct of life   In this book de Sousa assesses this viewpoint
and rejects it, albeit in a moderate, cautious, and highly qualified way,
emotion is essential to the rational life and many particular emotions
are objective and rational in certain respects and to some degree   De
Sousa examines many aspects of emotion in general—biological, psy-
chological, epistemological, and ethical—of particular emotions such
as love and amusement, and of the connected phenomena of belief and
desire   In assessing the extent to which emotions are objective and
play a positive role in our rational life, he discusses the concepts of
objectivity and rationality as such

What is an emotion?   De Sousa says, "I concede that I am unable
to give a definition" (p 19), but he does give an account of how emotions
develop and how emotion terms get their meanings   Both proceed
by means of what he calls "paradigm scenarios," "little dramas in
which our natural capacities for emotional response were first en-
listed" (p 45)   Children, presented with a certain sort of situation,
respond in a characteristic way, originally inborn and then subjected
to cultural influences   As these patterns of stimulus and response
become established, emotion names are learned   As we grow, we in-
crease our repertoires of emotional response and our understanding
of emotion terms

The idea of a paradigm *scenario* is useful, for it brings out the com-
plexity of emotion, which essentially involves many elements—the
stimulus situation, subjective states of belief and desire, physiological
and psychological reactions, intentions, and behavioral responses.
The idea of *paradigm* scenario brings out its normative status both
for the social molding of our emotional experience and for our learning
the public language of emotion   Yet it also leaves room for variations
from one person to another resulting from individual differences in
personality, temperament, physiology, and environmental influences

De Sousa sees another advantage of the paradigm scenario approach
It moves us in the direction of an affirmative answer to the question
of the objectivity of emotion   The situation which triggers the sce-
nario will have certain features which become standard for evoking
the response and upon which the emotion focuses   By virtue of this
causal/conventional tie to external features, de Sousa claims, emotions
"apprehend something in the world that exists independently of our
reaction to it" (p 15)   How does this work?   "Emotions are best
regarded as a kind of perception, the objects of which are what I call
axiological properties" (p. 45)   In this way, they "tell us things about
the real world" (p 203)

What are "axiological" properties?   Here are some examples he
gives pitiable, sad, fearsome, hateful, lovable (p 152)   De Sousa holds
that these are not merely projections onto situations by the subject

but are, at least sometimes, real properties which situations have independently of the observer but apprehended through emotion

De Sousa does not want to go so far as to say that some situations might have been, say, pitiable even if no one had ever felt the emotion of pity, an even stronger version of the objectivity of emotion, because "emotions are rooted in paradigm scenarios" (p 303) which essentially involve the actual responses of subjects to actual situations   Thus de Sousa holds a relational view of axiological properties as "what are sometimes called tertiary properties" (p 151), supervenient on other qualities and defined by their power to produce a particular response (pp 151-6)   The paradigm scenario consists of a certain sort of situation and the subject's response to it   The particular emotion is defined as that sort of response to that sort of situation, the objective feature of the situation which paradigmatically evokes that response is the axiological property

There are difficulties in this paradigm scenario account   Essential to it is the idea that for certain sorts of situations there is a "normal" response, biologically determined in infants and modified by subsequent social and individual development and experience   However, the concept of the "normal" is notoriously vague, as well as contentious beyond its use in biological and statistical contexts

De Sousa sees the difficulty here   Not only are "normal" reactions relative to cultural and social contexts, but they are also relative to individual temperaments and individual life histories, to what de Sousa calls "individual normality" (p 202), what is normal for that particular individual   Finally there is even what de Sousa refers to as "a mature emotional reaction" (p 187)   With all this relativity to various factors external to and independent of the stimulus situation, I find it implausible to see emotional reactions as apprehensions of objective properties of that situation

Looking more closely at this matter, the question of the objectivity of emotions raises two issues, first, whether there are general features common to the situations which cause particular emotions and, second, whether we can take emotions to be the apprehending of those features I am inclined to think the answers to both questions are in the negative. To take the example of mirth, to which de Sousa devotes a very interesting chapter, it is true that ordinary idioms suggest objectivity We speak of finding or failing to find a situation funny or, seeing or failing to see the humor in a situation, of having or lacking a sense of humor   But no one has come close to saying what humorous situations have in common   A sense of humor is more like a sense of style or decorum than a sense of smell, more like good sense than like good hearing, more a feature of personality or character than of cognitive capacity   We do not come to see the humor in a situation by inspecting it more carefully, improving the conditions of observation, or developing new instrumentation   Amusement is not detection

De Sousa believes that objectivity is a matter of degree, that different emotions will have different locations on "the continuum of subjectivity and objectivity" (p 314)   The closer our emotion is to the objective end of the continuum, the more we "feel things as they really are" (p 315)   The example de Sousa gives of a relatively sub-

jective emotion is that of a racist who feels disgust at the idea of miscegenation (p 315)   Of this case he says, "there is nothing in the racist's discomfort that tells us anything about the objective value at stake in the situation the racist's sentiment relates only to the racist herself" (p 316)   It is not clear whether he thinks that in some cases of disgust the situation or idea of it is really objectively disgusting I do not see that here we would have a case of "feeling things as they really are" or "learning about the objective value at stake in the situation "   It would seem that disgust is purely in the eye (or stomach) of the beholder

De Sousa does seem to be right in claiming that "paradigm scenarios" are essential to defining emotions, for, to take disgust again, various eating situations might serve for various groups of people to teach them what disgust is   But he goes on to say that "our only access to the level of reality that emotions reveal is through the paradigm scenario that has our world view" (p 315)   Different groups will find different eating situations disgusting, but it is very hard to take seriously the idea that any of them is having "access to the level of reality that emotions reveal "   There may well be an evolutionary explanation of the emotion of disgust connected with the fact that eating certain sorts of things was not healthy for our ancestors, but our present reactions of disgust are far removed from those ancient contexts and no longer provide reliable information about the object of our disgust

Perhaps de Sousa would admit that disgust is a relatively subjective emotion   Since he also speaks of the distress of the racist, his point might be that racist distress is subjective but the distress at, for example, a child in pain is objective   But how is this line to be drawn? It would seem that the idea of a paradigm scenario applies even to the racist, whose socialization and individual nature may both ingrain that emotional response   I can see no reason to think that the one situation is genuinely and objectively distressing whereas the other is not   I do not think de Sousa gives us adequate criteria for distinguishing subjective from objective emotions

Even if one remains unconvinced of the objectivity of emotion, there is still the very important question of the place of emotion in the conduct of our rational life, reflected in the very title of the book   De Sousa argues that emotions are essential to the rational life in the following way "emotion deals with insufficiencies of reason by controlling salience" (p 201)   In any given situation requiring action we are faced with a bewildering overabundance of objects of attention, information, interpretations, principles of inference, implications, strategies, needs, desires, character traits, and personal inclinations An emotion "limits the range of information that the organism will take into account, the inferences actually drawn from a potential infinity, and the set of live options among which it will choose" (p 195)

I agree that emotions do often determine salience and dictate actions   But are emotions necessary and indispensable to determining salience?   De Sousa believes that because of the need for salience "the faculty of emotion is actually required for the more conventional mechanisms of rationality to function" (p 2)   But the fact is that

salience comes about in other ways as well as through emotion   De
Sousa himself must admit this, for he points out that sometimes emo-
tions themselves conflict and require nonemotional resolution (p 236)
    On the matter of the role of specific emotions in our rational conduct,
de Sousa examines at length ways in which we assess individual emo-
tional responses for their appropriateness or legitimacy in a chapter
on pathology in emotional life   We may have erroneous beliefs about
what emotion we now have or lack   We may induce an emotion by
deliberately mimicking the behavior typically expressive of that be-
havior (the emotional analogue of cognitive self-deception)   A sit-
uation may evoke a long past scenario which is now inappropriate (as
in Freud's "transference")   We may have mistaken beliefs about who
is the object of the emotion or about whether we could have that
emotion toward anyone else   These are various ways in which our
emotional life can go awry, not by misapprehending an independent
objective reality but by misapprehending the nature of an internal
subjective reality   The basic distinction here is not between "normal"
and "abnormal" reactions, which depends upon "a yet-to-be-con-
structed theory of individual nature" (p 264), but between "authentic"
and "inauthentic" internal responses
    But de Sousa has difficulty distinguishing authentic from inauthen-
tic emotions because he recognizes the great weight that social con-
ditioning plays in the emergence of paradigm scenarios   He does
point out that "we do have some indirect control, however we can
regestalt even those early paradigms" (p 263), but he never says what
authentic regestalting would be   And he admits in the end that "the
notion of authenticity remains elusive" (p 322)
    On the major issues this book deals with, as with the key concepts
of "authentic" and "normal" emotions, de Sousa is inconclusive   But
this is perhaps his point, for he does demonstrate the great multiplicity
of factors in our emotional life which militate against neat and simple
conclusions—the complex interplay of biology, culture, and personal
idiosyncracies, the varying effects of the contingencies of life expe-
rience, and our inconstant efforts to make our emotional life rational,
objective, and ethical, to name only a few   Only a fool would look
for conclusiveness here and de Sousa shows himself to be no fool, but
a deeply thoughtful, suggestive and insightful philosopher —Jerome
Shaffer, *University of Connecticut*

DIETZ, Mary G , ed   *Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory*   Lawrence, Kan
    University Press of Kansas, 1990   x + 211 pp $25 00—This inter-
    esting set of essays situates Hobbes's writings in the political and
    religious debates of seventeenth-century England   The essays'
    strengths lie in their historical and political insights   The authors
    of the papers engage in detailed examination of Hobbes and English
    history in order to shed light on several slighted dimensions of
    Hobbes's works   The cases for these interpretations are mounted

with sensitivity and skill   The upshot is a stimulating book for phi-
losophers that raises more questions than it answers

All but one of the authors are political theorists   The topics of the
essays reflect their political interests and their attempts to show how
"Hobbes's writings are motivated by concrete political problems and
a practical concern, namely, to secure political order, absolute sov-
ereignty, and civil peace" (p 4)   The essays capitalize on the recog-
nition that "Hobbes was, first and foremost, a political thinker [whose]
writings were, first and foremost, political acts" (p 4)   At least for
the editor, then, these papers and the conference from which they
emerged involve recent revisions and elaborations of the Hobbes
interpretation that stems from figures like Quentin Skinner and
J G A Pocock.   Gordon Schochet's paper on the voluntary ground
of political obligation in Hobbes explicitly uses a Skinnerian starting
point, while other papers use notions of culture and discourse that
suggest the influence of Skinner, Pocock, Kuhn, and similar theorists

The book contains a brief introduction and eight essays by Sheldon
Wolin, David Johnston, Schochet, Deborah Baumgold, Stephen
Holmes, Richard Tuck, James Farr, and the editor   This is a prom-
inent cast of characters, many of whom have written important books
on Hobbes and seventeenth-century political thought   One has reason
to expect a good deal from them, and most do not disappoint

Wolin, for example, tries to show how Hobbes contributed to the
creation of a modern "culture of despotism, i e , a social mentality
and practice that enable power to operate unhindered" (p. 17)   In a
variety of ways, Hobbes links a new conception of theoretical, scientific
knowledge with a novel understanding of the state and political au-
thority   The outcome is a modern form of despotism that is neither
tyrannical nor theological but rather ties together power and knowl-
edge in diverse relations

Schochet, in "Intending (Political) Obligation," raises an important
question about Skinner's well-known thesis that Hobbes is a defender
of a secular, *de facto* justification for Engagement with the Rump
According to this style of defense, protection entails obedience   But
if so, Schochet asks, "what is to be gained by insisting that subjects
take an oath of allegiance?" (p 56)   What role, that is, does voluntary
consent actually play?   Schochet's answer, in part, is that personal
will ties subject to ruler and does so "without violating [the subject's]
natural liberty" (pp 58, 69)   Furthermore, Hobbes needs to enrich
an account of authority by acquisition that is by itself incomplete
with a doctrine of gratitude, which is ultimately inconsistent with
Hobbes's voluntarism regarding obligation   Schochet, then, identifies
interesting questions, but they are ones that he cannot quite answer,
for he does not show what intention or will mean in Hobbes's psy-
chology and exactly how Hobbes's naturalistic understanding of liberty
is at work here   Nor does he clarify precisely how consent is involved
in both the act of authorization and the interpersonal contract to
engage in it

Dietz's paper focuses attention on Hobbes's view of the citizen and
the virtues of citizenship   This is a neglected aspect of Hobbes's
moral and political theory, which is generally understood in terms of

obligations and laws rather than virtues and character   But Dietz's discussion is largely a matter of showing that Hobbes was interested in the subject as "civic personality" (p 103)   What she fails to do is to ask what virtues as character traits *are* for Hobbes, what he means by them psychologically, and how they are related to his notions of desire and rationality   In short, Dietz assumes that Hobbes's notion of a virtue or psychological quality is clear and she proceeds to explore its roles and connections in his political theory, but this assumption is one that should not be made

The final two essays deal with religious matters   Tuck's richly historical account of the political and legal background of religious toleration shows how *Leviathan* advocates a natural religion that is tolerant of historical diversity and that defended Independency Farr's focus is on the method of reading Scripture that Hobbes advocates and on the uses to which he puts Scriptural interpretation Ultimately these uses include a defense of Hobbes's rationalism, of his natural philosophy and materialism, and of his absolutism, as well as a polemic against religious power and superstitious religiosity

From these essays, then, we learn that to read and understand Hobbes we must be scrupulously attentive to the historical context in which he speaks as well as to what he says   Only by doing both will we understand Hobbes well, as an involved political thinker, as these essays argue, and as a religious thinker, classical scholar, student of language, and natural philosopher —Michael L Morgan, *Indiana University*

DZIEMIDOK, B , and McCORMICK, P , eds   *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden   Interpretations and Assessments*   Nijhoff International Philosophy Series   Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 x + 301 pp $69 00—This is a collection of twelve essays, four of which are from the English-speaking world and eight from Poland, home of the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden   Though he has written widely in ontology, epistemology, axiology, logic, and philosophical anthropology, Ingarden is chiefly known, especially in the English-speaking world, for his work in aesthetics   His chief works in this area, *The Literary Work of Art* (1931) and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (1937)—both appearing in English translation in 1973— established him as a philosopher of literature.   But his work in aesthetics extended both to the level of general theory and to the level of the analysis of other aesthetic regions, such as painting, architecture, sculpture, music, and film

The first article in this volume (Gierulanka, pp 1-20) provides a sketch of Ingarden's philosophical work, while the concluding bibliography provides a select list of 48 items in the Polish, French, and German originals from a complete bibliography of over 200 items, including 27 books   (The inclusion of full bibliographical information on works available in English would have been helpful for the English-speaking audience to whom the current book is addressed)

The next three articles are dedicated to exploring general issues regarding works of art their structure, their embodying aesthetic categories, and their relation to values   The next four are devoted to Ingarden's main focus the literary work of art   (Three of the English-speaking authors have devoted their articles to literary themes.)   The last three deal with other domains of art music, sculpture, and theatre

Ingarden's major focus on the literary work of art distinguishes four strata of the work, variously listed as levels of sounds, of language meanings, of perspectives, and of objects and situations (Gierulanka, pp. 13–14), or a phonological, a semantic, an objective, and a schematic level (Szczepanska, p 40)   The first has to do with sound as carrier of the work   Ingarden considers writing to be a mere set of directions for the imaginative "performance" of a work rather than a constituent of the work proper   Sound he sees as an essential feature of language. (Schusterman argues against this exteriorization of writing, p 152) The semantic level is the level of sentence meanings, while the objective level has to do with the entities described   The most interesting is the schematic level, which Szczepanska seems to fuse with the perspectival level   All of this exists as sets of special intentional objects essentially dependent upon the constituting acts of two kinds of subjectivities the author's, which produces the "purely intentional object," and the reader's, which, following the recipe of the printed text, brings into being the "derivatively purely intentional object" (Fizer, p 162)   Each reader consitutes out of the richness or poverty of his own experience a new intentional object based on the directives of the text but necessarily filling in its "areas of indeterminacy" (Markiewicz, p 115)

Ingarden further distinguishes the artistic object (givenness) from the aesthetic object (concretization), the latter having its existence actualized by the percipient (Fizer, p 171). The aesthetic object bears certain values, both material (in the sense of subject-matter) and formal   Combined together, these values generate "qualities of values," such as beauty, greatness, and immaturity (Misiewicz, pp 63–4)   Dziemidok sees the requisite concretization of the schematized object by a percipient as supporting a relational rather than Ingarden's more objectivist understanding of aesthetic value (p 78)

Editor Peter McCormick contrasts a dominant analytical approach to literature with a hermeneutical approach   The analytical considers the truth-value of sentences in literature and sees it at its best in reproducing actual states of affairs or in hypotheses about individual and social structure and action   The hermeneutic perspective, shared by Ingarden, claims that artworks furnish access to truths unavailable elsewhere   Literary truth is present minimally in the representation of "realities", further, in consistency with its own stipulations, more deeply, in the presence of "metaphysical qualities", and finally, in the "idea" of the literary work which manifests those qualities (pp 223–4)   Such qualities are the sublime, the tragic, the demonic, the grotesque, the holy, and the like   Their manifestness constitutes the high point of human existence, radically transforming us and throwing into relief our everyday existence (pp 225–6).   For Ingarden, the function of art in general is "to show the possible and necessary

connections between the qualitative endowment of objects, and of man
in particular, and values and to enable man to enter into a direct
commerce with values by acting upon his emotional life" (*The Literary
Work of Art*, p 203)

There are particular treatments of music (Pytlak, pp 233ff), sculp-
ture, and theater. Ingarden viewed abstract sculpture as well as pro-
gram music, abstract painting, film, and the stage play as interstitial
forms (Pollick, p 262) He works with a distinction between presen-
tational and nonpresentational art forms, architecture being a pure
example of the latter, literature of the former But, parallel to Ar-
istotle's view of music, the nonpresentational forms nonetheless pro-
vide a unique experience of the human soul (p 263) Even represen-
tational forms have a presentational feature Citing F David Martin
("The Autonomy of Sculpture," 1976), Pollick faults Ingarden for the
loss of the tactual in favor of the visual approach to sculpture, for
even in seeing we are aware of the power of the object and its appeal
to our desire to move around and apprehend it (pp 273-6) Reversing
Ingarden, Pollick claims that "representational sculpture is more a
transitional form than presentational sculpture" (p 278)

Ingarden's phenomenological approach is criticized for abstracting
from traditions that allow us to understand the conventions that define
a work within a culture and to understand why symmetricality, ex-
pressiveness, and originality, for example, are successively preferred
in different epochs (Dziemidok, p 88, Markiewicz, p 118) He is crit-
icized further for not attending in any significant way to the critical
work done by others, thinking that contact with other views and at-
titudes hampers intuitive contact with "the things themselves" (Mar-
kiewicz, p 105) He is criticized again for attempting to read different
regions of art from the perspective of his major focus, the literary
work of art He is criticized finally for regarding certain art forms
as borderline because of a prejudice that pure art can only contain
"quasi-judgments" that do not refer to actual entities (Markiewicz,
p 117, Kuznicka, p 285)

Taken as a whole, the essays in this book present a fairly clear view
of Ingarden's aesthetics, even to one only marginally familiar with
his work They likewise focus areas of critical disagreement among
those who have learned significantly from him

As an addendum, I might note that there are countless typos, gram-
matical errors, phrases repeated, lines missing, lines not brought to
margin, and names incorrectly entered (Zuckerkandl is referred to no
less than six times as Yuckerkandl) All in all, one can only regard
this as an extremely sloppy job of editing That constitutes a sig-
nificant distraction from an otherwise clear and balanced exposition
of the thought of a significant twentieth-century thinker —Robert E
Wood, *University of Dallas*

FOCILLON, Henri *The Life of Forms in Art* Translated by Charles B
    Hogan and George Kubler New York Zone Books, 1989 190 pp

$19 95—This theoretical work by the prominent art historian first appeared in 1934 as *Vie des formes* As Jean Molino indicates in his "Introduction," it contains "in condensed form a great specialist's global vision of his field of study" (p 9) The book is divided quite neatly into six chapters, with the core chapters on matter and mind framed by chapters on space and time, which are framed in turn by "The World of Forms" in the beginning and "In Praise of Hands" at the end

We should note from the start the restriction of the treatment to forms in the plastic arts, the arts of shaping space, the performing arts, the arts occupying time, do not enter into consideration None-theless, Focillon sees spatial forms not as static termini but as organizing principles They occupy a realm between physical extent and pure thought They have a relatively autonomous life of their own, not so much following conceptually articulatable meaning as gathering such meaning to themselves. They generate social structure by determining "psychological landscapes" They create historical myths and transform their meanings

Forms group themselves into different styles which tend to spread across different spatial media Styles are coherent groupings which move through processes of defining, transmuting, and escaping from their definitions They tend to pass through four successive states designated as the experimental age, the classic age, the age of refinement, and the baroque age Focillon claims, in diametrical opposition to the dominant contemporary canon of total artistic freedom—the one dogmatic absolute of today's artistic community—that confinement leads to more experimentation and refinement, while "unlimited freedom inevitably leads to imitation" (p 62) The classic age is differentiated from the academic as the "perfectly balanced instant of complete possession of form" from its inert image following the monotonous application of rules (p 55)

Passing on to the consideration of space, Focillon considers it to be not simply a location for art but shaped and even created by art Architecture creates a new world of geometrical, mechanical, and optical space It employs light as itself a material compressed into rays or patterned through the colors of stained-glass windows and thus rendered capable of taking shape as tranquilizing or vivifying Perspective in painting transformed the whole sense of pictorial space, but also, applied to architecture, exploded the ceilings and thus introduced a new geometry.

In his chapter on matter, Focillon views it not simply as inert stuff to be shaped but as structure and activity, that is, as itself form He considers the center of his investigations to be the idea of matter as intimately linked with the idea of technique Even the rationalist so views matter, for he sees it in function of the technique of logic Technique is "a whole poetry of action" (p 103) The consideration of technique puts us in the position of the artist rather than that of the passive viewer Technique extracts vital forces from matter Form, matter, tool, and hand are to be considered together, expressed best in the notion of the "touch"

The life of the mind which works in and upon matter is the life of forms in a general sense, which includes ideas as well as artistic forms, both of which are organized for action   Forms allow us to appropriate our world and to create a new man out of animal man   Minds are affiliated throughout time, not in terms of influence alone, but also, even without influence, in terms of families of mind united by affinities of form

In the chapter on time, Focillon notes that what occurs in a given time may, in terms of the other elements at the time, be actual, precocious, or residual   Forms are not so much governed by the other factors in a given time period as they are by the history of their own development, although they tend to break into a culture as an event of rupture   However, there are both organic and critical periods, periods of greater cohesion among the various segments of a culture and periods of greater diversity   In the former, art reaches a peak in provoking accord among the moments of race, environment, and life

In the final chapter, "In Praise of Hands," Focillon looks at the work of culture in general as form given to things by the touch of our hands   Except for spoken language, everything distinctively human is the work of our hands   Even spoken language takes on vivacity through gestural accompaniment   The textures of surface, volume, density, and weight are manifest not by sight but by touch   Through our hands we give shape to our dreams and bring into being the world of civilization, the manifestation in space and time of the relation between our minds and the formal energies of things

In his account, Focillon is both tempted and repulsed by a Platonizing tendency toward ideal types   The late-blooming visionary theoretician is held in check by a lifetime of practice in empirical inquiry. He consequently goes out of his way to keep his forms "alive" and evolving.   Always his theoretical vision stands in dialectical tension with his concrete investigations, each being stimulated and hampered by the other   But that tension is a needed safeguard against the empirical tendency to wander through piles of information raked together into loosely connected chapters as well as against the philosopher's occupational hazard of manipulating abstractions far removed from the lifeworld   *The Life of Forms* is a stimulating work, a live form itself, created by a mind whose sense of form is alive on every page —Robert E Wood, *University of Dallas*

HAASE, Wolfgang, ed   *Aufsteig und Niedergang der Romischen Welt*   Teil II   36 1 Philosophie (Historische Einleitung, Platonismus)   Berlin De Gruyter, 1987.   xvi + 712 pp   DM 438—This is the first of four projected volumes in this series that will concern themselves with philosophy.   Perhaps before discussing the contents proper it would be best to say something about *Aufsteig und Niedergang der Romischen Welt (ANRW)* as a whole, since a philosophical audience may not yet

have encountered it and its background is relevant to comments below
ANRW began some twenty years ago as a project to publish a collection
of articles which would delineate the state of contemporary scholar-
ship on various facets of the Roman period   Part 1 concerned the
Roman Republic, it was a *relatively* modest four volumes with a mere
4,500 pages available (at current prices) for about DM 2,000   For-
tunately, the quality of the scholarship was high, most contributors
were the recognized experts in their respective fields   Part 2 concerns
the Roman Empire   Publication is far from complete, but 62 massive
volumes are projected (with an estimated content of over 50,000 pages).
The cost of the volumes published so far is about DM 20,000   The
contents of the second part range over all aspects of Roman history
and culture, from Armenian history to New Testament studies
    This first volume on ancient philosophy concerns Platonism through
Plotinus (future issues will cover later Platonism, Aristotelianism,
Hellenistic Philosophy, and the transmission of philosophy to the Ar-
abic world) and contains seventeen studies ranging from an overview
of philosophy in the Roman period (J -M André, "Les écoles philo-
sophiques aux deux premiers siècles de l'Empire") and Platonism (J
Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Em-
pire") to highly specific analyses of particular texts (e g , P Hadot,
"Structure et thèmes du Traité 38 [VI, 7] de Plotin")   While many
fine and important items are contained within these pages, the reader
is confronted by two questions 1) why do the selections not give a
comprehensive view of "Roman" Platonism? and 2) why is the quality
of the scholarship so uneven?
    The content of this volume focuses on three subjects· Plutarch, mid-
dle Platonism, and Plotinus   In the case of (the oft-neglected) middle
Platonism, the volume serves us well by providing discussions of Apu-
leius (by B L Hijmans), Atticus (by C Moreschini), and Ammonius
Saccas (by F M Schroeder)   But it completely neglects the *Didas-
kalikos* by Albinus (or [Albinus]) which must be reckoned one of the
most central texts for our understanding of Platonism in this period
It also neglects the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*
Similarly in the case of Plotinus, there are two bibliographic contri-
butions (1951–71 by H J. Blumenthal and 1971–86 by K Corrigan), a
study of a specific text (noted above), and three studies one on con-
sciousness (by F M Schroeder), one on mysticism (by J Bussanich),
and one on asceticism as athletic training (by D A Dombrowski)
Plotinian metaphysics, to take only one example, is almost wholly
neglected   Prescinding from the question of the quality of scholar-
ship, it is difficult to understand why the three later studies should
have been published here rather than in appropriate journals
    But let us turn to the question of scholarship   There can be no
question that this volume contains many important contributions of
the highest scholarly standards   Yet one still finds studies which
are, to this reviewer's mind, rather weak   For instance, F E Brenk's
contribution, "An Imperial Heritage. The Religious Spirit of Plutarch
of Chaironeia," runs just over 100 pages, yet I do not find that this
adds much to our knowledge of Plutarch   Though it does present
analyses of many of Plutarch's works and the past scholarship devoted

to them, it never manages to synthesize this material so that we might come to a better understanding of Plutarch's religious spirit as a whole

Perhaps our main disappointment should be with the seemingly complete lack of editorial control   Many of these contributions (though certainly worthy of publication) should not have been published in this form, and a number of other articles should have been actively solicited in order that we might have a comprehensive and unified account of Platonic philosophy in the Roman period.   Finally, I might alert the reader to the cost of the volume, the price will keep this scholarship out of the hands of all but those with access to major research libraries —Lawrence P Schrenk, *The Catholic University of America*

HANCOCK, Ralph C   *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics*   Ithaca, N Y   Cornell University Press, 1989   xvii + 221 pp $26 50—
The question of Calvin's influence on modern political thought is a mine that has been so thoroughly worked that one would have expected it by now to be exhausted   Yet Ralph Hancock has not only uncovered and dug out a new (if perhaps tenuous) vein of ore, but managed to show that some of the ore previously extracted contains a sizeable admixture of fool's gold   To specialists in intellectual history this is doubtless a significant accomplishment; others may see it as the sort of modest contribution characteristic of a decent doctoral dissertation

Hancock holds that, in spite of obvious contrarieties, there is a curious but profound convergence between modern rationalism and Calvinist Christianity   The basis of this convergence is their mutual dethronement of classical reason, understood as the human speculative capacity to grasp the hierarchical structure of a telic order   By completing and radicalizing Luther's rejection of the (medieval) sacralization of existing hierarchies as well as of projected new ones, Calvin opened the way for secular activism and the untrammeled application of the human mind to worldly concerns arising from the instinct of temporal collective self-preservation which he viewed as the sole, but not saving, remnant of the image of God in fallen human nature.

Calvin's ruling motive in this was to affirm God's glory   The end that the Creator has ordained for man lies beyond man's speculative comprehension, he can but humbly follow the instinct divinely implanted in him to pursue his manifest social good   If he does this strenuously with the pure objective of magnifying God, it will be a sign of his election to eternal life   Works of practical justice are, for Calvin, the expression of love at the social level   The elect person will concentrate on such works instead of on the cultivation of mystical experience or spiritual perfection, for his aim is not his salvation but God's glory   As a faithful and zealous instrument of divine providential care, he knows that he is saved neither by his faith nor by his zeal, and certainly not by his works, these things are not merits for which he can claim credit but rather emanations of God's predestinating grace working in and through him

Thus Calvin sharply severs the secular from the religious, only to join the two more tightly than before   He liberates worldly life from bondage to the presumptuous claims of apotheosized human reason, only to bind it to a will that transcends the capacity of human reason to discern.

The above summary may seem fairly straightforward but it is necessarily oversimplified.   In actuality, Hancock leads the dizzied reader through a subtle and convoluted dialectic, moving from tension to tension and paradox to paradox, relying almost exclusively upon the text of Calvin's works, especially the *Institutes*   His argument is conducted at such a rarified level of abstraction that one is at times inclined to wonder whether the game is worth the candle   Moreover, exasperated by the unrelieved onslaught of Calvin's paradoxes, one is tempted to dismiss them as mere contradictions   But while Hancock does occasionally point out minor inconsistencies and ambiguities in Calvin's thought, in the last analysis he succeeds in demonstrating the "rigorous internal unity" of Calvin's theology and the "intricate unity of Calvin's practical teaching with his theology "

As might be anticipated, substantial portions of the book address the conclusions of other Calvin scholars (J W Allen, Quentin Skinner, Michael Walzer) and interpreters of modernity (Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Hans Blumenberg)   Its thrust, of course (although explicitly disclaimed by Hancock as his intent), is to support a stream of thought, much under attack for the past seven decades, that identifies Calvin as an important founder of the modern age

If I seem to damn this work with faint praise, it is only because it fails to live up to its half-promise of being something more than a study in intellectual history   No disparagement of intellectual history is intended, but near the beginning and the end the author delivers himself of oblique yet tantalizing programmatic hints   It is to be hoped that they will be developed in a future essay —Robert V Andelson, *Auburn University*

HUSSERL, Edmund   *Aufsatze und Vortrage (1922–1937)*   Edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp   Husserliana, Bd 27   Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989   xxx + 333 pp $142 00—This collection is the third of three planned volumes collecting Husserl's shorter essays, reviews, and lectures   Slightly more than one-third of the volume is devoted to five essays (and the relevant supplementary texts) on the theme of renewal   All were written in the years from 1922 to 1924, the first three were published in the Japanese journal *Kaizo* in 1923 and 1924, but the fourth and fifth were not published   These essays arise out of Husserl's own experience of and reflection upon the First World War   Husserl sees a crisis in which our loss of a proper sense of the human has consequences which are not merely theoretical but, much more broadly, ethical and cultural   His response to this crisis is to call for a philosophical renewal of the sort which can underwrite a cultural renewal

The first essay ("Erneuerung   Ihr Problem und ihre Methode")
poses the problem of cultural renewal as one whose solution requires
a clarification of the idea of the human, a clarification to be achieved
by a methodic and rigorous philosophical reflection on the nature of
human experience—both individual and communal—and of the nor-
mative forms of reason contained therein   The second essay ("Die
Methode der Wesensforschung") explores the meaning of this claim
by elucidating the nature and procedures of an eidetic science   Such
a science is most clearly exemplified by mathematics, which is itself
free of empirical considerations but which, by virtue of the fact that
its thematic sphere is any possible nature, makes possible the rational
account of nature   So too shall a pure, ideal, a priori philosophical
science make possible a rational account of rational humanity itself
The third essay ("Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem") be-
gins the development of this philosophical science of rational human-
ity   Cultural renewal requires a new science of ethics, and the ethical
renewal of the society presupposes the renewal of individuals   Pure
ethics, Husserl says, is the universal, a priori science of the essence
and the possible forms of a conscious life formed and deliberately
guided by the idea of renewal   The ethical life, then, is one of self-
rule, a life which freely chooses as its guiding maxims the norms
predelineated in the essential forms of humanity disclosed in philo-
sophical reflection

Husserl left no account of his own view of the relation between the
published and unpublished essays   However, as the editors rightly
point out (p xv), the fourth essay in their ordering ("Erneuerung und
Wissenschaft") completes the direction of the third by turning to the
formation of cultural communities in which rationality and rational,
ethical action are realized   Finally, the fifth essay ("Formale Typen
der Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung") discusses the movement
of self-regulating, free rationality as it manifests itself in both reli-
gious and philosophical cultures

These essays reveal the modernistic and rationalistic elements in
Husserl's thought, elements which point toward the development of
a formal axiology and a deontological ethic   For all his mentions of
the teleology at work within experience and within rational being,
Husserl's notion of the human *telos* is too frequently, as in these essays,
restricted to a "methodologism," that is, to an actualization of rational
method in both its theoretical dimension and its practical (calculative)
ordering of competing goods, while it is too infrequently developed in
terms of the objectivities to which reason is directed and of the ac-
tivities in and through which the human community realizes both its
external and internal goods   The potential richness of Husserl's no-
tions of intentionality and intersubjectivity, realized in many and
especially his later discussions of our cognitive and theoretical ex-
periences, is not fully realized in his discussions of ethical experience

This volume contains three other essays of substantial length (1)
"Uber Ursprung"; (2) "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie", and (3)
"Uber die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philosophie "   "Uber Ursprung"
was written in 1930 as a contribution to a festschrift for Thomas
Masaryk, but was never published. It is concerned with a problem

· often treated by Husserl, the origin of universal objects in more primitive encounters with individual objects, and Husserl is once again concerned to show that only an a priori philosophy of intentional experience, and not an empirical psychology, can give an acceptable account of this origin

"Phanomenologie und Anthropologie," a lecture delivered in 1931 in Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, and Halle, and which here includes the final two pages omitted in the previous edition prepared by Eugen Fink, stresses the inadequacy of an anthropological basis for philosophical reflection and insists on the indispensability of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction with its abstraction from purely empirical considerations as the fundamental starting point for philosophy

"Uber die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philosophie" (1934) was addressed to the Eighth International Congress in Prague and provides a starting point for the reflections which underlie the Vienna lecture and the *Krisis* In this work, however, we find no mention of a crisis, although the problems posed for consideration, especially the manner in which the special sciences have their founding experiences, their fundamental problems, and their fundamental concepts clarified in a philosophical science, are continuous in Husserl's last works

In addition to the usual collection of supplementary texts and appendices, this volume is completed by the inclusion of several shorter essays (1) "Uber die Reden Gotamo Buddhos" (1925), remarks on Karl Eugen Neumann's translation; (2) "Die Phanomenologie und Rudolf Eucken" (1927), (3) the foreword to Eugen Fink's "Die phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwartigen Kritik" (1933), (4) a letter to the President of the Eighth International Philosophy Congress, Dr Rádl (1936), and (5) Husserl's "Selbstdarstellung," which appeared in *Philosophen-Lexikon* in 1937 As has by now become almost unnecessary to note when reviewing Husserliana volumes—and we can surely be grateful for this—the editorial work on the volume is excellent —John J Drummond, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md.*

IHDE, Don *Technology and the Lifeworld* Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1990. xiv + 226 pp Cloth, $35 00; paper, $14 95—In this important and challenging contribution to the rapidly developing philosophy of technology Ihde proposes nothing less than a "systematic reformulation of a framework and set of questions regarding technology in its cultural setting" (p ix) More specifically, he sees his task as twofold to provide a perspective from which to view "the phenomenon of human-technology relations" and to offer a "framework or 'paradigm' for understanding" (p 9) Rejecting the distanced, objective, or "bird's-eye" perspective as inappropriate for considering a subject-matter in which we are inextricably immersed, he adopts a perspective which he calls "navigational," one of finding bearings and

directions within the fluid and dynamic situations of our technologi-
cally textured lifeworld   Remarking that such a perspective is "nec-
essarily relativistic," he claims that, nonetheless, the employment of
phenomenology and hermeneutical methods is able to yield a frame-
work for understanding this lifeworld   Ihde makes these points and
supports them in the "Introduction" and first four chapters of the
book, which together comprise a general introduction to his overall
approach, basic assumptions, and methodology   In the three chapters
which follow he provides us with some results of his use of these
methods in three "programs" which move, as he puts it, from a "phe-
nomenology of technics," through "cultural hermeneutics," to a more
speculative consideration of "lifeworld shapes "   This movement is
avowedly from a more focused and secure description of the essential
structures of material human-technology relations to increasingly
larger and less secure depictions of our technological culture and life-
world   He then concludes the book with certain "stewardship rec-
ommendations for the inherited earth "
    Ihde's primary aim in the first program (chapter 5) is to discover
and exhibit through close phenomenological analysis of human-tech-
nology relations both their basic structural features and their essential
ambiguity   His proposals in this regard represent the most persuasive
and illuminating part of the book   He distinguishes four such rela-
tions, which he labels "embodiment relations," "hermeneutic rela-
tions," "alterity relations," and "background relations "   In the first,
the use of an instrument involves a degree of "transparency" whereby
the instrument becomes, in effect, an unconscious element of the user's
bodily perceptual apparatus   As with eyeglasses, the instrument
functions on the perceiving side of the human-instrument-world re-
lation and fails to appear in the world or as an object of perception
There are, of course, degrees of such embodiment, from complete
transparency to a sort of translucency of the technological medium
itself, and an essential ambiguity in a revealing yet diminishing char-
acter of the relation (its magnification/reduction structure, as he calls
it) remains   The second relation which is phenomenologically re-
vealed, the hermeneutic, is typified by the reading of a map or, more
generally, a text   Here perceptual transparency is not achieved,
though a sort of hermeneutical transparency is achievable by means
of a learned and unconsciously exercised skill   One reads "through"
the text, in a sense, even though only the text appears as the object
of perception   Difficulties of interpretation push the text to a position
of ambiguity both in regard to hermeneutic fluency and the special
enigma of the connection between text and world   Alterity relations
arise when an instrument or technology presents itself as "other," as
something we have to consider in our attempted employment of it
From a bird's-eye or naive objectivist account of technology this re-
lation would be the first considered, but Ihde believes that to start
with it would tend to obscure or submerge the previous two relations
From the navigational and phenomenological standpoint, alterity has
to be seen as arising in the context of situations in which embodiment
and hermeneutic relations are equally foundational   We are also
aware of living in an environment in which technologies occupy back-

ground or field positions, we are thus experientially related to tech-
nologies in a fourth way, namely, as pieces of our immediate and lived
world.   There are, of course, other so-called "real" or "objective" re-
lations of the human to technologies such as a bird's-eye view might
insist upon, but their presence in our lives, phenomenologically speak-
ing, must fall into one or more of the other four relations

I shall not summarize the other "programs" or their results, though
Ihde's proposals regarding the cultural embeddedness, cultural trans-
fer, and "multistability" of technologies and the "pluriculturality" of
our contemporary technological lifeworld are always suggestive and
often illuminating   His discussion of these matters becomes more
and more speculative and idiosyncratic as he proceeds

The development of the book towards broader and fuzzier issues is,
given the cultural breadth of the subject-matter and our immersion
in it, a responsible one   And though this procedure lends itself to a
bothersome repetitiveness which often serves to distract the reader
from the course of the argument, it is carried forward honestly, with
verve and perceptiveness   In the process Ihde pauses now and then
to consider the merits of certain models or theories which have been
advanced about our present technology, in particular those which pro-
pose either its neutrality in respect to independently acquired human
ends or its deterministic autonomy   In view of his own close analysis
of human-technology relations—of our embodiment of technologies
and our embeddedness in a technological lifeworld, on the one hand,
and the plurality of points of view provided by the very pluriculturality
which is spawned by contemporary technology, on the other—he finds
persuasive reasons for rejecting both the neutrality and autonomy
models   Apart from the positive results of the "phenomenology of
technics" summarized above, these negative conclusions are the most
compelling in the book

I will mention only one basic problem.   Ihde insists throughout on
a sort of "necessary relativism" of his navigational approach   What
he seems to have in mind is that taking that point of view is always
context-bound and its soundings are consequently always relative to
one's own position in that context   This seems right   But the nav-
igational point of view is surely not itself devoid of a generic manner
of structuring things which is assumed in taking it   This manner of
structuring, once so assumed, introduces a nonrelativistic ingredient
into the game willy-nilly   And in this respect the navigational point
of view is no less absolutist than the bird's-eye —Douglas Browning,
The University of Texas at Austin.

KOLB, David   *Postmodern Sophistications Philosophy, Architecture, and
Tradition.*   Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990   xi + 216
pp. $29 95—"Do we stand sufficiently above traditions that we can
manipulate them and make them from some detached point of view
as if they were tools for other purposes" (p 2), as modernists have

claimed? Or are postmodernists right to criticize "the attempt to institutionalize an individual or social subject free from traditional restrictions" (p 6)? But neither the modernist refusal of the authority of tradition nor postmodern play with historical contents takes history seriously enough Kolb insists that we are more essentially placed in history, even as he refuses to grant history such authority as would stifle our need and ability to change and adapt

This thoughtful study, which should appeal to anyone interested in postmodernism, especially to architects, divides into two parts separated by thirteen illustrations The shorter first part begins with a sketch of the "Socratic myth," which is said to have presented us with an intellectual ethics for "behaving well" on the path of inquiry "erotic attraction to the good, communal dialogue, impartial questioning, openness, and refusal to insist on one's own opinions" (p 15) Of this ethics is born the insistence that inherited standards of belief and conduct justify themselves before the court of reason, the Platonic demand for last words that establish firm ground. This demand is challenged by the Sophistic substitution of persuasion for reasoned argument, where ancient Sophism has its recent counterpart in philosophical postmodernism, which seeks to defend humanity against what is all too easily experienced as a rationalist terrorism

Kolb develops this opposition only to call it into question neither Platonism nor Sophism are able to do justice to the world in which we find ourselves If the former cannot make good on its claim to seize true reality, the latter's power of persuasion remains bound by pregiven contexts If the one errs by thinking it possible to rise above our inevitably historical reality to the plane of truth, the other is too ready to exchange critical reflection for a noncommittal play with historical contents Inevitably "we find ourselves in historical situations we did not create, with goods and values we did not choose We work at revising and correcting as we build new places for ourselves" (p 34)

Especially important is the fourth chapter, also entitled "Postmodern Sophistications," which confronts the modernism of Habermas with the postmodernism of Lyotard Kolb steers a precarious course between the two, closer "to Lyotard's innovation than to Habermas's consensual process" (p 49) Aesthetic judgment is given a greater part than rational consensus in opening up the space for our judgments Yet finally Kolb agrees with Habermas "that Lyotard's mode of self-criticism does not allow the mutual dialogue that is necessary for living and building in the finite spaces that we must share" (p 50)

What lets us experience building as more than arbitrary invention? By its very organization, Kolb's study invites us to explore parallels between the work of the architect and that of the philosopher The latter has much to learn from the concrete ways in which recent architects have challenged and moved beyond modernism and its presuppositions Drawing on Heidegger, Kolb insists on the significance of history Yet to Heidegger's gloomy interpretation of the present age's subjection to the hegemony of the *Gestell* and the related nostalgic celebration of place Kolb opposes an emphasis on our tradition's

many different strands and voices, refusing to embed the self so completely in a particular history or language that it would become incapable of envisioning different languages and histories

"We need appropriateness, not necessity" (p 168)   Kolb links such appropriateness to creative rereadings or misreadings of the past But since, as he insists, the past speaks with many voices, we are left with the question of what makes one reading more appropriate than another   Having only many-voiced history and the Habermasian goal of "open discussion and community participation" to appeal to, we are left with the specter of arbitrariness that has haunted so much recent building —Karsten Harries, *Yale University*

KYMLICKA, Will   *Liberalism, Community, and Culture*   Oxford Oxford University Press, 1989   280 pp $38 00—In this book Kymlicka attempts to confute two related criticisms of contemporary liberalism. first, that liberalism must understate the role played by communal relationships in our individual lives, and second, that liberalism cannot, without transgressing its own principles, defend the special legal protections which are often required for the continued existence of aboriginal cultures within the modern state   In responding to these critiques, Kymlicka employs the theoretical resources of the contemporary welfare-state liberalism delineated by Rawls and Dworkin

Kymlicka identifies the political morality common to all forms of contemporary liberalism with the claim that human beings share an essential interest in leading a good life   Liberalism, then, seeks to secure politically the conditions necessary to pursue that interest Among those conditions are the liberties and resources required for people to live their lives according to their beliefs about what is good In order to develop those beliefs, Kymlicka insists that "individuals must have the cultural conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the good life   " (p 13)   This cultural requirement, however, is omitted from the standard accounts of liberal theory, according to Kymlicka   This omission is said by the communitarian critics of liberalism to be a consequence of its unqualifiedly individualist foundations   Those foundations, in turn, lead it to a view of the self and its good that ignores the social context in which persons are situated

Kymlicka believes that this communitarian indictment of liberalism is overstated   Liberals can agree with communitarians, he argues, that the self must select its beliefs and goals from those which it finds culturally presented to it, without subscribing to the more extreme communitarian doctrine that these goals are culturally fixed and cannot be revised   Communitarians, Kymlicka argues, try to dissolve the need for a theory of distributive justice which can accommodate a plurality of visions of the good life by insisting that our culture imposes upon all of us a univocal understanding of the good life   But liberals can reject the view of the community as a canonical moral

authority and nevertheless be sensitive to the social genesis of our
ends, according to Kymlicka   On the one hand he doubts that the
cultural community can prescribe a single vision of the good to the
political community when most states are comprised of a multiplicity
of cultures   On the other hand he accepts the view that our values
are culturally derived   If, then, plural cultures are the sources of our
goals and beliefs, liberal theory must take an interest in their mainte-
nance   Indeed, Kymlicka argues, it must defend special protections
for vulnerable, minority cultures

    Advocacy of such special status may appear to conflict with both
the neutrality with which liberalism is supposed to treat competing
cultural values and the equal protection that it is supposed to afford
to all persons regardless of their cultural affiliations   But these con-
flicts are only apparent, according to Kymlicka   Neutrality and
equality, properly understood, justify a liberal theory of special group
rights for vulnerable cultures   If the good life cannot be lived outside
of a cultural context, then the principles of neutrality and equal pro-
tection require special measures for fragile cultures in order to prevent
them from disappearing   To permit the demise of such cultures is
to treat them in a discriminatory way   To fail to afford their members
the special guarantees necessary to provide them with legal protections
equivalent to those given to members of the majority culture is, ac-
cording to Kymlicka, to transgress their entitlement to equal protec-
tion under the law   Kymlicka concludes that the special group rights
assigned to American Indians, for example, are not departures from
the traditional liberal attachments to neutrality and equal protection
under the law   They are, rather, applications of those two principles

    Kymlicka's attempt to reconcile political liberalism with these al-
leged deviations from its theory fails to come to grips with certain
empirical realities   Many nonaboriginal cultures have successfully
transported themselves to liberal societies, frequently in the face of
great hostility from the majority culture   Yet without the special
protections said to be requisite for the sustenance of aboriginal cul-
tures, these initially foreign cultures have managed to survive and
transmit their central values to subsequent generations of their off-
spring   One thinks, in this regard, of the many Asian cultures which
despite great adversity have flourished within liberal Western soci-
eties   Why should special protections be accorded to other less robust
cultures?   Perhaps their cultural values are insufficiently attractive
to their own members who then voluntarily reject them, thereby
weakening the rejected culture   If the values of a weaker culture are
being rejected by its own people, would not interventions intended to
forcibly shore up its depleted membership be illiberal in character?
Would not such interventions express a political preference for some
conceptions of the good over others?   Furthermore, if Kymlicka takes
the position that all cultures have an equal right to exist no matter
how depleted or disaffected their membership, then was the entire
panoply of historically defunct cultures entitled to special political
guarantees of their continued existence?   Must disaffected and un-
interested members of a fading culture be deprived of the rights en-

joyed by the majority culture in order to sustain a system of values to which they are no longer attached? Kymlicka needs to address these and related questions seriously if the new capaciousness that he finds in liberal principles is to be adequately defended —Jeffrey Paul, *Bowling Green State University*

LEHRER, Keith *Thomas Reid* The Arguments of the Philosophers Series London and New York Routledge, 1989 xii + 311 pp $49 95—Keith Lehrer wrote *Thomas Reid* for those who are not Reid scholars He claims that Reid is not widely read but believes the "combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled" (p ix) Lehrer focuses on the main theories and arguments of Reid (quoting extensively) rather than dealing with exegetical disputes or worrying about influences on Reid or Reid's influence on later philosophy

After an initial chapter dealing with Reid's life and work, Lehrer presents a fine summary of Reid's critique of the theory of ideas along with the importance of first principles and common sense Following this is a detailed presentation of the arguments in Reid's three published books—*Inquiry into the Human Mind, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,* and *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* One of the major enterprises in Reid's work was to provide an alternative to the theory of ideas Believing that Hume's reasoning leading to his skeptical conclusions was sound, Reid critically examined the premises accepted by Hume Hume, as did Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, accepted the premise that we are immediately aware of ideas or impressions and not external objects Reid dealt carefully with perception and argued that those who adopted the theory of ideas accepted reason as a guide for truth but called perceptual knowledge into question If the reliability of one faculty is questioned, there is no justification for accepting any other Lehrer quotes Reid as follows "Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception?—they both came out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist, and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another?" (p 18)

Lehrer is at his best when dealing with criticisms of Reid and anticipating problems or charges of inconsistency Lehrer's book shows that Reid's positions are carefully argued and not dogmatic Also Lehrer believes that more often than not, apparent inconsistencies can be resolved. In this respect the discussion of conception and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as those topics appear in the *Inquiry* and *Essays,* is particularly good (ch 11) Lehrer argues that the *Essays* should be understood as a development of the theory of conception that goes far beyond the *Inquiry*

Reid's theory of agency developed in the *Active Powers* is well done It is, in my estimation, one of Reid's most important contributions Lehrer is, however, less than convincing in certain aspects of his defense of Reid The major fault lies with his attempt to defend Reid's concept of causality Reid's libertarian view is built on his conception

of an agent   We are aware that we not only make something happen, but also initiate an action   The agent is the efficient cause of his action but is not caused to choose a particular action   The agent chooses among competing motives   The problem is that Reid essentially equates causality with agent causality, thereby eliminating causality in the physical world   For example, an avalanche certainly makes something happen, but does not initiate the event and therefore is not a cause   Reid recognized that this is contrary to the common use of "cause," but neither Reid nor Lehrer gives us a good reason to reject the common understanding   Others in the commonsense tradition recognized this weakness, but it was not until James McCosh that the tradition developed an adequate concept of cause

Lehrer concludes with a chapter on Reid's contributions   Besides Reid's refutation of the theory of ideas, Lehrer mentions Reid's method that accepts our understanding of both the mental and material realms   His major contribution, according to Lehrer, "is his combination of nativism, psychology, and epistemology" (p 289)   By treating Reid's work chronologically rather than topically, the book is at times unwieldy and repetitious   However, except for my reservation about his treatment of causality, Lehrer's book is a fine introduction to the thought of a very important philosopher —Todd L Adams, *The Pennsylvania State University, Worthington Scranton Campus*

LESLIE, John, ed   *Physical Cosmology and Philosophy*   New York MacMillan, 1990   viii + 277 pp   n p —The twenty-one readings collected by Leslie address four main questions Was there a Big Bang? Is our universe "fine-tuned" to life's needs such that the most minute changes would have made life-forms impossible?   Are there multiple universes?   Is there life elsewhere in the cosmos?   A brief survey of a sampling of the readings will convey the scope of this volume

Following Ernan McMullin's philosophical reflections in "Is Philosophy Relevant to Cosmology?"   Leslie includes "Modern Cosmology," the 1954 paper by George Gamow, one of the primary developers of the theory that a hot explosion, now referred to as the Big Bang, marks the beginning of the expansion of the universe   Although he acknowledges that no evidence remains of the pre-explosion period, Gamow suggests that the universe has existed for an eternity of time and was collapsing until it reached a state of maximum compression The universe is now on the rebound   W B Bonnor, in "Relativistic Theories of the Universe," continues Gamow's line of reasoning by arguing that the universe has an unlimited past and future   Bonnor believes it is best to think in terms of an infinity of cosmic oscillations explosions followed by recollapses and then new explosions   Bonnor makes a methodological claim his view may not be proven but it is legitimate because science should never adopt hypotheses that limit its scope.

In addition to the philosophical problem of creation involved in discussion of the Big Bang, recent cosmology has introduced speculation as to why the universe is the way it is   Certain features of the universe, such as its high degree of isotropy (being the same in all directions), are extremely improbable   An isotropic universe is necessary for the formation of galaxies and galaxies are necessary for life   But how can the improbable occurrence of isotropy be explained? One answer is the "anthropic principle," a term coined by Brandon Carter in 1974   If the universe were not isotropic, there would be no humans to observe it   Since we are here as observers, the universe must be isotropic   As Carter explains in "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," the universe "must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some stage" (p 129)   In "A Cozy Cosmology," Heinz Pagels considers such talk of "fine-tuning" to be an inadequate approach to science and "the closest that some atheists can get to God" (p 180)   He finds the theistic principle more reasonable "the universe seems tailor-made for our existence" because "it *was* tailor-made for our existence" (p 180)

As George Gale explains in "Cosmological Fecundity Theories of Multiple Universes," one of the motivations behind multiple-universe theories is to show that human life is not so improbable if an infinite set of different worlds exist, rather than only one universe   Robert Shapiro and Gerald Feinberg, in "Possible Forms of Life in Environments Very Different from the Earth," also lessen the need for special "fine-tuning" of our life-containing world by arguing that life might evolve anywhere and might be different from the chemically-based life known on Earth

Although some of the readings gathered together in this book require a knowledge of mathematics to be fully understood, Leslie reminds us that he selected them on the basis of their philosophical significance, not their scientific technicalities   To assist the reader, the "Introduction" includes a detailed commentary on each of the essays   In addition, Leslie appends over six pages of suggestions for further reading and a glossary of scientific terms —Andrea Croce Birch, *Saint Mary's College of Minnesota*

MAKKREEL, Rudolph A   *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant The Hermeneutic Import of the* Critique of Judgment   Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1990   xi + 187 pp $24 95—Before citing specific excellences in this study, I remark that it is exemplary in combining techniques for rethinking a major past figure with redispositions impinging on current controversy   The nerve in the Kantian philosophy reexamined here is the work of the imagination   Diverse functions of that capacity are found in Kant's pre-critical notes and writing But the first *Critique* is said to be progressively informed by "figurative" powers only among these operations   "Formative" powers

are increasingly neglected in both the Subjective and Objective De-
ductions   In the B-Deduction and in subsequent applications, the
imagination is given merely a reduced "schematizing" role, synthetic
and additive, rather than synoptic and holistic   Makkreel's argument
is not, however, that Kant changes his mind, either in sharpening
determinant natural and moral judgments or in reworking reflective
judgment in the third *Critique*   Instead, he shows that diverse labors
of the imagination are ingredient to distinct segments of the critical
philosophy in different ways

Imagination is dominant in the *Critique of Judgment,* where aes-
thetic apprehensions are attained in thoroughgoing cooperation with
reflective judgment.   By this move, neglected functions of the imag-
ination are reinstated and the more prominent and emphasized aspects
of the critical philosophy are shown to pose severely limited tasks,
enveloped, so to speak, within the wider functions of the reflecting
subject

From this broadened stance, the life of the imagination includes
the subject's feeling of life itself, with such intelligence as we build
on it in accordance with reflective and holistic intricacies of normal
and aesthetic ideas   In consequence, Kant's popular writings showing
purposiveness and human destiny in history may be seen to be re-
flective uses of teleology made authentic by regulative and moral ideas
of reason

The turning point of this argument is a brilliant chapter on "The
Regress of the Imagination," which is to say, on transcendental devices
grasping the sublime   Here, reflective judgment turns inward from
the linear and merely aggregative progression of the imagination to-
ward the "Whole Determination of the Mind," making it possible to
comprehend multiplicity by an intuitive regress which annihilates the
condition of time   "The third *Critique* thus establishes a reflective
framework within which the relationship between the natural and
human sciences may be clarified" (p 166)

In the final chapter, these themes concerning diverse functions for
the imagination in Kant converge, and the author makes good his
subtitle "The Hermeneutic Import of the *Critique of Judgment* "
Foundationalism appears to run rampant in Kant for those mesmer-
ized by the limited agenda of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* but Makkreel
reconceives the appeal to transcendental conditions as an imaginative
orientation which gives rise to indeterminate and revisable guidelines
for interpretation   "Orientation in Thinking" here, as in Kant's essay
of that title, entails any subject's feeling of distinction between right
and left whereby he or she forms a horizon from this initial quadrant
of the field of vision

Thus concepts of understanding and ideas of reason interact with
common sense according to reflective judgment   Being nonfounda-
tional, common sense opens the reflective horizon of communal think-
ing toward enlarged perspectives   Not being private, this reflection
is communicable in a public environment   We are brought back to
the pre-critical "synoptic image formation," a work of imagination
presupposed in reflection, even for the synthetic (and merely additive)
imagination of the first *Critique*   The subject is included amidst the

reciprocation between part and whole in the hermeneutic circle Thus it is common humanity that makes critical reflection possible Such is the "enlarged mode of thought" which Kant thinks a virtue, especially of judgment —William Sacksteder, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

ORMISTON, Gayle L and SCHRIFT, Alan D , eds *The Hermeneutic Tradition. From Ast to Ricoeur* Albany State University of New York Press, 1990 xii + 380 pp Cloth, $49 50, paper, $16 95
——————— *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context· From Nietzsche to Nancy.* Albany State University of New York Press, 1990 xii + 306 pp Cloth, $44 50, paper, $14 95—These two volumes, taken together, reflect a whole new phase in hermeneutic reflection The first volume, *The Hermeneutic Tradition*, keys on Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, following closely the account of the hermeneutic tradition presented in Palmer's *Hermeneutics* (1969) and offering important selections from that tradition, including a number of essays surrounding the Gadamer-Habermas debate It covers its selected thinkers in unusual depth and thus serves well its purpose of providing the "hermeneutic context" whose transformation it envisions in the second volume

The first volume is very useful as a collection representing the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Gadamer, but it is not of special significance to the current discussion in hermeneutics On the other hand, *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context* breaks new ground and its publication in a single volume should be considered a major event in the Anglo-American reception/conception of hermeneutics Its texts, taken together, represent a rival current of continental thought about interpretation which has gone largely unnoticed in Anglo-American hermeneutics Because of its significance as a challenge to prevailing hermeneutic opinion as represented by Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, it will be of interest to discuss very briefly the individual contributions to the volume

Nietzsche, the self-professed "transformer of values," is the anchor of Ormiston and Schrift's program for transformation The collection therefore begins with twelve pages of one- or two-paragraph quotations from Nietzsche on the topic of "Interpretation." For Ormiston and Schrift, it is Nietzsche who shakes the foundations of hermeneutic tradition, and the selections display Nietzsche's model of active, interest-guided interpretation, which contrasts with the traditional, contemplative model of knowledge

After the Nietzsche potpourri comes Michel Foucault's contribution to the seminal Royaumont conference on Nietzsche held in 1964 "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx " Foucault asserts that Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche "placed us once again in the presence of a new possibility of interpretation They founded anew the possibility of a hermeneutic" (p 61) The next contribution is by Eric Blondel, author of *Nietzsche, le corps et la culture* (1986). His "Interpreting Texts With

and Without Nietzsche" (1986) further explicates Nietzsche's view of interpretation "Life is linked to interpretation as passage, body, fecundity, plurality, whereas knowledge is always linked, in its univocal abstraction, to death   [for] interpretation, in Nietzsche's writings, is the symbol of *Uberwindung*, overcoming, of life as fecundity and overcoming" (p 85)

Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis" (1982) brings hermeneutics into conjunction both with psychoanalysis and politics "The political interpretations of our century," she asserts, "have produced two powerful and totalitarian results fascism and Stalinism Parallel to the socioeconomic reasons for these phenomena, there exists as well a more intrinsic reason the simple desire to give a meaning, to explain, to provide the answer, to interpret" (p 90) This hermeneutical impulse toward simple interpretations is part of the problem in political thinking   Says Kristeva, "Political interpretation is thus the apogee of the obsessive quest for A Meaning" (p 90) For Kristeva, it is psychoanalysis which cuts through the political illusion that there is "only one meaning" to human behavior and provides "an antidote to political discourse which, without it, is free to become our modern religion the final explanation" (p 90)

Next comes Derrida's "Envoi"—"Sending On Representation" (1980) Taking his lead from Heidegger's "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" ("The Age of the Worldpicture"), Derrida examines the issue of whether, as Heidegger argues, language since Descartes has been understood in terms of a representation of an uninterpreted object to an interpreting subject This has, for Derrida, metaphysical and political consequences, for it concerns "the very credit we would wish, as philosophers, to accord to a centered and centralized organization of all the fields or of all the sections of representation, grouped around a sustaining sense, of a fundamental interpretation" (p 131) It is difficult to address the question of the system and of history of representation, says Derrida, because "our concepts of system and of history are essentially marked by the structure and the closure of representation" (p 114)

The next two selections undertake a revision of the traditional view of Schleiermacher   Manfred Frank's "The Interpretation of a Text" (1982) emphasizes that Schleiermacher seeks the individuality of the author in the style of the text, and is not just concerned with the elements a text has in common with other texts of its genre or time He is able to make the regaining of the factor of individuality the basis for a critique both of Gadamerian hermeneutics and also of the structuralists' "code model for analyzing texts" (p 158) Manfred Frank's writings in general have had a double thrust the recovery of Schleiermacher and dialogue between German hermeneutics and contemporary French text theories

Werner Hamacher writes in "Hermeneutic Ellipses Writing the Hermeneutical Circle in Schleiermacher," that ellipsis is "the rhetorical equivalent of writing—it de-completes   at the same time it also withdraws, like writing, from every alternative of presence and absence . " (p 200) It is the ellipses in the text that both require and compromise the "hermeneutic circle" and "divinitory under-

standing" in Schleiermacher For Hamacher, the need for a "hermeneutics of approximation" in Schleiermacher shows that he is seeking to "understand the concealed *as* concealed, the foreign *as* foreign the other as other" (p 203) He finds that today, when interpretation is "almost exclusively still a matter of scientistic formalism and journalistic semanticism, it is precisely Schleiermacher's hermeneutics that could teach us to show them both the door" (p 205)

The volume culminates with the full text of Jean-Luc Nancy's luminous ninety-page monograph, *Le partage des voix* (1982), translated as "Sharing Voices " Nancy finds that modernity, including the "hermeneutical problematic," remains "caught in an interpretation of what 'interpretation' gives to thought" (p 211) This wrong verson of interpretation still dreams of an original meaning "which will be reached by hermeneutic means," but for Nancy there is no original meaning, only a dividing of the *logos* into voices which we as humans interpret Nancy turns to Heidegger's discussions of *hermēneia* in *Being and Time* and in his later "Dialogue on Language" in *On the Way to Language*, and also to Plato's *Ion*, for a start in reconceiving interpretation The meaning of *hermēneuein* in *Being and Time*, he asserts, is "to announce", it is announcing as Hermes announces the will of Zeus, it is not *a* meaning we can recover *Hermēneuein* "announces to the understanding of being the meaning of being" (p 220) Taking issue with Gadamer's emphasis on pre-understanding, Nancy asserts that "far from being related to this pre-understanding, it [*hermēneia*] consists in *Auslegung,* in which it announces what it comprehends" (p 220) The "anticipation of meaning" which Gadamer describes is derivative and rests, according to Nancy, on a prior "announcement" of meaning *Hermēneia* eludes us, says Nancy, because it "is the 'meaning' of this being that we are—'humans', 'interpreters' of logos" (p 211) It is only to be found dispersed in the harmony of separate voices announcing the logos

Nancy's rich "Sharing Voices" is a fitting conclusion to an extremely valuable and important set of essays In one way or another, each text declares its independence from the "hermeneutic tradition," and points to a new context for interpretation Most of the contemporary contributors—like Foucault, Kristeva, Derrida, Frank, Nancy—have set forth their views at much greater length elsewhere, but this collection provides an introduction specifically to their thinking in relation to hermeneutics Five of the nine essays appear for the first time in English in this anthology The editors and translators are to be commended for assembling a formidable program for "transforming the hermeneutic context "—Richard E Palmer, *MacMurray College*

ROTENSTREICH, Nathan *Alienation The Concept and Its Reception.* Leiden E J Brill, 1989 ix + 147 pp $47 50—Crossing philosophical terrain that is covered by many footsteps, Rotenstreich seeks to trace the transformations of the idea of alienation from its origins in

Plotinus' mystical conception of a positive, contemplative, and ecstatic elevation of the soul in union with divinity through Hegel and Marx's various uses of the term up to the alienation embraced by the young radicals who flourished between 1960 and 1970.   Given his previous work, we would expect that the discussions of Hegel's notion of alienation as a necessary, but transitional, phase in the dialectic of thought that culminates in a speculative synthesis that negates the alienation in alienation, and of Marx's depiction of exploited man as alienated from his "species essence" and from his labor and its fruits would be the centerpiece of his work   And, although they are, Rotenstreich has illuminating comments on personal psychic alienation and spends a fair amount of time on the feelings of alienation from established social norms and institutions that were prevalent among students in the 1960s

What is interesting about Rotenstreich's tracing of the transmutations of the meaning of alienation is that it is clear, terse, accessible, and reveals a healthy centrist perspective   Along the way, he examines the role that the valuation of "spontaneity" (versus institutional rigidity) plays both in personal senses of alienation and the subjectivist desire for expression, passion, and freedom in what is somewhat anachronistically called "contemporary radicalism" (because it refers to the '60s radicalism that is the bane of Allan Bloom)   It is shown that, despite the Marxist coloration of the student radicalism, Marx himself saw the overcoming of alienation as the *collective* attainment of man's "species essence" in a historical and actual synthesis of the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity   At one point, the subjectivity espoused by Kierkegaard is associated with the attitude of student radicals   This is contestable since Kierkegaard emphasized a disciplined "inwardness" and even an objectivity towards one's subjectivity that would serve as an ironic correction to what is later referred to (in Habermas's phrase) as a narcissistic "overinflated autonomy" (p 139)   Even though he only gets a footnote reference, Max Stirner's nihilistic subjectivity might have provided a more accurate analogy for Rotenstreich's point

Throughout his accessible account of a conception that is overtly or covertly present in a great deal of nineteenth- and twentieth century philosophy, Rotenstreich accurately (I believe) iterates that, in any ultimate sense, alienation cannot be deleted, be it because of man's drive towards self-transcendence or his ontological nature   One might add (though Rotenstreich does not explicitly do so) that each stage of modern and contemporary history seems to engender its own brand of alienation (one thinks of the recent French fury against relatively stable, consumerist, technologically oriented and scientifically managed democratic republics)

Despite his wide-ranging and eclectic scholarship, one misses in Rotenstreich's study Nietzsche's inflammatory alienation in relation to modern man, modern society, and modern ideas   And where is Heidegger's phenomenology of the obviously "alienated" world of "the they" and the ideally emancipated mode of authentic existence? Given recent revelations about his political and ethnic attitudes, Heidegger himself would have been a fitting subject for a discussion of

what Rotenstreich calls "psychopathic alienation " Missing, too, is
any reference to Sartre's two-volume *Critique de la raison dialectique*,
a work which deals with many of the issues in *Alienation* This is *a
fortiori* the case since the author refers to the paradoxes produced by
technical advance (pollution and other forms of "accidental alien-
ation"), the fact that unintended negative effects are generated by
seemingly positive actions This is but a lesser version of Sartre's
theory of "counterfinalities" generated by the social praxis of men
Even Richard Schacht's earlier work, *Alienation*, is substantial enough
to have found a place in the present study

Although he may not have intended it as such, Rotenstreich's book
could serve as a useful introduction to the concept of alienation And
even with its gaps and omissions (as well as some pagination mis-
matches in the indices), *Alienation* is a useful, informative, and in-
structive piece of work —George J Stack, *The State University of New
York at Brockport*

SIMPLICIUS   *On Aristotle's* Physics 6   Translated by David Konstan
    Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1989   189 pp $36 50—This work
    is a volume in the series Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, edited
    by Richard Sorabji   The aim of the series is to make the Greek com-
    mentaries available in English   Konstan does an admirable job of
    this   The translation is extremely careful, clear, and readable
    Konstan succeeds in staying close to the text without sacrificing in-
    telligibility   Whenever necessary, he inserts words or phrases in
    brackets to complete the sense of an accurately translated passage
    Konstan also makes use of brackets to give precise citations to fill out
    Simplicius' references   The footnotes, too, are excellent   There the
    reader finds information about deviations from Diels's text (the stan-
    dard Greek text), about alternative readings, and explanations of ren-
    derings into English that might be controversial   In the introduction,
    Sorabji gives a thumbnail sketch of the philosophical issues raised by
    Physics 6   Several useful documents are appended to the commentary,
    namely, a list of all departures from Diels's text, an appendix written
    by the editor providing a brief survey of the ancient Greek commen-
    tators, and a list of the philosophers cited by Simplicius with a one-
    sentence description of each

    Physics 6 is concerned with the relation between indivisibles, for
    example, instants of time, and the continuous magnitudes of which
    these might be thought to be the proper parts   Aristotle draws a
    distinction between proper parts which are extended and hence di-
    visible and such indivisibles and then uses this distinction to resolve
    to his own satisfaction (if not ours) Zeno's paradoxes of motion   Sim-
    plicius proceeds systematically, passage by passage, to interpret and
    analyze the often difficult arguments making up *Physics* 6   His re-
    constructions of Aristotle's positions often appeal to arguments found
    elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus and he makes frequent use of
    interpretations given by other Peripatetics, especially Alexander of

Aphrodisias   This makes his commentary an invaluable resource for serious students of Aristotle's *Physics* or later Peripatetic philosophy

Translated into English, the ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle will undoubtedly reach a much broader audience than previously and this is certainly to be desired   Still in all, paragraph by paragraph commentaries do not stand on their own very well   At the outset, readers should be advised to make constant use of the Aristotelian text   In an apparent attempt to make the commentary less dependent upon *Physics* 6, bracketed paraphrases of Aristotle's arguments are inserted throughout to supplement Simplicius' elliptical headings   This strategy works best when the argument under consideration is a short and clearly formulated one and not very well when the *Physics* passage under discussion contains several different arguments or complex or convoluted arguments   But it is in the latter instance that a supplement—ideally in Aristotle's own words—is needed

Physics 6 is, moreover, a text that challenges the most adroit interpreter and, not surprisingly, so does Simplicius' commentary on it It seems a shame that Konstan confined his attention to translation and philology, a discussion of the philosophical issues raised by the commentary would also be a welcome contribution to scholarship on the ancient Greek commentators

This book does, however, achieve exactly what its author and the editor of the series set out to achieve and in that regard is truly exemplary —D K W Modrak, *University of Rochester*

STUMP, Eleonore   *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*   Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1989   x + 274 pp $34 50— This work is essentially a history of the scholastic conception of *dialectica* from Garlandus Compotista to William Ockham, with an eye to rendering intelligible the puzzling nature of late medieval treatises on logical obligations   Such treatises seem to countenance violations of fundamental and indisputable logical rules, for example, that a disjunction is false if both of its disjuncts are false   In large part to explain this apparent surd development in medieval logic, Eleonore Stump has collected into a single volume twelve separately published essays.   Together they form an interesting and convincing argument

The essays are arranged according to five general themes the sources for the scholastic tradition of dialectic, Topics in early scholastic logic, logic and the Topics in the thirteenth century, obligations, and Ockham   The first three essays, which were published in Stump's *Boethius's "De topicis differentiis,"* take up the first theme   Here Stump skillfully outlines the nature of dialectic in Aristotle's *Topics* and Boethius's *De topicis*, discusses the differences between the two, and suggests that Theophrastus and Cicero are the key figures in the development of the Topics from Aristotle to Boethius   Aristotle's *Topics*, she argues, provides an art to discover probable arguments in disputative contexts by teaching the essence and accidents of each of

the four predicables (accident, genus, property, and definition)   Thus an Aristotelian Topic is primarily "a strategy for arguing" (p 20), something like a "basic recipe or blueprint" (p 25), which is founded on a common and basic principle   When Aristotle gives examples of particular Topics he usually presents both a strategy and its relevant principle   Boethius, however, considers the principle (which he calls the maximal proposition) primarily to be the Topic, as well as the general headings (*Differentiae*) under which the principles may be grouped   Boethius gives twenty-eight *Differentiae*   Stump suggests that this greater formality and abstraction in dialectical topics is partly the result of a gradual shift from oral to written disputations and prepared speeches

The next three essays show the influence first of Boethius and then of Aristotle on early medieval dialectic up to the thirteenth century   Garlandus Compotista's *Dialectica* (c 1040), considered the earliest complete medieval logic text, relies heavily on Boethius's *De topicis* but extends the applicability of the Topics to both probable and demonstrative syllogisms   According to Garlandus, the Topics provide metaphysical validity for all forms of inferences   For this reason, Stump argues that his account of dialectic is "a long way from being a formal logical system" (p 88)   Peter Abelard, on the other hand, limited the use of Topics to hypothetical (imperfect) inferences only, arguing that categorical, that is, demonstrative, syllogisms are valid or invalid solely in virtue of their form   Abelard's influence extended well into the thirteenth century, in which the divorce between Topics and syllogisms is complete

Stump's two essays on the thirteenth century respectively discuss the rise of Aristotelian logic in the work of the terminists and its decline in late thirteenth-century works on consequences   Taking Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* as representative of terminist logic, Stump argues that such logic is characterized by a) an emphasis on the categorical syllogism as the foundation of all inference, b) a sharp distinction between dialectic and demonstration, c) the relegation of Topical arguments to a secondary epistemological status   She notes that although the terminists were heavily influenced by Aristotle's logic, their views were in fact "very unlike" (p 155) those of Aristotle   Unfortunately, she does not spell out here exactly what the differences are and leaves the reader to suppose she is implicitly referring back to her earlier essays on Aristotle in which she claims, mistakenly I think, that the syllogism of the *Prior Analytics* is essentially demonstrative   Stump next describes how this Aristotelianism eroded because of a movement toward formalization present even among the terminists   In particular, the primacy of the syllogism was replaced with the primacy of the Topics (now viewed as logical, not metaphysical, principles), and Topical arguments (consequences) were considered formally necessary   Stump outlines the theory of consequences in a discussion of Walter Burley's *De consequentiis*

The final four essays trace the development of this formalization in medieval treatises on obligations by William of Sherwood, Walter Burley, and Roger Swyneshed, and in William Ockham's *Summa logicae*   Stump's principal concern is to provide the historical context

in which the perplexing fourteenth-century developments in obliga-
tions become understandable   The first treatises on obligations (a
set of rules for argument in fictive disputes) attempted to solve par-
adoxical arguments which arose when the subject of disputation was
confused with the act of disputation   Later treatises, however, at-
tempted to solve the incoherence found in these earlier solutions, most
especially those of Burley   It is in this light, as Stump argues in
considerable detail, that Swyneshed's seemingly bizzare theory of ob-
ligations needs to be understood —Gregory L Froelich, *The Catholic
University of America*

SUTER, Ronald. *Interpreting Wittgenstein   A Cloud of Philosophy, a Drop
of Grammar*   Philadelphia Temple University Press, 1990   xiii + 256
pp $34 95—This book presents an interestingly different approach
to the interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy   Instead of
an account focused on the text of the later writings, Suter has chosen
to organize his book by reference to certain central philosophical
problems and Wittgenstein's actual or constructed treatment of them
Thus, after an opening section dealing with Wittgenstein's conception
of philosophy, we are treated to an extended examination of the mind/
body problem which not only develops Wittgenstein's own ideas but
also shows how Wittgenstein would deal with various forms of the
identity theory, behaviorism, and classical dualism   This section is
followed by several chapters that develop Wittgenstein's ideas—in
less detail—in relation to Augustine's philosophy of time, the Dream
Argument, Russell on proper names, and Kripke's infamous discussion
of rule-following   Along the way, Suter makes a number of telling
points against various other interpreters and, among other things,
offers his own extended analysis of the notion of criteria   This ap-
proach, which is meant to let the reader see Wittgenstein's ideas at
work, presents his views as engaged and philosophically current and
for that reason is a very interesting introduction to Wittgenstein's
later thought
    The weakness of this approach is that it is likely to leave the reader
without an overview of Wittgenstein's thought, but Suter has tried
to correct this with the opening section on Wittgenstein's conception
of philosophy, which is designed to allow the reader to see how the
various treatments in the later sections fit together to form a coherent
pattern of thinking   There he stresses Wittgenstein's view that "phi-
losophy is to be conceived in mainly negative terms" (p 5), as a therapy,
and compares Wittgenstein's style of thinking to Freud's   After all,
as Suter notes, Wittgenstein described himself as "a disciple of Freud "
He has also included an interesting chapter on the "doctrine of family
resemblances" in which he rightly, in my view, rejects the interpre-
tation of that position that would treat it as an "answer to the problem
of universals "
    What this book fails to do in relation to Wittgenstein's thought is
to give any sense of how Wittgenstein's thinking actually works to

undermine philosophical problems   The feel and movement of Witt-
genstein's thinking is completely lacking   When Suter deals with
philosophical problems in the name of Wittgenstein, he borrows
claims, doctrines, positions, and arguments which are used to refute
other positions   In this sense, his own method of thinking is simply
not Wittgensteinian   For this reason, the two major parts of this
work don't quite work together because the methods identified and
developed in the first part do not shape the discussion in the later
sections   In the first part, we are told that Wittgenstein does not
hold philosophical positions, but the later sections read like a standard
philosophical text, not at all like a Wittgensteinian reflection   This
is especially clear in his discussion of dualism and of Russell's theory
of proper names   In fact, throughout Suter's discussion of the phi-
losophy of mind, we wander quite far from Wittgensteinian consid-
erations. The so-called Wittgensteinian response to dualism (pp 107–
9) is simply not distinctively Wittgenstein's   In the same way, while
Suter outlines a number of objections to Russell's theory of proper
names which Wittgenstein would certainly endorse (some are actually
developed in the *Investigations*), what he does not do is discuss the
whole rejection of the sort of philosophical project on which Russell
embarked   The *Philosophical Investigations* is not an assembly of
objections to other philosophical positions   In fact, it does not work
as a project of piecemeal criticisms of Russell or even of Wittgenstein's
own early work   What is at the center of this powerful philosophical
text is a radical gestalt shift, a new "way of seeing" which displaces
the traditional philosophical projects without absolutizing itself   This
dimension of Wittgenstein's thinking is missing from Suter's treat-
ment —Michael Hodges, *Vanderbilt University*

VATTIMO, Gianni   *The End of Modernity Nihilism and Hermeneutics in
    Post-Modern Culture*   Translated and with an Introduction by Jon
    R Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. lviii
    + 190 pp $27 50—Vattimo rethinks ontology at a time when mod-
    ernity's concept of Being has been uprooted along with any faith in
    history as a unitary process characterized by progressive reappro-
    priations of its own origins. Having dissolved the ground of the new,
    the end of modernity sees Being reduced to exchange value, the new
    for the sake of the new, which in turn science and technology make
    routine. The impasse is a radical one, for modernity cannot be left
    behind by offering a truer foundation, since "overcoming" and "foun-
    dation" themselves are concepts central to modernity   The first sec-
    tion of the book consists in an account of this condition.
        Borrowing heavily from Heidegger, especially the notion of *Ver-
    windung*, a going beyond that connotes resigned acceptance rather
    than a leaving behind, Vattimo sees in a weakened concept of Being—
    and in the *pensiero debole* (weak thought) appropriate to it—an opening
    for optimism, for a "different possibility for the existence of man "
    Following Gadamer, Vattimo suggests a hermeneutic ontology for

which experiences of truth and being, like the experience of art in
which new possibilities of meaning repeatedly open up and perish,
are events of constant reinterpretation   The second section of the
book, on "The Truth of Art," is an extensive discussion of
this idea

Unlike Gadamer, however, for whom the tradition within which
hermeneutics operates is never called into doubt, Vattimo considers
Rorty's view of hermeneutics as cultural anthropology, a form of Qui-
nean radical translation of the Other   This role for hermeneutics is
menaced by science and technology's rapid westernization of the globe,
a topic central in Heidegger but which Gadamer virtually ignores
Vattimo is at his most suggestive in the third and last section of the
book when he discusses this topic   Disagreeing with Heidegger, who
anticipated the total organization of the world in rigid technological
schemes, Vattimo does not see a quarter of a century later the dis-
appearance of cultures that are other   Instead the non-Western world
is becoming "an immense construction site of traces and residues" (p
158) tainted by modernity   In this "poverty of the inapparent and
the marginal" (p 161), where first and third worlds leak into and
contaminate each other, hermeneutics "develops into an ontology" (p
159)   It is here that the "first flashing up of Ereignis" is to be found

Only the nihilistic attitude of mourning of Nietzsche's man of good
temperament is adequate to this weakened, temporalized Being a
convalescent resignation to and acceptance of the messages of the
past present not only in the *Geisteswissenschaften* but also in the sci-
entific, technological, and even mass-media components of the con-
temporary scene—in other words, in the "entire tissue of erring that
constitutes the process of becoming of the false constructs of meta-
physics" (p 169)   Since these errors cannot be unmasked and liq-
uidated, "thought must attempt to see error as the very source of the
wealth that constitutes us and that gives interest, color and *Being* to
the world" (p 170)   Moreover, this *verwindend* interpretation and
distortion are "not just a matter of thought, they concern Being as
such, for the history which we recollect has itself the structure of the
Verwindung of recollection and distortion" (p 179)

Vattimo is well-known in Europe for his writings on *il pensiero
debole* and as co-editor of a 1983 volume of essays with that title   His
contributions to the discussion of modernism and postmodernism de-
serve a wider audience in the English-speaking world   This anthology
of essays, which first appeared in Italian in 1985, and which is the
first of his books to be translated into English, should contribute to
that end —Alicia Juarrero Roqué, *Prince George's Community College*

VELKLEY, Richard L   *Freedom and the End of Reason   On the Moral Foun-
    dation of Kant's Critical Philosophy*   Chicago   The University of Chi-
    cago Press, 1989   xvii + 222 pp $29 95—It is not often that one
    picks up a newly published book and feels that one has read what
    should become a new classic   Velkley's volume is a courageous piece

of imaginatively responsible scholarship that goes far beyond the realm of the ordinary   Effectively taking much pedestrian writing in stride, it points out new horizons of Kant interpretation which are systematically, as well as historically, sound and long overdue

Writing against a scholarship that has been "both historically and systematically too narrow" (p 4), Velkley's examination of early pre-critical texts pushes Kant's concern to redefine the nature of human reason, thereby the "Copernican turn," back to the 1760s, when he encountered Rousseau   Kant's dialogue with Rousseau found expression in the essay of 1764-65 entitled "Remarks to the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime" in which began the understanding of reason as fundamentally moral, as a "transcendental practice" (pp 13, 39) based on the primacy of freedom

The book provides a careful examination of Kant's engagement with Rousseau and the themes which this engagement set into development Culminating some twenty years later—first in the generally ignored "Doctrine of Method" at the end of the First *Critique,* the aim of which was "not to provide the foundations of moral philosophy (which aim in fact it explicitly renounces [A803 = B831]) but the outline of the completion of the metaphysical strivings of reason in a new 'system' of reason" (p 138), and then in the explicit assertion of the primacy of practical over theoretical reason in the Second *Critique*— these themes animate every stage of development

Velkley shows that Kant's encounter with Rousseau precipitated the "radicality" (p 41) of Kant's new account of reason *qua* pervasively moral, that is, practical, while his development of it goes far beyond what Rousseau had provided   Kant's initial development of this new conception of human reason, in the *Remarks* and in *The Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,* set out new essential characteristics of reason—as spontaneity, self-legislative, self-alienating, self-rectifying, and grounded in freedom—which saw full development in all stages of the critical philosophy and which were taken up in different ways by the ensuing Idealist and Phenomenological traditions

Insisting that the end of philosophy is "practice," Kant had already in the *Remarks* voiced the need of "a science of the limits of reason's powers" (pp 81, 108) which carries with it the innovation of a "metaphysical morality" based on "freedom as a metaphysical principle .   . [which] also accounts for the possibility of speculative reason" (p 187)   Eschewing any ethic of feeling on Rousseauean grounds (p 78), Kant developed Rousseau's notion of freedom as *"crux metaphysicorum"* (p 63) into reason's self-legislating autonomy that is not derived from nature, rather, it forms the human self as a time-binding rational capability that, for the end of "practice," seeks theoretical understanding of nature

The Rousseau to which Velkley directs prime attention is *Emile* Picking up Rousseau's arguments against earlier moral thinkers who had sought to derive morality from sociality, desire, moral sense, or feeling, Kant saw that morality is itself spontaneous reason, that it is inherently free rationality   In "Kant's transformation of Rousseau" (p 78) we then see the continuity of development that binds together the separable segments of the critical philosophy   Kant insisted that metaphysics cannot be a science merely derived from an

extension of knowledge of nature, rather, it is free moral reason that seeks out an understanding of nature—for "the moral world is called 'the sensible world viewed as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment' [A808 = B836]" (p 145).

Velkley points out that it was precisely Kant's insistence that free spontaneity is essential to reason that marked his crucial divide from Hume (pp 120ff.), that Kant's bifurcation of intuitive and discursive elements not only marked his opposition to German rationalism but also would mark "a decisive break with the whole of modern 'analysis' " (p 175), that neither the Idealism which followed Kant nor the Phenomenology that seeks some return to him has regained the Kantian ground, for "the emaciation of Kant into the theorist of the sciences of 'fact' and of 'value' meant that much of the original intent of critical philosophy was ignored or lost" (p 166)

Innovative as Velkley's study is within the range of English-language scholarship, it does not claim to be without precedent   Rather, Velkley finds support for his larger claims in "a number of European studies of Kant's thought   [which] are hardly known in the English-language literature" (p 49)   By implication much Kant scholarship is thereby chided for an insularity of perspective

One may regret that Velkley has so focused on *Emile* that the impact of *Du Contrat Social* on Kant's own moral doctrine is all but ignored One can quibble over minor points along the way and raise questions about the concluding discussions of the *telos* of reason   But such criticisms are really minor   What remains is a work which is truly required of serious Kant scholars

By demonstrating the continuity of development from Rousseau to Kant, Velkley has not only established the philosophic import of Rousseau. He has shown that an insight into reason's essential moral ground provides the animating concern and thereby the inherent coherence of the critical philosophy in its full development   This was, indeed, "the original transcendental problematic" which we may seek to "recover" (p 166) by comprehending the way in which Kant seems to have perceived the import of what he was trying to accomplish.— Charles M Sherover, *Hunter College*

WAITHE, Mary Ellen, ed. *A History of Women Philosophers, Volume II. Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers/A D 500–1600*   Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989   xxxviii + 349 pp $89.00—Mary Ellen Waithe has put together another collection of essays on seventeen different women philosophers   In addition to serving as the general editor, Waithe authors lengthy chapters on Murasaki Shikibu (970–1031), a Japanese literary writer; Heloise (1100–?), a French writer on love and friendship, Oliva Sabuco de Nantes Barrera (1562–?), a Spanish writer in natural philosophy, and a short summary chapter on Roswitha of Gandersheim (c 935–1001), Christine Pisan (1365–?), Margaret More Roper (c 1506–1544), and Teresa of Avila (1515–1582).

Joan Gibson, co-author of the introduction to the text with Waithe, raises some methodological issues of writing about women from this time frame   More specifically, they sought to determine which women could accurately be described as philosophers, since all women were cut off from access to institutional higher education during this period of history   Giving a very loose criteria of inclusion, they conclude "These women are not women on the fringes of philosophy, but philosophers on the fringes of history" (p xxxviii)

The chapters on the encyclopedia of Herrad of Hohenbourg (fl 1176) and on the mystical texts of Mechtild of Magdeburg (1207-c 1282) are written by Joan Gibson   The German author Elisabeth Gossmann considers the mystical thought and natural philosophy of Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), and Cornelia Wolfskeel examines the religious treatises of Beatrice of Nazareth (122-168), Hadewych of Antwerp (fl 1260), Brigitta of Sweden (1302-1373), and Catherine of Siena (c 1347-1380)   Elizabeth N Evasdaughter contributes a chapter on the English anchoress Julian of Norwich (1342-?), and Beatrice Zedler writes about Marie le Jars de Gournay (1565-1645)

Each chapter in the text is self-contained, so there is no interactive writing among the authors   There is an occasional reference to influence among the writers being considered   All chapters give a biographical introduction to the woman being considered, use original source material written by the authors, and give a solid general description of the central philosophical themes found in their works For this reason alone the text can serve as a good introduction to the thought of these authors, particularly because several of their works are not yet available in English

In addition, most chapters take a particular philosophical area of study to consider in relation to the author   For example, Murasaki is studied from the perspective of the existential import of her theories, and Hildegard as a philosopher of religion   Heloise's philosophy of love and moral responsibility, Herrad's philosophy of nature, Beatrice's and Mechtild's epistemology of religious experience, and Hadewych's and Brigitta's concepts of God and human nature are all emphasized

An effort is made by some authors to compare the woman philosopher's theory with those of better-known men philosophers   For example, there is a discussion of Julian of Norwich's epistemology in comparison with Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, of Catherine of Siena's theory of the freedom of the human will with that of St Augustine, and of Oliva Sabuco's skepticism with Descartes' methodical doubt.

One evident criticism from anyone familiar with the women writers of the period 500-1600 is that there is a strange weighting of authors which leaves some extremely significant women philosophers out of the text while other less significant ones are included.   Christine de Pisan, who engaged in systematic philosophical argumentation about many issues, and St Teresa of Avila, whose writings are the most sophisticated of any woman reflecting on the epistemology of religious experience, should have had a chapter of their own rather than a cursory mention at the end of the text   In addition, Lucrezia Marinelli (1571-1653), whose systematic arguments against the Aristotelian

view of woman place her high in the ranks of the male philosophers of her time, also deserves a chapter   Tullia of Aragon (1506–1565), Isabella Sforza Rossi (1471–1524) and Isotta Nogarola (1418–1466) also deserve mention along with the impact of the Italian Renaissance on women philosophical writers

A History of Women Philosophers Volume II constitutes an initial way to organize source material that is not readily available to the English-speaking public   Its main value is descriptive rather than evaluative, and it has a good bibliography and index for philosophers of religion —Prudence Allen, *Concordia University*

WEISSMAN, David   *Hypothesis and the Spiral of Reflection.* SUNY Series in Systematic Philosophy   Albany State University of New York Press, 1989   xi + 241 pp   Cloth, $49 50, paper, $12 00—These days every new departure in philosophy must be welcomed, even one that sounds old   Here at last is a philosopher who seems to take seriously Heisenberg's joke that the positivists are ready to engage in meta-mathematics, meta-language, meta-ethics and meta-anything until someone suggests meta-physics at which they gnash their teeth   But does Weissman wish to fly on "winged thought" to a new promised land of meta-physics or merely to take flight back to the old fleshpots of metaphysics?   There are impulses in both directions in this work

He appears to be rejecting both the old metaphysics and the old antimetaphysics, castigating them as intuitionism and advocating instead a new meta-physics under the name of "Hypothetical Method." Intuitionism embraces just about every philosopher from Plato onwards, on just one page (p 66) there is mention of Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Carnap, Gadamer, and Quine, and elsewhere many more names are added   The Hypothetical Method is much more selective, embracing only Peirce, Whitehead, and, it seems, Popper (though his name is never mentioned), or at least his fallibilist tests, though once again Plato figures as the eponymous ancestor   Indeed, the other joke Weissman takes seriously and even tries to improve on is Whitehead's witticism "that the history of philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato   Why not say instead that our history is often a succession of expositions calculated to make Plato literal and testable?" (p 108)

To make Plato literal and testable—that sounds like an extremely unlikely combination of the old (now discredited) metaphysics and modern (now outdated) scientific methodology   But elsewhere Weissman does write as if he might be willing to follow Heisenberg into meta-physical speculation   Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to consider the meta-physics of quantum theory—in the way that some physicists, like Bernard d'Espagnat, have done—considering quantum theory to be a "transitional theory" (p 39) which will presumably be replaced by one not plagued by problems of unfalsifiable interpretation   Instead of seeking for meta-physics at the point physics gives out, where the experimental evidence is no longer decisive and speculative interpretation must ensue, Weissman attempts the

opposite course of trying to make metaphysics experimentally testable
The metaphysical "hypotheses" he broaches are mostly hoary old
chestnuts such as "events have causes," or "nature endures" (p 31)
And this is how he tries to make out that they are empirically testable

> There is, for example, evidence for saying that some things are
> past It includes their perceived effects, e g children So is there
> evidence in the regularities we perceive for the claim that similar
> causes usually have similar effects   What should count as
> evidence for the hypothesis that we do have true beliefs? Only
> the obvious and hardly disputable fact that people, ourselves in-
> cluded, are observed doing things they apparently know how to
> do   (Pp. 117–18)

The facts are certainly indisputable, but do they count as evidence for
anything metaphysical?   Would Nietzsche, who argued that there
are no true beliefs, or any other skeptic be very impressed with such
evidence?   Does it amount to any more than Dr Johnson's famous
"I refute him thus" in reply to Berkeley's skepticism? Does any of
this bear the likeness that Weissman alleges to empirical evidence
for scientific hypotheses?
   Thus to conclude with a third joke at a meeting in New York where
Heisenberg expounded his version of a unified field theory, for which
he was roundly condemned as indulging in fantastic speculations, Bohr
finally rose and said that the question was not whether Heisenberg's
theory made nature peculiar but whether it was peculiar enough for
nature's peculiarities   Here, too, the questionable part is not whether
the Hypothetical Method is metaphysical but whether it is meta-
physical enough for theories such as Heisenberg's
   Despite these evident criticisms of the book's main thesis, I welcome
its appearance and acknowledge that there are excellent specific things
in it   There is a brief but devastating critique of linguistic philosophy
(pp 212–14) which ought to be anthologized   There are interesting
attempts at a revised systems-theory *cum* natural-law account of value
(pp 40–2) and a pragmatist *cum* cognitivist account of mind (ch 6)
I recommend the book to anyone who is bored with the inertia of
current professional neoscholasticism or the triviality of fashionable
alternatives and longs for some movement of thought—no matter
where it might be going.—Harry Redner, *Monash University*

WILLIAMS, C J F   *What is Identity?* Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989   ix
   + 200 pp $39 95—*What is Identity?* is the third volume in C J F
   Williams's trilogy, following *What is Existence?*, published in 1981,
   and *What is Truth?*, published in 1986
      The problem with statements of identity is that they may be both
   true and informative, mathematics and the natural sciences regard
   the solution of equations and discoveries of the form x is (really the
   same as) y as intellectual achievements, and discoveries of the form
   "I am the one who is (did) such-and-such" may reflect moral effort

and achievement   But it is trivial to say that a thing is the same as itself and false to say that it is identical with something else   To explain the informativeness of identity statements, Frege proposed that the two terms flanking the identity sign may have the same reference but different senses   Wittgenstein preferred to dispose of the problem by denying that identity was a relation which could be said to obtain between two items, a position which he summarized in the formula "Identity of object I express by identity of sign and not by using a sign for identity, difference of objects I express by difference of signs "

While acknowledging the interest of both positions, Williams sees a middle way inspired by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. He accepts the invitation to do away with "=" and "≠" as two-term relations and expresses statements of sameness and difference by means of an identity operator, in a way which owes much to Quine's eliminative projects   "Someone is deceiving himself," "My mother-in-law is the same as my psychotherapist," and "There is a number which is its own square" turn out to share a common underlying representation, and the identity operator thus "can be regarded as a regimented version of the reflexive pronoun in a natural language "   Williams finds empirical support for this analysis in the observation that earlier forms of English together with some other languages have a single word for "self" and "same "

What spoke against Wittgenstein and for Frege was in part the problem of identity in opaque contexts involving perception, belief, hope, intention, and the like   In chapter 6, Williams shows how his notation permits the formal management of such intentional contexts   Chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9 consider some of the broader philosophical implications—ranging from doubts about the need for a mathematical realism to a deep skepticism about Davidson's analysis of the logical form of action sentences and event-identity in general—of his analysis. Williams admits that he has not refuted the theory of mind-body identity but questions whether any supporter really understands it   The discussion of personal identity in chapters 5 and 7 is directed against Geach's theory of relative identity and its original in Locke   The author agrees finally with Swinburne that the identity of a person is a nonempirical matter which cannot be settled by appeal to criteria, and the conclusion of his discussion of Bernard Williams, Strawson, Chisholm, and Castañeda is that the knowledge of myself that is expressed in certain psychological and moral self-ascriptions cannot after all be represented in the reflexive notation advanced earlier in the book

There is a wealth of material here for the logician concerned with the choice of a symbolism but also for the philosopher who is interested in the constitution of the self, in scientific statements of identity, or in the nature of mathematical knowledge   Williams is exact and careful in his demonstrations of what a given notation can and cannot do, and his criticisms of influential positions, though brief and schematic, are direct and provocative   Only the example involving "your wife" and her wardrobe troubles on page 134 seems dated.—Catherine Wilson, *University of Oregon.*

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

Aristotelian Teleology, Presocratic Hylozoism, and 20th Century Interpretations, EDWARD M. ENGELMANN

This article shows that Aristotle's teleology is a sophisticated development of an early Presocratic understanding of motion, an understanding which regards motion as an expression of the divine-psychic reality of the natural world. Indeed, it is precisely by using the concept of teleology to develop this Presocratic insight that Aristotle is able to rescue nature and motion from Parmenides' critique The article goes on to examine modern interpretations which seek to "demythologize" Aristotelian teleology and thus "rehabilitate" it by conceiving end-directedness as merely an extrinsic feature of physical, inertial motion These interpretations are misguided, it is shown, because vital end-directedness is in fact an intrinsic aspect of motion as Aristotle understands it

The Mysteriousness of the Good Iris Murdoch and Virtue-Ethics, PAMELA HALL

This essay attempts to relate the ethics of Iris Murdoch, as presented in *The Sovereignty of Good,* with virtue-ethics more generally, in both ancient and contemporary embodiments First, an exegesis of Murdoch's thought is presented, with special attention to her understanding of human nature and virtue Her positions on these issues are related to her denial of a *telos* to human life Then the essay proceeds to compare Murdoch to other participants in the tradition of the virtues, with a view to determining whether she presents a truly coherent ethics of the virtues Such a determination involves reflection on what core beliefs are necessary in any

---

coherent manifestation of virtue-ethics   Finally, Murdoch's denial of a *telos* is used as a way to question one key presupposition of the tradition of the virtues

Stalking the Ubiquitous, Invisible Beast Reductionism, Relativity, and Time, LOUIS GROARKE

This paper discusses metaphysical claims about the nature of time Recent philosophers have argued that the nature of time is fundamentally opaque, that it resists, in some final sense, rewarding philosophical inquiry Responding to this modern agnosticism, the paper presents reductionism as a viable alternative to Newtonian or Platonic theories of time   Although the debate is situated within a broad historical context, the primary focus is on the relationship of metaphysics to contemporary science   The paper demonstrates, in some detail, that claims made by modern science and, in particular, by the theory of relativity, do not undermine traditional re-ductionism.   Indeed, reductionism becomes a tool whereby we can examine the metaphysical bias implicit in modern physics   Our understanding of the physical world and of science itself is thus contingent, not only on science, but upon an elucidation of larger metaphysical or epistemological issues

Ockham and Scepticism   The Intuitive Cognition of Non-Existents, VANCE G MORGAN

This article is an investigation of the common charge that Ockham's position concerning the intuitive cognition of non-existents commits him to extreme skepticism   The article concludes that while Ockham's phi-losophy does not commit him to skepticism in the way commonly charged, his direct avoidance of skepticism commits him to skeptical conclusions from a completely different source

Saint Anselm's Rejection of the 'Ontological Argument'—A Review of the Occasion and Circumstances, THOMAS A LOSONCY

This article notes that the first occurrence of what historically will be identified as an "ontological argument" occurs in Gaunilo's *Reply on Behalf of the Fool*   This summary by Gaunilo was, in turn, recognized and understood as a type of argumentation by Anselm in his own *Rejoinder* to Gaunilo   The article then proceeds to examine Anselm's rejection of such a way of reading his argument, and notes, in detail, Anselm's denial of specific points   Finally, the article briefly indicates the line of argument Anselm does employ in his *Proslogion* as a means of further indicating how Gaunilo has misconstrued his intent and efforts

Aquinas on Time and Eternity, BRIAN LEFTOW

In his recent "Was Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?" William Craig suggests that Aquinas is committed to two incompatible theories of time, which (adapting McTaggart) we may call an A- and a B-theory On A-theories, present and future events are unequally actual present events exist and future events do not On B-theories, present and future events are equally actual present events exist now, and future events also exist, but later in time This paper suggests against Craig that Aquinas is not committed to a B-theory of time or an inconsistency Rather than holding that present and future events are equally actual in time, as B-theorists do, Thomas holds that present and future events are equally actual in eternity but not in time This paper explores this position and argues that it does not entail a B-theory

---

Role Morality as a Complex Instance of Ordinary Morality,
JUDITH ANDRE

Role morality is not in conflict with "ordinary morality" but is a complex instance of it Role morality cannot be reduced to contractual obligation, nor to protection of the vulnerable, its obligations are to some extent independent of whether the role itself is morally justified A role obligates someone holding it because others expect, desire, or depend upon one to act in certain ways The weight of these expectations increases if one has voluntarily assumed the role and is still greater if one has made implicit or explicit promises and contracts Profiting from a role leads to further obligations of gratitude and fair play All of these obligations, however, are only *prima facie* We also need to evaluate and sometimes to reform or destroy the roles that exist

Mental Causes, JOHN HEIL and ALFRED MELE

Garden-variety explanations of human behavior feature agents' reasons, states of mind with particular mental contents Such states are commonly taken to contribute to the etiology of the behavior Worries about this picture abound, however One difficulty is to see how mental content could function causally An account of mental causation is advanced that squares with a standard conception of agency and with the notion that the content of mental states is often fixed in part by relational, nonintrinsic characteristics of agents

What is Wrong with Wicked Feelings? ROBERT C. ROBERTS

It is a common intuition that some feelings, considered without regard
to their behavioral antecedents or consequences, can be morally reprehen-
sible   This paper asks what other moral beliefs might support this in-
tuition, which seems ill-supported by both act deontology and consequen-
tialism   Three cases are examined invidious envy/pride, contempt, and
unjust anger   While various suggestions are made, they center around
the insight that friendship and allied relationships such as familial affection
are constituted in significant part by attitudes to which the wicked feelings
are contrary   Since, however, according to the intuitions of some, the
reprehensibleness of some of these feelings is not limited to cases of actual
friendship or family ties, it is hypothesized that this intuition belongs to,
and is properly supported in, a moral view in which all humans are somehow
regarded as having family-like ontological bonds with one another

Textual Deference, BARRY SMITH

It is a truism that the attitude of deference to the text plays a lesser
role in Anglo-Saxon philosophy than in other philosophical traditions
Works of philosophy written in English have spawned a massive secondary
literature dealing with the ideas, problems, or arguments they contain
But they have almost never given rise to works of commentary in the strict
sense, a genre which is a dominant literary form not only in the Confucian,
Vedantic, Islamic, Jewish, and Scholastic traditions of the past, but also
in relation to more recent German-language philosophy (thus, for example,
in work on Hegel, Heidegger, or Wittgenstein)   Moreover, Anglo-Saxon
philosophers have themselves embraced the commentary form when deal-
ing with Greek or Latin philosophers outside their own tradition   The
paper seeks to establish the reasons for this imbalance by examining those
factors which might be conducive to the growth of a commentary literature
in a given culture

Conscience, Sympathy and the Foundation of Morality, JIWEI CI

Some light can be shed on conscience, and hence also on the foundation
of morality, by investigating its conceptual and phenomenological rela-
tionship with sympathy   Conceptually, conscience contrasts with sym-
pathy in their respective focus on the self and on others   Phenomenolog-
ically, conscience is related to sympathy in ways that depend on the kind
of moral situation in question   In purely self-affecting situations, con-
science is activated independently of sympathy—a fact that detracts from
its intrinsic value   In other-affecting situations, conscience depends for
its activation on the presence of sympathy, in that moral principles gov-
erning other-affecting situations cannot be genuinely internalized in the
absence of sympathy.   It thus follows that sympathy is more basic than
conscience as a candidate for the foundation of morality   Moreover, sym-
pathy, rather than the activity of thinking (*pace* Hannah Arendt), is the
only effective means of preventing the internalization of principles that
enjoin the harming of others

Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints, HUGH J. McCANN

Certain authors reject what they call the "Simple View" of intentional action, that is, the principle that anyone who *A*s intentionally intends to *A*   It is argued that this is a mistake. Rejecting the Simple View forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action   This is likely either to multiply entities, or to invite revival of reductionist theories of intention   In addition, such accounts drive a wedge between intention and practical rationality by forbidding agents to intend goals it is rational to seek   Worse yet, the states they "substitute" for intention turn out to be subject to the same constraints of rationality that apply to intention itself, and hence are indistinguishable from it   Thus there is no basis for such supposed distinctions, and the Simple View is to be preferred

Consciousness Naturalized· Supervenience Without Physical Determinism, DENNIS M. SENCHUK

De Re *Desire,* PETER MARKIE and TIMOTHY PATRICK

Philosophers have assumed that once they develop an adequate theory of *de re* belief they can directly extend it to *de re* desire by replacing every reference to a belief relation by one to a desire relation   The article considers the extent to which different theories of *de re* belief are extendable to *de re* desire, and argues for two points in particular (1) *de re* desire poses a special problem for individual concept theories of *de re* attitudes, (2) both the singular propositions-mental states theory and the dual content theory of *de re* attitudes can be directly extended from *de re* belief to *de re* desire   The fact that these theories can be directly extended from *de re* belief to *de re* desire is an important point in their favor

---

Marx's Use of Religious Metaphors, THOMAS M. JEANNOT

The "embryology" of Marxist criticism is situated in the womb of Young Hegelian theological criticism   Marx's break with the Young Hegelians was a break with their theological mode of theorizing   After Marx broke with them, he was concerned with religion and theology only as

metaphors   The metaphorical function of religion and theology in Marx's mature criticism was to signal the presence of a mystification   Theoretical mystification consists in presenting some subject-matter in a one-sided, abstract, "otherworldly" fashion, in isolation from "this-worldly" practices The mystified consciousness of bourgeois political economy is a reflection of the concrete, material mystification of economic relationships in the capitalist mode of production, "a social formation in which the process of production is master over [human beings], instead of the opposite "

Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality,
   JONATHAN SHEAR

A major program in the study of mystical experiences has involved the attempt to isolate basic culture-invariant types and components of these experiences in order to examine their significance objectively   Hermeneutical thinkers such as Steven Katz, however, have argued (1) that mystical experiences cannot be understood independently of their embedding conceptual contexts, and (2) that the traditional notion of culture-independent "core" types and components of mystical experiences is therefore misguided   Examination of these hermeneutical arguments in light of (i) the phenomenological content of culture-invariant descriptions of the empirically qualityless "introvertive" mystical experience (identified by Stace and others as the "purest" mystical experience), and (ii) objective scientific research on the empirical correlates of this experience falsifies Katz's basic hermeneutical claims about the necessary culture-dependence of mystical experiences in general and this experience in particular   The conclusion is drawn that the traditional objective approach to mystical experiences, supplemented by the current scientific research, remains the most rational empirical one

The Structure of Self-Commentary in Hegel's Dialectical Logic,
   RICHARD GASKINS

Reasoning patterns throughout Hegel's writings point toward a unique self-referential structure which became the explicit theme of Hegel's *Logic* Mixing elements of content and form, the *Logic* employs distinctive philosophical concepts that serve as both objects of description and terms of explanation   The logical functions of these *"Begriffe"* have generally eluded the reductive descriptions found among Hegel's defenders and detractors   An adequate description of dialectic recognizes four structural principles (1) Hegel's *Begriffe* lose their distinctive force in any unit smaller than a triad of triads, drawn from a complex hierarchical order   (2) The relations among terms on adjacent levels of this hierarchy are discrete combinations of conceptual "specification" and "enrichment "   (3) Hegel's

narrative reveals a closed hierarchy of three or more integrated levels, in which the structural aspects of *Begriffe* are progressively integrated with their content   (4) The paradigmatic triad for dialectical self-commentary is Universality—Specificity—Individuality, amplified by sections on Judgment and Syllogism

Divine Irony and the Natural Law Speculation and Edification in Aquinas, THOMAS S HIBBS

Philosophic interest in Aquinas's ethics has focused almost exclusively on natural law as providing an autonomous and complete moral theory Yet Aquinas depicts the natural law as but part of a more comprehensive moral pedagogy   In fact, in his discussion of the convergence of the natural law with the decalogue, Thomas highlights the dialectical and instrumental status of the law   The law aids only by accusing, it commands without empowering   The law fosters self-knowledge and intensifies man's sense of his need for assistance   It is thus teleologically and pedagogically ordered to the recognition of the need for a mediator   The engagement of the natural by the supernatural, which builds upon certain analogies between the two, operates through dialectic and irony, through strategies that demand and allow for the re-appropriation of the self, its possibilities, its disorders, its needs

Rejoining Alētheia and Truth, LAWRENCE J HATAB

From early on in his thought, Heidegger engaged the word "truth" (*Wahrheit*) in terms of the Greek word *alētheia* (unconcealment), that is, a sense of truth as disclosure prior to truth as correctness   Near the end of his thinking he seemed to segregate these words, giving the term truth back to metaphysics and elevating *alētheia* as a unique word hidden within the history of Being and behind all disclosure   The article challenges this development and attempts to rejoin the terms by thinking the word truth "in-between" unconcealment and the traditional notion of correctness, thereby avoiding the extremes of both metaphysical closure and a detached mystery   A set of "signs" for truth are then articulated, indicating ways in which the word truth can function in our discourse without foundational guarantees   The goal is a sense of truth which is both open and authoritative

Eric Voegelin's View of History as a Drama of Transfiguration, GLENN HUGHES

Voegelin's view of what constitutes history is examined here   The essence of history, he argues, is the relationship between the significant constants and variables in human self-interpretation over time   The central constant of self-interpretation is the quest for meaning, the most important variable is the discovery of transcendent reality, and of the human

relation to transcendence   Radically historical consciousness emerges
from an awareness of significant human development through time com-
bined with an awareness of the tension of human existence toward a "be-
yond" of time   The participation of all humans in a transcendent reality
beyond spatiotemporal determinations grounds the actual universality of
history, a "human story" in which spatiotemporal reality is transfigured
through human participation in transcendent meaning   And because of
the mysteries of transcendence, expressions of history's meaning require
comprehensive stories—*mythoi*—that articulate both the sense and the
mystery of the overarching drama of human existence

Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom and
    Heidegger's Thought, WAYNE J. FROMAN

Hindu Doubts About God Towards A Mīmāṃsā Deconstruction,
    PURUSOTTAMA BILIMORIA

Truth and Language-World Connections, DOROTHY GROVER

    Some difficulties of incorporating language-world connections in an
analysis of truth are addressed   Hartry Field's suggestion that something
like the causal-historical theories of reference be used to eliminate "de-
notes" and "applies" from base clauses, in a version of Tarski's truth def-
inition, is shown to have true and false sentences connected by the same
causal connections to reality   This poses a problem if we assume, as Field
does, that truth has an explanatory role   For if truth itself has an ex-
planatory role, one would expect true and false sentences to be connected
in different ways to the world   Either different language-world connec-
tions must be found for truth and falsity; or, if truth itself does not have
an explanatory role, we should abandon the idea of incorporating language-
world connections in our analysis of truth

Rights and Rights Violators: A New Approach to the Nature of
    Rights, HEATHER J GERT

    When considering the nature of rights, many philosophers have asked
what sorts of things can have rights and in virtue of which of their qualities
they have these rights   The nature of the bearer of rights has been in-
vestigated, while the nature of the respecter (or violator) of rights has
been ignored   This narrow focus not only restricts our thinking about the
nature of rights, it also wrongly suggests that the qualities in virtue of

which one has rights have more moral significance than the qualities in
virtue of which one is capable of respecting (or violating) the rights of
others

Supervenience is a Two-way Street, RICHARD B. MILLER

It has been widely argued of late that the alleged supervenience of
the nonphysical on the physical is all that the physicalist could want or
need   With skepticism about reductive and eliminativist strategies on the
rise, a supervenience argument for physicalism becomes increasingly at-
tractive
This paper seeks to undermine such an argument by showing that the
considerations offered in support of the supervenience of the nonphysical
on the physical equally support the supervenience of the physical on the
nonphysical   Thus the arguments do not establish ontological primacy
Some concept of supervenience may still be useful as a way of explaining
physicalism, but it will not be of any help in justifying physicalism

THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 29, No 1, January 1991

The Intelligible World-Animal in Plato's "Timaeus,"
RICHARD D. PARRY

In Plato's *Timaeus,* an important part of the cosmology is the account
of the Form which the Demiurgos uses to create our Cosmos   This Form
is called the intelligible animal which contains all other intelligible animals
Expanding on an earlier article of the author's, this article extends his
analysis of the intelligible animal which contains all other intelligible an-
imals to give a deeper insight into Plato's account of cosmology and of his
theory of Forms, in particular, it expands on the notion of containment
which is at the heart of Plato's description of this very important Form.
This relation of containing is shown not to be that of genus to species, of
entailment, or of class inclusion   Rather, an important clue is taken from
Plato's example of the sphere—"the shape which contains all the other
shapes"—in order to explicate this particular notion of containment
among Forms

*Spontaneity and the Generation of Rational Beings in Leibniz's
Theory of Biological Reproduction,* DANIEL C. FOUKE

This article examines Leibniz's theory of biological reproduction in
relation to the requirements of his metaphysical system   Leibniz's meta-
physics emphasizes that because of the metaphysical perfection of God,
the system of nature which God creates must be autonomous and without
need of divine intervention   As a partial consequence of this view, he

holds that the development of substances must be understood as an unfolding of individual natures   One would expect Leibniz's theory of human biological reproduction to reflect these views, so that the merely sentient monads are elevated to a state of rationality as a spontaneous development which coincides with biological conception   However, Leibniz does not consistently take this view and more frequently appeals to a divine impartation of a new perfection   The apparent conflict between this reproductive theory and his metaphysics is explored and traced to tensions in his conception of God as both perfect in creative power and architectonic wisdom and as the immanent source and cause of the perfections of being

Corpuscles, Mechanism and Essentialism in Locke and Berkeley,
    MARGARET ATHERTON

John Locke is often held to be a spokesman for corpuscular mechanism, while George Berkeley is taken to be an important critic   Yet there are many passages where Locke is critical of corpuscular mechanism and many passages (chiefly in *Siris*) where Berkeley endorses the existence of particles too small to see   The explanation for this apparent anomaly is revealed if corpuscular mechanism is understood as embodying several different doctrines, in particular, a mechanist component and an essentialist component   Berkeley can be seen as accepting the mechanist component, but rejecting essentialism, and as picking up on clues laid by Locke, whose doubts are also about essentialism   When the debates about corpuscular mechanism are seen in this light, then the chief target of Berkeley's arguments is found to be Descartes and not Locke

John Stuart Mill on Induction and Hypotheses, STRUAN JACOBS

This paper examines aspects of Mill's philosophy of science, with special reference to his *A System of Logic*   The received interpretation of Mill's metascience as predominantly inductivist is challenged   Diachronic study of different editions of *A System of Logic* shows that Mill relinquished the inductive account of the genesis of most scientific laws in favor of a hypothetical account   The chapter of the *Logic* that Mill devotes to hypotheses (chapter 14 of book 3) is analyzed in detail   Several types of hypotheses are distinguished, and problems to which his account gives rise are exposed   Ideas presented in the paper are then used to throw light on relations between Mill's metascience and that of his distinguished contemporary, William Whewell

Hume's "Of Miracles," Peirce, and the Balancing of Likelihoods,
    KENNETH R MERRILL

Peirce contends that the method Hume recommends in "Of Miracles" for evaluating testimonial evidence is hopelessly inappropriate for that purpose   Hume's preoccupation with miracle stories, which are inherently

improbable, tends to obscure both the generality of his method and its logical weakness   The method in question—the balancing of likelihoods—is a relatively informal version of the calculus of chances (or the calculus of probabilities)   That calculus is a valuable tool for insurance companies, gambling casinos, and the like, but its use in the assessment of historical testimony is fundamentally and irredeemably wrongheaded—or so Peirce argues   This paper does essentially two things (1) it sets out both an informal and a more formal account of Hume's method of balancing likelihoods, with a view to showing that it is an application of the calculus of chances, and (2) it collects, systematizes, and discusses Peirce's somewhat scattered animadversions upon Hume's method   As part of (2), it follows up some lines of thought that Peirce suggests but does not develop

Property, Entitlement, and Remedy, JEFFREY PAUL

This paper discusses, first, the sorts of acts that are prohibited on a Nozickian entitlement view of justice, and then derives the sorts of remedy that such a view of justice would permit   All acts which are interferences with the objects to which another is legitimately entitled (including one's physical self) are proscribed according to this view   The remedies for such acts must include the restoration of the object to its legitimate owner (when it is being withheld) in its original condition, and compensation for the uses and the fruits of those uses of which he has been deprived   Once full restoration has taken place, any further remedial action, such as imprisonment, would be prohibited by the entitlement theory, for full restoration of the entitlement implies that the debt of the wrongdoer has, on entitlement grounds, been fully discharged   Imprisonment or execution under such circumstances would deprive the wrongdoer of the right of self-ownership   Punitive actions which exceed full restoration are without justification, then, within entitlement theory as delineated originally by Nozick

Property in Science and the Market, JOHN O'NEILL

This paper considers the following question   what is wrong, if anything, with the market as an institutional framework for science?   It opens with an examination of different senses of "intellectual property"—that which is presupposed by the market, and that which is presupposed by professional science.   Two kinds of objection that might be raised against the employment of market mechanisms in science are then considered (1) that scientific theories and information are not the sort of things that can be commodities, and (2) that the property relations presupposed by the market necessarily conflict with good scientific practice   It is argued that the first kind of objection fails   The paper defends three versions of the second

In developing these arguments weaknesses in recent epistemological arguments for the free-market developed by economic liberals, in particular by Hayek, are highlighted

Meinongian Theories of Generality, MARCO SANTAMBROGIO

It is not widely appreciated that Meinong's nonexistent objects are closely related to Twardowski's general objects and Locke's general abstract triangle   The latter is usually thought to be an incoherent notion   In order to disprove that, a formal semantics for such objects is outlined   The adequacy conditions it satisfies are discussed in detail.   It is argued that general objects are needed in order to account for such uses of definite descriptions as in "The whale is a mammal "   The central section of the paper is devoted to discussing which notion of reference is appropriate for general objects   Once it is appreciated that general objects can be referred to although they are not what is talked about—they are related with the justification of assertions—ontological inflation is no longer to be feared   A comparison with Fine's theory of arbitrary objects and with Castañeda's guise theory is given

Direct Reference, Meaning, and Thought, FRANCOIS RECANATI

According to Kaplan and other theorists of direct reference, the "content" of an indexical expression is its reference, while its "character" (linguistic meaning) is a mode of presentation of the latter   Since propositional attitudes such as belief *are* sensitive to the way the reference is presented or thought of, they also say that the object of the attitudes is a certain content (for example, a singular proposition, with the reference as a constituent) under a certain "character" or mode of presentation   This paper argues that there are two distinct notions of "character" at play here the mode of presentation which constitutes the linguistic meaning of an indexical expression and the mode of presentation of the reference which is crucially involved in the individuation of the attitudes are two different sorts of mode of presentation, with different properties   The relations between these two sorts of modes of presentation are investigated.

The Myth of the Essential Indexical,
   RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN

A strong contemporary current runs to the effect that the ability of an agent to project knowledge of the world into relevant action in the world depends upon the ability to think indexical thoughts, especially the ability to think "I "   This article argues that it is not true for the general

case that the relation an indexical bears to its referent yields a relation that would be relevant to action   Nor are those relations of self to world that one must take into account in order to act relations of the sort that indexicals bear to their referents   Moreover, it is no part of the job of an indexical token to *signify* the relation either of itself to its referent or of its interpreter to its referent   Finally, if an agent employs a mental term to represent herself, this cannot in principle be a mental indexical

Real Possibility, HARRY DEUTSCH

Suppose you are solicited for funds by the American Cancer Society, and you believe that the lines of research pursued by the Society could well lead to a cure   So you say to yourself, "This could lead to a cure," and you send the money   But why?   What beliefs prompt you to act in this way?   Surely it is not just that you believe that there is some possible world in which the society's line of research leads to a cure, for that would not explain why you send money   Instead, you believe that there is a "real possibility," a possibility for the actual world, that a cure will be found along these lines   In this note, a semantics for real possibility is sketched which treats it as a future-oriented modal-temporal notion

Thinking of Something, GREGORY FITCH

Indexicality. The Transparent Subjective Mechanism for Encountering a World, HECTOR-NERI CASTAÑEDA

All the Difference in the World, TIM CRANE

Many philosophers of mind believe that the Twin Earth arguments of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge establish that certain intentional states have "broad contents "   Others think that although these arguments may show this, there are other reasons to think that these states must have "narrow contents" too   There is thus a consensus that the Twin Earth arguments force a theory of content to adopt broad content, narrow content, or both   This paper disputes the consensus   It is argued that Putnam's and Burge's arguments only establish their conclusions if certain implausible assumptions about natural kinds and the relation between thought and language are made   It is concluded that the contents in question can be shared by "Twins" and yet have truth-conditions, so they are neither broad nor narrow   The broad-narrow distinction is thus undermined

A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time,
L NATHAN OAKLANDER

In recent years, Mellor, Oaklander, and Smart, amongst others, have defended the new tenseless theory of time, according to which our need to think and talk in tensed terms is perfectly consistent with its being the case that the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed in a tenseless metalanguage that describes unchanging temporal relations between and among events   In an article by Quentin Smith (*Philosophical Studies,* 1987), both the token-reflexive and the date-version of the new tenseless theory are criticized   In this article the author shows how a careful attention to the type-token distinction and to the views of Kaplan on indexicals can overcome Smith's objections to the token-reflexive account   The article also responds to Smith's objections to the date-analysis

Anscombian and Cartesian Scepticism, ANDY HAMILTON

Anscombe's "Sensory Deprivation Argument" (in "The First Person") presents a subject in a tank, totally sensorially deprived and amnesiac, yet still apparently guaranteed to self-refer using "I "   Since the subject has no conception of itself as embodied, she argues, "I" must here refer to a Cartesian Ego or (Anscombe's conclusion) to nothing at all   However, this argument depends on an empty phenomenon of "no unnoticed substitution" of the referent of "I" or (a skeptical variant of the argument) a modal fallacy   One can reconstruct Anscombe's argument avoiding these fallacies, but paradoxically a Cartesian conclusion results   The way "I" continues to refer in the absence of a Fregean conception, together with Anscombe's important claims about the circularity of the self-reference principle, does however suggest that the concept of a person is irrelevant to self-reference—a claim not easy to counter

Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement,
ROBERT ELLIOT

The Fifth Meditation, WALTER EDELBERG

Two theses constitute epistemological rationalism, properly understood (1) truth-values of propositions known *a priori* are sometimes determined by extra-conceptual fact, and (2) concepts yielding *a priori* knowledge are sometimes innate   Only in Meditation Five does Descartes argue for these at any level of generality, thereby making his pitch for a *genuinely* rationalist epistemology for the *a priori* disciplines like geometry,

and maybe theology He makes this case mainly in the arguments that the idea of the triangle is innate and has a true and immutable nature, but recent philosophers have found these arguments hopelessly confused A perfectly coherent reading of these arguments is possible, however The new reading invites a picture of the Cartesian system with a surprising view of innate ideas and true and immutable natures, and with a much larger role in Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology for the three "principle attributes" of thought, extension, and supreme perfection

The Indispensability of Sinn, GRAEME FORBES

This paper presents a new analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions which is Fregean in spirit but which makes an unusual use of Frege's apparatus The main concern is with attitude ascriptions which use names. An account of the sense of a name is formulated that is argued to be immune to Kripke's objections to this notion, these senses are employed in the analysis, and the paper ends with an application of the analysis to Kripke's "puzzle about belief"

Backgrounding Desire, PHILIP PETTIT and MICHAEL SMITH

Assume that desire is always involved in the genesis of intentional action Does this mean that in practical deliberation, the intentional agent takes the state of his desires into account? This paper argues that it does not· while desire is always present in the background of intentional action. it need not figure in the foreground of deliberation It is then shown that this view of things—called "the strict background view"—impacts on a number of current debates in moral philosophy It undermines two well-known arguments, one in defense of cognitivism, the other in defense of utilitarianism, and it has important significance for our understanding of autonomy, integrity, and prudence

Ockham, Adams and Connotation, PAUL VINCENT SPADE

This paper is a critical notice of Marilyn McCord Adams's two-volume study William Ockham The article discusses the contents of Adams's book, its intended audience, and certain proofreading problems in the first (hardbound) edition It then focuses on the notion of "connotation," which is central to Ockham's program of reducing the number of ontological categories to substance and quality alone The author disagrees with Adams over the ultimate promise of this program of "ontological reduction" by pointing out some difficulties not discussed by Adams The article concludes by remarking that the theory of connotation as described by Ockham is really two distinct and incompatible theories This fact has previously gone unnoticed in the secondary literature

Do Animals Feel Pain? PETER HARRISON

Most assessments of the moral status of animals are founded on the
assumption that animals feel pain   This assumption is generally supported
by three arguments· (1) We know that animals feel pain because they behave
in much the same way as we do when we feel pain   (2) Many animals
have nervous systems which resemble our own in structure and function
(3) Evolutionary theory provides for no radical discontinuity between hu-
man and other species, and it is therefore unlikely that only humans feel
pain   These arguments are examined and shown to be defective, or at
best, inconclusive   It is suggested that the experience of pain is essential
only in agents capable of free choice—people   Accordingly, some views
about how animals ought to be treated may need to be revised

Freedom and Human Nature, ANTONY FLEW

Part I is an attempt to develop and defend Kolakowski's contention
that the future of freedom in the world depends upon belief that freedom
"is rooted in the very quality of being human "   After first distinguishing
such political freedom from "freedom of the will" it is argued that we are
creatures who can and cannot but make choices, and that only creatures
such as we, having in our own persons abundant immediate experience
both of action (both free and under constraint) and of (uncontrollable)
behavior, could even understand the thesis of universal necessitating de-
terminism   It is, therefore, a thesis which can be understood only by those
in a position to know that it is false   Part II applies these distinctions
and conclusions to B F Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*

What is this thing called 'Love'? FRANCES M. BERENSON

Most theories of emotions differentiate between objective evaluations
and unaccountable subjective states   However, *every* emotion is neces-
sarily subjective at least in the sense that a subject has it   No theory of
emotions will ever be adequate without coming to grips with this allegedly
mysterious subjectivity and what follows from it   The standard necessary
conditions for something to count as an emotion can be shown to be in-
adequate to accommodate the complexities inherent in the emotion of love
The differences which emerge are so significant that they demand a different
treatment   Any analysis of love needs to go beyond necessary conditions
and focus on the variety of appropriate criteria arising from the meaning
of the concept and imperatively from the contemplation of the lived ex-
perience of loving.   This approach excludes the possibility of accommo-
dating conceptions of love to our preferences or to our convenience

Substance and Selfhood, E J. LOWE

A self is defined to be a being which can identify itself as the necessarily unique subject of certain thoughts and experiences   Various traditional theories of the ontological status of the self, both substantival and nonsubstantival, are criticized and rejected   A substantival theory is proposed and defended according to which the self is a simple substance distinct but not necessarily separable from the body   This theory is shown to be consistent with a naturalistic, evolutionary view of the emergence of mind

Wittgenstein's Indeterminism, R K SCHEER

Philosophizing, A. B. PALMA

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol 50, Supplement, Fall 1990

Husserl's Yearbook, KARL SCHUHMANN

The idea of founding a publication organ devoted to phenomenology first sprang up among Husserl's Gottingen students in 1907   In 1911 Husserl took over, and in 1913 there appeared the first volume of the "Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research "   Where in volume 1 the co-editors presented themselves to the public, volumes 2 and 3 contained dissertations written by young Gottingen and Munich phenomenologists Volumes 4 to 6 harbored the contributions to a Festschrift offered to Husserl in 1919   Volumes 7 to 11 were marked by Husserl's struggle to counter the large number of Munich and Gottingen contributions by publishing material close to his Freiburg transcendental version of phenomenology Yet the most important piece, Heidegger's *Being and Time,* turned out to radically undermine all such transcendental aspirations   As he did not succeed in preparing print work of his own, Husserl in the end preferred to abandon the idea of a yearbook for phenomenology

Externalist Theories of Perception, WILLIAM P ALSTON

Externalist theories are those that take something "external" to sensory experience to be required for the experience to figure in a perception of a physical object   Whether this is so depends on how we characterize experience.   Most ways of doing this, including sense-datum theory and adverbial theory, require something extra, for instance, a causal relation On the theory of appearing, by contrast, there is no such requirement, for on that theory a sensory experience just is something's appearing to one

as so-and-so, and when that something is a physical object, that object is
thereby perceived   This essay considers the strongest externalist theories
and finds that none of them succeeds in specifying conditions that exactly
fit object perception across all possible worlds

The Fallibility Paradox, KEITH LEHRER and KIHYEON KIM

Philosophers commonly concede that no matter how well justified we
may be in accepting something, it is possible that we are in error   We
fall into paradox when we attempt to combine fallibilism of this sort with
the doctrine that there must be some criterion for determining justification
Philosophers disagree about whether the criterion of justification is also
a criterion of truth, but two theses concerning a criterion of justification
are fundamental to the notion of criterion   The first is that satisfaction
of the criterion is a necessary condition of justification   The second is
that justified determination that the criterion is satisfied by some statement
or proposition yields justified acceptance of it   Paradoxically, the doctrine
of fallibilism is logically inconsistent with these two theses   Solutions to
the paradox reject either externalism, internalism, or fallibilism and expose
the epistemological importance of a criterion of justification

Qualities and Qualia—What's in the Mind?
    SYDNEY SHOEMAKER   ╱

One motive for "quining qualia" (in Dennett's phrase) is the view,
held by those like Harman, that the only introspectively accessible features
of perceptual experiences are their intentional (representational) features
It is argued here that this "intentionalist" view cannot be right   A con-
sideration of possible differences between "quality spaces" shows that there
are possible cases in which there is a phenomenal difference between ex-
periences that cannot be construed as a difference in their intentional
properties.   Also, the intentionalist position is undermined by the fact
that the similarity and difference relations among secondary qualities are
perceptual-system relative, the relations between the experiences therefore
being prior to those between the properties they represent   The final sec-
tion of the paper discusses the bearing on this of the "projectivist" claim
that our experiences of secondary qualities project onto external things
properties they do not have

Philosophical Anthropology What, Why and How,
    RICHARD SCHACHT

For the past half-century, there has been in Europe something called
"philosophical anthropology "   While criticized in some quarters and ig-
nored in others, it has persisted as a philosophical enterprise, and remains
an area of serious philosophical inquiry   The question of what it is to be
a human being and to live a human life is not the only question with which
a philosophical anthropology might be expected to deal   It also need not

be taken to presuppose the possibility of giving any particular sort of an-
swer   One of the marks of a philosophical anthropology is concern with
the ways in which various particular types of phenomena both involve and
serve to illuminate the complex interrelation of the various dimensions of
our human reality—biological and physiological, social and cultural, and
psychological and experiential   It may well be that there is no meta-
physical human essence, and that our biological nature is neither timeless
nor uniform even now, that indeed it endows us with a plasticity which
extends into nearly every corner of human life as we know it, and that our
"forms of life" have come to be what they are through long historical
developments operating on the level of sociocultural formations. But these
considerations do not preclude the possibility of a philosophical anthro-
pology, rather, they have the positive significance of setting the stage
for it

The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts, DANIEL C DENNETT

Four different exercises of interpretation are examined and shown to
be instances of the same project, conducted according to a single set of
principles, applied to different domains of objects hermeneutics, or the
interpretation of texts, intentional psychology, or the interpretation of
people, the interpretation of artifacts, and adaptationism, or the interpre-
tation of organism design in evolutionary biology   In all cases, there is
the possibility of residual indeterminacy of interpretation, in which case
there may be no deeper fact about the "real meaning" of an entity

Causation in the Philosophy of Mind, FRANK JACKSON and PHILIP PETTIT

If my behavior can be causally explained by my neurophysiology, how
then can it be explained by the contents of my beliefs? This paper offers
an answer to this question in terms of (a) a functionalist approach to
content and (b) an account of causal relevance which makes it clear how
functional role can be causally relevant   The paper concludes with an
application of the central idea to rebut an initially attractive argument
that certain forms of connectionism support eliminativism about the prop-
ositional attitudes

Causation· Reductionism Versus Realism, MICHAEL TOOLEY

This paper argues that reductionist accounts of causal laws and of
causal relations are untenable   In the case of laws, reference is made to
a fundamental epistemological difficulty, together with the problems posed
by cosmic, but accidental uniformities, by uninstantiated basic laws, and
by probabilistic laws   In the case of causal relations, two sorts of ob-
jections are advanced first, that a reductionist approach cannot provide a

satisfactory account of the direction of causation, either for certain very simple universes, or for "inverted" universes, unless one is prepared both to define the direction of causation in terms of the direction of time, and to adopt a realist view of the latter, secondly, that causal relations between events are not logically supervenient upon even the totality of all noncausal facts, together with all laws, both causal and noncausal, plus the direction of causation in all potential causal processes

Hume and Thick Connexions, SIMON BLACKBURN

This article discusses the interpretation of Hume's philosophy of causation   It distinguishes between positivist and more modern "skeptical realist" interpretations, and argues that neither quite fits the data   In particular, skeptical realism must underplay the role of the theory of ideas in Hume   It is urged that although there are some crucial indeterminacies, a closer approximation to his position is a not-so-skeptical quasi-realism

Aristotelian Essentialism, GARETH B MATTHEWS

This survey of recent efforts to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of an essential property reveals (1) a widespread failure to appreciate that Aristotle does not have our idea of "a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all)", (2) ignorance of the need to eliminate accidental unities from consideration so as to be able to focus on the only entities Aristotle supposes to have essences, and (3) a need to appreciate that, in Aristotle's view, we must have a good science of F's to be able to determine whether having property p actually belongs to the (Aristotelian) essence of an F, rather than p's being simply a *proprium* that all and only F's have, and have necessarily

Equality of What? NORMAN DANIELS

What is the target of our egalitarian concerns?   Rawls's focus on resources, in the form of the primary social goods, has been criticized from two directions on the grounds that it is insensitive to relevant variations among people   Sen argues that such differences as disease, disability, and metabolic needs mean individuals will not be able to convert primary goods into the same capabilities or positive freedom   Arneson and Cohen argue that variations in unchosen preferences or values mean people cannot convert primary goods into equal opportunities for welfare (or advantage)   An extension of Rawls's theory to meet health care needs, Daniels's fair equality of opportunity account, responds to Sen's criticisms   The appropriate response to the harmful effects of unchosen preferences is treatment whenever the underlying capacity to choose is disabled, this preserves a reasonable version of Rawls's claim about responsibility for ends   Even if resources are the target of a political conception of justice, they may not be the target of all our egalitarian concerns

Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory, VIRGINIA HELD

Far from providing mere additional insights which can be incorporated into traditional theory, feminist explorations often require radical transformations of existing fields of inquiry and theory From a feminist point of view, moral theory will have to be transformed to take account adequately of the experience of women This article begins with an examination of how various fundamental aspects of the history of ethics have not been gender-neutral. It then discusses three topics where feminist rethinking is transforming moral concepts and theories (1) reason and emotion, and the denigration of emotion, (2) the public and the private, and associations made with them, and (3) the concept of the self

The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics, PHILIP L. QUINN

This paper is meant both to review and to contribute to the recent revival of divine command ethics In the first section, recent efforts by philosophers to formulate defensible divine command theories of morality and to recover the historical tradition of theological voluntarism are described It is then suggested that it is time to begin proposing and evaluating positive reasons for adopting the divine command conception Following this advice, the paper concludes by discussing two such arguments The first is historical and rests on reflections by such thinkers as Augustine and Aquinas on the scriptural cases of the immoralities of the patriarchs The second is theological and is based on a strong form of the doctrine of divine sovereignty

Moral Dilemmas, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

Against views advanced by Bernard Williams and Bas C van Fraassen it is argued that there are no facts about moral dilemmas, characterizable independently of any moral theory It is further argued that any adequate theory which denies that there are in fact genuine moral dilemmas must provide a convincing account of what it is for moral agents to take themselves to be in a dilemmatic situation The ability of rationalist theories, which deny the occurrence of genuine moral dilemmas, to provide such an account is examined, and Aquinas's contribution to the provision of such an account receives particular attention

Phenomenology as Cooperative Task. Husserl-Farber
    Correspondence during 1936-37, KAH KYUNG CHO

Justification in the 20th Century, ALVIN PLANTINGA

Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief and Believing,
    RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

Noema and Meaning in Husserl, DAGFINN FØLLESDAL

How Wide is the Gap Between Facts and Values?
NICHOLAS RESCHER

The Good in Plato's Gorgias, F C. WHITE

In the *Gorgias* Socrates teaches that we should practice virtue and
concern for others, at the same time he teaches that all actions are and
should be done with an eye to the agent's good   A favored way of fitting
these two doctrines together is to take Socrates to be teaching that the
practice of virtue, including concern for others, is an instrumental means
to achieving one's own good   This paper argues that what Socrates teaches
in the *Gorgias* is not that virtue is a means but that it is one among several
intrinsic goods it is the sovereign intrinsic good

Meno, *the Slave Boy, and the Elenchos,* HUGH H BENSON

There is a recent view according to which Socrates understands his
elenchos not simply as a method of eliminating the false conceit of knowl-
edge, but also as a method for acquiring genuine knowledge to replace it
It is a corollary of this recent view that in the *Meno* Plato does not provide
a substantive view about how knowledge is to be acquired, which Socrates
previously failed to have, but rather, simply substitutes one substantive
view with another   However, a careful examination of the structure of
the *Meno* suggests that Plato takes himself to be going beyond the Socratic
method, not replacing or revising it   The theory of recollection, first in-
troduced in the *Meno,* is presented as a substantive view about how knowl-
edge is to be acquired once the Socratic *elenchos* has achieved its aim, that
is, once it has eliminated the interlocutor's false conceit

Plato and Archytas in the Seventh Letter, G E. R LLOYD

A close analysis of the information given about Archytas in the Sev-
enth Letter ascribed to Plato suggests that the author of that letter, while
acknowledging Archytas' role in rescuing Plato from the tyrant Dionysius
II of Syracuse, is nevertheless keen to dissociate Plato from Archytas and
to underline his independence from Pythagoreanism   It is as if that author
is conscious of the charges that were eventually to be made that Plato
plagiarized his ideas from the Pythagoreans—or that (as Aristotle claimed
in *Metaphysics* 1 6) his theory of Forms is a modification of Pythagoreanism

That does not rule out Plato as the author of the Seventh Letter But if he is, the usual picture of his close association with and admiration for Archytas needs to be revised

---

Ernst Mach and the Elimination of Subjectivity,
ANDY HAMILTON

The desire to eliminate the subject is a constant theme of positivism The neutral monism of Mach's influential *Analysis of Sensations* aspired to a pretheoretical subjectless "given " His rejection of the subject anticipates the nonskeptical solipsism of the Vienna Circle (and Wittgenstein), his opposition to objects as genuinely persisting entities anticipates the complementary phenomenalism of the Circle Mach's phenomenalism differs from Mill's because it is intended to be "neutral" and not mentalistic But Mach wavers between an objective and a subjective interpretation of his "sensations", examination of his account of others' sensations, and of merely possible sensations, shows that he lacks the resources to defend a neutralist middle way However, Mach's neutral monism remained a strangely potent doctrine for the Vienna Circle He inspired Carnap's conventionalist, neutralist constructionalism in the *Aufbau*, to be treated in a sequel to this article

Dretske on Perception, AMIR HOROWITZ

Fred Dretske, in his *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*, offers a comprehensive naturalistic account of knowledge based on the concept of *information.* In the special case of perceptual knowledge Dretske endorses the idea that the perceptual process consists of two distinct stages, a sensorial one and a cognitive one It is argued that this distinction is false The article trys to show a difficulty that the distinction creates in Dretske's model, and then argues that *every* model of perception which endorses this distinction will be subject to the same difficulty, and that therefore the distinction must be rejected altogether

Quine's Relativism, PHILIP HUGLY and CHARLES SAYWARD

A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine's work is that "there is no extra-theoretic truth " This article argues that on its best interpretation this doctrine is inconsistent with these other Quinean doctrines bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth

Frege and Husserl on Number, RICHARD TIESZEN

Husserl's criticisms of the account of number presented by Frege in the *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* raise deep problems in the philosophy of mathematics concerning the status of primitive terms, definability, intentionality, and constructivity   It is argued that they show that logicism, even in newer incarnations, must fall short of providing an adequate epistemology for mathematics   The argument of the paper also bears directly on the debate between Dummett, Sluga, Resnik and others over the question whether Frege is best understood as a realist or as some kind of Kantian transcendental idealist.

Rorty, Davidson and Truth, MARIA BAGHRAMIAN

Closing the Chinese Room, THOMAS WEISS

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Hume Society is pleased to announce a call for papers for its Nineteenth Hume Conference taking place June 29–July 3, 1992, at the University of Nantes   Papers may be on any aspect of Hume's writings, although the conference directors particularly encourage submissions on three themes (1) Hume and French Philosophy, Past and Present, (2) Hume's Aesthetics, and (3) Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Interpretations of Hume   Papers should be no more than thirty minutes reading length with self-references eliminated for blind refereeing   They may be in English or French, but all papers must be accompanied by an abstract in English   Three copies of papers and abstracts should be sent by October 1, 1991, to Dorothy Coleman, Secretary of the Hume Society, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185

The Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love announces a call for papers to be presented at our meetings with the American Philosophical Association   Papers to be read at the Eastern Division meetings in December 1991 and papers to be read at the Pacific Division meetings in March 1992 should reach the below address by April 15 and October 1, 1991, respectively   Submit in duplicate, prepared for blind review, with standard spacing and margins   Text, excluding footnotes, is limited to twelve pages   Contact Alan Soble, Philosophy Department, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana 70148 (tel 504-286-6819)

The International John F MacMurray Society announces a call for papers to be read at a conference entitled "God, Earth and Human Community The Post-Modern Religious Philosophy of John MacMurray," to be held October 18–20, 1991, in Toronto at Regis College   The guiding objective of this conference, being held on the centenary of John Mac-Murray's birth, is to provide a forum which will make evident the growing importance of MacMurray's thought for a wide range of contemporary issues   Papers should not exceed a reading time of thirty-five minutes and should be mailed in triplicate, accompanied by a one hundred-word abstract, by July 1, 1991, to Stanley Harrison, Department of Philosophy, Charles S Coughlin Hall, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

The Association for Process Philosophy of Education announces a participatory conference entitled "Process Philosophy of Education Confluence and Construction," to be held July 29–August 1, 1991, at Cornell University   Principal presenters include George Allan, Robert Brumbaugh, D Bob Gowin, Pete A Y Gunter, Brian Hendley, and George Lucas. For more information, write Malcolm D Evans, Executive Secretary, APPE, 85 DeHart Drive, Belle Mead, New Jersey 08502 (tel 908-281-7970, evenings only)

Articles on peace are invited for submission to a forthcoming collection entitled *Essays on Peace*   The emphasis of this collection will be on innovative approaches to the problems of violence and its manifold manifestations in our world, while avoiding over-specialization   Submissions should not be in excess of five thousand words, though longer contributions will be considered on their merits   Copies on floppy disks should also be forwarded if possible   Contributions should include international reply coupons and be received by the editorial committee toward the end of June 1991   Send submissions to Michael Salla, Department of Government, or Walter Tonetto, Department of German, University of Queensland, St Lucia Queensland 4072, Australia, or to Enrique Martinez, c/o Spanish Chamber of Commerce, P O Box 121-130, Taipei, Taiwan (R O C)

Northwestern University announces the establishment of a new summer program, the Institute for Classical Philosophy   The Institute offers intensive elementary philological training in classical Greek, Latin, and, in future years, Sanskrit, to students of philosophy, history, theology, and allied disciplines   In the summer of 1991, the Institute will sponsor two independent courses, Philosophical Greek and Philosophical Latin, each of which combines elementary philological instruction with lectures in the history of philosophy   For further information contact the Institute for Classical Philosophy, Summer Session, Northwestern University, 2003 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2650, (tel 708-491-5250, outside Illinois, 1-800-FINDS-NU)

The Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University has announced its seventeenth annual Intensive Bioethics Course, to be held June 2–8, 1991, at Georgetown University   The course is an in-depth study of ethical theory and the application of ethical principles to selected problems in health care and biomedical research   The course, directed primarily toward physicians, nurses, and policymakers in the health care field, consists of lectures and small-group discussions   The course is limited to two hundred participants   For more information, contact LeRoy Walters, Director, Center for Bioethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D C 20057

The Department of Philosophy at The Ohio State University is pleased to announce the inauguration of a new and unique track in graduate studies, the Mediaeval and Modern Studies Program   The Program will provide students with a solid training in mediaeval and modern philosophy, a substantial background in the ancient sources of the philosophy of both periods, and the tools needed to carry out research in these areas linguistic skills, historiographical methods, and paleography   Core faculty for the program are Ivan Boh, Daniel Farrell, Glenn Hartz, Peter King, Calvin Normore, Tamar Rudavsky, George Pappas, and Allan Silverman   For further information regarding the Mediaeval and Modern Studies Program, contact Peter King, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210 (tel 614-292-2578)

Eugene Thomas Long has been appointed Editor-in-Chief of the *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* succeeding Bowman Clarke Persons submitting articles for consideration should consult a recent issue of the journal for style and send two copies of the article and two copies of a one hundred-word abstract to Professor Long, The Byrnes International Center, Suite 308-B, The University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina 29208

The Department of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University is pleased to announce the appointments of Edward F McClennen as Ohio Regents Eminent Scholar in Moral and Social Philosophy and of Loren E Lomasky as Professor

The University of Tulsa is pleased to announce the appointment of Nicholas Capaldi as McFarlin Endowed Professor of Philosophy   The appointment commences on September 1, 1991   Professor Capaldi will also serve as head of the Philosophy Department

The Phi Beta Kappa Society is pleased to announce the appointment of Marjorie Grene of the University of California, Davis, as Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa Professor in Philosophy for 1991–92

On November 27, 1990, the city government of Naples, Italy, conferred honorary citizenship on Hans-Georg Gadamer, Professor Emeritus, Universitat Heidelberg, in testimony to the gratitude of the city for his teaching at the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici

The Catholic University of America conferred on Josef Pieper (Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Universitat Munster) the degree, Doctor of Humane Letters, *honoris causa,* in ceremonies at Eichstatt, Germany, on November 20, 1990   On the same occasion, Wolfgang Kluxen (Bonn) was similarly honored by the Katholische Universitat, Eichstatt.

ANALYSIS

Edited by Peter Smith

Analysis maintains its tradition of publishing cogent but brief arguments for substantive conclusions.

Articles range over all aspects of philosophy, often generating discussion which continues over several interchanges.

Recent articles include:

Externalism and experience
Gregory McCulloch
Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusion
Philip Cam
Grammar, semantics and conditionals
V H Dudman
Nonbranching and nontransitivity
Douglas Ehring

LA POLITIQUE CARTÉSIENNE

Thought
A Review of Culture and Idea

THE SESQUICENTENNIAL EDITION

RATIO (NEW SERIES)

Edited by Edward Craig

Ratio (New Series), publishes work of high quality on a variety of philosophical topics. The furtherance of mutual understanding between philosophers who work in English and those who work primarily in German is an important aspect of editorial policy. The journal aims to include contributions on topics until recently thought of as 'continental' in their interest.

Recent articles include:

Morality and Justice in Kant
Martha Klein

The Metaphysics of
Communism
Yuval Lurie

Stroud and Williams on
Dreaming and Scepticism
Andrew Rein

Basil Blackwell   **Oxford and Cambridge MA**

CROSSINGS

Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy

JOHN SALLIS

Although significant writers on Nietzsche, including Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze, regard his *The Birth of Tragedy* as immature, Sallis argues that it is a rethinking of art at the limit of metaphysics His close reading focuses on the complexity of the Apollonian/Dionysian dyad and on the crossing of these basic art impulses in tragedy Drawing on the full range of Nietzsche's manuscripts, lectures, letters, and notebooks from the same period, Sallis brilliantly articulates the uncanny thoughts presented in the philosopher's debut work
Paper $11 95   168 pages
Library cloth edition $24 95

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
5801 South Ellis Chicago, IL 60637

---

crítica

SUMARIO

T. STEEL

SEPTIMUM ARGUMENTUM

IN THE HISTORY of Ideas, an entirely
new argument for the existence of God.
Formulated *a priori* from the nature of the
good.   Latin text, with a translation into
English, approved by the philosopher. 173
verba. $7 (U.S).

Orders for this historic opusculum may
be placed through your local bookseller, or
write directly to SMALL HOUSE, Attn:
Mr Jay Hume, *Correspondence Sales.* The
address is 534 Agnew Road, Greensburg,
Pennsylvania 15601

SMALL HOUSE

1990

articles

books received

philosophical abstracts

announcements

index

T he *Review of Metaphysics* is devoted to the promotion of technically competent, definitive contributions to philosophical knowledge Not associated with any school or group, not the organ of any association or institution, it is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into root questions, regardless of the writer's affiliations

Institutions supporting the *Review* as sustaining institutions are listed on the back cover

The *Review* offers below-cost subscriptions to foreign libraries and scholars unable to pay its standard rates, a service made possible in part by donations and by subscriptions of sustaining institutions

Volumes 1 to 25 can be purchased from the A M S Reprint Company, 56 East 13th St , New York, New York 10003

Microfilms of complete volumes of the *Review* are available to regular subscribers only, and may be obtained at the end of the volume year from University Microfilms, 313 North First St , Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Articles appearing in the *Review of Metaphysics* are indexed in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Philosopher's Index*, the *Repertoire Bibliographique de la Philosophie* and the *Book Review Index*

The thirteenth, revised edition of the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* is the *Review's* authority on matters of style   Contributors are requested to follow the *Manual* or a recent issue of the *Review* in preparing their manuscripts A style sheet for articles is available upon request

Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor, and all other correspondence to the manager, *Review of Metaphysics*, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064 USA   Material submitted for publication must be accompanied by return postage

A notification of change of address should be received six weeks in advance Replacement of unreceived issues must be requested within a year's time

The *Review of Metaphysics* is published quarterly by the Philosophy Education Society, Inc , Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064   POSTMASTER Send address changes to *Review of Metaphysics*, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064 USA

the review of
metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

SQUARING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE

STANLEY ROSEN

I

IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, I shall examine two questions. Is there an anticipation of the understanding that constitutes the act of interpretation? If so, does that anticipatory understanding possess a structure of the sort that stands to the act of interpretation as the ontological ground is held to stand to the ontic or factual consequences of that ground? These questions together make up the problem of the hermeneutical circle.

The traditional version of the hermeneutical circle goes something like this. whereas the parts must be understood in terms of the whole, the whole can be understood only by way of the parts.[1] Various suggestions have been put forward as to how to avoid the vicious (or ostensibly vicious) nature of the circle. These suggestions normally turn upon the contention that we possess an insight into, or a pre-understanding of, the whole, which is then developed or rendered articulate by the analysis of the parts.

This contention has been given its strongest and most detailed formulation by Martin Heidegger; I cite two crucial passages from paragraph 32 of *Sein und Zeit*. First:

> Existence is understood together with every understanding of the world and vice versa Further, every interpretation moves in the indicated pre-structure. Every interpretation that intends to furnish understanding, must already have understood that which is to be interpreted.

---

[1] As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, this version of the circle goes back at least to Martin Luther, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tubingen. J C B Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1975, 4th ed), 163–4

Second

> This circle [*Zirkel*] of understanding is not a circle [*Kreis*] in the sense
> that it motivates an arbitrary manner of knowledge; it is rather the
> expression of the existential *pre-structure* of *Dasein* itself   The circle
> may not be degraded to that of a vitiosum, not even to one that is
> tolerable   There is concealed within it a positive possibility of the
> most original knowledge, which indeed is achieved in a genuine manner
> only when the interpretation has understood that its first, continuing,
> and last task remains to allow itself to be pregiven as project [*Vorhabe*],
> foresight [*Vorsicht*], and anticipation [*Vorgriff*]   2

Heidegger's resolution of the circularity, or of the viciousness, of
the hermeneutical circle is unmistakably Kantian   One might refer
to this resolution as a squaring of the circle in the sense that the
area of the original figure is doubled by its elevation to the tran-
scendental level   Explanations of the parts of experience are now
illuminated by a preunderstanding, based upon a phenomenological
description of experience, of the conditions for the possibility of
that experience   These conditions are proximately accessible as the
existential (as Heidegger refers to his categories) structure of
"thereness" (the "being there" that is the defining mark of human
existence).

Stated with maximum simplicity, Heidegger purports to de-
scribe the structure of temporal experience, or historicity, as a se-
cretion, or quasi-solidification of the temporality secreted, by *Dasein*.
Heidegger "historicizes" Kant's transcendental ego   "Historicity"
is of course a transcendental rather than an immanent term   The
"gift" (*Schick*) of Being is the epochally varying transcendental con-
tent of immanent history (*Geschichte*).   History, in other words, is
squared in order to yield the distinction between the ontological and
the ontic.   What concerns Heidegger is the former, just as Kant is
concerned with the transcendental· with the conditions for the pos-
sibility, and so the intelligibility of experience, not with experience
in itself

In its expanded or doubled form, the hermeneutical circle may
be stated as follows.   The parts of experience receive their form,
nature, sense, or being from the world-constituting activity of the
structure of the transcendental ego or agency (depending upon
whether we follow Kant or Heidegger)   In what I have called the

---

2 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tubingen   Max Niemeyer Verlag,
1977), 152-3   All translations are my own

process of being squared, the hermeneutical circle is not simply bloated but undergoes a deeper transformation

There are now two wholes the empirical whole that is the sum of empirical parts, for example, a specific text or a historical event; and the transcendental or ontological whole that is the ultimate source of sense-giving. The interpretation of the empirical (ontic) whole is anticipated in the pre-understanding furnished by the ontological, sense-transmitting nature of *Dasein* We ourselves, as we read Heidegger's text, understand his analysis because we have a projective anticipation of that which he interprets, namely, *Dasein*.

In the traditional doctrine of hermeneutics, appeal is made to an insight or *Einfuhlung* into the essence or totality of the text or, event to be interpreted, in other words, a kind of intuition, literally a "seeing into" or "feeling into" that is also a preliminary vision of the explanatory unity or wholeness of the parts Now insight is transferred to the ontological activity of *Dasein* as the constructor of its world.

At the ontological level, then, to repeat, we are able to follow Heidegger's interpretation because of our own pre-understanding, namely, the exercise of our natural faculty This faculty enables us to anticipate the appropriateness of Heidegger's discursive account of the totality of *Dasein*'s existential structure That is the ontological circle This circle must be actualized once more when we come to explain an ontic entity The ontological circle must be pre-understood as that which renders interpretable the ontic thing, event, text, or what have you Hence my use of the metaphor of squaring the hermeneutical circle

In the traditional case, we could say something to the effect that our pre-understanding of the whole stems from a combination of natural intelligence and sympathy together with our general experience of the world In the case of the squared or transcendental situation, it is as though two types of intelligence, two types of pre-understanding are in play At both levels, we must as it were be already at work before we can begin to understand; we must be ahead of ourselves

Our understanding of the faculty of being ahead of ourselves depends upon its own exercise· hence the circularity This understanding must in turn be applied to an ontic entity in order to account for its interpretability, and so its own mode of being. Hence the doubled circularity. And yet the two levels fall within the same

circle: we cannot be ahead of ourselves in two entirely distinct ways.
The anticipative structure of understanding, represented by the
prefix "pre-," is not different in the two cases; what differs is the
application of this structure; in the first instance to understanding
itself (*Verstehen* as the *Existenz* of *Dasein*), and in the second, to
the particular interpretation (*Auslegung*) of the ontic entity.

I infer from this complicated situation that pre-understanding
is not circular but reflexive at the ontological level.   It acts *ex nihilo*
or spontaneously as the pre-awareness of itself, which pre-awareness
is also the pre-understanding of things in the world.   Of course, the
exercise of this pre-awareness in us does not provide us with the
whole of Heidegger's phenomenological description in an instant;
we need to read it consecutively and in its entirety in order to un-
derstand what our pre-understanding has illuminated, or better,
what it is illuminating for us, always one step ahead of our discursive
comprehension.

The whole becomes visible only through the parts   At the on-
tological level, however, the whole is a structure that is said to fur-
nish the sense of every ontic whole   No one sees the world as a
whole, but (the claim goes) if we understand *Sein und Zeit* thor-
oughly, we have the means of accounting for each worldly whole as
a project constituted by the sense-granting activity of *Dasein*.   So
there really are two wholes to be understood. the total structure of
Dasein and the ontic wholes which *Dasein* seeks to interpret.   That
they are ontologically the same does not alter the dual nature of the
ontological and the ontic.

Contrary to the situation in geometry, the squaring of the her-
meneutical circle turns out to be illuminating as well as puzzling.
It is puzzling because we now have twice as much to explain as
before· the empirical totality of parts is now said to derive its on-
tological structure from a transcendental source   For example, this
means that a novel will have an ontic as well as an ontological sense
The episodes in the novel must be explained in terms of the under-
lying theme or (if I may be forgiven a pre-postmodern expression)
the intention of the author; but the novel is itself a part of a world
that draws its structural significance from a transcendental or on-
tological source

The squared circle is also illuminating, however, because it en-
ables us to decide whether it is possible to provide a transcendental
or ontological foundation to hermeneutical circularity   To say that

we understand beings in the world because we are ourselves the sense-giving or hermeneutical beings is to utter the latest version of the standard thesis of modern philosophy to the effect that we know only what we make. The doctrine of the squared circle, since it purports not to be vicious, or, in my earlier formulation, since it is reflexive rather than circular, must attribute spontaneity to understanding. The crucial question is then whether what is spontaneously made is finally understandable whether, in other words, interpretations prepared by a spontaneous understanding have any enduring sense whatsoever

Kant gives us the transcendental version of the thesis of spontaneous understanding In Heidegger, the transcendental is historicized; despite the distinction between the ontological and the ontic, the temporal or temporary status of the existentials, which are gifts of Being and not eternal structures, negates their status as categories and dissolves ontology into mythology. I need not insist upon the transition from Heidegger, and in particular from Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, to the advanced thinkers of our own generation.

Both Kant and Heidegger say in effect that in order to understand anything in the world, we must understand something else, namely, the world as a totality not as a sum of parts, but as a sense-transmitting structure World-understanding is of course not necessary for empirical or ontic understanding. But a genuine or philosophical understanding of the empirical intelligibility of things in the world requires a pre-understanding of the transcendental (or ontological) pre-structure of those things

At the risk of repetition, it may be wise to emphasize the following point As a matter of historical fact, of course, we come to the understanding of the transcendental or ontological dimension after, rather than before, finding our way about with respect to the things in the world But the analysis of the conditions for the possibility of having empirical (or ontic) experience shows us that this experience is prepared in advance by the world-constituting activity of the transcendental ego, or in Heidegger's case, of *Dasein.*

The difference between Kant and Heidegger, on the point that concerns me here, is as follows. For Kant, the preparation of immanent or empirical knowledge is not temporal in any sense, whether ontic or ontological This is true even though experience takes place within time, time being understood as a form of intuition. The

conceptual articulation of time, like that of space, is transcendental, not temporal. Significant time is as it were an artifact of eternity. The "pre-" in "pre-understanding" is thus logical, not temporal. Temporalized experience is prepared by the categories or rules of *Verstand* and the regulative Ideas of *Vernunft*.

These rules and Ideas are always put into play whenever beings like us (namely, those that cognize by a combination of sensation and concepts) experience a world like that characterized essentially by Newtonian mechanics. There is as it were no temporal gap between the transcendental constitution of the world and the empirical experience within it. But the latter nevertheless presupposes the former Furthermore, once we have understood the presuppositions and in that specific sense acquired a pre-understanding of beings or events in the world, that is the end of the process of pre-understanding There is nothing more to understand that serves as a presupposition for the preconditions of the empirical world

It seems to be the case that Heidegger regarded *Sein und Zeit* as the first part of an ontology in which a revised version of the Kantian doctrine would be completed The second part was never published, unless one counts the brief and enigmatical essay entitled "Zeit und Sein," which seems to reverse the perspective of *Sein und Zeit* as well as the main terms in the title The central point is this· since the existentials (Heidegger's "categories") are themselves historical (albeit in the ontological sense of that term), or merely one of many gifts sent to us from an as yet inaccessible source, the world in which we currently live has been constituted as a historically contingent world, not just ontically, but ontologically as well.

The pre-understanding of ontic experience that is an intrinsic property of *Dasein*, a property that we may call self-reflexive in the sense that *Dasein* secretes the structure of signification of the world, and so of beings in the world, differs from the Kantian transcendental activity of world-constitution in that it is both ontologically and ontically temporal Since what I have been calling "secretion" and "world-constitution" is intrinsically temporal, *Dasein*'s pre-understanding of ontic being is *temporary*. It can and, according to Heidegger, will be superseded by a new revelation or gift from Being (that is, the inaccessible source)

Since this pre-understanding is temporary, or will be succeeded by a new pre-understanding, one must assume that it was also preceded by a different pre-understanding This assumption is sus-

tained by Heidegger's interpretation of the difference between the pre-Socratic "thinkers" and the Socratic "philosophers " In general, it is clear that the epochal nature of *Seinsgeschichte* amounts to a transmission "backward" of ontic into ontological temporality   The transcendental or final status of Kant's conditions for the possibility of a world such as ours has been entirely dissolved

I do not want to discuss the textual details of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche in this essay   Suffice it to say that Heidegger's prestige, together with the implicit agreement between his own historicist ontology and Nietzsche's doctrine of radical or unending perspectivalism, accelerated the process, already set into motion by the extraordinary influence of the later Wittgenstein, that has led to the widespread predominance of the view that we are all embedded within an unending series of historico-linguistic horizons or perspectives

The squaring of the hermeneutical circle thus leads to disaster after all, just as the geometricians would have insisted   Less metaphorically, but without sacrificing the metaphor entirely, the circle has been replaced by an infinite regression   Whether the key phrase is "pre-understanding" or "background theory," the point is the same   We have come to think of ourselves as "situated historically" within a perspective or linguistic horizon, which in turn derives its sense from antecedent perspectives or broader horizons   The transcendental ego, having first been diluted into ontological historicity, is now stalking the hermeneutical boulevards in the persona of *différance.*

The key point, again, is this pre-understanding is not understanding at all, but the mark of radical ignorance   Even for those hermeneuticists who insist that the illumination within one's historical perspective is bright enough for distinctions and evaluations to be made, the validity of these distinctions and evaluations is of course relative to the perspective itself   But how shall we justify one perspective as against another?   By what right, for example, do the most fashionable spokesmen for perspectivalism today invoke liberal democracy, or the wish not to be cruel to anyone, as a justification for a denial of a hierarchy of perspectives?   Does not the intelligibility of liberal democracy depend upon its claim to be entirely superior to other political perspectives?

Let us not waste time on side-issues, however fashionable they may be.   There is a second key point to be added to the first   I will

restate the first point as follows   Kantian transcendentalism is
dissolved by Heideggerian historicity into postmodern transience
The second major cause for the devolution of transcendental pre-
understanding into the ignorance of transience is Kant's own insis-
tence upon replacing intellectual intuition by discursive, rule-for-
mulating intelligence.

We do not need to discuss in detail here Kant's treatment of
intellectual intuition.   Suffice it to say that he denies the possibility
of a direct cognitive contact between the intellect and the thing in
itself   There are two main reasons for this denial.   First, a claim
to intellectual intuition gives rise to mysticism or *Schwarmerei*, that
is, to unsubstantiated claims to have apprehended the truth by an
inexplicable power   Second, in accord with the requirements of the
so-called Copernican Revolution, if we were in direct intellectual
contact with the forms of the things in themselves, then the intellect
would conform to the things it knows, and we could never be certain
that we know those things in their essential nature.

To restate this, Kant wishes to make the human mind (*Gemut*)
independent of nature on the one hand and God on the other, while
at the same time avoiding the idealism of a Berkeley or a Fichte.
He thus contends that the knower constitutes the intelligible world
in the act of knowing it, but does not produce the sensations which
are as it were the prime stuff of which the world is built (and I pass
by the complications of Kant's doctrine of sensation)

Instead of seeing the entities of ordinary experience as what
Kant calls things in themselves, we *make* (not, to be sure, out of
whole cloth) appearances in the technical sense of phenomena, that
is to say, objects of the experience constituted by the activity of the
transcendental subject.   Given the rejection of intuition, we cannot
in the Kantian account first "see," whether perceptually or intel-
lectually, a thing and then know or conceptualize it.   Empirical
perception is already a concept- or rule-governed, and so productive,
activity

This point is sufficiently important that it requires a citation
The universality of empirical concepts is for Kant an empirical gen-
eralization from particular perceptions, in accord with the laws of
association as formulated by John Locke [3]   This means that the

---

[3] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV)*, B 114, 118

laws are "physiological" or not determined by transcendental con-
cepts. Kant says that "we make use of certain characteristics" in
the construction of empirical concepts "only so long as they are
adequate for the purpose of making distinctions. New observations
remove some properties and add others; and thus the limits of the
concept are never assured."[4]

In the language of the later Wittgenstein, we carve up the world
in accord with different conceptual schematisms, depending upon
our purpose, the state of current knowledge, our perspectives, and
so on. At this point, we detect a circle in Kant's argument which
will have decisive consequences for the development of modern her-
meneutical theories. Empirical concepts are generalizations from
perceptions. But perceptions of empirical objects are themselves
regulated by empirical concepts, which in turn refer "immediately
to the schema of the imagination as a rule for the determination of
our intuition, in conformity with a certain universal concept."[5]

An empirical concept is a contingent rule   The schema of the
imagination is not an image, not a paradigm for the phenomeno-
logical look of the object, like the Platonic Idea of the dog, but itself
a rule, more specifically, a universal concept. What Kant means by
"universal" was explained in a slightly earlier passage· it is "the
representation of a method for representing a concept in an image."[6]
To return to the later passage.

> The concept of a dog signifies a rule, in accordance with which imag-
> ination can sketch the *Gestalt* of a four-footed animal, without being
> restricted to any individual particular *Gestalt* which experience fur-
> nishes me, or any possible image which I can exhibit *in concreto* [7]

In sum: the universal rule is not that of a dog, but of a four-footed
animal. As Kant makes explicit, this rule can be applied to (to say
the least) a wide range of shapes, that is to say, to an indefinite
spectrum of sensations   The Kantian texts leave it entirely unex-
plained how we perceive a dog in contradistinction to a hippopota-
mus, an aardvark, or a fox. There is in Kant no intuition or direct
apprehension of empirical entities   Instead, there is an *interpre-
tation* of the shapes of sensation, which shapes are furnished by the

---

[4] *KrV*, B 755
[5] *KrV*, B 180
[6] *KrV*, B 179
[7] *KrV*, B 180

"physiological" or nontranscendental laws of association of British empiricism.

Perception is interpretation in Kant for two reasons First· Kant distinguishes between the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience in general, and at what I will call an intermediate level, of such general objects as four-footed animals, but both of these levels are distinguished from actual specific perceptions of this or that specific entity These perceptions must be indeterminate in order to allow for the contingency of empirical knowledge. Second. in order to be caught up in the web of concepts or rules that are the ego-generated production of the intelligible world, empirical entities must be "objects" or artifacts of the cognitive dimension of perception. For that matter, even the sensations or noncognitive "matter" of perception are already modified by the pure forms of space and time. This point will assume special importance in the *Opus postumum* and bring Kant very close to idealism or a completely constituted world of form and matter

These two reasons seem to contradict one another, and they have caused great difficulties for Kant scholars who try to reconcile them. A dog cannot be both contingent and an object of knowledge because, whereas empirical knowledge is, *qua* empirical, contingent, it is, *qua* knowledge, the result of an *a priori* constitution. Of the many passages that sustain this latter assertion, I limit myself to the following. "Understanding and sensibility are able to determine objects in us only in conjunction."[8] The perception of a dog is the perception of a determinate (albeit from one standpoint contingent) object The dog must therefore have been determined through the activity of the conceptual apparatus of the understanding, including the aforementioned universal rule of the schema, and not at all merely through the corresponding empirical concept.

In sum, dogs are made, not seen. This making is both transcendental and empirical, and I myself see no evidence that Kant, to say nothing of his commentators, ever succeeded in reconciling these two aspects of objective production No doubt the matter would have to be investigated at much greater length than I can devote to it here What is beyond doubt, however, and of central importance for my argument, is this: once the transcendental ma-

---

[8] *KrV*, B 314.

chinery that provides the objective structure of the empirical object is historicized, we are left with nothing but interpretations of transient associations of sensations

We are therefore justified in regarding Kant as one of the decisive ancestors of the denial of the given   Stated more fully, it follows from Kant's doctrine that no empirical entities are given; instead, there are interpretations which must also, and inconsistently, be regarded as transcendentally constituted objects   Yet, as so transcendentally constituted, they are *objects in general,* and neither this nor that particular thing

Kant's denial of intellectual intuition cannot be understood simply as a rebuttal of views to be made fashionable by Fichte and Schelling. While it is true that he rejects such views, as well as their neo-Platonist precursors (which he confuses with the doctrines of Plato), Kant also rejects something much more immediately important the philosophical relevance of everyday, ordinary, or pre-theoretical, better, pre-hermeneutical, experience   Kant could, however, be said to have a "theory," if not quite in the Greek sense of *theoria,* but nevertheless an account of a final level of pre-understanding, the source of truth, and hence the foundation of philosophy as well as of mathematical and experimental science.

This final level of pre-understanding provides whatever stability is possessed by Kant's doctrine of perspectivalism with respect to empirical concepts   The great defect of Kant's approach is that, by rejecting any trace of a stable, given, pre-theoretical world of common, everyday experience, his final, that is, ostensibly transcendental level becomes arbitrary. What is sometimes today called Kant's "model" of the Newtonian world has no more historical stability than Newtonian mechanics or, more broadly, the physics and mathematics of the late eighteenth century. If physical and mathematical theories are themselves perspectives, artifacts of the cognitive process, or interpretations, then what can be said of the world they model?

The defect in Kant's transcendental model turns out to be in principle the same as the defect in Heidegger's ontological model. According to Kant, thinking is both spontaneous and autonomous [9] As independent of natural or divine order, it produces from itself

---

[9] *KrV,* B 74-5, 93, 430, 561, 573ff

its own activity; as rational, this activity manifests itself in the form of laws, that is, concepts or rules   Kant is therefore required to defend the thesis that necessity is spontaneous but not contingent, that reason necessarily actualizes in the exact form described by Kant, and cannot actualize in any other form   How could this be established?

Since what we regard as necessary is spontaneous, it cannot be deduced from a higher principle.   One has only to conceive of an alternative "axiomatization" of necessity to see that there are alternative models of the world, and hence that there are different worlds.   If we argue backward from empirical reality to the model, then we have reversed the Copernican turn, and reinstituted empiricism.   The locus of spontaneity is then no longer transcendental but psychological   Models are then fictions, and natural science is hermeneutics

The squaring of the hermeneutical circle thus leads from a modest to a grandiose conception of pre-understanding; we arrive initially at transcendental spontaneity, the immediate ancestor of the activity of the Absolute and thereby of Hegelian speculative dialectic, and from there proceed to historicity, historicism, and the chaos of *differance*.   Being is interpretation, but interpretation is the spontaneous production of texts; it is writing rather than reading   Reading, and so interpretation itself, becomes impossible; each attempt to read depends upon the presence of a visible text.   But reading is now effectively the erasure of the initial text by our own discursive production.

We cannot be rid of the need for intuition in the modest sense of the capacity to see what is present to the intelligence   We need to see what we are talking about   The contemporary preference for absence over presence, itself a modification of Heidegger's doctrine of the covering-over of Being by its own activity, is the latest form of the long-standing attempt to assimilate intuition into discursivity. In the absence of vision, however, discourse may be spontaneous, but it is also blind

II

What then is the alternative to the squaring of the hermeneutical circle, with its consequent regression into unintelligibility?

It is not, as some might suggest, a reversion to orthodox or tradi-
tional Platonism. I want to show now that there is no Platonic
"doctrine" or set of deductive arguments in support of the direct
presence of the things and events of the everyday world   The por-
trait of perception in the Platonic dialogues leads to roughly the
Kantian conclusion of the constructed nature of empirical reality.
Human existence is perspectival or hermeneutical for Plato, in place
of Kant's transcendental regulation of interpretations, Plato offers
us the suggestion (rather than the developed theory) of the Ideas.
In its orthodox or traditionally understood form, this suggestion
will not repair the deficiencies intrinsic to transcendental reason.

Now for some details   I cannot canvass every discussion of
perception in the dialogues, but must select paradigmatic texts. My
first text is from the *Philebus*. At 38a6, Socrates introduces a strik-
ing image of two demiurges, a writer and a painter, who dwell within
the human soul, where they are generated by reflection upon the
act of perception   The writer represents the discursive component
by which we identify a previous perception as of such-and-such a,
being, whereas the painter illustrates this identifying judgment with
an appropriate image in the book of the soul (38e12-13). Socrates,
thus engages in his own squaring of the hermeneutical circle by
providing the writer in the soul with a painter

In the Socratic account, I look at something in the near distance,
and then ask myself. "what is that which shows itself [*to . . . phan-
tazomenon*] to be standing there next to the rock under the tree?"
(38c12-d11). The "appearance" begins as a straightforward pres-
ence of the visible entity and becomes the "fantasm" of what we
now call subjective experience. Socrates' reference to the book of
the soul may remind us of Derrida. The attempt to verify the iden-
tity of the perceived presence leads to its absence or replacement
by *écriture*. Painting is then a subordinate version of writing
Perceptual judgment is accordingly both de- and re-construction,
or what Kant calls a "representation of a representation."[10]

Not all of Plato's accounts of perception are composed in a Der-
ridean key. There is a Kantian resonance of a different kind in
Socrates' discussion of perception with Theaetetus (*Theaetetus*
184b4ff). In that passage, it is first agreed that we perceive the

---

[10] *KrV*, B 93

separate sensations by distinct organs or powers   These powers do
not sit within us like occupants of a wooden horse   They are not
demiurges but tools of the soul which furnish it with observations.
The soul unites this sensory information by the addition of such
common properties as being, like and unlike, same and different,
and so on.

The situation in the *Theaetetus* is oddly reminiscent of the
Kantian construction of the object of experience by the twofold pro-
cess of a synthesis of the manifold of intuition and its unification
by the categories   The soul, furthermore, is its own demiurge, but
with respect to the object, not the judgment, of perception. The
soul knows what it perceives by "looking at" (*episkopein*) the common
properties without the aid of the senses (186d2ff)   Perceptual
knowledge is derived from noetic construction of the object   Per-
ception is thus spontaneous construction, whereas judgment is
theoretical vision, or interpretation in the sense that the soul decides
which common properties are to be used to unite the object in ques-
tion. The properties are not spontaneous products of the soul, but
the object is an artifact of cognition

Comparison of the *Philebus* and the *Theaetetus* is enough to
sustain the assertion that there is no single, coherent account of
perception in the Platonic dialogues. Each of the selected texts
illustrates a different side of the Kantian problem   On the one
hand, analysis of the phenomenon of perception leads to an account
of the unity of the perceived thing as a theoretical construction   On
the other hand, we arrive at a discursive analysis that separates us
from the structure of the original being.

The passage in the *Philebus* is closer to our central concern
Let us look at it more closely. *Doxa* ("Belief" or "Judgment") is
not simply the work of the writer, but is generated by reflection
upon a previous perception. The writer is thus himself a construc-
tion "memory coincides with the senses in the same being, and the
affections [*ta pathēmata*] which are associated with them seem to
me as it were to write words in the soul" (39a1-3)   This is not
Kantian· the judgment is a response to the unification of memory
and sense, not to that of concept and intuition. Memory and sense
jointly initiate a *pathos* rather than a spontaneous act

There are in fact two stages to the process of perceptual judg-
ment. In the initial stage, vision is primary and gives rise directly
to the question: "what is that?" The answer may "hit the mark"

(*epituchos*: 38d6) or "be misled" (*parenechthes*: 38d9)   This is not the same as to say that the answer is true or false   These terms belong to reflection; they apply to the production of the writer in the second stage of the process (39a3-7)   This stage follows after an unspecified interval of time, and is thus connected to the first stage by the memory

We infer that truth or falsity depends upon the accuracy of the memory   If the writer records truly, a true *doxa* ensues; if he writes falsely, the result is a false *doxa*. The *pathos* is the actual writer (39a1-7), that is to say, writing is the conjoint effect of sensation and memory upon the soul   In this brief myth, two points are left unclarified. the link between seeing and speaking in the first stage of perception and the function of memory in the transition to the second stage

The second point also concerns the shift from hitting the mark and being misled to truth and falsity   I suggest that Socrates is silent about the activity of the memory because it contains no internal structure analogous to the machinery of Kant's transcendental ego   It thus anticipates the Aristotelian *nous* which has no shape of its own and is therefore able to become the shape of the thing it thinks. What we gain thereby in directness, we lose in the absence of a principle of verification   Either we remember or we do not   This is the basis for subsequent writing and painting

In short, the work of the two demiurges has the net effect of separating us from, not joining us to, the original "remembered" perception   We eventually forget it, and remember instead what we now judge it to be. Nor, incidentally, will the *Theaetetus* solve our problem, for at least two reasons   First. in order to judge correctly that I am now perceiving a man, I require not merely the common properties but the form *man*. Second· the judgment "this is a man" can only be verified by sense-perception itself   This raises the dilemma that perceptual judgment can be verified neither by other judgments nor by an additional perception   The first eliminates the perception, and the second terminates in silence

I note in passing that the considerations in the preceding paragraph apply also to the so-called theory of Ideas   If these are supposed to endorse our true perceptions, they reduce knowledge to silence   The statement "I see the Idea of man" can only be verified by the vision on the part of our interlocutor of that very same Idea with respect to the very same perceptions   I pass by the technical

difficulties that stand in the way of establishing this correspondence of visions

Our introductory inspection of episodes from the *Philebus* and the *Theaetetus* leads to the following conclusion   The root of the Kantian distinction between things in themselves and appearances is already evident in the two senses of the Greek word *phainomenon*, which is present in the story of the two demiurges as *to phantazomenon*. What comes to light or shows itself is on the one hand a unity. a man, a rock, a tree   To be, as both Plato and Aristotle insist, is to be something.   But the "something" is a dyad that shows itself differently to the senses and to the intellect.

It follows that what Heidegger calls the "as" structure of meaning,[11] and hence of the apophantic *logos*,[12] is already present in the original show of being as this something   It is not produced by the shift from *Zuhandenheit* to *Vorhandenheit* but constitutes the structure of openness.   No doubt the Heideggerian shift from being as "this something" to Being as the openness or uncoveredness of what shows itself as "this something" is motivated by the desire to overcome the dualism and separation intrinsic to discursive speech to judging or *Urteilen*, "primordial division," as one could translate this term   The price to be paid, however, for such an overcoming is silence.

There is no literal account of the unity underlying the "as" structure of presence, because unity as such has no structure   Difference in structure between one unity and another leads directly to multiplicity.   This in turn underlies the constructive or what has been called the mythical nature of speech about the given.   One may suggest that if philosophical hermeneutics is to be preserved from a vicious regression, the integrity of the given must be preserved from the multiplication of analysis   But how can we engage in philosophy without saying, and thereby multiplying, what we have seen?

Whether we consider the Platonic, Kantian, or Heideggerian attempt to square the hermeneutical circle, the suggested inference is, I think, the same.   We do not come into closer contact with the elements of our experience by doubling them, or by interpreting

---

[11] *Sein und Zeit*, 151
[12] Ibid , 158

"pre-understanding" with respect to an antecedent principle that constitutes form or disseminates meaning   In the language of the *Philebus*, the painting that produces the mental image of the perceived entity is itself an interpretation of the discursive interpretation of the writer; in the Kantian expression, it is a representation of a representation

The exercise of squaring the circle is then extremely useful, not because it resolves our problem, but because it makes evident the radically unsatisfactory nature of the standard philosophical response to that problem   Philosophers, as it were, are paid to talk. In more elevated terms, the old sense of philosophy as a way of life has gradually been replaced by the modern sense of philosophy as theory-construction.   One crucial result of this shift is that we now conceive of ourselves as constructing our ways of life.

There are some things that cannot be explained, not because they are unintelligible, but because they are more intelligible than any explanation   This point is unfortunately often illustrated by philosophers with a reference to the indemonstrable nature of the first principles of demonstration   The illustration is unfortunate because the principles of one demonstration may serve as premises or conclusion of another   Especially when demonstration is axiomatized, the result is to reduce demonstration to a formalist game in which one's starting-point is arbitrary and therefore contingent

It would be much better, I believe, to take our bearings by the omnipresent phenomenon of understanding, a phenomenon to which the pre-ontological or philological hermeneuticists appeal with their references to literary tact, the *esprit de finesse, Einfuhlung, subtilitas legendi*, and the like.   The utility of this appeal is in turn vitiated by efforts to overcome the ostensibly "unintelligible" nature of literary insight or, more generally, intuitive understanding, by propounding a quasi-axiomatic or canonical formalization of hermeneutics, or still worse, a mathematical or cybernetic model of the mind.

Canons for textual interpretation, if sensible, are platitudes, and there are no rules for the refined application of platitudes.   With respect to cybernetics, let us assume that the artificial intelligence specialist of the future will enact the ultimate step of the Cartesian project to master nature and produce a hardwired replica of the human intellect   In this case, nothing will have been accomplished in the way of solving the hermeneutical problem, since the dilemmas

arising in the case of the human intelligence will now be generated by the activity of the humanoid computer

Our very understandable obsession with analysis, explanation, formalization, and the control as well as manipulation of nature, leads us to overlook the fact that a model of neurophysiological activity provides us with the external structure of elapsed thought It cannot produce an insight into or an understanding of anything in particular, but only a formalization of the steps or processes by which the insight is expressed   In the cybernetic example, the program of the computer will not issue in the understanding of a text, this understanding must be supplied by the computer as an enactment of its program

I do not want to pursue the example of the computer, which strikes me as at best strained and at worst ludicrous, but which had to be mentioned because of the contemporary fascination with modeling and artificial intelligence. Much more illuminating is the previously mentioned Aristotelian doctrine of the intellect as a formless form of forms. This doctrine is illuminating, but it cannot be articulated into a theoretical analysis of the process of understanding

In order to avoid any possibility of confusion, let me repeat the point: the act of understanding a text, which is merely a generalization upon the act of perception or of conceptualization, may exemplify various canons and no doubt must obey certain laws of logic, not all of which, I suspect, can be specified in advance   But the application of these canons and laws will not produce an act of understanding. It is the living act of intelligence that precedes the identification and application of canons and laws, not some ontological configuration of canons, laws, concepts, or rules

It is essential to emphasize that in asserting the priority of the living act of intelligence, I am not endorsing some type of mysticism or surrender of discursivity   Neither do I accept the Kantian thesis of spontaneity   What I have in mind here is the fact that each act of understanding is regulated, not by the silence of its own priority to canons and rules, not by *a priori* rules, and not even by unconsciously imposed historical perspectives, but by the intelligibility of what is present to us, including rules but also perspectives, as soon as they are articulated

The objection will immediately be made that I am here begging the question by assuming that what is present to the intellect is indeed intelligible   I think that this objection misses the point.

We cannot be situated within a perspective that does not itself make accessible the entities of the world opened by that perspective, in all their problematic multiplicity We cannot perceive the difference between alternative perspectives unless both are accessible *as* distinct and determinate perspectives

Similar considerations apply in the case of perception Philosophers have never doubted that perception is at least partially a constructive process. But if the process is entirely constructive, if in other words the sense of the perceived entity is entirely produced by the act of perception, then cognition is not world-construction (which requires subordination of cognition to general laws that cannot themselves be the products of a given and contingent world-horizon), it is an act of radical arbitrariness, and therefore it is not at all the production of senses but senseless or chaotic flux.

Since we cannot evade this lapse into chaos by the construction of transcendental structures of spontaneity, there remains only one method for assessing and regulating the insights of the living intelligence, and this, not surprisingly, is by checking them against our experience, both discursive and silent The traditional method for determining whether one has understood a written text is two-fold: first, we attempt to explain all parts of the text as integral to a whole, second, we discuss our interpretations with other persons, whose competency we determine, not by rules and conformity to models, but on the basis of the understanding their words exhibit.

I am under no illusion whatsoever that these rather homespun remarks will provide us with solutions to the outstanding epistemological and ontological problems of the day The largest part of this paper was dedicated to the thesis that recourse to epistemology and ontology for solutions to the hermeneutical question are misguided Ontology and epistemology are themselves dependent upon the intelligibility of the everyday world Intelligibility here does not mean perfect intelligibility; but the everyday world is sufficiently intelligible to enable us to carry out our everyday affairs as well as to ask profound questions about perceived ambiguities in everyday explanations of life

To apply once more an earlier observation, I contend that the intelligibility of the everyday world, together with its diversity of perspectives and implications of depths beneath the surface as well as heights beyond the horizon, is more secure than any epistemological or ontological analysis of the essential nature of that world

I further contend that there are not multiple everyday worlds, but instead multiple perspectives onto the everyday world. I cannot "prove" this contention in the sense of demonstrating it by deducing it from some antecedent or higher principle or level of pre-understanding. If such a proof were possible, it would result in the negation of my contention, as I have tried to suggest in what has preceded.

What I do undertake to accomplish is to show the unreasonableness of all so-called theoretical replacements for the givenness of the everyday, including objects of perception as well as individual acts and communal events. My discussions of Plato, Kant, and Heidegger, although necessarily abbreviated, were intended to exhibit how I would proceed in all cases of this type   In so doing, I would claim not to be abolishing philosophy but to be enacting or illustrating it

Up to a point I share the Humean thesis that it is the task of the philosopher to begin from convention and to proceed by making a continuously deeper critique of it, rather than to begin by rejecting convention, or what is worse, by defining convention as a contingent historical artifact [13]   This thesis is related to the earlier Socratic attitude toward *doxa*, as well as to the later Husserlian doctrine of the *Lebenswelt*. All versions of this thesis lead naturally to the question of the ontological status of what I have called the everyday world. But the question cannot be posed except thanks to the givenness of the everyday.

To come back finally to hermeneutics, the sense of the term has undergone an inflation in late modernity, thanks largely to the consequences of Kant's transcendental turn, some of which I have inspected in this essay   A similar inflation of hermeneutics is to be found in Plato's account of perception, but is also indicated in mythical terms by Diotima in the *Symposium*, when she calls genesis by the name of Eros, a daimon intermediate between mortality and immortality, whose function is "to interpret [*hermeneuon*] and convey human things to gods and divine things to humans" (202d8ff).

Diotima speaks of gods, which are eventually replaced in her discourse by pure forms, the so-called Platonic Ideas. In a different context, I would defend the view that the Ideas are not separate

---

[13] My thanks here to Donald Livingston for sending me an unpublished version of an essay on Hume that spells out this point in compelling detail

ontological entities but points of intelligibility, the very intelligibility
of the things in this world to which I have been alluding above
From this standpoint, there is no "theory" of the Ideas, because they
are not ontological principles like Kant's transcendental ego or his
regulative Ideas (to mention his own version of the Platonic Ideas).
To take them in this way is to square the hermeneutical circle, with
the results that we have now noticed.

What has been traditionally called the hermeneutical circle is
not circular. We do indeed understand the parts in terms of the
whole, and the whole in terms of the parts   In each case, namely,
with respect to the whole as well as to its parts, what initiates in-
terpretation is understanding, which I am willing to call insight or
even intuition, to say nothing of the many other names that this
everywhere accessible but impossible to analyze phenomenon has
been assigned. Understanding becomes either circular or regressive,
when we attempt to explain it on the basis of a conceptual analysis
of pre-understanding. But pre-understanding, after all is said and
done, is just understanding.

Heidegger is, I think, right to speak of understanding as a self-
anticipation. To state only one reason for this, if thinking were
entirely linguistic or propositional, we could never understand an
initial proposition; once more an infinite regress would be generated
Plato refers to self-anticipation as recollection   To call his account
of recollection a myth is not to belittle it in comparison with onto-
logical or transcendental articulations of anticipation   Such artic-
ulations are impossible   We cannot pre-understand discursively
what is antecedent to, and the condition of, discourse   But neither
can we describe it after the fact, since anticipation, whether it is
spontaneous or a response to the given, has no inner structure.
Phenomenological descriptions of anticipation are always a step
too late

By way of conclusion, let me state briefly how the previous re-
sults apply to the task of interpreting a text   To begin with, there
are no canons of interpretation, apart from the obvious requirements
of philological competence and knowledge of the subject-matter un-
der discussion. Wittgenstein, following Kant, was entirely correct
to insist that there are no rules for the application of rules   To
this we may add that rules are useful only because of their excep-
tions. The most important example of this point is the ironical
text, which would be completely misunderstood if it were read in

the light of canons of genre, historical period, and the like   Certainly it would be the height of naiveté (often reached by learned interpreters) to assume that works of genius are to be judged in the light of the typical beliefs of the author's own time.

We may appeal to the need for *subtilitas legendi*, but we cannot enforce it   Unjust though it may be, the subtle is accessible only to the subtle, as Nietzsche puts it, everything deep loves the mask Just as there are no hermeneutical canons, so too there are no ontological principles that illuminate a text   If the work is one of philosophy, then it must state its own ontological doctrines, in the case of a work of art, such as a novel, the application of ontological principles succeeds only in suppressing what is to be understood

That we are in fact able to understand written texts and explain them to each other is a mark of human intelligence, not the result of the application of a theory   Theories are themselves the result of our capacity to see what we and our fellow human beings are talking about.   But seeing is not itself talking.   There cannot be unanimity about the meaning of a text because we do not all see alike.   The shortsighted must turn, not to the spectacles of hermeneutics, but to what is just under their noses: life itself.   Some will say that life is the production of a multiplicity of texts, and hence cannot furnish us with a stable basis for the understanding of written artifacts.   In this case, however, interpretation is certainly impossible, since reading dissolves into writing, and writing into illiterate scribbling

The Pennsylvania State University

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICAN LAW II
THE CONSTITUTION[1]

ANDREW J. RECK

I

REASON AND REVOLUTION, to which Henry F May has called at-
tention in his noteworthy book, *The Enlightenment in America,*
mentioned in the first article in the present series,[2] marks the period
of American colonial history from 1763 to 1776   The Declaration
of Independence, I have maintained, is a consummate expression of
these Enlightenment features, influenced by the thought of John
Locke and others in philosophy   From cautious moderation the
American movement of protest against British rule climaxed in a
revolution   The dynamic structure of the epoch unfolded as a kind
of *sorites,* of which the major premises are a general philosophy of
rights and a particular theory of the British Empire, the minor
premises are numerous allegedly factual violations of these theo-
retical premises, and the conclusion is a decisive act of separation
or independence.[3]   Since, however, the Enlightenment mode of rev-
olution rested, to reiterate May's statement, on "the belief in the
possibility of constructing a new heaven and earth out of the de-
struction of the old,"[4] the moment in history expressed by the Dec-
laration of Independence logically leads to other moments, one of

[2] The first article in this three article series is "The Enlightenment
in American Law I The Declaration of Independence," *Review of Meta-
physics* (March, 1991) 549-73   A third article on the Bill of Rights will
appear in the next issue of the *Review*
[3] See Andrew J Reck, "The Philosophical Background of the American
Revolution," *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* (1974) 179-202, and
Andrew J Reck, "The American Revolution, a Philosophical Interpreta-
tion," ibid (1974) 95-104
[4] Henry F May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York Oxford
University Press, 1976), p xvi

which is the formation of the American republic as both a federal
and national union. This singular moment is crystallized in the
Constitution of the United States, a document equal in import-
ance to the Declaration of Independence as a symbol of the
Enlightenment

The resolution of the Continental Congress calling for the Dec-
laration of Independence, passed in May 1776, was accompanied by
an act which directed the colonies to erect new governments and
everywhere to suppress royal authority   In fact in some colonies,
as in Virginia, this process of constitution-making was already in
process. At the state level, therefore, began the complex activities
involved in the construction of constitutions. Having suffered the
vicissitudes of the unwritten constitution of Great Britain, which
had been susceptible to diverse and conflicting interpretations, the
American patriots determined that constitutions should be written,
just as their own compacts, such as the Mayflower Compact and the
colonial charters, had been written.

In establishing constitutions the patriots confronted a grave
problem, both theoretical and practical, concerning the solution of
which the pages of the philosophers, the political theorists, and the
historians were blank   The right of the people to institute new
government is, in American revolutionary theory and in the prev-
alent political philosophy of the Enlightenment, exercised within
the framework of "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."
Americans inherited these ideas and their related values from Eu-
rope   The idea of popular sovereignty generates questions as to
what a people is. The American loyalist Thomas Hutchinson had
denied the claim of the first paragraph of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence that two peoples—British and American—were being sep-
arated[5]   From his point of view people in British America were
part of the British people   On the other hand, the signers of the
Declaration of Independence posited that the Americans composed
a distinct and therefore separable people from the British. Al-
though Americans were the offspring of the British people, their
experiences extending over a century and a half in a new continent
had molded them into a distinct people   No doubt their ethnicity
affiliated them with the British but they had been differentiated in

_____

[5] See my discussion of Hutchinson in "The Enlightenment in American
Law I· The Declaration of Independence," 569-71

history and had discerned a unity in the exercise of their inalienable rights.

The record of the American revolution and the American Constitution is hauntingly pertinent today as events unfold in the Soviet Union. Is there a Soviet people? Or are there only Russians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and so on? Of course, in American history the issue as to what comprises one people erupted again during the period of the war between the states. It suffices to observe for the moment that in 1776 Americans were affirmed as one people, and in 1787 as one people again, with the proviso that they organized themselves into separate states for government in regard to one kind of ends and into a nation-state of continental expanse with regard to other ends

II

A major problem with the idea of popular sovereignty is the problem of the implementation of the will of the people In tracing the development of the idea of popular sovereignty, Edmund S. Morgan has investigated the invention of the political strategies and institutions to implement this idea.[6] Morgan, unfortunately, espouses a cynical positivism which reduces political conceptions to fictions, as though those who use such conceptions or are affected by them do not accept them as true. While some manipulators do exploit ideas they do not hold true, the effectiveness of the manipulations still depends upon widespread belief No doubt, demagogues often invoke the idea of popular sovereignty to serve their own ends without, indeed, believing in the people whom they mislead and abuse. Let cynical positivism loose, it undermines all beliefs in ideal conceptions, including the principle that its own conceptions are valid Nevertheless, stripped of its cynical positivism, Morgan's work records that the concept of popular sovereignty arose, during the period of the British revolutions of the seventeenth century, in opposition to the doctrine of the divine rights of kings, and that it migrated to these shores to play a significant role in the American revolution.

---

[6] Edmund S Morgan, *Inventing the People* (New York. W W Norton and Company, 1988)

The conception that the people are the supreme power—the sovereign—in a political society is multifaceted   It embraces a wide range of possibilities for the exercise of power the people directly participate in the suffrage, they are the electors of persons holding office, and who are therefore their representatives, and so on   Most crucial for our consideration here of the idea of popular sovereignty is the thesis that government, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, rests upon the consent of the governed, that is, on the people   This polarity of the government and the governed underscores the question of how the few may legitimately hold sway over the many.

In an insightful essay, "Of the First Principles of Government," David Hume, whose writings were carefully studied in America before, during, and after the Revolutionary period, addressed this question and, from his detailed historical investigations, concluded that, "as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded. .   "[7] Hume's theory of government as based on opinion applied to all forms of governments, including the most despotic   Furthermore, Hume divided opinion into two kinds, opinion of interest and opinion of right, and he analyzed right into two kinds, right to power and right to property Moreover, in another essay, "Of the Original Contract," he rejected as vain the thesis that "all governments are or should be at first founded on popular consent as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit "[8] As a hedge, he added·

> My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government   Where it has place, it is surely the best and most sacred of any   I only contend that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent, and that, therefore, some other foundation of government must be admitted [9]

In the case of the American Constitution, opening with the phrase "We, the People," the founding of government on the consent

---

[7] David Hume, "Of the First Principles of Government," in *David Hume's Political Essays*, ed Charles W Hendel (New York The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 24

[8] David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in *Hume's Political Essays*, 49

[9] "Of the Original Contract," 50

of the people is clearly made   The contractarian basis of government expressed in the Declaration of Independence is reaffirmed   Nevertheless, the problem of how to implement the will of the people as the ground for the political contract upon which government is erected remains.   In this regard the Founders could turn to the pages of John Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, where the English philosopher explained how men, all free, equal, and independent by nature, agree to form a political society   Locke wrote:

> For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority   For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body must move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority.   [10]

In addition to Locke's mechanistic justification for majoritarianism in the formation of a political society, his conception of the original formation of political society was not directly applicable to the American situation in 1776   The American Revolution, according to the theory of the Founders, did not hurl America into a state of nature.   Coming into play was the Lockean distinction between "the dissolution of the society" and "the dissolution of the government "[11] The dissolution of government, on Locke's theory, could rightly occur when the government abused its trust—including abuses committed by the legislature   Remaining still in political society, the people retain the power to erect a new government   Even the legislature, therefore, is subordinate to the will of the people on Locke's account. But then how is this will to be implemented?   Although Locke implies the distinction between the legislative power of government and the constituent power of the people, he did not specify how this constituent power could be exercised except through a new legislature   Morgan cites episodes in British revolutionary history when attempts were made to invent a new institution distinct from the legislature, in order to signify the implementation of the constituent power of the people [12]   But these attempts did not approach the

---

[10] John Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, ed J W Gough (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1948), chap 8, #96, p 48
[11] Locke, *Second Treatise*, chap 19, #211, p 103
[12] See the treatments of the Agreement of the People and of the Convention Parliament in Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 72-7, 107-121

political novelty of the Americans, namely, the creation of the con-
stitutional convention as the instrument of popular sovereignty

R. R. Palmer has correctly apprehended that "the most dis-
tinctive work" of the American Revolution was in finding a method,
and furnishing a model, for putting the ideas of liberty and equality
and popular sovereignty into practical effect   As he has written,

> The problem throughout much of America and Europe, for half
> a century, was to 'constitute' new government, and in a measure new
> societies   The problem was to find a constituent power .   The
> Americans solved the problem by the device of the constitutional con-
> vention, which, revolutionary in origin, soon became institutionalized
> in the public law of the United States [13]

Enlightenment political theory grounded government in the
sovereignty of the people. It centered on the notion of compact or
contract formed by the people, assembled in a state of nature, by
means of which they erected a government over themselves. In the
process they yielded up some of their natural rights (or all of them)
in order to guarantee other fundamental rights (or to receive in
their stead civil rights retentive of their natural core in yet more
secure legal form). Now the principle of popular sovereignty is a
very abstract idea, ultimately metaphysical in essence. How, in-
deed, can it be practically embodied? The American answer was
the creation of a new political institution, the constitutional con-
vention. As Palmer has explained:

> The constitutional convention in theory embodied the sovereignty
> of the people. The people chose it for a specific purpose, not to govern,
> but to set up institutions of government   The convention, acting as
> the sovereign people, proceeded to draft a constitution and a decla-
> ration of rights   .   It was thus the constitution that created the
> powers of government, defined their scope, gave them legality, and
> balanced them one against another   The constitution was written
> and comprised in a single document   The constitution and accom-
> panying declaration, drafted by the convention, must, in the developed
> theory, be ratified by the people   The convention thereupon disbanded
> and disappeared, lest its members have a vested interest in the offices
> they created   The constituent power went into abeyance, leaving the
> work of government to the authorities now constituted [14]

---

[13] R R Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1959), vol 1, pp 214-15
[14] Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, vol 1, p 215

The sovereign people, by there own actions in the constitutional conventions which proposed and the conventions which ratified constitutions, set up governments over themselves   They legislated for themselves, having made the fundamental law which applied to themselves   Simultaneously, they established in their constitutions a system of laws which governed the officials in the government over themselves.   The constitution became a higher law which only the people could alter, and governments were limited, their authority restrained within the bounds of the constitution with its declared rights   Whatever laws a government made were subject to the higher law embodied in the constitution which erected it.

III

The right of the people to institute new government was, in the American Revolution, implemented by the innovative device of the constitutional convention.   Although this device first appeared at the level of individual states—most memorably in Massachusetts in 1780—its historically most conspicuous and influential occurrence was at Philadelphia in 1787, when the Constitution of the United States was framed.   Yet in one sense the Constitutional convention of 1787 was a political anomaly   The delegates represented not the people but the several states   A remedial consideration is the fact that the Constitution was proposed for a process of ratification in conventions held in several states but consisting of delegates elected by the people

During the Progressive Era Charles Beard, perhaps inspired by populist principles as well as by a Marxist theory of history, had revived the position of the antifederalists and had charged that the delegates at the Constitutional convention, in pursuit of their own economic interests, had betrayed the more democratic principles of the American revolution [15]   Beard's influence held sway for nearly

---

[15] Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York. Macmillan, 1935)   Originally published in 1913, the work contains in its 1935 edition an introduction which Beard added to disclaim the Marxist origin of his thought   See my treatment of Beard's interpretation in Andrew J Reck, "Moral Philosophy and the Framing of the Constitution," in *Liberty, Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution*, ed Paul Ellen Frankel and Howard Dickman (Albany State University of New York Press, 1989), 29-31

half a century   More recent historians, however, have dealt harshly
with the methods, evidence, and inferences of Beard's views on the
Constitution [16]

The judgment as to whether or not the Constitutional conven-
tion violated the commission which had summoned the delegates to
Philadelphia in 1787 ought to be formed with regard to the docu-
mentary evidence of the time   In *Federalist* 40 Publius (James
Madison, the architect of the Constitution) addressed the objection
of the antifederalists that the convention had overstepped its au-
thority by proposing a new constitution instead of merely amending
the Articles of Confederation   Madison's response is noteworthy.
First, he contended that the delegates at the convention had adhered
to the commission they had received from Congress and the states
under the Articles of Confederation   In making this claim, Madison
was careful to subject the terms of the commission to interpretation,
saying that in order to discover meaning in the whole of the text,
parts which do not fit the end of the text as a whole should be dis-
regarded   In accord with this canon of interpretation, Madison
could insist that "the great principles of the Constitution proposed
by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new than as
the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Con-
federation "[17]   Still, Madison was cognizant that the nature of the
American union was being altered from the purely federal form it
had under the Articles of Confederation into the national character
it assumed in the Constitution by applying its laws directly to the
people rather than solely to the states   Thus Madison related how
the delegates at the convention of 1787 "must have reflected that in
all great changes of established governments forms ought to give
way to substance, that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former
would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent right of the
people to 'abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness' .   "[18]

---

[16] Robert E Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution   A Critical
Analysis of an "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution"* (Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1956), and Forrest McDonald, *We the People·
The Economic Origins of the Constitution* (Chicago University of Chicago
Press, 1956)
   [17]*The Federalist Papers,* ed Clinton Rossiter (New York New Amer-
ican Library, 1961), 40, p 251
   [18] Ibid , p 253

Madison's invocation of the Declaration of Independence as guiding the reflections of the delegates at the convention in Philadelphia in 1787 supports the belief that there was sufficient continuity of American thought and action from the decade of independence through the decade forming the Constitution to embrace both decades and the major acts they involve within the American Revolution   Indeed, it is germane to recall Hannah Arendt's insightful work *On Revolution*, first published in 1963.[19]   According to Arendt, revolution in the classical sense involves the notion of a return to an original point from which consequent conduct on the part of rulers had wrongly departed, while the romantic meaning of revolution, palpable in the French Revolution, entails an upheaval, followed by a reign of terror, which so permanently and radically alters the political terrain that instability, hazardous to the original values for revolution, ensues   Hence, according to Arendt, whose analysis I esteem to be correct in this regard, the American revolution stands out for its singular success   The American revolution proved to be successful in two acts—first, the overthrow of the old order, and second, the institution of an enduring new political order manifest in the Constitution.

IV

Constitution-making in the American states and at the national level commingled novel institutions such as the Constitutional convention with the inherited Enlightenment political theory found in the writings of the philosophers and historians   Remarkably the best anthology representing the heritage of history and philosophy that molded the minds of the framers of the state constitutions was published by John Adams, signer of the Declaration of Independence and second president of the United States   I refer to the first volume of his immense treatise, *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, against the attack of M. Turgot in his letter to Dr Price, 22 March, 1778*   This volume appeared in 1787, on the eve of the federal Constitutional convention held in

---

[19] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Westport, Conn   Greenwood Press, 1982)

Philadelphia, when Adams was the American envoy in London [20]
It presents translations, selections, and paraphrases from the clas-
sical and modern sources of republican constitutions, and Charles
Francis Adams, John's grandson and editor, has claimed that it was
"much circulated in the [American Constitutional] convention [of
1787], and undoubtedly contributed somewhat to give a direction to
the opinion of the members "[21]

The foil for Adams's composition of *A Defence* was a letter
written by Turgot (1727-81), the French economist and statesman,
to Richard Price (1723-91), the Welsh philosopher whose pamphlet,
Observations on Civil Liberty and the War with America (1776), iden-
tified him as a sympathizer and supporter of the American side in
the war for independence   Turgot had criticized the constitutions
of the American states for having failed to collect "all authority
into one center, that of the nation," and for having established,
instead, "different bodies, a body of representatives, a council, and
a governor " The French author further accused the Americans of
imitating "the customs of England   without any particular mo-
tive." For while in England a house of commons, a house of lords,
and a king may be necessary "to balance these different powers" in
order to check "the enormous influence of royalty," no such equilib-
rium is required in "republics founded upon the equality of all the
citizens "[22] Against these strictures Adams undertook to justify
the governments of the states which their constitutions had pro-
vided   That a letter nearly a decade old stimulated Adams to write
A Defence may be explained in part by Benjamin Franklin's influen-
tial activities promoting unicameralism in Pennsylvania at that time
as well as by the occurrence of such events as Shays' Rebellion in
Massachusetts   Strong currents were carrying the states in the
direction of an amended federal system.

The first volume of *A Defence* is composed in the form of fifty-
five letters, nearly one a day, addressed to Adams's son-in-law, Wil-

---

[20] The second volume of Adams's *A Defence* appeared later in 1787, it
treats the history of republics   The third volume appeared in 1788, it is
a critique of the political theory of Marchmont Nedham   In 1794 Adams
published a revised edition of the work
[21] *The Works of John Adams (1850-56),* ed. Charles Francis Adams
(reprinted Freeport, N Y Books for Libraries Press, 1969), vol. 4, p 276
[22] John Adams, *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the
United States of America* (New York H Gaine, 1787), 1-2

liam Stephen Smith, and enclosed by a long preface on the nature
of republics and a postscript   Within this volume are contained
Adams's excerpts and discussions of such philosophers and histo-
rians as Plato, Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Sidney,
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Price   Since I have discussed
Adams's treatment of these figures elsewhere, I will be selec-
tive here.[23]

As Adams related, his aim was to enlighten readers about the
formation of the governments of the American states, of which too
little was known in 1787, and to show that the men who erected
them were not inspired by the gods, but merely used "reason and
the senses   . . [N]either the people, nor their conventions, com-
mittees, or subcommittees, considered legislation in any other light
than ordinary arts and sciences, only as of more importance " They
had studied the histories of nations and had examined the theories
of the political philosophers.   Hence Adams offered his volume as
"a specimen of that kind of reading and reasoning which produced
the American constitutions."[24]

For Adams, as for most Enlightenment thinkers, Polybius (205–
123 B C.) and Cicero (106–43 B.C.) ranked highest among the ancients
A universal historian who focused his attention on Rome, Polybius
excelled in the kind of didactic history that engrossed the Founding
Fathers   While the ancients had differentiated three kinds of pure
constitutions and their degenerate counterparts· monarchy–tyranny
(the rule of one), aristocracy–oligarchy (the rule of few), and de-
mocracy–anarchy (the rule of many, or no rule at all), Aristotle had
concluded that the best constitution was the mixed constitution,
since it offered the greatest stability.   Like Cicero after him, Po-
lybius exalted the Roman republic as the exemplar of the mixed
constitution for incorporating the kingly principle by means of its
institution of the consuls, the aristocratical principle by means of
the senate, and the democratical principle by means of the tribunes
For Adams, "the generation and corruption of governments,"[25]
rooted in the course of human passions, was like a circular rotation

        [23] See Andrew J Reck, "The Philosophical Background of the American
Constitution(s)," in *American Philosophy*, ed Marcus Singer (Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 278–98
        [24] Adams, *A Defence*, xvi–xvii
        [25] Ibid , 175

moving them ever to the same points, only to rotate again.[26]   The
remedy for this political instability, as Adams following in the foot-
steps of Polybius and Cicero taught, was to be found in the mixed
constitution.

> [G]overnment not of one sort, but   [embodying] all the advantages
> and properties of the best government, to the end that no branch of
> it, by swelling beyond its due bounds, might degenerate into the vice
> that is congenial to it, and that while each of them were mutually
> acted upon by *opposite powers*, no one part might incline any way, or
> *out-weigh* the rest, but that the commonwealth, being equally *poised*
> and *balanced*, like a *ship* or *waggon*, acted upon by *contrary powers*,
> might long remain in the same situation, while the king was restrained
> from excess by the fear of the people who had a proper share in the
> commonwealth, and, on the other side, the people did not dare to
> disregard the king, from their fear of the senate, who being all elected
> for their virtue, would always incline to the justest side, by which
> means, that branch which happened to be oppressed became always
> superior, and, by the occasional weight of the senate outbalanced
> the other [27]

Among the moderns, Machiavelli especially intrigued Adams,
who applauded the Florentine political theorist for founding his
philosophy of politics and of law upon the doctrine of man according
to which "all men are bad by nature."[28]   Adams also credited Ma-
chiavelli for his discussion of the mixed constitution in book 1, chap-
ter 2 of the *Discourses on Livy*, while in volume 2 of *A Defence*
Adams retraced Machiavelli's history of Florence, attributing its
unrelenting sequence of political tragedies to its failure to incor-
porate the mixed constitution, a point Adams repeatedly belabored
Machiavelli for missing   Still he assigned the Florentine republican
to almost the highest rank among political thinkers   Adams wrote·

> The science of government has received very little improvement since
> the Greeks and Romans   Machiavel was the first who revived the
> ancient politics the best part of his writings he translated almost
> literally from Plato and Aristotle, without acknowledging the obli-
> gation, and the worst of the sentiments, even in his *Prince*, he trans-
> lated from Aristotle without throwing upon him the reproach   Mon-
> tesquieu borrowed the best part of his book from Machiavel, without
> acknowledging the quotation   Milton, Harrington, and Sidney, were
> intimately acquainted with the ancients and with Machiavel   They
> were followed by Locke, Hoadley, etc [29]

---

[26] Adams, *A Defence,* 179
[27] Ibid , 168-9
[28] Ibid , 129
[29] Ibid., 323

Among the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political
thinkers mentioned by Adams, at least James Harrington deserves
passing mention here   Harrington was much admired by Adams.
Harrington's *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) was a visionary
portrait of England as a classical republic and had served as a model
for the constitutions of several American states, especially the state
of Massachusetts, whose 1780 constitution Adams had a hand in
drafting.   Adams borrowed, with acknowledgment, Harrington's
distinction between government *de jure* and government *de facto.*
Whereas government *de facto* is government by some man or some
few men which subjects a state to serve only his own or their own
special interests, government *de jure* is defined as one where "a civil
society of men is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of
common interest; or .   an empire of laws and not of men."[30]   Since
interest is the mover of all government, only that government which
serves the interest of the people, the public interest, exemplifies the
principle of being a government of laws and not of men, the principle
which is Adams's favorite formula for a republic.   Adams, moreover,
accepted Harrington's thesis (formulated succinctly by the latter's
editor John Tolland) that "empire follows the balance of property,
whether lodged in one, a few, or many hands " He explained the
American revolution as due to the balance—that is, the widespread
distribution of lands among the people, and the economic discordance
of this distribution with the British constitution, which allocated
the larger measure of political power to the monarchy and the no-
bility   Hence "the balance destroyeth that which opposed it"[31]—
the Americans resisted and overthrew British rule when it attempted
to impose a bureaucracy of aristocrats over them
Although Adams should have been aware that his description
of the socioeconomic situation in America rendered obsolete his ar-
gumentation favoring a mixed constitution on the British model and
based on the traditional orders of men—monarch, aristocracy, and
people—he nonetheless clung to this ideal, if somewhat inconsis-
tently.   Of course bicameralism was his main theme in *A Defence*
Here his conception reflected Harrington's conception of an upper
house (the Senate) deciding and a lower house (the Assembly)
proposing what the upper house would consider for its decision

---

[30] Adams, *A Defence,* 124
[31] Ibid , 160

According to Harrington and Adams, the members of the Senate
would occupy their seats, not through inheritance, but as a conse-
quence of their superior reason and virtue. The merit of bicam-
eralism, Harrington mused, is known even to girls. The English
republican wrote·

> For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided which was
> given between them that each of them therefore may have that which
> is due 'Divide', says one to the other, 'and I will choose, or let me
> divide, and you shall choose' If this be but once agreed upon, it is
> enough for the divider dividing unequally loses in regard that the
> other takes the better half   Wherefore, she divides equally and so
> both have right   'O the depth of the wisdom of God', and yet 'by the
> mouths of babes and sucklings hath he set forth his strength'   That
> which great philosophers are disputing on in vain is brought into light
> by two silly girls, even the whole mystery of a commonwealth, which
> lies only in dividing and choosing [32]

In *A Defence* Adams still admired the British constitution for
having embodied the ideal of the mixed constitution which the an-
cients had discovered and upon which the moderns had improved
With king, lords, and commons, the British constitution had sur-
passed the ancient model not merely in regard to stability but also
in regard to its preservation of the democratic principle within its
constitution   Further principles had been added to the ancient ideal
polity by the moderns, explicit in the reflections of thinkers such as
Machiavelli, Locke, Hume, and Montesquieu. These principles are,
in Adams's words, "Representations instead of collections of peo-
ple—a total separation of the executive from the legislative power,
and of the judicial from both—and a balance in the legislature, by
three independent, equal branches. .   "[33]

Hence Adams's direct answer to Turgot was that the American
states, instead of being criticized, should be praised for following
the British model of a mixed constitution. Whereas the British
constitution had evolved historically, in fits and starts, and some-
times murkily, Adams pointed with exuberant pride to the fact that
"the United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first
example of governments erected upon the simple principles
of nature."[34]

---

[32] James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656), in *The Po-
litical Writings of James Harrington*, ed. Charles Blitzer (New York The
Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 58
[33] Adams, *A Defence*, iv
[34] Ibid , xv

V

In addition to Adams's *A Defence*, which is replete with extracts and commentaries on the Enlightenment philosophers and historians who influenced the American framers of constitutions, the records of the debates, in particular those pertaining to the United States Constitutional convention held at Philadelphia in 1787, provide the contemporary student with a truly excellent opportunity to witness the clash of political philosophies as the Founding Fathers formulated the document that remains today as the core of the Constitution of the United States Foremost among these records for completeness, information, and insight is *The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, as reported by James Madison.

Since natural law doctrine had developed, as Forrest McDonald has reported, "into a large, systematic, and respectable body of legal theory that had gained some standing even in the courts of England,"[35] it comprised the ground upon which the debates were conducted.[36] After all, the delegates at the convention of 1787 were sent by states, which, according to the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation, were sovereign entities on a par with the powers of the world. Besides the rights and duties these states entailed as members of the compact expressed by the Articles of Confederation which bound them to one another, natural law in its guise as international law had due application to their predicament

Nevertheless, the contemporary student will be disappointed if he should go to the debates in order to find explicit reference to the natural law/natural rights philosophers [37] By comparison with the citations in the pamphlet literature of the American revolutionary era from 1763 to 1776, the use and mention of philosophers during the 1787 debates is sparse Montesquieu was cited more often than any other Enlightenment philosopher—by six delegates, according to Forrest McDonald's count [38] James Madison mentioned

---

[35] Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan University Press of Kansas, 1985), 58

[36] Andrew J Reck, "Natural Law and the Constitution," *Review of Metaphysics* 42 (March 1989) 483–511

[37] Andrew J Reck, "Philosophy in the Debates at the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787," in *Constitutionalism The Philosophical Dimension*, ed. Alan S Rosenbaum (Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, 1988), 113–24

[38] McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, 7

Montesquieu twice· first in respect to the Lycian confederacy, which
was based on the proportional representation of its members,[39] and
second, on the separation of powers.[40] Edmund Randolph cited
Montesquieu on the topic of suffrage [41] According to the notes taken
by Robert Yates, a delegate from New York, Pierce Butler of South
Carolina invoked Montesquieu to caution on the corruption that re-
sults from entrusting persons with too much power and without
checks [42] The contents and direction of the debates confirm the
commonplace of scholarship that Montesquieu was the main phi-
losopher who influenced the thinking of the American statesmen
and politicians of the era

     This is not to say, of course, that the influence of other philos-
ophers was inconsiderable   In his recent book, *Foundations of
American Constitutionalism*, David A J Richards has maintained
that the Founding Fathers combined the political philosophy of John
Locke with the political science they learned from Machiavelli, Har-
rington, Hume, and Montesquieu in the framing of the Constitution,[43]
while Morton White in his interpretation of *The Federalist* has re-
affirmed the role of Locke while also stressing that of David Hume [44]
In the case of Hume it is not the Scottish philosopher's epistemo-
logical skepticism, but his moral and political philosophy, expressed
in his essays and in his widely read *History of England*, which in-
fluenced the thinking of the Founding Fathers.

     Thus epistemological eclecticism dominates the thinking and
argumentation of the Founding Fathers as they framed and defended

---

[39] "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as reported by James
Madison," in *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the
American States* (Washington Government Printing Office, 1927), 130
     [40] Ibid , 397
     [41] Ibid , 354
     [42] "Secret proceedings and debates of the convention assembled at
Philadelphia, in the year 1787, for the purpose of forming the constitution
of the United States of America" (from the notes taken by Robert Yates,
Esq , Chief Justice of New York [Albany, 1821]), in *Documents*, 800
     [43] David A J Richards, *Foundations of American Constitutionalism*
(New York Oxford University Press, 1989)   See my review of Richards's
book in *Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society* 27 (1991) 111-14   For
another account of Locke's influence on the Founders, see Thomas L Pangle,
The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago University of Chicago Press,
1988)
     [44] Morton White, *Philosophy, "The Federalist," and the Constitution*
(New York Oxford University Press, 1987)

the Constitution. While their adherence to the rationalist moral epistemology of John Locke is paramount in their theory of natural rights, they employed the empirical methods of Hume and Montesquieu as they searched history to discover the realities of human nature and political organization   Along with the axioms of reason, they sought the maxims of experience which they contended no frame of government could neglect without hazard. With the light from both the candle of reason and the lamp of experience, they endeavored to formulate the best constitution for their time and situation.

Montesquieu was eminently pertinent to the American enterprise of framing a federal constitution   Although the French political thinker contributed to the natural law tradition upon which the Founding Fathers drew,[45] he is most famous for his anticipation of sociological jurisprudence, endeavoring to find the spirit of the laws in a combination of elements, such as the climate, industry, geography, institutions, and "the genius of the people " These elements reverberate in the debates on the Constitution

Montesquieu differentiated three forms of government [46] These are the republican, the monarchical, and the despotic, and he further divided republics into two subtypes democratic and aristocratic Each form, moreover, has its own psychological spring, the principle which moves the members to work as a political body   The republican form of government, whether democratic or aristocratic, is moved by virtue, the monarchical by honor, and the despotic by fear Each, moreover, occupies its own kind of space. In the case of a democratic republican government where participation by the people is required, the territory covered must be small   In the case of the despotic state, however, it may be as large as a conquest can reach For monarchy a middle-sized territory is appropriate   This doctrine of Montesquieu was compelling to the eighteenth-century mind, so compelling that it persuaded the antifederalists to deny that it was possible to establish a republican federal government that would extend over the vast space occupied by the original thirteen states

---

[45] Andrew J Reck, "Natural Law and the Constitution," 493–4   See also Thomas Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1973), ch 3, pp 20–47

[46] Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans T Nugent (New York Hafner Publishing Co , 1949), bks 2 and 3, pp 9ff

and the Western territory to which they laid claim   The anti-federalist argument stimulated the ingenious Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist* 9 to present a sophisticated (and perhaps sophistical) exegesis of Montesquieu's writings to demonstrate that the French author had recommended federations of republics which would preserve their character by calling attention to "the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work."[47]

Hence, in compliance with an interpretation of the political science of Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers designed the Constitution to establish a confederated republic of republics. At the practical level they simultaneously invented a new political conception of shared sovereignty, the so-called Great Compromise between the large states and the small states. This compromise allotted the states equal representation in the Senate while granting them representation according to population in the House of Representatives.

Furthermore, the security of liberty in republican states was, in Montesquieu's view, dependent upon a system of checks and balances within the government   Commenting on the precarious existence of political liberty even in moderate governments, Montesquieu expatiated:

> [Political liberty] is there only when there is no abuse of power   But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go   Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits?
>   To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power [48]

Governments, therefore, should be so constituted that they incorporate such a system of checks. Montesquieu continued. "In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative, the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations, and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law."[49] In this tripartite division of powers Montesquieu followed Locke, acclaiming the British constitution as an exemplar of a government resting on divided powers   In the course of this disquisition a distinction surfaces between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary branches. Montesquieu observed

---

[47] *Federalist* 9, p 73
[48] Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, bk 11, #4, p 150
[49] Ibid , #6, p 151

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive   Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be then the legislator   Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression
There would be the end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals [50]

This doctrine of the separation of powers is incorporated in the Constitution, and in the defense of this principle James Madison, in *Federalist* 47, lauded "the celebrated Montesquieu" as "the oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject   ."[51]   Madison went on in the same paper to elucidate Montesquieu's meaning and his reasons.   Since these reasons have already been stated above, and restated with some of the same quotations from Montesquieu by Madison later in *Federalist* 47, it suffices to attend to the Founding Father's interpretation of the French thinker's meaning   Thus Madison said that Montesquieu, having in view the British constitution,

did not mean that these departments ought to have no *partial agency* in, or no *control* over, the acts of each other   His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the *whole* power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the *whole* power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted [52]

VI

As proposed by the convention of 1787, the Constitution exemplifies the best principles of Enlightenment thought and style as adapted to the peculiar situation of the United States of America. On September 8, 1787, the Constitutional convention appointed by ballot a committee "to revise the style and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the house."[53]   Members of the committee were Dr William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut as Chair and

---

[50] Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, bk 11, #6, p 152
[51] *Federalist* 47, p 301
[52] Ibid , pp 302–3
[53] "Debates," in *Documents*, 694

Alexander Hamilton of New York, Gouvenour Morris of Pennsyl-
vania, James Madison of Virginia, and Rufus King of Massachusetts
September 11 was a day of adjournment, as the convention waited
upon the committee to report, which it did on September 12 through
its chairman, Dr Johnson

The architecture of the Constitution, shaped from the resolu-
tions produced in the debates, is a well-planned structure consisting
of an opening paragraph and seven articles. It is a coherent whole
represented in straightforward language, although key provisions
were hammered out in heated controversies among rival delegates.
The Constitution has the semblance of reflecting, to borrow a phrase
Publius (probably Madison) used in another context, "the cool and
deliberate sense of the community   "[54]

The so-called Preamble, in proclaiming: "We, the People of the
United States,   do ordain and establish this Constitution," enun-
ciates the principle of popular sovereignty cherished in Enlighten-
ment political theory   It affirms that the people—the collectivity
of individuals bound together in political society—is the supreme
embodiment of human will which expresses itself in commands that
make laws, including such fundamental law as the Constitution.
The compact into which the people enter in order to establish gov-
ernment is the Constitution   Thus the polar ambiguity which has
been discerned in the Declaration of Independence between the states
and the people is resolved. Representatives of states recede, as the
people erect their government.

Still, the so-called Preamble presents the act of popular sover-
eignty not as a blind act of will, but as an act informed by reasons
These reasons are introduced by the phrase "in order to"; they state
that the objectives are: (1) "a more perfect union," (2) "justice," (3)
"domestic tranquility," (4) "the common defense," (5) "the general
welfare," and (6) "the blessings of liberty " Elsewhere I have said
that this statement of objectives modifies the interpretation of the
Constitution as a mere product of human will [55] For it appeals to
a conception of higher law, particularly natural law, which provides
the Constitution with goals, imbues its form with content, and at
the same time invokes a transcendent order of norms by which the
achievements of the People may be measured.

---

[54] *Federalist* 63, p 384
[55] Andrew J Reck, "Natural Law and the Constitution," 484

At the same time this appeal to a transcendent order of norms falls short of an invocation of the religious   This difference becomes apparent when the Preamble is compared with the goals professed in earlier American compacts.[56]   The Mayflower Compact (1620), for example, declares that its ends are "the glory of God and advancement of the Christian faith and honour of our King and Country "[57]   By contrast, the Constitution enunciates goals and values which are humanistic, although normative for a people at any point in its historic voyage.

Nor is it possible to esteem the Constitution as proposed in 1787 as a perfect embodiment of ideals and values which human beings cherish.   There is a dark side to the Constitution, conspicuous in its treatment of slavery, most strikingly so in counting the population of slaves by the three-fifths rule in order to appease the slave-holders.[58]

At present, however, it suffices to recognize the normative character of the objectives stated in the Preamble.   Among these objectives is listed "a more perfect union "   This objective merits special consideration here   No doubt, it was explicit in the instructions to the delegates   In complying with their commission, however, they devised a new structure of national government   The first compact historically is that between the states and its people.   The original federal compact as a league of sovereign states was between the states   The Constitution tightened this second compact by its grounding in the people, composing still a third compact between the people and the federal union in its national character

Of the seven articles of the Constitution, the first three define the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government respectively.   The fourth article deals with the states and the citizens thereof, the fifth article with the amendment process, the sixth with the validity of existing debts and the legal supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws, and the seventh with the ratification process.   Each of these articles, its sections and clauses, deserves considered examination, just as each has received in the course of American constitutional history.   For my more limited purposes

---

[56] See Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism*, 112ff
[57] Kate Caffrey, *The Mayflower* (New York Stein and Day, 1974), 340
[58] See *Federalist* 54, which is discussed in Andrew J Reck, "Natural Law and the Constitution," 500-53

here, the first three articles demand our restricted attention now, and the others are passed by.

Of these three delineating the powers of government, the first article on the legislature predominates in provisions as would be expected in a republican form of government where the popular element is vital. Within the legislature, however, a division occurs— not between aristocracy and democracy as classical republicanism posited, but between states and people, the Senate representing the states equally while representation in the House is determined by population   Of course a residue of the aristocratic principle remains in that the qualifications required for senators are higher than those for representatives   Yet this outcome of the "great compromise" between the large states and the small states exhibits how classical republicanism had to be modified or rejected in order to accommodate the peculiarities of the American situation.

In the second article on executive power the Founding Fathers introduced a novelty in political science when they constructed the institution of special electors to vote on the candidates for the offices of president and vice-president. This innovation, as originally contrived, proved to be so defective that its mechanism had to be remedied by Amendment 12. The intent of the framers in designing the electoral college was to assure that the election of the two highest executive officials in the federal government would be determined by persons of wisdom and virtue who would be most capable of selecting the best candidates available without succumbing to the wiles of demagogues or transient political passions   The conception is, of course, grounded in the ideal of classical republicanism which centers on virtue and governance by virtuous persons

Throughout the Constitution's systematic definition of powers, which are separated yet intermixed, the Enlightenment principle of checks and balances is visible   But in the Constitution of 1787 the mechanism is far more complex than the simplistic classification of orders of men into the monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratical, as even John Adams in his version of classical republicanism supposed. On the contrary, the Constitution in Article 1, Section 9, explicitly eliminated the first two orders, at least so far as titles are involved "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States. . . ."[59] And in Article 4, Section 4, it is declared·

---

[59] "The Constitution of the United States," in *Documents*, 995

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government. . "[60]   The complex mechanism
of checks and balances incorporated in the Constitution, therefore,
is rooted not simply in the theory of classical republicanism; it
springs also from Enlightenment thought, to which, indeed, the
Founding Fathers contributed at the same time they were engaged
in the task of fashioning a new instrumentality of governance.

VII

The "method of counterpoise" is A. O. Lovejoy's apt phrase to
denote the political mechanism of checks and balances   To use the
intellectual historian's own description, the method of counterpoise
is the method of "accomplishing desirable results by balancing
harmful things against one another."[61]   As Lovejoy has shown, it
is a method favored among Enlightenment moral philosophers, and
he cited John Adams as "the principal American exponent" of the
late eighteenth-century theory of man which underlies the method [62]
However, Adams was not alone among the Founding Fathers in
adhering to this doctrine, and unfortunately for his enduring rep-
utation as an American political thinker he linked it to the doctrine
of the orders of men fostered in classical republicanism.   In the
progressive development of American moral and political philoso-
phy, Adams is superseded by James Madison, whose employment
of the method of equipoise was learned perhaps first from the teach-
ing of his mentor at Princeton, John Witherspoon, an immigrant
from Scotland who joined the American revolution and became a
signer of the Declaration of Independence, and who also served as
the conduit of the masterworks of the Scottish Enlightenment to
these shores.[63]

The method of equipoise is evident in the variety of checks and
balances ingredient in the American constitutional system—between
individuals and government, states and the federal union, the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers, large states and small states,

---

[60] "The Constitution," in *Documents*, 100

[61] A O Lovejoy, *Reflections on Human Nature* (Baltimore: John Hop-
kins University Press, 1961), 39   See Andrew J Reck, "Moral Philosophy
and the Framing of the Constitution," 23–41

[62] Lovejoy, *Reflections on Human Nature*, 33–4

[63] Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in America*, 62–4.

the Senate and the House of Representatives, and so on   The most original American articulation of the method of equipoise, however, was made by James Madison in his celebrated *Federalist* 10

Madison recommended the proposed national government for "its tendency to break and control the violence of faction "[64]   As Morton White has observed, Madison's term "faction" is, according to its definition, "a moral epithet."[65]   For Madison offered the following definition "By faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."[66]   The causes of faction, according to Madison, are sown in the nature of men, in the diversity of their different and unequal faculties, resulting in different opinions concerning religion, government, and other matters, perhaps more pertinent to the American situation, such as property   As Madison explained

> [T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the verious [*sic*] and unequal distribution of property   Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society   Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination   A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views   The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in necessary and ordinary operations of government [67]

Since, given the nature of man, the causes of faction cannot and ought not to be eradicated, Madison recommended the Constitution for its capacity to moderate the effects   He appealed to the method of equipoise with its separation of powers, its divisions of sovereignty, its checks and balances, operating over a vast territorial expanse from which the best representatives would be chosen for federal office, in order to render it unlikely that any faction, even a

---

[64] *Federalist* 10, p 77
[65] White, *Philosophy, "The Federalist," and the Constitution,* 65
[66] *Federalist* 10, p 78
[67] Ibid , p 79

majority faction, could gain control of the government and pursue interests contrary to the rights of individuals and to the common good

Madison also stated in *Federalist* 51 and 55 the theory of man in relation to government which underlies the political and legal philosophy of the Constitution   This theory portrays man neither as abjectly depraved, as drawn by Calvinism, nor as inherently noble, as pictured in the romanticism of Rousseau   Rather, the theory of man and government offered by Madison balances human qualities by the method of equipoise in relation to government·

> As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form [68]

> [W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?   If men were angels, no government would be necessary   If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary   In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself   A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions [69]

VIII

The Constitution of 1787 was subjected to public scrutiny and heated debate before its ratification   The outcome was by no means assured, as indeed two centuries after its establishment it stands in place, but not without incessant criticism and litigation   Providing for its own amendment, it institutionalized change and revolution   Still, what was proposed in 1787 had first to be ratified before it could be changed, although the outcries for change in 1787, 1788, and 1789 were numerous, especially on behalf of a Bill of Rights Both Madison and Hamilton tried to deflect these outcries and hasten toward ratification first   They succeeded but on condition that the

---

[68] *Federalist* 55, p 346
[69] *Federalist* 51, p 322

Constitution contain a Bill of Rights.   In the first Congress Madison
introduced the amendments which are known as the Bill of Rights,
the philosophical significance of which will be the subject of the next
paper in this series.

Back in 1788, however, Hamilton was steadfast in the need for
ratification prior to any changes in the document.   In the final paper
of *The Federalist* Hamilton relied upon David Hume's essay, "The
Rise of the Arts and Sciences."   Describing Hume as "a writer
equally solid and ingenious," Hamilton quoted·

> To balance a large state or society   , whether monarchical or re-
> publican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no human
> genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere hint of reason
> and reflection, to effect it   The judgments of many must unite in the
> work, EXPERIENCE must guide their labor, TIME must bring it to
> perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mis-
> takes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and
> experiments [70]

After quoting Hume, Hamilton continued·

> These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the
> sincere lovers of Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against
> hazarding anarchy, civil war, and perpetual alienation of the States
> from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
> demogogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but
> from TIME and EXPERIENCE   It may be in me a defect of political
> fortitude but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tran-
> quillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer contin-
> uance in our present situation as imaginary   A NATION, without a
> NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle   The
> establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the
> voluntary consent of a whole people is a PRODIGY, to the completion
> of which I look forward with trembling anxiety [71]

Tulane University

---

[70] Quoted from Hume's "The Rise of Arts and Sciences," in *Federalist*
85, pp 526-7
[71] *Federalist* 85, p 527

THE *NOUS*-BODY PROBLEM IN ARISTOTLE

DEBORAH K. W. MODRAK

ARISTOTLE, PUNDITS OFTEN SAY, has a *nous*-body problem   The psychophysical account that succeeds in the case of other psychological faculties and activities, they charge, breaks down in the case of the intellect   One formulation of this difficulty claims that the definition of the soul given in *De Anima* 2 1 is incompatible with the account of *nous* in *De Anima* 3 and elsewhere in the corpus   If a contradiction of this magnitude lies at the core of Aristotle's psychology, it is seriously flawed   Even if it should turn out that *De Anima* is internally coherent, it is arguable that certain aspects of Aristotle's theological and ethical teachings raise the *nous*-body problem.   Indeed, any type of mental capacity or activity that on Aristotle's description threatens the unified conception of the soul expressed in the general definition poses a challenge to the overall coherence of his conception of soul and intellect.[1]   There are four candidates the faculty for thought as described in *De Anima* 3.4, the intellection of indivisible objects of thought in *De Anima* 3.6, the active intellect of *De Anima* 3.5, and the type of thinking likened to the activity of the divine mind in *Metaphysics* 12 6–8 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.6–8.   Each of these poses a distinct challenge to the

---

[1] There have been various presentations of the claim that Aristotle is a dualist in recent literature, however, when put in terms of Aristotle's psychology, the question becomes one about the unity of the individual, who is a composite of matter and form, and hence a question about whether the definition of the soul as the form of the body applies to the intellect Arguments for attributing one type of dualism or another to Aristotle are found in R Heinaman, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem," *Phronesis* 35 (1990), H Robinson, "Aristotelian Dualism," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983) 123–44, and C Shields, "Soul and Body in Aristotle," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1988) 103–37   For an interesting treatment of this topic that locates the problem in the tension between the "metaphysical" and "physical" definitions of soul in *de Anima* 2 1 and 2 respectively, see D O'Meara, "Remarks on Dualism and the Definition of Soul in Aristotle's *De anima*," *Museum Helveticum* 44 (1987) 168–74.

definition of the soul and thus to the cogency of Aristotle's position.
I shall consider each in turn and argue that Aristotle is on firmer
ground here than is often believed.

I

In *De Anima* 2.1, Aristotle gives three formulations of the def-
inition of soul (ψυχή); the final one asserts that the soul is the first
actuality of a living body having organs (412b4-6). The actuality
in question is the form or substance of the living body; it is the
functional organization of a body that enables that body to carry
out the processes that are constitutive of life for a particular type
of living thing   The soul is defined by the capacities for nutrition,
perception, thought, and movement (413b12), and insofar as it can
be described as having parts, these are its parts [2] But many faculties
do not mean many souls; the vital capacities possessed by an indi-
vidual are ordered and integrated to constitute its soul. Souls, like
living things, form a hierarchy—the simplest type of soul, nutritive,
consists in the powers shared by all life-forms (the capacities for
nutrition, growth, reproduction); the perceptive soul consists in the
senses and higher-order perceptual capacities and contains the nu-
tritive powers potentially, the locomotive soul consists in the power
of self-movement and contains the nutritive and perceptive powers
potentially; the rational soul consists in the power of ratiocination
and in the case of mortal beings contains all the other powers po-
tentially (414b28-415a13).[3] Aristotle's intent is clear. The loco-
motive soul, for instance, is said to contain nutritive and perceptive
soul potentially because in self-moving animals nutritive and per-

---

[2] Aristotle is very cautious about describing the soul as having parts
In *De Anima* 2.2, he asks whether the faculties of the soul are its parts
(413b13-15) and when he returns to this topic in *De Anima* 3 9, Aristotle
argues against the concept of psychic parts as found in Plato and remarks
noncommittally that if the soul has parts, the faculties he has mentioned
are the best candidates (432a21-b4)   Nevertheless, he sometimes uses
"part" (μόριον) for psychic faculties (402b9-12, 429a10)
[3] Aristotle says that the higher-order soul contains the lower ones
potentially to avoid the implication that the soul of a creature whose life
is characterized by self-movement, such as a dog, consists in several distinct
souls, viz., the nutritive, perceptive and locomotive souls   The lower-order
capacities are required by the higher powers but the latter are distinctive
of the soul of that particular type of creature

ceptive capacities are presupposed and conditioned by the capacity
for movement. By envisaging the relation between different clusters
of vital capacities as that of an ordered series of nested potentialities,
Aristotle is able to secure the unity of the ensouled individual and
the cohesion of its soul.[4]

Despite issuing a proviso about the limitations of the general
definition of soul, Aristotle treats the definition as a blueprint for
the line of analysis to be pursued in the case of each type of soul
In the biological treatises, he explores the nature of nutritive soul
by looking at the anatomical and physiological structures and pro-
cesses in which the nutritive capacities of the living creature are
realized [5] In *De Anima, De Sensu, De Insomnis* and *De Somno,*
Aristotle follows the same procedure for the capacities that living
things possess in virtue of having perceptive soul [6] When he ex-
amines the capacity for thought (νοῦς), however, he argues that this
faculty has no organ (429a18–27) [7]

If the definition of soul (ψυχή) applies only to faculties that
enform specific bodily systems, then *nous qua* faculty for thinking
will fall outside the purview of the definition and thus *nous* will not
be a constituent of the soul. This would seem to leave Aristotle
with a hard choice—either jettison the definition of the soul or ex-
clude rationality from the form and essence of the human being
He is unwilling to embrace either horn of this dilemma, human soul
(ψυχή) includes *nous* and it falls under the general definition Even
if Aristotle can tell a story which makes this position intelligible,
the existence of a completely self-contained mental activity of the

---

[4] On Aristotle's account of the relation between form and matter (ac-
tuality and potentiality) there are nested potentialities (cf 1049a19–23)
The form of a house is realized in bricks and this requires that the form
of brick be realized in earth Thus, if all houses were made of brick, the
form of a house could be said to contain the form of brick potentially
Similarly, the perceptive soul is realized in a creature which possesses the
nutritive capacities and thus Aristotle says that the perceptive soul contains
the nutritive soul potentially

[5] This topic is introduced in *De Anima* 2 4 immediately after the dis-
cussion of the definition of the soul

[6] Perceptive soul includes a range of activities For some animals,
the possession of perceptive soul consists merely in having the sense of
touch, for others, it consists in having all five senses and imagination (cf
415a1–11)

[7] The use of νοῦς (*nous*) for the rational faculty is found throughout
De Anima, see, e g , the definition of νοῦς at 429a23

sort that he sometimes seems committed to would pose an additional
threat to the unity of the composite thinking substance (cf 413b24–
27). These considerations prompt Aristotle to wonder whether *nous*
is separable (χωριστός) This query is a persistent concern in *De
Anima*, it is found in the first book and crops up once again at the
end of *De Anima* 3 7 when the description of the rational faculty is
all but complete (403a8–11, 429a10–14, 431b17–19) Aristotle seems
to be fully cognizant of the tension between the two tendencies in
his theorizing about the human soul—(a) the desire to give a unified
treatment of all the faculties of soul such that the internal unity of
the soul and the unity of the living being who is an ensouled body
is assured and (b) the desire to give an account of the intellect that
captures its uniqueness and divinity. The first desire issues in the
attempt to encapsulate the core concept of soul in the general def-
inition and the second in the attribution of separability to active
nous in 3.5.

Even though *nous* (intellect), unlike other psychic capacities,
has no bodily organ, in *De Anima* 3 4 and elsewhere Aristotle stresses
the similarity of the rational and perceptive capacities and assim-
ilates the analysis of the former to that of the latter. Indeed, in
several passages Aristotle speaks as if there were a single power of
cognition that included perceptual abilities, imagination, and think-
ing. At 432a15, for instance, we find. "The soul of animals is char-
acterized by two faculties, the faculty of discrimination [κριτικόν],
which is the work of thought and sense, and the faculty of originating
local movement" (cf 427b28, 433a10). Moreover, the analysis of the
rational faculty in 3 4 employs the explanatory model used for the
perceptual faculty [8] As Aristotle puts it at 429a17, "Mind must be
related to what is thinkable, as the perceptive faculty is related to
what is sensible." Both faculties are described as impassive, as
potentially what its objects are actually; each faculty is realized in
the act of apprehending its appropriate objects. The cognitive object
gives the experience the character it has, and the power in question
is simply the capacity for having that type of cognitive experience.
Nor is the strategy of appealing to similarities between the two
faculties overturned by the argument that *nous* has no organ, for,
after making that argument, Aristotle entertains the hypothesis

---

[8] For a detailed defense of this claim, see D Modrak, *Aristotle The
Power of Perception* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1987)

that the rational faculty just is the perceptual faculty differently disposed.[9]

> Since a magnitude and what it is to be a magnitude are different, also water and what it is to be water are different   , one discerns what it is to be flesh and flesh either by means of a different faculty or the same faculty differently disposed   (429b10–14)[10]

If the latter were the case, then Aristotle could tell this sort of story about the connection between *nous* and the body: the perceptual faculty is exercised through the system of bodily organs made up of the peripheral sense organs on the surface of the body, the central organ (the heart), and the network of arteries and veins connecting them.   When differently disposed, *qua nous*, the faculty is no longer exercised through these organs   *Nous* would, nevertheless, be tied to the body in a quite direct way.   It would satisfy the definition because it would be numerically identical to a faculty that is a power of a natural body having organs.

Aristotle, however, ultimately chooses to make *nous* a separate faculty and thus he must tell a more complicated story   The rational faculty is dependent upon the perceptual faculty as the source of its objects.   All abstract objects are derived from perceptible objects (432a3–6).   The paradigm object of thought is a universal, and Aristotle says that mind is its own object in this case; nonetheless, he also holds that such objects cannot be thought about without the use of imagery.   *Nous* thinks its objects in images ($\phi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$) (432a8–9).   Imagination ($\phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$), which is a component of the perceptual faculty, is exercised through the central sense organ.[11] Rationality would then require the body even though it is not exercised through a bodily organ   Aristotle is entitled to draw a distinction between being a capacity possessed by a body and being a

---

[9] *De Anima* 429b10–21   Commentators disagree about the correct interpretation of this passage   Here I appeal to the interpretation that I believe to be correct (see D Modrak, *Aristotle   The Power of Perception*, 118–19, for a detailed discussion)

[10] As I read 429b13, $\mathring{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega$ (different) means "different from the perceptual faculty" and $\mathring{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\varsigma$ $\mathring{\epsilon}\chi o\nu\tau\iota$ (differently disposed) means "the perceptual faculty differently disposed."   Cf R Hicks, *Aristotle De Anima* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1907), 487   "A. appears to be discussing the question, Are sense and intellect different or are they the same faculty in two different attitudes?"

[11] See D Modrak, "Phantasia Reconsidered," *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* 68 (1986) 48–56.

capacity exercised through a body (cf 408b20-25)   This distinction
is the tacit assumption behind his claim that even if *nous* has no
organ, if thinking is "not possible without imagination it will not
be possible without body" (403a8-10)   Once the distinction is
granted, then the definition of the soul will apply unproblematically
to the rational faculty.

At this point a word is in order about two descriptive terms
that figure prominently in Aristotle's characterization of *nous*—
χωριστός (separable) and ἀπαθής (impassive)   It is worth noting
that neither term is used exclusively of *nous* in *De Anima*   The
analogy drawn at 429a15-18 between intellection and perception im-
plies that the perceptive faculty is impassive and at 432a20 the ques-
tion whether the locomotive faculty is separable is raised [12]   Aris-
totle's willingness to use these terms in a variety of contexts shows
that their application to *nous* in 3 4 should not be taken as evidence
against the interpretation just presented   Granted, Aristotle may
have in mind a stronger sense of these terms when he restricts their
application to active *nous* in chapter 5 of *De Anima* or when he talks
about the distinctive character of divine *nous* in the *Metaphysics* [13]
These issues will be addressed in sections III and IV below.

II

The existence of a cognitive activity that is separable from
the body in the strong sense that this activity could take place with-
out a body would challenge the comprehensiveness of the general
definition of the soul and threaten Aristotle's unified account of hu-
man cognition   The question then becomes Are there among human
cognitive activities any that fit this description?   Discounting active
nous, Aristotle's account of thinking suggests two other possibilities.
(a) acts of immediate intuition that do not employ imagery or con-
cepts derived from sense experience and (b) the manipulation of
abstract universals previously acquired, perhaps on the basis of sense

---

[12] Cf *De Anima* 408b19-24, where Aristotle says that an old man with
a new pair of eyes would see as well as a young one because the eyes, not
the perceptive soul, have deteriorated with age
[13] *De Anima* 430a17-18, *Metaphysics* 1073a3-5

experience, but now severed from their experiential base [14]   The evidence, such as it is, for attributing (a) to Aristotle is found in *Posterior Analytics* 2 19, *Metaphysics* 9 10, and *De Anima* 3.6   According to some commentators, in the final chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle invokes a form of immediate intuition (*nous*) to validate universal principles that are recognized through a process of generalization from sense experience (100b5-17) [15]   A careful reading of the chapter, however, affords little evidence for this interpretation [16]   Aristotle explicitly associates the capacity for deriving universals with perception "it is clear that we must recognize the first principles by induction, for perception instills the universal in this way" (100b3-5)   What he calls *nous* is the epistemic state in which induction, the process of articulating a general principle, terminates, it is not an independent way of apprehending the principle.

At *Metaphysics* 1051b21-27 and *De Anima* 430a26-b6, Aristotle distinguishes between propositional truths recognized through discursive reasoning and indivisible intelligibles that are simply grasped (θιγγάνειν).[17]   Can he make sense of this distinction without appealing to a type of intellection that bypasses sense and imagination (φαντασία) altogether?   Both passages distinguish between simple and complex intelligibles and consequently between two types

---

[14] As we shall see in section III below, active *nous* strictly speaking is not a cognitive activity because although it is a necessary condition for the apprehension of intelligibles, it is not the apprehension of these objects or of any others

[15] See, for example, Terence Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1988), ch 7

[16] This has been argued by numerous commentators in recent years See, for example, J Barnes, *Aristotle's* Posterior Analytics, trans with notes (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1974), J Lesher, "The Meaning of *Nous* in the *Posterior Analytics*," *Phronesis* 18 (1973) 44-68, C Kahn, "The Role of *Nous* in the Cognition of First Principles in *Posterior Analytics* II, 19," in *Aristotle on Science* The Posterior Analytics, ed E Berti (Padua, 1981), 385-414, L Kosman, "Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in the *Posterior Analytics*," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed E. Lee, A Mourelatos, and R Rorty (Assen Van Gorcum, 1973), 374-92, and D Modrak, *Aristotle The Power of Perception*, ch 7

[17] *Metaphysics* 1051b21-27 emphasizes the immediacy of the apprehension of the simple objects, *De Anima* 430a26-b6, the role of *nous* in combining the components of a composite judgment   Both texts affirm that truth and falsity strictly speaking only apply to composite judgments

of intellection.   Apart from insisting on simplicity, Aristotle does
not say much in these passages about what sort of object would be
indivisible   If we look elsewhere in the corpus for examples of in-
divisible intelligibles, the *infima species* seems to be the most likely
candidate.   The definition that expresses the essence of an *infima
species* does not involve predication (1030a7–17); it is a unified and
simple object [18]   The apprehension of a simple essence would be the
intellection of an indivisible object; it would, however, be based on
sense experience, according to the story told in the *Posterior Ana-
lytics*.[19]   Because the concrete object of experience exemplifies its
essence, that essence can be expressed by an act of intellect that
just is a way of representing the object presented through perception
or imagination.   In the case of the *infima species* this representation
is not mediated through other more basic objects; it is not inferred.
It is merely grasped but not without the use of imagery

There is, moreover, evidence internal to *Metaphysics* 9 and *De
Anima* 3 that Aristotle does not appeal to indivisible intelligibles
in order to cut certain intelligibles free from their moorings in sense
experience   *Metaphysics* 9.10 speaks of the simple objects as objects
of inquiry [20]   The discussion of indivisible objects in *De Anima* 3 6
is followed in chapter 8 by the reminder that "no one can learn or
understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is
actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with
an image" (432a6–8).   Taking note of the difference between simple
and complex objects of intellection, Aristotle recognizes a similar
difference between their modes of apprehension, namely, between
simple apprehension and discursive reasoning.   This difference can
be made sense of without appealing to a type of mental activity that
is divorced from sense perception and the employment of imagery
and hence is genuinely separate from the body

One is hard-pressed to find proponents of (b), namely, the view
that while the formation of concepts of all sorts including those of

---

[18] E Berti points out that all of Aristotle's examples in *De Anima* 3 6
are separated essences of material objects and argues that what is at issue
is being indivisible in potentiality, see "The Intellection of Indivisibles
According to Aristotle, *de Anima* III, 6," in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses*,
ed G Lloyd and G Owen (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1978)
[19] *Posterior Analytics* 1 18, 2 19
[20] See 1051b32 ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν ("but we do inquire
as to what they are")

indivisible objects is weakly dependent upon the body, the manip-
ulation of certain acquired concepts is not.   Nevertheless, some sup-
port might be garnered from Aristotle's claim at 429b5-9 that "once
the mind has become each of its objects   the mind is then able
to think itself."[21]   Two interpretations of Aristotle's remark that
mind thinks itself are plausible (1) the intellect has the capacity
for self-awareness, and (2) the act of thinking a previously acquired
concept is an act of thinking a thought-construct and hence mind
thinks itself in this instance   On the first interpretation, this pas-
sage might be cited as evidence for an autonomous activity of the
intellect, namely, the reflexive awareness of thinking.   Since, how-
ever, according to Aristotle, cognitive self-awareness includes the
awareness of the object of the cognition, reflexive awareness will be
no more or less independent of the body than the first-order cognitive
activity of which it is the awareness.   This brings us to the second
interpretation, which appears to lend some support to the claim
that certain objects of thought, namely, acquired concepts, can be
thought by the intellect without recourse to the senses or the imag-
ination [22]   Suppose for the moment that there is a kind of thinking
that is wholly self-contained and not dependent in any way on the
perceptual faculty or the body   In order to save the general defi-
nition of the soul, then, Aristotle will be forced to argue for a very
attenuated connection between the capacity for this type of thinking
and the body.   Even though the capacity could be exercised in the
absence of a body, the acquisition of the capacity would require the
body, for unlike the general capacity for thought, thinkers would be
capable of this type of autonomous cognitive activity only insofar
as they had acquired the knowledge of the requisite concepts   But
since what a human being is born with is merely the capacity
for acquiring this second-level capability, the rational faculty
would still appear to satisfy the description, "first actuality of a
natural body."

---

[21] With the manuscripts, I retain δὲ αὐτὸν at b9   For a good discussion
of the history of emendations and interpretations of this passage, see J
Owens, "A Note on Aristotle *De Anima* 3 4, 429b9," *Phoenix* 30 (1976)
107-118, reprinted in *Aristotle The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens*, ed
J Caton (Albany State University of New York Press, 1981)
[22] It is worth noting that, even on the second interpretation, 429b5-9
does not entail (b) and thus the rejection of (b) need not be taken as evidence
that the second interpretation, narrowly construed, is untenable

Aristotle's subsequent insistence upon a role for imagery in thinking, however, suggests that images are employed even when the (human) mind thinks itself and this counts against taking 429b5-9 as evidence for (b)   Apart from the unlikely construal of 429b5-9 retailed above, there simply are no cognitive activities as described by Aristotle which are such that they could be performed by a mind that did not have immediate access to perceptual contents. A mind having this access is *ex hypothesi* one that is an integral part of the embodied soul of a human being.

III

De Anima 3 4 affirms the dependence of thinking on its object and acknowledges that in many cases the object is itself a thought because essences, even the essences of physical objects, are logically distinct from the objects that exemplify them   Articulated essences exist in the mind as universals abstracted from their concrete manifestations   Aristotle says that the mind is itself thinkable insofar as the object of its thinking is a conceptualization or thought (430a2-9). But since these thought objects are only potentially present in material objects, the actualization of the rational capacity exercised in thinking them must have a source in addition to our perceptions of the external world   Nor will the possession of an image of an object manifesting the essence do the trick, for it too presents a particular

In the case of sensing, under suitable conditions, objects existing in the world bring about our perceptions, we see, for instance, a red ball when there is a red ball in front of us acting on our eyes through the medium of light. Aristotle needs an analogue in the case of thought   In *De Anima* 3 5, he attacks the problem with a familiar tool—the delineation of an active and passive component involved in thinking   Active *nous*, the *nous* that makes all things, he suggests, is a state like light   Aristotle's conception of light and its role in the perception of color is quite unlike the modern view that colors are simply wavelengths of light   Light is the actuality ($\dot{\epsilon}\nu\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$) of a transparent medium that enables the medium to transmit the ratio of black to white that is constitutive of color from the surface of the object to the eye (418b2-10)   Light enables the percipient substance to exercise its power of vision. Active *nous* ($\pi o\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\grave{o}s$

νοῦς) plays a similar role; it is a necessary condition for thinking, a state of a thinking substance that enables the substance to exercise its rational faculty   Just as light does not produce color, which is an objective feature of the world, active *nous* does not literally produce essences, which are also objective features of the world.   In a way, light makes potential colors actual, Aristotle tells us; that is, light is necessary for the transition from color as a feature of an external object (a first actuality) to color-as-perceived (a second actuality)   Active *nous* is necessary for the transition from the embodied essence presented in an image to the essence-as-thought.   In the paradigm case, to see is to apprehend a color, to think is to apprehend an essence [23]   The description of the terminal activity does not mention, nor should it, the actuality (light, active *nous*) that made the transition possible from the first actuality (sight, thought) to the second actuality (seeing, thinking).

Several attributes that were mentioned earlier in connection with the rational faculty are restricted to active *nous* in 3.5.   "And this *nous* is separable [χωριστός] and impassive and unmixed, being with respect to substance actuality" (430a17-18).   The participial clause gives the reason why these characteristics belong to active *nous*.   Possessing actuality essentially, active *nous* cannot contain matter (hence it is separable) or be affected by something else or be mixed with something else, for these conditions all bring potentiality with them.   Since any employment of *nous* having a cognitive content is brought about by that content and thus involves a change from possessing the potential for having the thought to actually apprehending the content in question (429a13-24), active *nous* cannot be the activity of thinking.   All cognitive activity requires a shift from potentiality to actuality, any such shift in Aristotle's metaphysics requires an actually existing actuality, which in this case is active *nous*   While the activity of thinking is an actuality, it is not, in the case of human beings, a continuously existing actuality and hence should be distinguished from active *nous* [24]   Even the theoretical employment of *nous* (θεωρία) which is directed upon thoughts

---

[23] Aristotle also includes the awareness of darkness among the functions of sight and similarly not all thinking concerns essences

[24] *Pace* M Wedin (*Mind and Imagination in Aristotle* [New Haven Yale University Press, 1988], ch 5), who argues that active *nous* is simply the exercise of *nous*

(abstract universals) and is thus more self-contained than any other rational function is the realization of a psychic potentiality.[25]

Why, if the interpretation just given is right, a skeptic might ask, does Aristotle say at 430a22, "but it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not"? Should we, following most of the manuscripts, retain οὐχ (not) and make active *nous* the subject, then the implication that active *nous* thinks is unavoidable. But as the long tradition of commentary on this line attests, both moves are controversial [26] I am inclined to follow Simplicius and delete οὐχ; then Aristotle's reference at 430a5 to "not always think-ing" may be cited in favor of making *nous qua* faculty of thought the subject of a22, that is, *nous* is sometimes exercised by its pos-sessor and sometimes not. Suppose, however, we accept οὐχ as gen-uine and hence retain, "it is not the case"; we still must decide what the subject of the sentence is. Aristotle's reference at a20 to the exercise of knowledge is a good reason (if οὐχ is retained) to take the subject to be the exercise of *nous* rather than active *nous*. This reading is also unproblematic, for insofar as *nous* is being exercised, thinking is taking place continuously The skeptic might also won-der why, if active *nous* is not a cognitive activity, Aristotle calls it νοῦς (*nous*). But since in the *De Anima* νοῦς is Aristotle's term for the capacity for thought possessed by a human being and active *nous* is a *hexis* (disposition) required for exercising this capacity, it is not surprising that it too is called *nous* [27]

The definition of the soul does not apply to active *nous*, which is a full-fledged, second actuality and not a first actuality as required by the definition. Active *nous*, however, is the state of a thinking substance that enables such a substance to exercise *nous qua* capacity for thought. As the faculty for thought, *nous* is an essential com-ponent of the form or soul of a human being. The integration of *nous* into the rest of the soul is secured by its dependence upon

---

[25] Even when celebrating the superiority of contemplation to other human activities in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 7, Aristotle reaffirms human limitations in this regard (1177b26–31)

[26] See R Hicks for a good summary of the tradition (*Aristotle* De Anima, 1976 ed , p 505) Several of the manuscripts omit οὐχ (not), and commentators are far from unanimous in taking active *nous* as the subject of a22

[27] Cf 429a2–4, where Aristotle suggests that φαντασία gets its name from light (φῶς) on the grounds that light is required for vision

images.   The human soul as a whole is the first actuality of the (potentially) human body.   Just as light as the actuality of transparent media does not exist independently, active *nous* as the actuality required for the exercise of rationality does not exist apart from rational creatures

At 430a22, Aristotle says that when separated (χωρισθείς), active *nous* is alone just what it is and it alone is deathless and eternal The crucial question is whether χωρισθείς can refer to the result of a mental separation or whether it must refer to an actual separation.[28]   Aristotle often uses χωρισθείς in the first sense [29]   Most likely, that is his intent here.   If so, then the passage merely explores the consequences of conceptually separating active *nous* from the human body   Active *nous* always exists as an actuality, it is *ex hypothesi* indestructible, similar considerations in the *Metaphysics* lead Aristotle to say that species-forms are indestructible (1043b17)   Even on the less likely reading of χωρισθείς as indicative of an actual separation, separated *nous* need not be identified with the active *nous* of the individual.[30]   In the *Nicomachean Ethics* at 1159a5, Aristotle uses χωρισθείς of god and in the present context his attention may have momentarily shifted to divine *nous*   Finally, even if one were to identify separated *nous* with human active *nous*, this sentence does not, contrary to tradition, yield a conception of active *nous* that is incompatible with the general definition of the soul.   To overturn the definition, separated human *nous* must constitute a discrete individual, and there is no evidence that this is the case.

IV

Even though Aristotle's characterization of thinking in *De Anima* assimilates *nous* and its activities to other psychic capacities and activities, the analogy drawn between divine thought and human thought in the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* seems to call this assimilation into question   Divine *nous* is separate from all matter and all change.   There can be no question of its being the actuality, first or second, of any body whatsoever or being a

---

[28] Hicks argues for the former, Zabarella the latter
[29] *De Anima* 403a14, 412b13, *Physics* 216b7
[30] This use of χωρισθείς is much less frequent in Aristotle's writings.

constituent of a form that is an actuality of a body. If the analogy drawn between human *nous* and divine *nous* implies that human *nous* resembles divine *nous* in this respect, then this analogy can be invoked in support of a dualist interpretation of Aristotle's psychology Developing this line of argument, one might envisage a human soul consisting of the form of the human body and *nous*, a distinctive psychic power that is wholly independent of the body.[31] This picture is obviously incompatible with the general definition of the soul.

This worry is reinforced by noting the many similarities that Aristotle explicitly or implicitly marks between human and divine thought Many of the predicates mentioned in connection with active *nous* in *De Anima* are ascribed to the cosmic final cause in *Metaphysics* 12 [32] The first mover is impassive ($\dot{\alpha}\pi\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}s$, 1073a11), and is a substance and an actuality ($o\dot{v}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}v\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$) (1072a25) [33] Like active *nous*, thought thinking thought is pure activity with no element of potency Both are invoked to explain phenomena which, within the confines of his metaphysics, Aristotle can only explain by appealing to a second actuality. As theoretical entities, their characters are determined by the needs of the explanatory model at hand; in each case, an unqualified actuality is required The distinction between a cognitive activity and the enabling condition required for that activity is however maintained in the human case but not in the case of the divine substance(s) Active *nous* meets a need peculiar to human thought that is without counterpart in the wholly self-reflexive divine activity While divine *nous* exists as a separate substance, active *nous* does not

Potentially more troublesome is Aristotle's belief that an analogy obtains between our employment of theoretical *nous* and the nature of god In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues that contemplation is the highest virtue because it most resembles the activity

[31] Not even Plotinus is willing to opt for a rigid distinction in the case of the human soul despite his belief that the intellect and soul as principles of reality are distinct (*Enneads* 2 9 1-2)

[32] The divine substance is $\dot{\alpha}\iota\delta\iota os$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\dot{\alpha}\kappa\acute{\iota}v\eta\tau os$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\kappa\epsilon\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}v$ ("eternal and unmoving and separate") (1073a4)

[33] Cf *De Anima* 430a17 $\tau\hat{\eta}$ $o\dot{v}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\mathring{\omega}v$ $\dot{\epsilon}v\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (being in essence actuality) Active *nous* is separable (430a17) and divine substance is separate (1073a4) As we shall see shortly, the analogy drawn between cosmic *nous* and active *nous* is less troublesome than that between cosmic *nous* and theoretical *nous*

of the gods. In *Metaphysics* 12 he arrives at the conception of a divine substance from a consideration of what is best in us (1072b13–25). These passages threaten the distinction (drawn above) between the theoretical employment of *nous* and active *nous*

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as the *Metaphysics*, being a self-contained activity ($\dot{\epsilon}\nu\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$) is the aspect of rationality which sustains the analogy between human contemplation and the activity of a god. The account in the *Ethics*, however, is hypothetical: if there are gods, they are living, active beings   "But if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation?" (1178b20–21). Starting from a list of human activities, Aristotle concludes that the only one appropriate to a god would be contemplation   The human's contemplation of a universal is the actualization of an object of thought already possessed as an intelligible object   Because human contemplation is relatively autonomous, Aristotle attributes contemplative ($\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{\eta}$) activity to the gods [34]   The *Ethics* passage does not speak about the objects contemplated by the gods, the gods might contemplate the same types of universals that humans contemplate or they might not   If they do, then there would be no internal mark that distinguished a god's act of contemplation from a mortal's   From an external perspective, however, a distinction between the two could still be drawn: the god can contemplate continuously, the human cannot.

Self-sufficiency ($\alpha\dot{\upsilon}\tau\dot{\alpha}\rho\kappa\eta s$) figures prominently in the *Ethics* account.   Theoretical activity on the part of the mind ($\nu o\hat{\upsilon}s$ $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{o}s$) does not occasion action, it does not represent objects as either desirable or repugnant (*De Anima* 432b26–29; cf 433a15) [35] Nor is it productive (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a27–29, cf. 1180b21, *Metaphysics* 982a1) [36]   For this reason, Aristotle calls it $\alpha\dot{\upsilon}\tau\dot{\alpha}\rho\kappa\eta s$

---

[34] In light of its hypothetical and speculative character, this description of the gods does not provide hard evidence in favor of attributing human-like contemplation to god

[35] It is noteworthy that while Aristotle uses the phrase $\dot{o}$ $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{o}s$ $\nu o\hat{\upsilon}s$ to distinguish $\nu o\hat{\upsilon}s$ in its function as thought about abstract universals from other types of thinking, he does not extend this treatment to $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$ (to contemplate), which he uses as a synonym of other verbs for thinking (see, e g , *De Anima* 432b29)

[36] Lest we think that $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{o}s$ $\nu o\hat{\upsilon}s$ (theoretical *nous*) is a technical term that excludes $\delta\iota\dot{\alpha}\nu o\iota\alpha$ (thought), we should note that Aristotle uses $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{\eta}$ $\delta\iota\dot{\alpha}\nu o\iota\alpha$ at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a27 and $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\dot{\eta}\mu\eta$ $\dot{\eta}$ $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{\eta}$ (theoretical knowledge) at *De Anima* 430a4

contemplation is an end in itself; we do not choose it for the sake of achieving some further objective (cf *Metaphysics* 982b11-27). Theoretical activity is αὐτάρκης in a second sense.[37] Unlike perceptions, we can initiate acts of contemplation on our own, and we can engage in them for extended periods of time   In its theoretical mode, *nous* does not consider universals in relation to particulars; it studies the universal in itself   As a result, the theoretical employment of *nous* is further removed from perceptual functions than any other rational activity.[38] Not surprisingly, the separability thesis is limited to this type of *nous* in *De Anima* 2 when the question of separability is first raised (413b24-27) [39]

Despite Aristotle's willingness to develop and exploit the analogy between divine activity and theoretical *nous*, the distinction between the two does not collapse, because the object of divine contemplation and hence its character is quite unlike that of human contemplation. Human reason is subject to various limitations. We are only able to engage in contemplative activity for short periods of time. Reasoning about abstract objects, moreover, takes the form of either demonstration or definition and both of these are linear processes; unlike divine thought, these cognitive activities do not circle back on themselves (407a22-32)   Divine thought by contrast is nondiscursive and continuous. "For were the object of divine thought composite, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole" (1075a6-7)   The sequential and intermittent character of the theoretical activity of human *nous* is sufficient to establish the nonidentity of human and divine *nous*

Thus far nothing has been said that would overturn the proposition that at any arbitrarily selected moment, human contemplative activity has the same character as that which divine *nous* always has. Human *nous*, however, is also dependent upon imagery [40] The contemplative act of a human is directed upon a universal, and this cognitive activity requires the presentation of instances of the uni-

---

[37] Both uses of αὐτάρκης are found in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 6-7, see 1176b4-5 and 1177a27-b1

[38] This is not to say that no activity of the perceptual faculty is required for the exercise of theoretical *nous*, here too images (φαντάσματα) serve as the vehicle for the intelligible forms

[39] Earlier, in *De Anima* 1 1 at 403a10-16, the issue of separability is broached and seemingly laid to rest

[40] *De Anima* 432a1-9, cf 431b2-9

versal through a perceptual faculty   Not only does this requirement
insure the functional unity of the soul of the human engaged in
contemplation, it also insures the distinctive character of human
contemplation at each and every moment.   It also explains why,
unlike gods, we are only able to contemplate for short periods of
time.   Rational activity considered in abstraction is not subject to
fatigue, but since, like any other bodily organ, the central sense
organ, which is actively involved in the presentation of images, be-
comes fatigued, human contemplative activity is at best intermit-
tent [41]   The theoretical employment of *nous* by a human being and
the thinking of a divine intelligence are too different to allow us, on
the basis of the analogy drawn in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to gen-
eralize from the body-independent existence of the latter to that of
the former.

Aristotle's descriptions of both human and divine *nous* stress
the unity of thought with its object. "In the theoretical sciences the
definition or the act of thinking is the object   Since, then, thought
and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that
have no matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same
." (1075a3-4)   In the case of human reason, the faculty for
thinking is potentially what its object is actually and is in this sense
ontologically posterior to the object   This will not do in the case
of the cosmic mover, Aristotle believes, and thus he interprets the
thesis that divine thought is identical with its object in a unique
manner.   In one sense, every act of thinking is identical with its
object, just as every act of perception is identical with its object,
for cognitive activities just are the actualizations of their objects
This sense, however, will not do in the present instance because, as
Aristotle points out in a slightly different context, it is a universal
characteristic of thinking (1074b31-33), the activity of thinking the
most trivial or immoral thought will be identical with its object in
this sense.   There is a second and stronger sense in which no act of
perception and only certain acts of human thought are identical
with their objects—namely, when the object is one of the things
without matter, an abstract universal, an object of theoretical sci-
ence (1075a3-5), for then the object of the cognitive activity is itself
a thought   The problem is that not even this will support the

---

[41] Cf *De Anima* 408b20-25, where Aristotle appeals to the decline of
some inward bodily part to explain the blunting of the mind in old age

priority of thinking over its object   In the case of human ratiocin-
ation, all these conditions are met and yet the object retains its
preeminent position.   Aristotle's solution is to make the object of
divine thought its own activity; divine "thinking is a thinking on
thinking" (νόησις νοήσεως νόησις, 1074b34).[42]

In the lines leading up to this conclusion, Aristotle raises a
series of questions concerning the identification of god with *nous*
(1074b15–33); most importantly, he worries about the nature of the
object of divine thought (it must be maximally good and a substance)
and about avoiding the identification of divinity with a *dunamis*
(capacity) for thinking   Both problems are solved by the νοήσεως
νόησις dictum   The proposal has a certain rhetorical power, for it
confounds the argument from the priority of the object to the relative
inferiority of the thinking   If the object of the thinking just is the
thinking, how can it possibly be ontologically prior to itself?   Per-
suasiveness notwithstanding, however, Aristotle's model of cognition
is stretched to the breaking point by the notion of pure self-reflexive
thought   As he remarks, "Knowledge and perception and belief
and thought always appear to be of something else, but only of
themselves as a by-product" (1074b35–36)   The cognitive activity
and its object are actualized simultaneously; the character of the
activity is determined by the object and consequently the reflexive
awareness of the activity includes the awareness of the object.   In
De Anima 3 2, Aristotle defends the claim that the reflexive aware-
ness of seeing belongs to sight on the grounds that the awareness
of color is an essential component of visual self-awareness (425b12–
24) [43]   Here, however, Aristotle's desire to identify god with contin-
uous activity rather than the faculty for such activity and, at the
same time, to make the object of this activity the best of all beings
produces a conception of reflexivity that eliminates any distinction
between the activity of thinking and its object.   There is no first-
order cognitive content analogous to color, the actualization of which
is the first-order activity analogous to seeing   Since on Aristotle's

---

[42] J DeFilippo makes an ingenious argument for reading νοήσεως as a
subjective rather than objective genitive, see *Theology and First Philosophy
in Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Ph D diss, Princeton University, 1989), ch 2
I remain unconvinced, however, because it is precisely the reflexivity of
thought thinking itself that allows Aristotle to identify this activity with
pure actuality

[43] Cf L Kosman, "Perceiving That We Perceive *On The Soul* III, 2,"
Philosophical Review 84 (1975) 499–519

model of cognition, the character of a cognitive activity and the character of the reflexive awareness of that activity are determined by the first-order object, the elimination of an antecedent cognitive object has the consequence that divine thought, having itself as object, does not seem to have a cognitive content as such or, strictly speaking, to be a cognitive activity at all.

One solution to this difficulty is to suppose (and many commentators have) that Aristotle's god in thinking its own activity is engaged in thinking in the more mundane sense.[44] On this view, god might, for instance, apprehend the totality of intelligible objects in a continuous, indivisible act of thought. The continuity and comprehensiveness of divine thinking would distinguish it from human thinking, but both would take the same type of objects. To posit mind-independent intelligibles would clearly be incompatible with Aristotle's insistence upon the ontological priority of the activity of divine thinking, to suppose, however, that god's nature just is the continuous actualization of the totality of intelligible objects would be consistent with Aristotle's description of divine thinking The suggestion, however, is completely speculative, there is no direct textual evidence for it nor any uncontroversial indirect evidence.[45] Moreover, had Aristotle conceived divine substance in this way, it seems very likely that he would have explained that νόησις νοήσεως νόησις (thinking that is a thinking of thinking) is a shorthand way of saying that the divine mind thinks the totality of intelligible objects

In addition, the notion of divine substance developed in *Metaphysics* 12 satisfies two objectives—to specify the character of the cosmic first mover and to identify a pure actuality. The first is a consequence of the theory of motion developed in the *Physics* and

---

[44] See, for example, R Norman, "Aristotle's philosopher-god," *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 63-74, J Lear, *Aristotle The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1988), 293-309, and C Kahn, "The Role of *Nous*" (see n 16 above)

[45] The only indirect evidence I can find is the *Ethics'* claim that if there were gods, they would engage in contemplation (1178b20-23) Aristotle's project here, however, is not a disinterested investigation of divine activity but rather a thought experiment based on the plausible principle that what is best in us can be discovered by reviewing which of our many activities would be appropriate to a morally superior being We are not capable of the kind of thinking attributed to the divine mind in the *Metaphysics* and hence, since the gods' activity as described in the *Ethics* is modeled on our cognitive life, it would be a mistake to generalize from that description to Aristotle's considered judgment about divine activity

the requirement that motion in the universe be sustained by an unmoved mover   The second is a consequence of the identification of substance with actuality in the *Metaphysics* that generates a hierarchy of substances where the best substance excludes all potentiality.   Looking for an analogue in the range of human experience for a pure activity, Aristotle locates it in the activity of thinking The projected activity is totally self-contained because, having no object other than itself, it perpetually turns back on itself.   Since there is no need to elaborate upon this notion in greater detail and real risks are involved in trying to do so, Aristotle wisely refrains from further speculation   We are simply left with the puzzle that divine *nous* is νόησις (thought) and yet noncognitive in that it slips through the net provided by Aristotle's analysis of cognition

In short, neither the account of god's activity and its similarity to active *nous*, on the one hand, nor the similarity of divine thought to the human's theoretical employment of *nous*, on the other, undermines *De Anima*'s account of a unified human soul.[46]

V

The challenge put to the defender of Aristotle's philosophy of mind was to show that his conception of *nous* as possessed by human beings was consistent with the definition of the soul which directs and shapes the *De Anima*'s investigation of human psychology Four aspects of Aristotle's descriptions of *nous* in the *De Anima* and elsewhere seemed potentially problematic: *nous*' having no specific bodily organ, the intuition of essences, active *nous*, and the relation between human and divine *nous*   Upon closer examination, none of these defeated the definition's claim to hold of a unified human soul of which *nous* is the essential and dominant component.[47]

University of Rochester

---

[46] Cf Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, ch 6, which also argues for exercising constraint in generalizing from the analogy drawn between human and divine thought

[47] I would like to thank Michael Frede for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper as well as an anonymous referee for the *Review of Metaphysics*

HOW IDEAS BECAME MEANINGS LOCKE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTIC THEORY

ROBERT HANNA

I

T HERE IS A NOTORIOUS THESIS in the philosophy of language which runs as follows· meanings (or semantic contents) are wholly mind-dependent, in the sense that they exist only in particular human minds   We might call this "the thesis of semantic psychologism." Versions of this thesis have been attacked and rejected by some of the most important philosophers of language in the twentieth century. Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Hilary Putnam.[1]

Two features of the career of semantic psychologism should strike us immediately   First, the thesis has had a remarkable

---

[1] Frege's and Husserl's critiques of semantic psychologism follow by implication from their more famous critiques of "logical psychologism" (the thesis that logical laws are wholly mind-dependent)   Frege's rejection of semantic psychologism can be found most explicitly in "Thoughts," in *Gottlob Frege Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, ed B McGuinness (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1984), 360–72   Husserl's similar rejection can be found in *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols , trans J N Findlay (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), Inv I, section 30, pp 327–8 Wittgenstein's attack on semantic psychologism takes the form of an attack on the idea of a *private language* in *Philosophical Investigations*, trans G. E M Anscombe (New York· Macmillan, 1953), pars 243–293, pp 88e–100e   Finally, Hilary Putnam rejects semantic psychologism in his attack on *internalism* in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in *Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1975), 227.   The several critiques of semantic psychologism differ not so much in form as in their direct opponents.   Frege's and Husserl's opponents are late nineteenth-century neo-Hegelians and neo-Kantians   Wittgenstein's opponent is the early twentieth-century "atomistic" semanticist such as early Wittgenstein himself in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, or early Russell in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, and Putnam's opponent is the late twentieth-century "language of thought" semanticist such as Jerry Fodor in *The Language of Thought*

tenacity in light of the fact that so many important philosophers have spent so much time and effort refuting it. And secondly, although semantic psychologism is almost universally rejected, philosophers of language are nevertheless by no means in agreement as to whether the contrary or the contradictory of the thesis is true: whether, that is, meanings are wholly mind-independent, or whether meanings are simply not wholly mind-dependent   The contrary of the thesis puts meanings altogether outside the mind, while the contradictory is consistent with meanings being partially mind-dependent and partially mind-independent   Frege, Wittgenstein, and the Putnam of the 1970s all defend versions of the contrary of semantic psychologism,[2] while Husserl and the Putnam of the 1980s defend versions of the contradictory.[3]   What explains both the tenacity of the thesis of semantic psychologism and this divergence in opinion amongst the implacable enemies of the thesis?   The tenacity and the conflict *seem* to stem from the rather surprising fact that the precise character of the semantic theory underlying the thesis has never been very well understood

In my opinion, the relative lack of understanding of the foundations of the thesis of semantic psychologism (and consequently both the "staying power" of the thesis despite repeated criticism, and the disagreement as to the correct antithesis of the thesis) is due ultimately to the failure to identify or characterize accurately the *historical origins* of the thesis   It can be argued that to an important extent, the central problems of nineteenth- and twentieth-century semantics are simply recapitulations of the central problems

---

[2] Frege's defense of the view that meanings are wholly mind-independent can be found in his theory of "senses" (*Sinne*) in "On Sense and Meaning," in *Collected Papers*, 157–77   Wittgenstein's defense can be found in his theory that "meaning-lies-in-use" in *Philosophical Investigations*, pars 30, 43, and 197, pp 14e, 20e, and 80e   The Putnam of the 1970s's defense of this view can be found in his two-part theory of the direct reference of natural kind terms and the "linguistic division of labor" in "The Meaning of 'Meaning' "

[3] Husserl develops the view that meanings are at once partially mind-dependent and partially mind-independent in his theory of meanings as ideal intentional act-essences in Investigation I of *Logical Investigations*   The Putnam of the 1980s defends the same thesis in a very different way in his theory of "internal realism" in chapter 7 of *Representation and Reality* (Cambridge MIT Press, 1988)

of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemology[4] If this is so, then the thesis of semantic psychologism is in fact a derived thesis from the more basic and traditional thesis that *meanings are ideas.* Here is roughly how such a derivation would go·

(1) Meanings are ideas
(2) Ideas are wholly mind-dependent
(3) Therefore, meanings are wholly mind-dependent.

"Ideas" in this thumbnail derivation is used in the sense current amongst philosophers from Descartes to Kant. the modern, non-Platonic sense of "an object immediately before the mind"[5] It is simply a constitutive feature of this modern sense of "idea" (where this must be understood as excluding the very different notion of an "innate idea"[6]) that ideas are wholly "in" the mind[7] By no means all of the philosophers in the Descartes-to-Kant sequence defend the truth of premise (1), however   In fact, the thesis that meanings are ideas was originally developed and defended by Locke in book III of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding.* Hence

---

[4] See Ian Hacking, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1975), Norman Kretzmann, "History of Semantics," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 7, ed. P Edwards (New York Macmillan, 1967), 379–404, and Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1979), chapters 3 and 6

[5] Descartes and many other philosophers, including Locke, understand ideas to be objects "immediately before the mind" in two senses: an epistemological sense, and an ontological sense   In the epistemological sense, ideas are *directly presented to* the mind, and in the ontological sense, ideas are *parts of, and existentially dependent on,* the mind   The Platonist might hold that an idea (the *eidos*) is an object "immediately before the mind" in the epistemological sense, but *not* in the ontological sense—since Platonic *eidē* are of course ontologically independent of particular minds

[6] The theory of innate ideas is of course to be found in its modern-classical locus in the third and fifth Meditations of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy,* trans J Cottingham (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1986), 26, 47   For a good survey of recent discussions of innate ideas, see Stephen Stich, ed , *Innate Ideas* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1975)

[7] This point is perhaps brought out best by Berkeley, see "The Principles of Human Knowledge," in *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings,* ed D Armstrong (New York Collier Macmillan, 1965), par 89, p 98 "[Ideas] are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances "

Locke may be said to be the first explicit defender of the thesis of semantic psychologism.

My aim in this paper is to give a critical description of some of the main tenets of Locke's semantic theory in book III, especially as found in chapters 1, 2, and 3   Here we shall find the thesis of semantic psychologism in its original form as a thesis about the identity of meanings and ideas [8] Here too we shall find the main difficulties of semantic psychologism in their original forms. A careful consideration of Locke's original version of this thesis and its basic difficulties will allow us to choose definitively between the two possible antitheses of the thesis. This in turn should put us in a better position to see just where and how the foundations of semantics might be constructed beyond semantic psychologism   This notorious thesis has shown itself to be easy enough to reject, but rather difficult to correct. Those who do not carefully study the history of a philosophical problem are perhaps doomed, if not actually to repeat it, then at least to waste a lot of time re-inventing it.[9]

II

At the very end of book II of the *Essay*, in his characteristically prosy, honest manner, Locke makes the following admission·

> Having thus given an account of the origin, sorts, and extent of our Ideas, with several other Considerations, about these (I know not

---

[8] Strictly speaking, this needs qualification. Only *determinate* ("clear and distinct") ideas and meanings are identical for Locke; hence some (vague) ideas are not meanings on the Lockean account, although all meanings are ideas   See sect II below

[9] This appears to have happened to a considerable extent in Stephen Schiffer's recent tour de force, *Remnants of Meaning* (see esp chap 10, "The No-Theory Theory of Meaning")   Many of the problems Schiffer identifies in mainstream twentieth-century semantic theory are problems that have been inherited from its epistemological and psychological precursors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, via nineteenth-century "psychologistic" semantic theory   This is a long story, but for a few details from one part of it, see my "Kant's Theory of Empirical Judgment and Modern Semantics," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7 (July 1990) 335-51   The reappearance of old-fashioned problems in mid-twentieth-century semantic theory shows not so much that mainstream semantic theory itself is bankrupt as that it has not yet come to terms with the conceptual flaws and half-truths inherent in its historical origins

> whether I may say) Instruments, or Materials, of our Knowledge, the
> method I at first proposed to my self, would now require, that I should
> immediately proceed to shew, what use the Understanding makes of
> them, and what Knowledge we have by them   This was that, which,
> in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I thought
> I should have to do but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is
> so close a connexion between Ideas and Words, and our abstract Ideas,
> and general Words, have so constant a relation to one another, that
> it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which
> all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature,
> Use, and Signification of Language [10]   (II, 23, 19)

In a word, Locke is saying that in order to carry out a complete
epistemology—a fully critical inquiry into the origins, scope, and lim-
its of the human understanding—one must also do semantic theory

To be sure, this "linguistic turn" seems on the face of it very
surprising. This is because the *Essay* is "officially" about the ex-
clusively *ideational* foundations of all human opinion and knowledge.
Locke's basic theory of mind is both startlingly reductive and sur-
prisingly elegant in its general outlines   In the famous chapter,
"Of Ideas in General, and their Original," Locke explicitly states
that all knowledge and opinion is reducible to the *ideas* found before
a person's mind. Locke defines an idea in the following way

> Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object
> of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call *Idea*   (II, 8, 8)

It is notorious, of course, that Locke also uses 'idea' in two distinct
senses

> To discover the nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to discourse of
> them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they
> are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds, and as they are modifications
> of matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us   (II, 8, 7)

Locke says explicitly that the first sense of "idea" is the primary
one for his discussion, although he also admits that he may slip
occasionally into the second sense: "which *Ideas*, if I speak some-
times, as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean
those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us" (II, 8, 8)

---

[10] John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed P H
Nidditch (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975)   All further references to the
Essay will be made to this edition, signified by book, chapter, and paragraph
numbers respectively, enclosed in parentheses

By the use of "idea" in what follows, we shall mean strictly Locke's first sort of idea: objects which are "Perceptions in our Minds" "Ideas" in this sense possess three necessary characteristics (1) they are immediately accessible to the mind, (2) they are literally a part of the mind, and (3) they are asymmetrically dependent on the existence of the mind. An idea is precisely "whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks" (I, 1, 8)—hence it is directly presented to the mind. Moreover, an idea is also what is literally "in" the mind—hence it is in the mind as a proper part is in a whole. And finally, if minds are altogether removed, so are all ideas Since the mind while dreamlessly asleep can exist without any ideas in it (II, 1, 9-11), ideas are asymmetrically dependent for their existence on minds.

The mind itself in turn for Locke is nothing but a set of mental powers put into action by the arrival of "simple" ideas. Simple ideas arise either from sensation, reflection on the mental powers, or from both sensation and reflection (II, 1, 4). Simple ideas of sensation are cognitively primary in the following sense the blank tablet of the mind originally receives the causal impression of external objects and produces an idea in the mind; this in turn sets into motion some mental operation (such as perception), which becomes the object of a secondary simple reflective idea of that mental operation (II, 1, 23-24). Beyond simple ideas are only "complex" ideas. And complex ideas are recursively parasitic on simple ideas.

> As the Mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple Ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple Ideas, as the Materials and Foundations of the rest, the other are framed. (II, 12, 1)

A complex idea is the result of retaining, relating, repeating, or transforming (say, by abstraction) some simple ideas It follows that complex ideas are constructed as a *function* of simple ideas, due to recursive mental operations on those simple ideas The set of all simple and complex ideas exhausts the scope of what can be opined or known: "Our thoughts can go no further than our own, so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very Guesses, beyond the Ideas received from our own Sensation and Reflection" (II, 23, 13). At least schematically, then, the strategy of ideas makes possible the tight circle of Locke's epistemological critique of the human understanding, or what he calls his inquiry into "the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge" (I, 1, 2).

So why, given the apparent completeness of the strategy of ideas, must Locke make his linguistic turn? One might easily give the following "snappy" answer [11] Locke wants to analyze human knowledge and belief; human knowledge and belief are constituted only by means of propositions; propositions are linguistic items; therefore, Locke must analyze language (see III, 9, 21). This is true enough, as far as it goes. Yet there seem to be two deeper reasons for Locke's turn to language.

First, although it is possible to have ideas without any words associated with them, nevertheless ideas cannot be "determinate" (clear and distinct) without correlating them directly to words ("Epistle to the Reader," p. 13, see also II, 29, 6). That is an idea cannot be cognitively individuated unless annexed to a word. Pre-linguistic infants can have ideas, and mere animals can have ideas, but neither of them has anything but vague or ambiguous ideas It is of course possible to produce mere words or utterances without any ideas annexed to them—witness Locke's famous example of the uttering parrot (II, 27, 8) Locke's claim is only that every determinate idea must have an associated word or phrase; this amounts to a Lockean "principle of expressibility"[12] for ideas·

> *L-Expressibility* For every determinate idea there exists a correlated word in the common language, which exactly expresses that idea

Secondly, an extremely important leftover problem for Locke from the analysis of ideas is the issue of epistemological solipsism.

> Man, though he have a great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight, yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear   (III, 2, 1)

The subject of ideas is a single personal self. Ideas are indexed by times and persons. Yet somehow ideas come to be communicatively shared across persons   How is this possible? Descartes had required a theory of "innate ideas" in order to handle a similar

---

[11] This is the answer given, for instance, in one of the standard interpretations of Locke, R I Aaron's *John Locke* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1955), 194

[12] The notion of a "principle of expressibility" can be found in its most recent form in John Searle's *Speech Acts* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1969), 19–21, where it relates semantic contents directly to expressions of natural languages

problem. For Locke, who explicitly rejects the theory of innate ideas, the answer lies in language   Communication for Locke is the essential function of every natural language   The function of communication is to promote social ties and political liaisons

> God having designed Man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society   (III, 1, 1)

How does Lockean communication work?   By sharing the same set of words, two or more persons thereby share the same set of ideas. (This claim is of course highly problematic; we shall discuss it critically in section V below.)   The words stand as public indications of the ideas privately before the mind:

> Besides articulate sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that [Man] should be able to use these Sounds, as signs of internal Conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another.   (III, 1, 2)

For this to be possible, it must be the case that for every distinct word of the common language there exists correlated with it a single, determinate idea.   If the correlation between words and ideas were not one-to-one, or if the correlated ideas were not determinate, effective communication would be impossible.   Ambiguity and vagueness would infect every communicative transaction.   Science and the transmission of information would be undermined. The epistemological problem of solipsism thus literally forces the linguistic turn on Locke

In this way, then, Locke is naturally led to a thesis about ideas, speakers, meanings, and words:

> *L-Meaning* The meaning of a word is the (determinate) idea uniquely assigned to that word by a given speaker [13]

---

[13] Locke puts the thesis of L-Meaning in this way "the use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of [determinate] Ideas, and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification" (III, 2, 1), and again that "Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the [determinate] Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them" (III, 2, 2).   To be sure, indeterminate or "confused" ideas may be intentionally assigned to words by speakers (II, 29, 5-12), but these assignments are not *meaning-assignments*, they are rather a mere "abuse of words" (III, 10, 1-3)

Words thus express, as their meanings, the determinate ideas assigned to them by speakers   More formally, we can think of L-Meaning as a three-place function from speakers, words, and ideas onto meanings a meaning is the direct result of the speaker's intention to assign a given word to a given idea. Recent philosophers of language and mind will recognize this as a version of what Ryle has called the " 'Fido'-Fido" theory of meaning.[14] words obtain meanings by assignments to well-defined entities, such that for every word there is at least and at most one entity to which it is assigned. What is not often recognized is that Locke is the first to develop a 'Fido'-Fido theory such that the range of the assignment-function consists exclusively of (determinate) ideas in a speaker's mind. Ideas, we will remember, are understood by Locke to be entities directly accessible to the mind, literally a part of the mind, and asymmetrically dependent for their existence on the mind   Hence it is a mere consequence of Locke's identification of (determinate) ideas and meanings, that meanings are wholly mind-dependent

As has been indicated already, there are many good arguments against the thesis of semantic psychologism, and by implication, against the thesis of L-Meaning   But what precisely is Locke's argument on behalf of the view that meanings of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker?[15]   In a nutshell, for Locke meanings must be ideas in the mind of the speaker because (1) a speaker must have some direct cognitive access to the meanings of her words, and (2) the only things to which a speaker has direct cognitive access are ideas in her mind (IV, 4, 3).   Now premise (2) is quite implausible,[16] so we may safely ignore it.   But what about premise (1)?   Suppose

---

[14] See Gilbert Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning," in *Collected Papers*, vol. 2 (New York Barnes and Noble, 1971), 350–72

[15] A very careful and plausible explication of Locke's argument(s) in this regard can be found in Norman Kretzmann, "The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," *Philosophical Review* 77 (1968) 175–96

[16] The earliest and perhaps best critic of this premise is Thomas Reid in *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed B Brody (Cambridge MIT Press, 1969), essay 2, chap 14   Reid's three main arguments against the premise can be glossed as follows   (1) The claim that there are such things as ideas in the first place is strictly a philosopher's invention (the lack-of-evidence strategy)   (2) The assumption that the only direct object of the mind is an idea leads directly to skepticism, and so must be rejected (the *reductio* strategy)   (3) The assumption that the mind can have direct access to *ideas* is in need of at least as much explanation as the controverted claim that the mind can have direct access to external things (the switching-the-burden-of-proof strategy)

a speaker assigns to her words, as their meanings, something distinct from anything that can come directly before the mind; she would thereby assign to those words a signification to which she had no direct cognitive access at all; but then *for the speaker* her own words would have no signification at all, so the speaker could never say just what she intended to say (III, 2, 2)

This is by no means a bad *reductio* argument, if we take it to be stressing the fact that meaning must be to some extent speaker-oriented, or at least partially mind-dependent. If meanings were wholly mind-independent, then meanings would not be at all what the speaker directly meant when she uttered her words—but that is absurd   Meaning is at least in part speaker-meaning.[17]   Although this line of argument cannot be considered by any means a full vindication either of the thesis of semantic psychologism or L-Meaning (because of the implausibility of premise [2] above), it does seem to be the case that it is a fairly strong argument against the contrary of semantic psychologism, namely that meanings are wholly mind-independent   Thus Locke's *reductio* argument can plausibly show that meanings are at least *partially mind-dependent* because it is absurd to suppose that they are *wholly mind-independent.*

III

We must now look a little more closely at Locke's idea-based theory of the assignment of meanings to words. It is sometimes alleged or at least implied (for instance, by Jonathan Bennett)[18] that Locke held the patently false view that for each and every word there must be a corresponding idea of some *sensory* type· so every word will have to have a correlated mental image that is its meaning But this clearly overlooks Locke's careful distinction between simple ideas of sensation (mental images) and simple ideas of reflection.

---

[17] This modest Lockean thesis would thus half-vindicate H. P Grice's stronger thesis to the effect that linguistic meaning is reducible to speaker-meaning   See Grice's *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1989), chaps 5, 6, and 14

[18] Jonathan Bennett, *Locke, Berkeley, Hume Central Themes* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1971), 6–7

The latter sort of ideas is explicitly nonsensory, and consists in the self-conscious awareness of mental powers and operations. This will allow Locke to assign to some words meanings of the mental-image sort, and to some words meanings of the mental-operation sort. On the face of it at least, this will make it possible for Locke to handle the most obvious difficulty for the idea-based theory· how can ideas be assigned to syncategorematic words or (as Locke calls them) "particles" (III, 7, 2) such as conjunctions, articles, preposi-tions, negation-signs, and so on? Since the meanings of these syn-categorematic words are made manifest only in relation to other words already having meaning (that is, the categorematic words), it seems impossible to assign to any one of them a particular mental object. Locke's answer is not to assign them particular mental ob-jects in the sense of sensory images, but rather to assign them spe-cific mental operations or functions considered objectively:

> The Mind   when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes
> its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other
> Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as
> any of those it received from foreign things   (II, 6, 1)

Now particles according to Locke "are all marks of some Action, or Intimation of the Mind" (III, 7, 4) [19] Since mental operations (such as combining or separating) are defined over sets of ideas for Locke ("the term *Operations* here, I use in a large sence, as comprehending . . . the Actions of the Mind about its Ideas" [II, 1, 4]) there will be

---

[19] There is a textual nicety here   The opening sentence of book III, chapter 7 *seems* to say that unlike words which stand for ideas in the mind, particles stand for something else   Kretzmann, in "The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," takes this to mean that for Locke only cate-gorematic words ("names") signify ideas so syncategorematic words ("particles") do not have meanings, see 179-80   My construal is rather that Locke in this passage is implicitly restricting "ideas" to ideas of sen-sation   He makes it clear in at least one other place that ideas of sensation are semantically primary, while ideas of reflection are semantically sec-ondary and constitute "more abstruse significations" (I, 1, 5)   So my read-ing is that he is saying that syncategorematic words signify not the primary type of ideas (sensory ones) but rather only the secondary sort of ideas (reflective ones)   This interpretation has the virtue of allowing the thesis of L-Meaning to apply to all words, not just categorematic ones   D F Henze defends an interpretation of the Lockean semantics of particles quite similar to mine, although he restricts the signifying function of par-ticles to complete propositional contexts, see Henze, "Locke on Particles," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 9 (1971) 222-6

no need to assign to a "particle" a particular mental image or sensory idea in order to assign it a determinate idea

Therefore, for Locke all words are assigned determinate ideas as their meanings, but not every word is assigned the same *sort* of determinate idea   Words standing directly for sensory ideas are "names", words standing for some mental function or power are "particles " Names and particles exhaust all the significant simple parts of speech [20]

To be sure, not all significant parts of speech are simple; there are also phrases and sentences of varying length and complexity Just as phrases and sentences are made up of names and particles according to a certain grammatical ordering, so too the meanings of both names and particles contribute directly to the meanings of larger expressions in which they occur, but in different, well-ordered ways.   Names, as categorematic terms, contribute complete, simple meaning-constituents.   Particles, however, contribute incomplete, simple meaning-constituents which combine with simple, complete ones to form larger, complete meanings such as propositions, as Locke puts it, "Particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contain'd in them" (III, 7, 6).[21]

The notion of a complete assignment by a speaker of every word (be it a name or particle) to a determinate idea, together with the notion of repeatable mental operations over particular sensory ideas,

---

[20] I am charitably assuming that Locke intends both verbs (such as "runs") and also what he calls "negative or privative words" (such as "ignorance") (III, 1, 4) to fall within the class of names   Verbs can be construed as assigned to general ideas of different types of events or "durations" (III, 14, 3), and privative words can be construed as limiting cases of names of sensory ideas   Also it is worth pointing out that Locke seems not to have noticed that certain parts of speech seem to have communicative force without either being terms or particles, that is, without being assigned to a meaning-entity phrases such as "I promise" or "I wish", signs such as "!" or "?", and tones of voice and accompanying gestures   This "illocutionary" aspect of meaning was first brought forward by Berkeley in the "Principles of Human Knowledge," Introduction, par 20, pp 57-8, as a direct criticism of Locke's semantic theory, within the larger context of a critique of Locke's theory of abstract ideas

[21] Thus it is simply false to say, as Stephen K Land does, that formal or structural properties of language have no significant place in Lockean semantics   See Land's *From Sign to Proposition The Concept of Form in Eighteenth-Century Semantic Theory* (London. Longman, 1974), 8, 18

and with the distinction between two sorts of ideas corresponding
to syncategorematic and categorematic words, makes possible what
might be called Locke's "compositionality thesis"·

> *L-Compositionality* The meaning of a complex name, phrase, or sen-
> tence is the direct result of combining the simple reflective ideas as-
> signed to its constituent particles, with the simple sensory ideas as-
> signed to its constituent names [22]

To be sure, this thesis is but a natural extension of Locke's general
empiricist thesis to the effect that every complex idea allows of a
complete, finite, decompositional analysis into its simple sensory
ideas together with the simple ideas of various mental operations
on the simple sensory ideas. If empiricistic analysis of ideas is
possible, and if for every significant phrase there is a corresponding
set of ideas, then Lockean semantic compositionality is possible.

    This is an important and ramifying point   If there is a more
or less explicit semantic compositionality thesis in Locke, then it is
plausible that the very idea of semantic compositionality for natural
(not formalized) languages has at least in part an epistemological
origin in Lockean empiricism and not an exclusively logical origin
in Leibnizian analysis, as has often been thought [23]   Whereas the
complete logical analysis of contingent propositions can only be

---

[22] This is how Locke expresses this thesis "The case [for obtaining
definitions] is quite otherwise [than the ostensive strategy] in complex Ideas;
which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of Words, standing
for the several Ideas, that make that Composition, to imprint complex
Ideas in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their Names
be understood" (III, 4, 12)   It should be noted that in my formulation of
L-Compositionality, the phrase "direct result" is intentionally ambiguous
as between meaning "logical consequence according to a rule" and meaning
"psychological causal effect "   That is Lockean compositionality is at once
a thesis about *logical* rules tying semantic units to semantic complexes,
and a thesis about *psychological* powers which actually construct the se-
mantic complexes from the semantic units

[23] It is of course natural, in light of the Leibnizian influence on the
early Russell, to suppose that the semantic notion of compositionality de-
pends entirely on Leibnizian logical atomism   For instance, Michael
Dummett explicitly rejects the suggestion that epistemology (not to men-
tion psychology) plays any positive role in the origins of the theory of
meaning, and holds that semantics is the child of strictly logical reflections
on the nature of truth   See his *Frege Philosophy of Language*, second ed
(Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1981), 665-84

infinite and available to a Divine Knower, as Leibniz recognizes,[24] natural languages must by contrast be learnable by an individual human knower.[25] What is needed for the learnability of a natural language is a finite, humanly accessible recipe for constructing the meanings of complex expressions: in a word, what is needed is something like Lockean (not Leibnizian or logical) compositionality Thus it is plausible that the very idea of semantic compositionality for natural languages derives in part from Locke's empiricistic epistemology and from its attendant notion that every complex idea (including every mental proposition) admits of a complete, finite, reductive analysis into its simple ideational constituents. Natural-language compositionality is in its origins partly a thesis about *ideas*, tied ineluctably to the further empiricist thesis that the limits of cognitive significance are the limits of the set of simple ideas possessed by an individual knower. Only within the framework of such an empiricist thesis would a *finite, humanly knowable* compositional meaning-theory be possible   Here, as in other cases, it is epistemology together with psychology, and not only logic, that drives semantic theory.

We should glance briefly in a little more detail at Locke's notion of a "name," that is, a word assigned to a sensory idea   For Locke, there are two basic sorts of names· (1) *particular names*, including proper names (names of individual substances), names of simple sensory ideas such as "red," and names of individual mixed modes or relations such as "the tallest building in the village"; and (2) *general names*, including simple predicate terms such as "red," terms for specific substances (natural kinds) such as "gold," and terms standing for nonindividual mixed modes such as "murder."

This classification is not fully perspicuous, however, and the reason why it is not has to do with Locke's theory of general ideas. It is not our purpose here to explicate and criticize Locke's theory

---

[24] See G W Leibniz, "Necessary and Contingent Truths," in *Leibniz Philosophical Writings*, ed G H R Parkinson (London J M Dent and Sons, 1973), 97   See also Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz Metaphysics and Language* (New York Oxford University Press, 1986), 112–14.
[25] See Donald Davidson, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1984), 3–15

of abstraction;[26] this would take us too far afield from our focused topic of semantic foundations   But it is crucial to see, for the purposes of understanding how idea-meanings are assigned to words, that it is by no means clear on the surface whether a term such as "red" is to be assigned a particular idea or an abstract general idea when it occurs in a singular proposition such as "This rose is red " Is "red" here referring to the red of this rose directly, or is it referring to the general idea *redness*, which is in turn exemplified by this rose?

Locke tries to handle this problem by distinguishing between "concrete" and "abstract" terms (III, 8, 1–2): the former sort of term is assigned to individual ideas, or collections of individual ideas, the latter sort of term on the other hand is assigned directly to general ideas   The distinction between concrete and abstract terms cuts across the distinction between particular and general names. It is thus possible for a term such as "red" to be both concrete and general in the same usage   On the other hand, "redness" is both general and abstract, since it is assigned directly to the general idea, not to its extension   So the Lockean answer to the query in the preceding paragraph would be that "red" in "This rose is red," as a concrete general term, is assigned to the individual red of the rose. In "Red is a color" on the other hand, "red" would function semantically like the abstract substantive "redness" and be assigned to a general idea. The systematic ambiguity between concrete and abstract terms runs throughout Locke's discussion of general terms

This systematic ambiguity in turn reflects a basic epistemological ambiguity in the Lockean semantics of predicate-terms. On the one hand, the idea(s) assigned to a predicate term might (if the term is functioning concretely) be understood to be the *extension*

---

[26] Locke's theory of abstraction can be found in the *Essay*, primarily at II, 11, 9–11   In a nutshell, it works like this A particular idea (say, of red), already indexed to a time and place (say, the red of this tomato) is "de-particularized" by imaginatively varying the same idea over different times, places, and conditions   Then the de-particularized idea is made a "representative" of the set of particular ideas over which the imaginative variation has occurred   This operation of "representation" (reminiscent of the way in which, in Lockean political contexts, a single person "represents" a group) makes the de-particularized idea into a "universal " At the same time, an abstract general word ("redness") is assigned to the abstract idea

(or part of the extension, if the term occurs in a singular proposition) of that term—the set of ideational or phenomenal particulars to which the term applies; or, on the other hand, the idea assigned to a predicate term might (if the term is functioning abstractly) be understood to be the *intension* of that term—the general idea exemplified by the particulars to which the term applies   If the same term (say, "red") will take the extensional assignment in some contexts, and the intensional assignment in others, then we are entitled to ask for a way of *knowing* which is which.   If no such epistemological criterion is forthcoming, then we have pointed up an obvious hindrance to Lockean semantic compositionality   Lockean semantic compositionality—the finite, idea-based meaning-analysis of a natural language—works only if simple meaning-assignments are epistemologically unambiguous, but here is a manifest case in which simple assignments will be consistently ambiguous to the semantic knower.   This ambiguity will then be iterated for any semantic complex into which those simple meanings enter

What needs to be brought to our attention here is not so much a vitiating difficulty in Locke's semantic theory alone, but rather a difficulty in any compositional meaning-theory which will appear in virtue of the fact that general terms at least have *two* semantic correlates, namely, their extension and their intension.   For Locke, of course, both intension and extension are equally ideational, thereby making things especially tricky   But the general problem for any meaning-theory, even those for which extensions are not strictly psychological, remains, namely: Do we assign intensions or extensions to predicate terms?[27]   They cannot both be assigned at the same time, since that would violate the uniqueness of the assignment   So some principled way of distinguishing extensional from intensional assignments to general terms must be provided. But since no one since the time of Locke has ever come up with a

---

[27] On this issue, see the "Frege-Husserl Correspondence," in *Frege Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence,* ed G Gabriel et al, trans. H. Kaal (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1980), 60–71   Here Frege criticizes Husserl for assigning extensions to predicate-terms as their reference (*Bedeutung*), since that makes uninstantiated predicates into vacuous general names, yet stresses that he himself does not assign intensions or senses to predicate terms as their reference   See also note 28 below

very satisfactory way of doing this,[28] it seems safe to say that later
semanticists are no better off than Locke on this tricky point

<div align="center">IV</div>

In considering what we have been calling the thesis of "L-
Meaning," we have been investigating what Locke calls "Words in
their primary or immediate signification" whereby they "stand for
nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them" (III, 2,
2). So far we have focused on the general idea of a complete, com-
positional, one-to-one assignment of words to ideas; but it is appro-
priate now that we should concentrate on what is obviously the most
controversial aspect of Locke's thesis, namely, the fact that the as-
signment occurs strictly within the confines of a given person's mind.

On Locke's picture of semantic assignment or interpretation,
the speaker employs utterances or written sequences "as Signs of
internal Conceptions" insofar as he is able to "make them stand as
marks for the Ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be
made known to others" (III, 1, 2). So the operation of semantic
assignment consists in taking a particular uttered word and con-
ventionally correlating it with a particular idea. This sounds
straightforward enough, but how is it possible?

The main problem with the Lockean picture of semantic as-
signment runs as follows. On a particular occasion, the speaker
produces an utterance and thereby has an idea of a word immediately
before the mind, and also has another idea immediately before the
mind which is to be the meaning of that word insofar as that word

---

[28] Frege's solution to this problem is that every predicate is assigned
to an unsaturated function (the *Begriff* or "concept")—a sort of half-way
house between intension and extension   When the function is saturated,
the predicate is assigned to the extension. If the function remains un-
saturated, then the predicate is assigned to the empty set   In either case,
the intension of the predicate uniquely determines the function, although
the intension is not the object to which the term is assigned in the com-
positional meaning-theory   See the "Frege-Husserl Correspondence," and
"Function and Concept," in *Collected Papers*, 137-56   It is by no means
clear whether by this ingenious strategy Frege has really gotten rid of the
assignment-ambiguity or has simply ruled it out by stipulation   In any
case, the unsaturated function or "concept" is a far more mysterious entity
than a Lockean idea

is correlated with that very idea   The semantic assignment, according to L-Meaning, thus assigns the idea-meaning directly to the *idea* of the word.[29]   So let the idea of the word be combined with the idea-meaning through an act of mental combination.   This generates a complex idea. "word + meaning " The complex idea containing the two original sensory ideas plus the reflective idea of the combinatory act is then stored away in memory   Then suppose that on a later occasion the speaker wants to express himself again, on the same topic and in the same way, to another person   The speaker employs the mental power of retention together with the physical act of utterance ("Word[s] revive imports" [II, 10, 7]) to retrieve the complex idea of the particular semantic assignment. But of course on the present occasion the word he utters is not the original word, nor is the idea perceived the idea of the original word, but rather he utters a *different* word and therefore receives a correspondingly different idea of that word   an idea of a distinct utterance indexed to a different time (and in all likelihood a different place).   So how can a speaker ever express himself to an audience twice in the same way about the same thing?

Obviously, the only way out of this difficulty is to admit that the original assignment of word to idea assigns not a mere ideational word-*token* to the idea-meaning, but rather that an ideational word-*type* is originally assigned by the speaker to the idea-meaning   This means that an implicit act of abstraction is combined with every meaning-assignment   But that runs Locke into problems of circularity, since general ideas are constituted in part precisely by assigning them to general names (II, 11, 9)   Thus the theory of abstraction, required to explicate the notion of a meaning-assignment, presupposes the very possibility of a meaning-assignment

And that is not the worst of it   The very possibility of communication requires that speakers and audiences not only make inner meaning-assignments or semantic interpretations on particular speech-occasions, but also that the speakers actually produce real utterance-tokens[30] of real utterance-types on those occasions. how

---

[29] Kretzmann is emphatic on this point, see "The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," 190 ff

[30] Kretzmann ("The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory," 190) argues that words are auditory sounds and hence ideas, but it seems more likely that for Locke words are speaker-produced sounds—utterances, or what Locke calls "articulate Sounds" (III, 1, 1)—and hence not ideas

else could the audience know either (a) that the speaker was actually speaking, or (b) that the speaker was uttering, on that occasion, words which could be uttered repeatedly in order to say the same thing more than once? But since Locke has rejected the possibility of real types or universals out of hand (III, 6, 10), this option is not open to him. Words become general for Locke only through their function of "signifying or representing many particulars" (III, 3, 11); and this function results from the assignment of an abstract *idea* to the word (II, 11, 9-11; see also note 26 above). Thus there are no real universals, but only *ideational* universals for Locke. But communication itself requires that it be possible to repeat the same real utterance on different occasions, or even twice or more on the same occasion So, at least implicitly, if his view is to remain tolerably coherent, Locke must be a Platonic realist about utterance-types—even if he is an anti-Platonist about all other kinds of universals

The general conclusion to draw from this is that one can hold a tenable semantic thesis (of any sort) about communicable meanings only if one also defends a Platonic realism about utterance-types The very idea of "attaching a meaning to a word" in a communicative setting is the idea of attaching a meaning to an essentially objective or public word-type. Therefore no semantic theory which is also a theory of communication can be *wholly* psychologistic, since even the most psychologistic of semantic theories—Locke's—is not intelligible without implicit appeal to linguistic type-realism Therefore the contradictory of the thesis of semantic psychologism (namely, that meanings are not wholly mind-dependent) can be shown to be true, quite independently of any appeal to referential considerations.[31]

Words are assigned to idea-meanings by way of the speaker's assignment of the idea of the word to another idea

[31] Most of the contemporary arguments used against semantic psychologism turn on the strategy of holding mental contents fixed while varying the reference of words—either by varying the environment or by varying semantic conventions See Putnam's "Meaning of 'Meaning'", and see also Tyler Burge's papers, "Individualism and the Mental," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol 4, ed P A French et al (Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 73-121, and "Other Bodies," in *Thought and Object*, ed. A Woodfield (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982), 97-120 This referential strategy involves the use of controversial imaginative examples The value of the appeal to linguistic type-realism is that it obviates the need for science fiction

V

Another aspect of Locke's theory of semantic assignment which requires some careful scrutiny has to to do with the fact that every operation annexing a word to an idea is an operation essentially hidden from other speakers and interpreters. Even if Locke were to grant that the assignment drew upon an independently real and abstract language, still the mental operation carrying it out, and the idea-meaning assigned, are intrinsic to the person. This leads immediately to a problem of which Locke is vividly conscious The problem has to do with the fact that speakers "suppose their words to be Marks of Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate" (III, 2, 4). But of course if each person makes all her semantic assignments privately, what right has anyone to make this assumption? How can it be guaranteed that any one person uses her words to designate the same ideas that any other person designates with the same words? "Men stand not usually to examine, whether the Idea they, and those they discourse with have in their Minds, be the same" (III, 2, 4) The nub of the issue here is that since all semantic assignment is both conventional ("Words being voluntary Signs" [III, 2, 2]) and private, what is to prevent it from being perfectly *arbitrary*? And this of course directly entails the puzzle of what might be called Lockean "radical communication". faced with another person using the same words as you do, how can it be secured that that person assigns to them the same ideas that you do?

Locke's response to this nest of problems is intriguing. First, where names of simple ideas are concerned, he thinks it plausible that creatures sharing the same sensory endowments in the same physical environments will apply the same names to the same sensory ideas (III, 4, 11-17, III, 9, 18) But of course not all names are names of simple ideas—nor can even the identity of simple idea-assignments to the same words across different persons with the same sensory endowments in the same physical environments be absolutely guaranteed so as to satisfy the most stubborn skeptic. So Locke then appeals to a second line of defense·

> 'Tis true, common use, by a tacit Consent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages, which so far limits the signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea, he does not speak properly And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite

> the same Ideas in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in
> speaking, he does not speak intelligibly   (III, 2, 8)

That is· the answer to the problem of purely idiosyncratic and ar-
bitrary meaning-assignments and its attendant puzzle of radical
communication is simply that by means of a "tacit consent" within
the community of speakers, each person agrees to assume that she
and her interlocutors make assignments of the same words to the
same ideas.

Let us call any private meaning-assignment governed by the
assumption of tacit consent within a given community a "standard
assignment" within that community   Clearly there will be no way
of enforcing or even checking whether the very same one-to-one
assignments to determinate ideas are actually being made according
to the thesis of L-Meaning, since every standard assignment is in-
ternal to the person making it.   On the other hand, however, ac-
cording to the standard assignment, each person is self-enforcing
to the extent that without seeking consistency in her own assign-
ments and without assuming it in others, intelligibility is impossible:

> 'Tis plain cheat and abuse, when I make [words] stand sometimes for
> one thing, and sometimes for another, the wilful doing whereof, can
> be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater dishonesty   (III,
> 10, 5)

Thus a standard assignment is underwritten by the desire of each
person to be intelligible to others and thereby to promote her own
projects and plans with maximum efficiency   The consent is "tacit"
because *self-motivated.*[32]

This still leaves Locke with a problem, however.   The notion
of a standard assignment does not in and of itself guarantee that
every person is in fact assigning the same idea to the same word· it
guarantees only that each speaker will operate under the *assumption*

---

[32] There is of course an interesting analogy between the semantic
strategy of tacit consent and Locke's idea of a "social consent" as developed
in the *Second Treatise on Civil Government,* chapter 8   The conditions
under which one enters into harmonious social relations guaranteeing the
right to private property seem to be paralleled by the conditions under
which one enters into harmonious communication guaranteeing the "vol-
untary imposition" (III, 2, 2) of ideas onto words   Both social consent and
communication are driven by self-interest

that every person is making the same assignments   Hence the
standard assignment does not entail that a given word is being used
in its "common Acceptation" (III, 2, 4) or "general Meaning" (III,
2, 8).   Indeed, it does not even entail that there *exists* such a thing
as a "common Acceptation" or "general Meaning "[33]   For since idea-
meanings are internal to the person (they are mind-dependent), even
if all communication necessarily occurs under the assumption of
tacit consent, and even if the idea-meanings are necessarily assigned
to real word-types, it does not follow that the idea-meanings assigned
by speakers to a given word-type—say,"murder"—will always be
exactly the same across persons.   Hence Locke speaks of the "par-
ticular Sense" (III, 2, 8) that an individual will give to a word, even
when communicating effectively.

Presumably it *will* follow from the idea of a standard assignment
that the idea-meanings assigned to the same words by different
persons cannot be too radically different, since that would lead to
obvious incoherences in communicative behavior.[34]   But that is con-
sistent with quite a wide variety of distinct assignments within a
tolerable range   Thus Locke's theory of what we have called "stan-
dard" meaning-assignment leads to a semantic pluralism there can
be no single meaning-theory, compositional or otherwise, for a given
language.   The only hope for such an analytic theory is with respect
to a given person's idiolect   But since uniqueness of assignment is
not apparently even required for effective communication, it is not
at all obvious why an analytic meaning-theory (even if possible) will
be of much use to the empiricist philosopher in any case.   As Locke
explicitly points out, "Our Business here [in the *Essay*] is not to
know all things, but those which concern our Conduct" (I, 1, 6).   An
analytic meaning theory for a particular person's idiolect would seem

---

[33] Locke seems to hold the interesting view that the "general meaning"
of a word is determined (a) relative to particular communities or popula-
tions, and (b) relative to a specially-designated set of persons within those
populations "those who are thought to use Names in their most proper
Significations" (II, 32, 12, see also III, 2, 4)

[34] Just how similar do ideas in different persons' minds have to be in
order to sustain coherent communicative behavior?   Wittgenstein seems
to say in the *Philosophical Investigations* that coherent communicative be-
havior is altogether logically independent of similarity of ideas (par 293,
p 100e)   Locke's weaker claim, that there must be *some* fit, even if a fairly
loose one, between similar mental contents and coherent communicative
behavior, seems more plausible

to have no impact whatsoever on the everyday conduct of linguistic communication.

What is above all salient here is Locke's evident wobbling between two very different approaches to philosophizing about meaning On the one hand, his analytical empiricist epistemological motivations push him towards an ideational, solipsistic compositional semantics for a given person's idiolect. On this view meanings must be well-defined ideas necessarily correlated with words (according to L-Expressibility), and every word has a single, determinate idea in a speaker's mind as a meaning (according to L-Meaning). But on the other hand, Locke's concern for human actions, practices, and institutions (in a word, Conduct) pushes him towards a much looser conception of a meaning relative to a given natural language, as simply a something-I-know-not-what which supports effective communication under the necessary assumption that everyone uses the same words to designate the same ideas. Is semantics a formal science, or a social science? Are meanings well-defined entities, or flexible constructs? Is a meaning-theory directed primarily to idiolects, or to communal natural languages? Is the primary fact of meaning the analyzable meaning-entity, or the unanalyzable communicative speech-situation? Locke has no final answers to these hard questions, but then neither it seems do later underlaborers in the semantic thickets [35] But the problems are posed clearly enough by Locke's semantic reflections

VI

So far we have discussed the primary signification of words (their assignment to ideas) and the relation of words used by a given speaker to the ideas in the minds of other speakers assigned to the same words. But Locke also speaks of another relation into which words enter, namely the reference of words to things in the world speakers "often suppose their Words to stand also for the reality of Things" (III, 2, 5). This relation can never be the primary

---

[35] See in this regard Hilary Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?" in *Mind, Language, and Reality*, 139-52, and Donald Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality*, ed R Grandy and R. Warner (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986), 157-74

signification of words, which must always be the assignment of words to ideas [36]   But in some cases, words are assigned both to ideas *and* to things.   This has the effect of expanding the very notion of signification or meaning for Locke words can mean ideas, and they can also mean things

What are those cases in which words are assigned both to ideas and to things?   The names of simple ideas (and their modes) and of substances are assigned to ideas which "intimate . . . some real Existence, from which was derived their original pattern" (III, 4, 2).   Thus concrete predicate-terms, proper names, and natural-kind terms carry an existential "intimation." This existential "intimation" or commitment, it must be stressed, does not hold for all terms Names of mixed modes, for instance, according to Locke stand strictly for complex, abstract ideas in the mind and do not carry over into things

It must also be stressed in this connection that for Locke no reference to real entities is ever "direct" existential intimation, when it occurs, takes place mediately via the idea-meaning immediately assigned to the word (II, 32, 8)   This has the interesting result that not only are words understood by Locke to be signs of ideas, but also ideas are understood to be the signs of things (IV, 21, 4).   So linguistic reference is a feat of *double-signification* for Locke first the speaker assigns an idea to a word, and then secondly a thing is assigned to the idea   In this way the thing is indirectly assigned to the word.

At this point we shall require some supplementary terminology (not actually employed by Locke) for talking about those words which have both ideas and things semantically assigned to them   Let us call the idea assigned to the word its "intension," and the real thing or set of real things assigned to the word and the idea the "extension " And let us also say that such words "connote" their intensions and "denote" their extensions [37]

---

[36] Thus Locke (despite his fondness for the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning) could never be a strictly referential or extensional semanticist So C Landesmann is mistaken when he claims that Locke's theory of meaning is a version of referential semantics   See "Locke's Theory of Meaning," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 14 (1976) 35

[37] These terms have not been chosen at random.   Mill's famous theory of the connotation and denotation of terms appears to be simply a reworking of Locke's account of the double signification of words   See J S

The name of a simple idea connotes a simple idea as its intension, and denotes the external object causing that idea (III, 4, 11)   This is singular reference, carried out by means of proper names and general terms functioning concretely in singular propositions Locke does not explicitly mention definite descriptions (predicate phrases preceded by "the"), but it seems quite clear that they would connote mixed modes together with the mental operation assigned to "the," and thereby take no denotation.[38]

General terms take abstract or general ideas as their intensions. The abstract idea, understood as the intension of a general name, is also called a "nominal essence" by Locke for two reasons: (1) because that intension always includes a meta-linguistic component mentioning the name itself; and (2) because of that intension's necessary connection with the essence of some species or sort of things which is the extension of the word

> When a Man says *Gold is malleable,* he means and would insinuate that *what I call Gold* is malleable   (III, 10, 17)[39]

> Between the Nominal Essence, and the Name, there is so near a Connexion, that the Name of any sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has this Essence, whereby it answers that abstract Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign   (III, 3, 16)

But here is where things become especially difficult.   The nominal essence is not by any means the essence of a set of Really Real things united by a "real Essence" (II, 31, 6)—a natural kind—but only the essence of a set of empirical things insofar as they are strictly ideational or phenomenal particulars.   Nominal essences

---

Mill, *A System of Logic* (London Longmans, Green, and Co , 1879), 32-8 Another heir to the same Lockean account, although of course framed in a very different way, would seem to be Frege's distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*), see "On Sense and Meaning," in *Collected Papers,* 157-77

[38] If this extrapolation of Locke's theory is correct, it would tend to support Saul Kripke's contention that genuine singular reference is not carried by definite descriptions   See his *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1972), 21-33, 58-97

[39] This implies that no two general names will be exact synonyms for Locke, since the meta-linguistic component of each intension will differ precisely in the syntactic shape of the word mentioned This accords with the view proposed more recently by Nelson Goodman to the effect that no two distinct words can be exact synonyms, see his "On Likeness of Meaning," in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language,* ed L Linsky (Urbana, Ill University of Illinois Press, 1952), 67-74

are the "Workmanship of the Understanding" (III, 3, 14) or human constructs, they are how the mind carves up the phenomenal world and orders it into recognizable species and genera. The "real Essences" actually constituting the natures of Really Real things are hidden and at present epistemically inaccessible (II, 23, 8-12, II, 31, 6-13).[40] If we were to be in possession of an intension determining a real essence for a given term, then the denotation of that term would be a set of Really Real things united by that real essence But as it is in our present state of knowledge, we assign only nominal essences to general substance-terms. Therefore the current denotation of general substance-terms is strictly an ideational extension—a set of phenomenal particulars. Yet in principle, in some advanced state of knowledge, we might come to know real essences and hence assign intensions to general names which determined Really Real extensions (II, 23, 11) So the ambiguity we noted earlier between the concrete and abstract functions of a general term—its assignment to extension or intension—is further deepened when we take into account the fact that the very notion of an assignment of a general name to an extension is equivocal as between assignment to a Really Real extension and assignment to a strictly phenomenal extension

This equivocation is to a certain extent finessed by Locke   He is able to do this by means of his ingenious doctrine to the effect that (1) because of the current epistemic inscrutability of real essences, the correct extension of a general term is that phenomenal set of things determined by the nominal essence, but (2) by a kind of unavoidable fallacy we always *try* to refer the general term to the Really Real extension   As Locke puts it

> In the general Names of substances, whereof the nominal Essences
> are only known to us   we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or
> intend, they should stand for the real Essence of a certain sort of
> Substances   (III, 10, 17, see also III, 10, 18)

---

[40] There is an important refinement here worth noting   By the unqualified term "substance" Locke means a singular metaphysical substratum from which all the properties of a certain entity or class of entities flow (II, 23, 1-7), by the term "real Essence" Locke means the particular microstructural organization of primary qualities, from which all the secondary qualities of a certain entity or class of entities flow   Substance is in principle epistemically inaccessible, while real essence is simply contingently unknown   For a good discussion of this distinction, see J L Mackie, *Problems from Locke* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1976), 76-83

This tacit supposition of real-essence reference is a mere "Abuse of words" whereby in using general names of substances we end up "setting them in the place of Things, which they do or can by no means signify" (III, 10, 17)   Linguistic abuse aside, however, Locke's recognition of the tacit supposition by which we refer words to real essences is implicitly a recognition of the component of *direct reference* in the use of every natural-kind term [41]

This Lockean direct-reference component factors into the semantics of natural-kind terms in an interesting way   Nominal essence (the intension of a natural-kind term) and real essence (the hidden constitutive structure of sets of Really Real things) are logically independent for Locke in the following sense Someone might in principle apply the same general name (say, "gold") assigned to the same nominal essence (say, *yellow, malleable metal*) to sets of entities constituted by two or more real essences (say, real gold and iron pyrites) (see III, 6, 19), and someone might in principle apply two different general names (say, "water" and "ice") assigned respectively to two distinct nominal essences (say, *clear, potable liquid*, and *clear, cold solid*) to a set of entities constituted by the same real essence (that is, H_2O) (see III, 6, 13)

This logical distinctness allows Locke to distinguish precisely between the *meaning* of the natural kind term (its nominal essence) and the *speaker's tacit reference* to an extension united by a real essence   The latter belongs not to the semantics of general names, but rather to their *pragmatics*   Direct reference is thus strictly what the *speaker* intends, it is not part of the nominal essence   It is this pragmatic component that varies for the speaker from one physical environment or historical period to another, since the real essence of the physical environment may change over time and space, thus the intended Really Real extension changes   But the meaning or nominal essence is held fixed   Thus Locke can claim along with semantic scientific essentialists such as Saul Kripke[42] and Hilary Putnam (in the 1970s)[43] that the meaning of a natural-kind term

---

[41] This implicit recognition is pointed up by Mackie in *Problems from Locke*, in a section entitled "Locke's Anticipation of Kripke," 93–100

[42] Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 116–19, 123–7

[43] See Putnam's "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," 268–71   Ironically, in this essay Putnam instances Locke as a prime example of a philosopher who has failed to recognize the direct-reference component in the use of natural-kind terms (p 271)

802 ROBERT HANNA

such as "water" does not change through history or over changes
in the physical environment—but for very different reasons. Ac-
cording to Locke what may change is simply the pragmatic desig-
nation of the hidden real essence to which the speaker intends to
refer; the nominal essence of the general term remains the same
(We shall return to this theme of the invariance of intensions very
shortly.) By contrast, the semantic scientific essentialist—Kripke
or Putnam of the 1970s—will say that the meaning of "water" does
not change because it is primarily determined by the scientifically
known real essence of the extension to which the speaker directly
refers   But Locke would remain steadfastly skeptical that knowl-
edge of such an essence is presently attainable   Significantly, Put-
nam of the 1980s seems to have come around to Locke's skeptical
view of the matter, scornfully calling the semantic scientific essen-
tialist approach the "magical theory of reference."[44]   So it seems
that Locke's subtle, equivocal view of the semantics of natural-kind
terms reflects a genuine, as-yet-unresolved difficulty in the very con-
cept of a natural-kind term.

Let us now ignore the difficulties posed by natural-kind terms
and concentrate on nominal essences and their purely phenomenal
extensions   In this regard, Locke proposes two principles relating
nominal essences to their extensions. He does not name the prin-
ciples, but for convenience's sake we will do so for him·

> *The Sameness Principle* The sameness of the nominal essence assigned
> to two (or more) general terms determines the sameness of the set of
> things that the terms denote   That is sameness of intension deter-
> mines sameness of extension [45]

> *The Difference Principle* The difference between the nominal essences
> assigned to two (or more) general terms determines the difference
> between the sets of things that the terms denote   That is difference
> of intension determines difference of extension [46]

---

[44] Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History* (Cambridge Cambridge
University Press, 1981), 47
[45] Locke expresses the Sameness Principle in the following way. "When
general Names have any connexion with particular Beings, these abstract
Ideas are the Medium that unites them, so that the Essences of Species,
as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be anything
but those precise abstract Ideas we have in our minds" (III, 3, 13)
[46] Locke expresses the Difference Principle in this way "Every distinct
abstract Idea, is a distinct Essence and the names that stand for such
distinct Ideas, are the names of Things essentially different" (III, 3, 14)

Now the Difference Principle is clearly false. It is quite easy to find clear examples of distinct general terms assigned to distinct intensions, which nevertheless have the same extensions:

(1) "cordate" (a creature with a heart);
(2) "renate" (a creature with a kidney).

Although these two terms connote different meanings, it just so happens that in the phenomenal actual world the terms have the same denotation.

The Sameness Principle appears to be false as well. For example, in Locke's day "liquid" had a very different phenomenal extension than today, since the same term in English now includes 7-Up and Coca-Cola as part of its phenomenal extension, although these liquids did not exist in the seventeenth century. But surely it would be false to say that the intension of "liquid" has changed since the seventeenth century. And indeed Locke wants to hold, as we have mentioned already, that the nominal essence assigned to a general term as its meaning remains fixed over time

> Essences being taken for Ideas, established in the Mind, with Names
> annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same,
> whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to   (III,
> 3, 19)

If Locke wants to save the Sameness Principle, and still hold onto the view that intensions of words are invariant, the only way out seems to be the rather Pyrrhic solution of holding that a given general term can always give rise to two or more homonymous general terms differing in meaning (say, like "bank" [a place to keep money] and "bank" [the shore of a river or stream]) whenever some new entity falling into the nominal species appears phenomenally   So Locke could then speak of two distinct words with distinct intensions, namely, "liquid (17th c.)" and "liquid (20th c.)," and thereby save the Sameness Principle. But this would surely complicate the general task of a finite compositional semantics enormously by multiplying homonymous general terms indefinitely using temporal indices. In fact, it would make a knowable compositional semantics for an individual speaker (who certainly will not possess instantaneous up-to-date knowledge on all newly appearing objects) impossible.

The root of Locke's problem seems to lie in the essential logical distinctness of intensions from extensions *even when both are purely*

psychological or phenomenal. Intensions are conventionally determined by a "voluntary imposition" (III, 2, 1) of the mind in assigning an idea to a word. But conventionality for Locke does not entail arbitrariness·

> There comes by constant use to be such a Connexion between certain Sounds, and the Ideas they stand for, that the Names heard, almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senses   (III, 2, 6)

Once assigned, then, there is a kind of nonlogical or conventional necessity in the connection between a word and its meaning, that is perhaps best displayed disquotationally: "Red" means being red. One is inclined to reply: "Of course, how could "red" *fail* to mean that!" By contrast, extensions are not assigned in a similarly conventional-but-necessary fashion. The extension of a general term is the set of phenomenal individuals which actually and contingently are either present to the mind or are retained in memory, and which just happen to fall under the nominal essence. The mind cannot itself either create simple ideas, or determine just *which* particular ideas will appear adventitiously before the mind and take their places in the storehouse of memory (II, 2, 2). There is then no necessary connection, conventionally imposed or otherwise, between a word-plus-its-intension and the extension.

Hence intensions and phenomenal extensions, despite the fact that they are both ideational on the Lockean account, are nevertheless logically distinct from one another in the sense that two distinct terms with distinct intensions might adventitiously receive the same extension, and two terms with the same intension might adventitiously receive different extensions. We have already pointed up a similar logical distinctness between nominal essences and real essences—between intensions and Really Real extensions. But the crucial point to re-emphasize here is that the distinctness problem arises, as we have seen, even if both intensions and extensions are exclusively psychological or ideational   Even if the thesis of semantic psychologism is correct and in addition all the objects of our knowledge are ideas,[47] intensions *cannot* uniquely determine extensions!

---

[47] This is the thesis of epistemological (as opposed to metaphysical) idealism   For the classical formulation of epistemological idealism, see Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,* trans J W Ellington (Indianapolis Hackett, 1977), pt 1, remark 3, p. 37

VII

What have we learned by scrutinizing Locke's idea-based semantic theory? In my opinion, we have learned two important lessons The first lesson is about the thesis of semantic psychologism, the second about the nature of a semantic theory in general.

First, we have learned something quite definitive about semantic psychologism, namely that its contrary must be false and its contradictory true. Thus meanings must be at least partially mind-dependent, but meanings cannot be wholly mind-dependent.

Secondly, we have learned that although Locke's semantic theory is obviously rife with problems, its problems are important ones for twentieth-century semantic theory If Locke was wrong, he was at least *greatly* (insightfully, influentially) wrong; his problems are, *our* problems. When ideas became meanings, basic problems in the epistemological theory of ideas became basic problems in semantic theory Hence the problems inherent in the thesis of semantic psychologism are not merely problems about meanings being mind-dependent, but rather problems about meanings being *ideas*. The first task of a semantic theory that can go significantly beyond the tenacious thesis of semantic psychologism must therefore be a semantic critique of the very idea of an "idea" Looking back at Locke's semantics teaches us that we really cannot go forward in the theory of meaning until we have made some progress on this old-fashioned issue.[48]

University of Colorado, Boulder

DOES THE GRISEZ-FINNIS-BOYLE MORAL PHILOSOPHY REST ON A MISTAKE?

HENRY VEATCH AND JOSEPH RAUTENBERG

WHO IN TODAY'S WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY has not been made acutely aware of a singular and even felicitous phenomenon that has arisen in recent moral philosophy from within the natural law tradition? This is the phenomenon of three philosophers of whom it might be said that not only do they have "hearts that beat as one," but even their minds would appear to think as one as well. Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle   What could be more appropriate for economy of reference in our critical study than if we simply refer to them henceforth as "the Grifinnboyle"?

Accordingly, what we should like to do in this paper is raise a question as to whether, in one of the key moves that is made early in the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle, that move may have been something of a mistake; or if not a mistake, then at least a move fraught with consequences with which the Grifinnboyle themselves may not have clearly reckoned.   Bluntly put, we believe their moral theory involves a crucial ambiguity concerning the focus of moral reasoning, namely, whether the moral focus must be said to be person-centered or person-neutral.   For if we mistake not, the move they make appears to commit them to a position in ethics that has frequently been designated, in the tradition of Anglo-American moral philosophy at least, as being one of altruism, as opposed to egoism   True, the term "altruism" might be a misnomer in this connection, since in their reaction against any sort of crude egoism in ethics, the moral philosophers who employed the term "altruism" presumably did so, not so much to designate the fact that a moral agent ought to have a regard for others rather than simply or principally for himself, but rather they meant to suggest that in his choices and actions a moral agent ought always to be strictly impartial, never favoring his own interests and concerns over those of others   Particularly when they are trying to ground moral absolutes

(often ecclesially identified), the Grifinnboyle have a tendency to speak exclusively in the "impartiality mode" Hence it might be somewhat more appropriate to speak of an ethics of impartialism, rather than one of altruism Despite this qualification, we shall continue to use the standard, if somewhat misleading, term, "altruism"

Suppose that the Grifinnboyle, as we are suggesting, rather early on in their moral philosophy, make a move that would commit them to an altruism in the sense just indicated. Might this not have some rather embarassing consequences for them? The Grifinnboyle's option for agent-neutrality is a paradigm of the option which has been taken by some of the founders of "modern" analytic ethics— a group of men who on the whole would be very unsympathetic to many of the Grifinnboyle's most cherished moral and religious propositions For doesn't their altruism immediately place them in the company of those later utilitarians in ethics—people such as Sidgwick and G E. Moore in years past, and possibly someone such as Thomas Nagel in the present? Are not such utilitarians very strange company for the Grifinnboyle to be keeping,[1] particularly since they have never ceased to claim a quite decided affinity, albeit with certain reservations, with the ethical tradition of Thomas Aquinas? Surely there is no way that Aquinas could very well be reckoned an ethical altruist of the stripe of Henry Sidgwick, or of G E Moore, or even of Thomas Nagel!

Having made this rather startling, perhaps even impertinent-sounding, suggestion as to what the underlying and, for all we know, largely unconscious moral-philosophical affiliation of the Grifinn-boyle may be, our task in this present paper is fairly well defined for us from the beginning First, we must try to determine the cardinal features of that prevailing moral and ethical altruism that

---

[1] Readers may think it not without irony that we would presume to rank the Grifinnboyle with the utilitarians in ethics For has not Germain Grisez marked out the utilitarians as his arch-enemies, particularly on account of their proclivity toward what Grisez would call the error of "proportionalism" in ethics? True enough, but what we shall argue in this paper is not that the Grifinnboyle are, after all, secret allies of the utilitarians in the matter of proportionalism, but rather that they are perhaps unconscious and unwitting allies of the utilitarians in an entirely different respect, viz, that of what we are labelling impartialism in ethics

has for so long dominated the tradition of modern ethics, be that tradition either Kantian or utilitarian in character   Our next task will be to show, at least incidentally, that such an ethics is quite irreconcilable with any ethics that is in the Aristotelian tradition, particularly the ethics of Thomas Aquinas   We should then be able to return to a direct consideration of the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle, showing that it is indeed an altruism of the general type indicated, and that in this regard at least it can have little or no basic affinity with an ethics like that of Thomas Aquinas   That done, it should then be possible to come around on both modern altruism in general and on the Grifinnboyle in particular, showing that both alike rest on a mistake.

<div style="text-align:center">I</div>

Let us first try to detail, more or less point by point, what we would consider to be some of the salient and cardinal features of that brand of altruism which has come to be the hallmark of so much of modern moral philosophy, Kantian no less than utilitarian! Fortunately, our task has been rendered notably easier by a veritable sunburst of recent ethical criticism that seems directed at what has come to be called the ethical "theory" that underlies the fashionable altruism of modern moral philosophy   Among the critical studies one might mention Charles Taylor's quite recent and seminal, though somewhat verbose book, *Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity*   Preceding it by a few years is Bernard Williams' *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, and not long prior to that was Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*   Nor perhaps should one omit mention of Martha Nussbaum's rather ponderous fine-print tome, *The Fragility of Goodness*, a book whose very weight betrays somewhat the demonstrated fragility of the goodness she is discussing   In any case, the varieties of goodness Nussbaum attempts to trace and to expound from the history of Greek literature and philosophy would appear to have few if any echoes in the typical discussions of goodness that appear in the ethical theories of modern altruists   And so it is that Nussbaum might well be associated with the likes of Taylor, Williams, MacIntyre, and any number of the other so-called "anti-theorists" in ethics who now seem so keen on directing their fire at what they like to call the ethical "theory" that supposedly

underlies almost the entire tradition of modern moral philosophy [2] Moreover, for our part, we would claim that some of the basic criticisms that have been directed against proponents of the "theory" bear on the Grifinnboyle as well

What is this "theory" that is alleged to determine the various ethical views of a long line of distinguished modern ethical thinkers—Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, Hare, Donagan, Nagel, and any number of others?   Can one perhaps pinpoint the salient features of such a "theory," despite the varieties of treatment and of recognition that have been accorded it in the history of modern ethics? We here venture an enumeration of five cardinal features of this presumed "theory" of ethics.   True, in listing these features, we will not deny that, while we have been both stimulated and inspired by the writings of the so-called "anti-theorists" mentioned above, the listing is entirely our own   And not only is the listing our own, but the arguments adduced in explanation of the distinctions and of the respective character of these five features are our own as well

Feature 1 consists largely in the way most modern moral philosophers have tended to regard ethical or moral knowledge.   It almost goes without saying that it is generally taken for granted that such a knowledge cannot possibly be "scientific" in character—at least not in the modern, post-Renaissance sense of "scientific." The reason for this is that no investigation of the natural world, however exhaustive or sophisticated, could possibly be expected ever to yield a knowledge of such things as distinctions between "right" and "wrong," "ought" and "ought not," or even "good" and "bad " On the contrary, according to the "theory" that is said to underlie practically the whole of modern ethics, any effort to derive a knowledge of ethics from a knowledge of nature is bound to involve one

---

[2] Throughout our ensuing discussion, we are going to place the word "theory" in quotes   The reason is that "theory," as used by both Williams and Taylor, would seem to have a rather specific sense and reference, even though neither of them seems to spell out systematically what he takes the sense and reference of "theory" to be   It is true that we shall ourselves, whether it be out of daring or folly, propose a comparatively definite sense and reference for "theory" as the term tends to come increasingly into use Indeed, as evidence of this increasing current use, we might note the appearance of a recent volume of essays to which Taylor, Williams, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre are all contributors   The volume is entitled *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*, ed. Stanley Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany State University of New York Press, 1989)

in such supposed fallacies as the "naturalistic fallacy," or trying to infer an "ought" from an "is." And with that, it would seem, we have the first of the features of modern ethical "theory": Ethical knowledge cannot possibly be scientific knowledge, based on any sort of investigation of nature

Feature 2 might be said to be immediately consequent upon and derived from the first. For if a knowledge of ethics cannot come from any scientific investigation of nature, then where else may we turn for a proper resource for our moral and ethical knowledge, if not to something like language or language use? Indeed, when one reflects upon what might be called the behavior in language, or, if you will, the distinctive "logical grammar," of the words we tend to use in our moral appraisals of the actions of ourselves and of our fellow human beings, is it not obvious that such so-called moral words behave quite differently from any and all words of appraisal that are nonmoral in character? For instance, is it not the case that when such words as "right" and "wrong," or "ought" and "ought not," are used in appraising human actions, these words are clearly "universalizable," as the technical term has it? For example, suppose that I declare of some action or course of conduct of mine that it is something I ought to do   Would it not seem to follow, by the very logic of my moral language, that I thereby imply that such action as I consider to be right or wrong for me must also be reckoned as thus right or wrong for any and every other moral agent as well, given similar circumstances?

In contrast, however, to such a seemingly inescapable universalizability of all moral words when they are used to appraise human actions and behavior, there are other words that we are continually using to appraise human actions (our own or those of others), and these latter words are not universalizable at all. Thus, for example, suppose that instead of saying I ought to do thus and so, I say merely that I like doing it, or enjoy doing it, or find myself inclined to do it. Clearly all such words that express our desire to do certain things or our liking to do them are words of appraisal; and yet, just as clearly, they aren't universalizable   From the mere fact that I desire to do x, or like to do it, it certainly does not follow that anyone and everyone must desire or like to do it as well, whereas from the fact that I ought to do x it would appear to follow, by the mere logic of such moral words alone, that x is something that anyone and everyone ought to do as well, given similar circumstances

Accordingly, we can state as Feature 3 of the modern "theory" of morality that the Principle of Universalizability must be recognized as an unmistakable criterion for distinguishing words of moral appraisal from those of nonmoral appraisal.

Immediately, though, this third Feature of the so-called modern "theory" of morality would seem to generate a fourth. This Feature 4 would appear to be a source of some puzzlement, not to say even embarrassment. For if what we might call mere "desire"-words—words expressive of our approval of actions that we desire to do, or like to do, or that we think will contribute to our happiness or well-being—are not to be reckoned as universalizable, and if not universalizable, then not words of any properly moral import at all, it must follow that such words will have no role in ethics. But what about a word such as "good"? Surely things that we pronounce to be "good" are things that we take to be somehow good for us, and hence things that we most definitely desire and want and seek after as contributing to our own good, we might say. But if a person's own good be no more than what he or she likes or desires, and thinks of as contributing to his or her happiness or well-being, then the predicate "good" will not be universalizable. the fact that I hold a thing to be good, or to be of value to me, certainly does not imply that anyone and everyone else must therefore hold it to be good or of value for him as well. It would then appear that Feature 3 of the "theory" (the Principle of Universalizability) generates Feature 4 of the "theory," the prohibition that such words as "good" or "value" are not to have any real place in ethics at all. After all, if words such as "good" or "value" signify no more than what some agent desires or finds to his liking, then sentences declarative of what is good or of value for some moral agent will not be universalizable and therefore, in light of Feature 4, will be simply irrelevant to ethics.

But with that, would not the fat seem to be in the fire, so far as the vaunted "theory" of modern ethics is concerned? For how can the notion of "good" be eliminated from ethics altogether? Certainly, if we think of figures such as Aristotle and Aquinas, it would seem that the effect of Feature 4 would be to exclude them from being moral philosophers entirely After all, we need hardly be reminded that Aristotle opens the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the ringing sentence, "The good is that at which all things aim"—which might be interpreted to mean that the good of anything is simply

that which a thing desires and seeks, and in this sense aims at it as its desired end or *telos*.   Aquinas is no less insistent that *bonum*, or the good of a thing, is nothing if not that which an individual desires as being his true end or goal in life, and without which the individual's very life and existence would be without sense or meaning.[3]

It is not only an Aristotelian or a Thomist who would bridle at having to accept Feature 4 as a necessary requirement of any ethics that would conform to the "theory."   The utilitarians, it would seem, no less than the Thomists, would feel uncomfortable by any requirement such as that specified in Feature 4.   Yet the utilitarian objection to Feature 4 would be on very different grounds, and to a quite different effect, we believe, than that of the Thomists.   Accordingly it is just this sort of difference that we need to turn to now and to consider somewhat more carefully before we proceed.   For it is interesting how, among modern altruists, the Kantians might well have little or no difficulty in accepting Feature 4.   Why could one not simply say that Kantians by and large have dispensed for the most part with all notions suggestive of "good" or "the good" in their ethics?   For if the good of a thing be construed as being in any way that which an individual simply wants or desires for himself, then it becomes readily understandable that Kantians would much prefer a language of "oughts" and "duties" rather than of "goods" or "values."   It is not to be denied that in ordinary language as it pertains to ethics, there seems to be a kind of continental divide between what might be called "ought"-words and "value"-words For instance, when a person says of something that it is good, he presumably means thereby that it is somehow good for him, in that he either desires or likes it, and so takes it to be of what might be called personal value to him   When we use "ought"-words or words expressing our duties and obligations, however, we recognize that the duty or obligation that is held to be incumbent upon us is in no wise contingent upon our liking to do, or wanting to do what it is said that we ought to do, or that it is our duty to do.

For these several reasons, accordingly, it might well be said

---

[3] For both references, as well as for a considerable discussion of how Aquinas tends to understand *bonum* in terms of the desired end of the person or being for whom such a *bonum* is an end and thus a "good," see Henry Veatch, *Human Rights Fact or Fancy?* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), esp 68ff

that Kantians seek to dispense with "value"-words in their ethics altogether, wishing thereby to say that theirs is what one might call a "duty"-ethic exclusively, and not a "desire"-ethic. Yet notice that while this might be acceptable for the Kantians, the resulting formulation of Feature 4, so as to exclude all reference to goods or values from ethics altogether, would simply leave the utilitarians very much out on a limb. After all, far from dispensing with such words as "goodness" or "value" in his ethics, a preeminently sophisticated utilitarian like G. E. Moore discusses the meaning of "good" and "the good" almost *ad nauseam.* Yet if in light of Feature 3 of the "theory" all value-words must necessarily flunk the test of universalizability, just what do Moore and the other utilitarians attempt in order to bring their own ethics into conformity with the requirements of the "theory"?

The answer that the utilitarians have by and large attempted to give to this question is a somewhat ingenious one, even if it may not be entirely without its own characteristic arbitrariness   Let us recall how G. E Moore, exercising his talents for so-called analysis, undertook to show that the word "good" was simply indefinable.[4] His purpose in this was to show that there is no reason to suppose that the idea of "good" is necessarily tied up in any way with the idea of that which is good being necessarily desired or liked by someone. Clearly, though, if to say a thing is good in no wise implies that such a thing is necessarily desired, or liked, or found to be attractive or pleasurable to the person who calls it good, then our supposed inability to employ the word "good" in ethics is thereby removed   If being "good" no longer has to signify being simply "agent-relative" to the person or the being for whom or for which the thing in question is a good, then there is no reason why judgments regarding the goodness of a thing should not be readily universalizable   And if such judgments are universalizable, it will no longer be necessary to deny to words such as "good" or "value" the status of moral or ethical words   In fact, given this general line of consideration, one can now see how Feature 4 of the "theory" might be reworded so as to permit a tolerance for utilitarians, no less than for Kantians, under the terms of the "theory."[5] Thus, why not

---

[4] The reference here is to *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1929), esp ch I, sects A and B
[5] Although several present-day critics of the "theory" that supposedly lies behind modern ethics would direct their fire at Kantians, no less than

propose as a reformulation of Feature 4 the following Any and all goods can perfectly well claim a place in ethics, provided only that such goods be purely "impersonal" goods, as well as not being goods that are in any way "agent-relative" to the person desiring or seeking such goods, but rather purely "agent-neutral."[6]

Feature 4 may be seen to generate still a fifth feature of the "theory"—call it simply the feature of an ethical impartialism Given the fact that on the basis of Feature 4 all so-called "goods" or "values" are to be understood as being strictly "impersonal" or "agent-neutral" values, it must follow that there will be no reason (at least no morally valid reason) for a moral agent ever to prefer one good over against another—certainly not in the sense that he or she finds the one good to be somehow more attractive or desirable than another. With goods and values having now been "de-natured" and dissociated from their being desired, liked, or found attractive, what possible ground could a moral agent have for showing a partiality for one good over against another? Instead, all goods having now been converted into so many "oughts," it would seem to follow that this cannot but impose upon the moral agent a strict obligation to further and promote every and all goods equally and impartially.

One cannot fail to see what implications this Feature 5 of ethical impartialism is bound to have for any altruism in ethics, as opposed to an egoism. After all, utilitarianism has traditionally been an ethics of altruism. Accordingly, Features 4 and 5 of the "theory" would appear to place in the hands of the utilitarians the instruments they think they need to support their altruism Given the dissociation of the notion of "good" from all reference to our human desires and interests, and given also that all goods are to be pursued impartially, this can only mean that as a moral agent I have, as it were, a categorical obligation to do what I can to promote the good of my neighbor no less than my own In fact, in accordance with

---

at utilitarians, our own concern will be more with the utilitarian altruists than with the Kantians The reason for this is that in our judgment the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle, in its treatment of "good" and of "goods," shows more affinity for the sort of things the utilitarians tend to say than for what the Kantians tend to say

[6] We are afraid that we cannot document just when, where, and how these terms "agent-neutral" and "agent-relative," and "impersonal value" as over against "personal value," came into currency, but current they certainly are See the illuminating article by Eric Mack, "Moral Individualism Agent-Relativity and Deontic Relations," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1989) 82-111

Feature 5 of the theory, no partiality may ever be shown for one person's good over another's

True, this sort of ethics that we might now designate as an ethics of altruism-cum-impartialism, one that tends to be generated as a result of the application of the "theory"—such an ethics does seem to entail some rather puzzling, if not paradoxical, consequences We might do well to mention these just in passing, before we turn to a consideration of how the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle qualifies as an ethics according to the "theory," whereas an ethics such as that of St. Thomas simply cannot be brought under the "theory" at all

As a matter of history, most utilitarians in ethics have also been hedonists. Of course, it is characteristic of hedonists to equate goods or values with pleasures This presumably could only mean that ultimately, as moral agents, our sole reason for ever calling a thing good or of value is that we find it to be pleasing to us, or enjoyable, or contributing to our happiness. Note, though, that if one is to abide by Features 4 and 5 of the theory, one may never give as a reason for pursuing the good (or even any good, for that matter) the fact that such a good is something that one finds pleasing, or that one desires, or that contributes to one's happiness. No, for by the terms of Feature 4 the notion of "good" needs to be denatured and completely dissociated from all reference to our liking, desiring, or finding pleasing those things which we take to be good Instead, all "goods" are to be converted into so many "oughts," and as "oughts" they are to be furthered and pursued.

Does this not sound as if by the terms of Feature 4 of the "theory" the utilitarian hedonist is maneuvered into a position wherein the right hand scarcely knows what the left hand is doing? The presumed reason that a utilitarian hedonist has for reckoning a thing to be good or of value in the first place is that he finds it to be pleasing or desirable, or that it makes for his greater happiness. Yet when it comes to a question of the reason why that same hedonist pursues or promotes that which he finds to be good or of value, this reason can never be that it is something that he finds desirable or pleasing or contributing to his greater happiness Surely in this matter of giving reasons, the utilitarian hedonist does seem to have allowed himself to be maneuvered into a position wherein the right hand does indeed not know what the left hand is doing

There is still another oddity or even paradox that seems to afflict the utilitarian altruist insofar as he feels constrained to op-

erate under the terms of the "theory " In accordance with Feature
5, as we have seen, a moral agent may not show the slightest pref-
erence or partiality for one good over against another   Instead, an
agent is under a strict obligation to work for and to promote all
goods equally and impartially   Moreover, since any relation to de-
sire has been excluded from the very conception and understanding
of such goods, it is as if such goods were to be pursued no less
indifferently[7] than impartially   Nor is it only the agent's own goods
that are to be pursued indifferently and impartially, as being so
many "oughts" which one is to pursue, but also the goods of all other
agents as well are no less so many "oughts" which that agent is
under obligation to pursue, all equally and impartially and indif-
ferently   Consider this, however. just how is such a thing possible?
How can any one moral agent work to further all goods and all
values, not only his own, but those of all others as well, and do so
all at once without showing the slightest partiality for any one good
that might prompt him to choose that one as over against another?[8]

---

[7] It must surely occur to many at this point that, no sooner does a
utilitarian make this move that in effect would turn a "good" into an
"ought," then the difference between utilitarians and Kantians in ethics
would immediately seem to become minimal at most   In addition, if util-
itarians choose thus to denature the notion of "good" or "value," and to
dissociate it from any connection that such goods or values might have
with their being desired or liked or sought after, then the utilitarian will
immediately be confronted with a problem that has long afflicted Kantians
in ethics   This is the problem of "Why be moral?"   That is to say, if what
a person ought to do, or what it is right that he or she do, has no connection
of any kind with what the moral agent, simply as a person, might like to
do, or desire to do, or find that he or she has some interest in doing, then
what possible motive might a moral agent have for doing his duty, or for
acting on the promptings of his moral consciousness or conscience?

Of course, the stock answer that modern Kantians have long given to
this kind of challenge is an answer that would distinguish between having
a *reason* for doing something, and having a *motive* for doing it   To rec-
ognize that it is one's duty to do anything certainly provides one with a
reason for doing that thing, even though one may lack any motive to do
it   Unfortunately, it is hard to refrain from remarking here that, as an
answer to the difficulty, this seems to involve little more than an appeal
to a distinction without a difference

[8] It surely would not be out of place to cite here a revealing passage
from Sidgwick which Bernard Williams has quoted in *Ethics and the Limits
of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass   Harvard University Press, 1985)

> I obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual
> is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of

Surely, this would seem to be a changed and updated version of the problem of Buridan's ass.

II

The five features of the "theory" being enumerated, what now of the Grifinnboyle· may they be said to propound and subscribe to an ethics structured in accordance with such a "theory," or are they as moral philosophers to be classified with the likes of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas? Before we can properly answer this latter question, we should perhaps take a moment to confirm how thoroughly an ethical theory of the utilitarian altruism type is at variance with an ethics of an Aristotelian or Thomistic type.

With respect to each of the five Features of the "theory," one can readily recognize that a Thomist must surely differ with nearly every one of the five. With regard to Features 1 and 2, for example, it is not hard to imagine that Aquinas and Aristotle would contend that ethical knowledge is unquestionably based on a knowledge of nature, and more specifically on an understanding of human nature, for a human being is an integral part of nature, and possibly of supernature as well. An ethical or moral knowledge will not be based solely on considerations of moral language, or of the mere behavior in language of moral words as contrasted with non-moral words

As far as Feature 3 of the "theory" is concerned, St. Thomas would doubtlessly not be inclined to question it directly, though he

---

the Universe, than the good of any other   and it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally—so far as it is attainable by my efforts—and not merely at a particular part of it (p 105)

One can only wonder just how a moral agent can bring off such a feat as "aiming at good generally," and therefore presumably without aiming at any goods particularly   Presumably this shotgun character of the moral agent's aim can best be understood in terms of the stock utilitarian formula of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number " Yet it is far from clear just how a reliance upon this formula obviates the difficulty of aiming at "good generally" in abstraction from any particular goods of particular individuals

might be concerned that it be reworded and expressed differently. Rather than basing Feature 3 simply on linguistic considerations having to do with the difference in linguistic behavior between "moral"-words and mere "desire"-words, Aquinas might well prefer to stress what is logically required for any rational justification that might be given for any and all moral judgments that an individual might make. Suppose, by way of illustration, that I became convinced that I ought to strive for greater Socratic self-knowledge in my daily conduct and behavior   Surely, I must have some reason justifying this newly acquired moral conviction of mine. Yet clearly, there is no way I could possibly advance a reason for what I have thus become convinced I ought to do without my adducing, as a major premise in my argument, that the reason I am sure I ought to cultivate a greater self-knowledge is because that is what any human being ought to do, given similar circumstances.

Accordingly, while Feature 3 of the "theory" might not cause an Aristotelian or a Thomist too much difficulty, when one makes the transition to Features 4 and 5 of the "theory," any would-be disciple of either Aristotle or St Thomas would surely find that he must part company with the utilitarian altruists   Thus Aquinas, for example, would surely insist that the notion of *bonum*, or good, or value, is never to be dissociated from the idea of such a good or value being relative to the desire or *appetitus* of some agent   In fact, Aquinas might even be said to define (in a loose sense) "good" or *bonum* as that which an agent somehow desires, or wants, or loves, or aspires to, as being that agent's particular end or goal or purpose.[9] Far from acceding to anything like Feature 4, Aquinas would be most insistent that what one might call human goods or values cannot possibly be agent-neutral   Rather, they must be agent-relative, and hence must always be thought of as goods or values that are necessarily the goods or values *of* or *for* some moral agent.

Aquinas would not only repudiate Feature 4 as being incompatible with the very meaning of *bonum* as this is set forth, for example, in *De Veritate*, qu 21, art 2, but also the peculiar interpretation and significance that is given to impartiality in Feature 5 is one that would be hard to find even the slightest echo of in Aquinas

---

[9] See the references given in note 3 above

For by the terms of Feature 5, as we have seen, moral agents are under an obligation to do what they can by way of promoting any and all human goods, equally and impartially, regardless of whose goods they may be   In other words, I am no less obligated to promote my neighbor's good than I am my own   And I am obligated to promote my own good, but not in any way because it is mine.   Instead, I am obligated to promote all goods indifferently and impartially, regardless of whether or not any one of them be good for me.

Contrast this thesis of ethical impartiality with the Thomistic view that there can be no goods or values of any kind except those that are *of* or *for* some person or agent.[10]   In this sense, each and every good or value must be regarded as being, as it were, literally "indexed" to the individual of whom and for whom it is a good   So it is that Aquinas would construe the good of a person as being related to the person or individual of whom or for whom it is a good, simply as act is to potency: the good of a thing, in other words, represents no more and no less than the full perfection or flourishing of that thing or being of which it is a good, much as the full-grown oak, shall we say, is but the fullfillment or perfection of a particular acorn   That being the case, the good or perfection or fulfillment of any one individual can no more be reckoned as the good or perfection of some other individual than can the act or actuality of one individual be reckoned to be the actuality, or perfection, and hence the good, of some other individual   That would not make any sense in a Thomistic or Aristotelian context—or in any context, for that matter!   Hence the idea that as a moral agent I am obligated to promote all goods and values of all individuals entirely impartially and regardless of whether they be "my" goods in any sense at all—any such conception of moral values and moral obligations would appear to be quite irreconcilable with either the Aristotelian or Thomistic conception.

Moreover, if one should try to make a rejoinder to this by asking whether in an Aristotelian or Thomistic context there can be no such thing as a love of neighbor, or no sacrificing of oneself for

---

[10] It is true that for Aquinas, "good" is an analogous term, so that "goods" are not the goods only of human beings, rather, all substances in the natural order are such that each is ordered to its own good as potency is to act   Clearly, though, in the present paper, it is not the metaphysical (or in the Thomistic sense, the transcendental) import of "good," or *bonum*, that is of importance for us, but only the ethical import

the good and well-being of others, the reply is that not only is pro-
vision made for such a thing as an individual's love of his friends,
but also and more generally a love of neighbor is actually something
morally requisite for each and every human being   Yet this cer-
tainly does not mean that such a love of neighbor for Aquinas is
ever to be construed as an exercise in utilitarian impartiality, in
which a moral agent is supposed not really to feel any actual love
or concern for his or her neighbor at all, or even to take the slightest
personal interest in that neighbor's happiness or well-being, it being
instead an exercise of pure duty, from which all fondness and par-
tiality have been excluded on principle   No, for Aquinas, as for
Aristotle, a love of neighbor is to be construed as a love for one's
friend in which one's friend's good is to be identified with one's own
good, and where to pursue the good of one's friend is to show even
a definite partiality for one's own happiness and well-being, of which
the good of one's friend becomes an integral part   To put it in a
nutshell one's obligation is to love one's neighbor *as oneself*!

<div align="center">III</div>

Let us return to the question of the Grifinnboyle: are we to say
that their brand of moral philosophy is to be reckoned as having a
decided affinity for the type of ethics characteristic of the modern
altruists and impartialists rather than for that of Thomas Aquinas?
Consider first that key transition that is made rather early in the
Grifinnboyle's philosophy from the so-called First Principle of Prac-
tical Reason (the *Fppr*) to the First Principle of Morality (the *Fpm*).[11]
At the outset, one might say, the Grifinnboyle's philosophy begins
with an account of the so-called basic human goods—knowledge,
both theoretical and practical, health and physical well-being, the
society and friendship of fellow human beings, play and recreation,

---

[11] Of course, the definitive account of the nature of this transition
from the First Principle of Practical Reason to the First Principle of Mo-
rality is to be found in Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, vol I,
Christian Moral Principles (Chicago Franciscan Herald Press, 1983)   We
have relied heavily upon the excellent, if somewhat critical, exposition of
the *Fppr* and the *Fpm* that is provided in Russell Hittinger, *A Critique of
the New Natural Law Theory* (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame
Press, 1987).

religion, and so forth   It seems that the Grifinnboyle would wish
to say that these are goods in the sense that all of us, simply as
human beings, naturally tend toward them, and in that sense we
all desire them as being goods that are manifestly goods for us
Accordingly, the Grifinnboyle enunciate as what they call their *Fppr*
a principle taken directly from St. Thomas. "Good is to be done and
to be pursued, and evil to be avoided."[12]   Though this is a first prin-
ciple of practical reason, the Grifinnboyle would say that this *Fppr*
is not yet a moral principle because our human desiring and seeking
after such basic goods is not really a matter of choice with us at all.
Instead, as human beings we are by our very nature already inclined
towards, and thus motivated to seek after, such goods, and this is
so even without our exercising any choice in the matter of these
fundamental human tendencies and inclinations of ours toward the
basic goods   Instead, choice enters the picture only when in the
concrete situations of our daily lives we find ourselves constantly
having to act, and so having to make decisions as to which of our
many human options I, for example, am going to choose to do just
now. am I going to study yet a bit longer with a view to furthering
my knowledge, or should I take a little time off for play and recre-
ation; or, for reasons of health, were it better that I stopped now to
rest and recuperate?

Accordingly, the circumstances of human life are such that real
choices do constantly have to be made, and made with respect to
whether it will be toward this, that, or the other of the basic goods,
that my action, for example, will be directed on this, that, or the
other particular occasion   With choice, the Grifinnboyle go on to
say, it would appear that morality enters the picture for the first
time.   But this means that, supplementing the *Fppr*, a First Prin-
ciple of Morality (*Fpm*) needs now to be considered, and this will
be a principle for determining whether our choices between basic
goods are to be adjudged good or bad, right or wrong, in terms of
the individual's plan or lack of it for his life as a whole   For is it
not clear that any choice between basic goods in concrete situations
can only be made in light of some end or goal of human life as a
whole?   And what this goal must be, say the Grifinnboyle, is simply
that of Integral Human Fulfillment (call it *Ihf*)   What such a ful-

---

[12] *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q 94, a 2 "Bonum est faciendum et pro-
sequendum, et malum vitandum"

fillment requires is that all of the basic goods of all human individuals be honored and respected equally and impartially [13]   In fact, it is just this moral requirement associated with *Ihf* that is enunciated in the *Fpm*, which simply says there can be no morally justified integral human fulfillment, unless an individual in his efforts to accomplish such a fulfillment be careful to respect each and all of the basic goods not only of himself, but of all human beings as well

Accordingly, in terms of the concerns of this present paper, the question that immediately presents itself is whether this end or goal of *Ihf* is one that needs to be conceived more on the model of man's true end, or goal, or *telos*, as this has been understood in the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition in ethics,[14] or whether the model needs to be similar to the one prescribed by the "theory," particularly as this comes to be determined in Features 4 and 5. We have no doubt that it is the latter model, rather than the former one, that is determinative of the Grifinnboyle's understanding of *Ihf*   But this must be shown, and not just asserted

To begin with, we would suggest that, in the eyes of the Grifinnboyle, the trouble with the Aristotelian and Thomistic way of conceiving and understanding the human end or *telos* is that, for that particular tradition in ethics, such an end tends to be construed in terms of notions such as those of happiness or *eudaimonia*   No sooner is that done then any Aristotelian or Thomistic type of ethics immediately lays itself open to the charge of what Germain Grisez has long been wont to call "proportionalism" in ethics   This charge boils down, we would suggest, to something like the following· If the end or *telos* of *Ihf* is understood in terms of a maximum

---

[13] It should be noted that Integral Human Fulfillment functions for the Grifinnboyle as a technical term, by which they mean something very different from integral human fulfillment as this might be used in an Aristotelian-Thomistic context   In the latter context, "integral human fulfillment" would signify no more than an individual human being's ultimate end or goal in a person-centered teleology   For the Grifinnboyle *Ihf* functions as an ideal which derives its force from a deontological theory of moral obligation.   This should become clearer in our subsequent discussion

[14] For the purposes of this present paper, we shall treat the Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptions of man's end or *telos* as largely the same   Of course, this is not to imply that one cannot find many and significant differences between the two conceptions   For purposes of this paper, we feel that such differences can be largely disregarded

satisfaction of our human desires for the so-called basic goods (and
such other goods as may be subordinated to these), the result will
tend to be that certain basic goods will likely be shortchanged in
favor of others—and this, for the reason that a greater maximum
satisfaction overall may thereby be attained

For instance, by way of a rough example, suppose that I am a
person for whom the basic goods of religion and theoretical knowl-
edge do not mean much. At least, these two goods do not appeal
to me nearly as much as do the goods of health and physical well-
being, of play and recreation, and perhaps also of friendship and
the society of my fellows   Accordingly, given such tastes and pref-
erences of mine, when it comes to my working out my own life-plan
(with a view to *Ihf*), why would it not make sense for me to play
down, and perhaps neglect altogether, the goods of religion and of
theoretical knowledge and to concentrate entirely on those basic
goods which I find so much more rewarding and satisfying?

Such a policy and tactic on my part, or on anyone else's part
for that matter, would seem to make sense indeed, provided always
that the end of *Ihf* be interpreted to mean no more and no less than
a maximum satisfaction of one's human interests and desires in
respect to the basic goods   To this the reply of the Grifinnboyle
would be that while a policy of sacrificing some less-favored goods
in favor of others that are more favored would indeed pay off in
terms of *Ihf*, conceived of as a maximum happiness or *eudaimonia*,
it would still be a policy in violation of the *Fpm*, which requires that
all basic goods be honored and none disregarded when it comes to
their integration into the end or goal of *Ihf*   In fact, this is precisely
what is amiss about any policy of proportionalism in ethics, the
Grifinnboyle would say it goes counter to the *Fpm*

Moreover, by way of bringing home the seriousness of such a
policy of proportionalism in ethics, the Grifinnboyle like to point to
that serious shortcoming that would indeed seem to afflict most
varieties of utilitarianism, particularly when a transition is made
from a consideration of what might be productive of the greatest
happiness of a single individual to a consideration of what might
best make for the greatest happiness of the greatest number in so-
ciety as a whole   Clearly, when considered in a social context, there
is no question that a greater overall happiness in society as a whole
might well be achieved by sacrificing the happiness of some few in
order to achieve a greater total happiness of the many   Indeed, as

we all know, for a longtime this has been a scandal associated with utilitarianism.

Suppose that the Grifinnboyle would make their case against proportionalism along some such lines as these   Their next move, we suggest, is to repudiate altogether the Aristotelian and Thomistic way of seeking to understand what man's true end or *telos* in life is, or, in the terminology of the Grifinnboyle, what constitutes proper *Ihf* for human beings   If our *telos* or goal in life be conceived along more or less Aristotelian lines, in terms of something like happiness or *eudaimonia,* the inevitable consequence must be, as the Grifinnboyle see things, the fatal error, not to say even the cardinal sin, of proportionalism   Accordingly, to avoid proportionalism, the Grifinnboyle seem to think it necessary to understand *Ihf* entirely differently than Aristotelians and Thomists understand it.   And what is that alternative way of understanding *Ihf*?   Our answer to this question is that, whether or not they are fully conscious of doing so, the Grifinnboyle have simply embraced the "theory," particularly Features 4 and 5   This would seem to have provided them with their principal resource in working out that alternative account of *Ihf*

Thus if the *Fpm* stipulates that in seeking to achieve *Ihf* a moral agent may not neglect or sacrifice any one of the basic goods in favor of the others, then must not the consequence be that, as moral agents, we must cease to regard the basic goods as being anything but goods which we find ourselves naturally desiring and being inclined towards?   If we continue to regard the basic goods simply in this way, such goods will be valuable for us only to the extent that they contribute to our maximum happiness or satisfaction, and this is bound to entail the error of proportionalism—or so the Grifinnboyle would say [15]   To obviate any such error, why not simply dissociate such goods from any idea that, as goods, they are things that are somehow attractive to us, and that we thus desire and want, simply as contributing to our ultimate happiness or *eudaimonia*?   Instead, why not follow the course indicated in Feature 4 of the "theory" and

---

[15] We are not all convinced that if Aristotle's *eudaimonia* is rightly understood, it would necessarily lead to the sort of proportionalism in ethics that the Grifinnboyle are so given to inveighing against   However, for us to take issue with the Grifinnboyle on this score would be beside the point of this paper

simply dissociate such goods from any idea that they are necessarily liked or desired by human beings, thus turning them instead into just so many "oughts" which make up the substance of *Ihf,* and which, accordingly, following the requirement of the *Fpm,* we then can recognize ourselves as being morally obligated to honor, like them or not?[16] By following such a tactic, the Grifinnboyle will presumably then be able to explain and justify the requirement of the *Fpm,* and to obviate quite successfully any temptation toward proportionalism

It will not be only Feature 4 of the "theory" which will thus come to be operative in the articulation and explanation of the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle, but Feature 5 as well   For if all goods—basic goods as well as others—come to be converted into so many "oughts," then as a moral agent, I will find myself obligated not only to pursue and promote each and all of my own basic goods and without any discrimination against some in favor of others, but I will also find myself equally obligated to honor, and so to further and promote, the goods of all other human beings as well. And what could be a farther cry than this from St Thomas's account of "good" or *bonum* as being always a thing ordered to and thus, as we said earlier, actually indexed with respect to the individual persons and moral agents of whom and for whom such things are goods? In their apparent subscription to what we earlier designated as being a kind of altruism-cum-impartialism in ethics, the Grifinnboyle[17]

---

[16] In this connection we cite the following declaration of Grisez that Integral Human Fulfillment is "   the realization of all the human goods in the whole human community   an ideal corresponding to total human responsibility" (*Christian Moral Principles,* 185)   Note here both the focus on goods (not persons) as the goal of teleological activity and the (deontological) move into impartiality which they feel is demanded by reason

[17] For decisive textual evidence that the Grifinnboyle do indeed insist that not only should a moral agent show no partiality with respect to any of his own goods, but also no partiality with respect to any or all of his own goods as compared with those of others, see John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1980), ch 5, sect 3 ("No arbitrary preferences amongst values") and sect 4 ("No arbitrary preferences amongst persons")   The second sentence of the latter section reads "Another person's survival, his coming to know, his creativity, his all-around flourishing may not interest me, may not concern me, may in any event be beyond my power to affect   But have I any reason to deny that they are really good, or that they are fit matters of interest, concern, and favor by that man *and by all those who have to do with him?*" (emphasis added)

have surely distanced themselves from the company of anyone like Thomas Aquinas, apparently preferring instead the company of utilitarians.

IV

All of this still leaves a final, but by no means unimportant, point still unresolved.   Even if the Grifinnboyle have been shown to be not quite what they so often profess themselves to be in ethics, followers of St. Thomas, but rather are more like utilitarian altruists and impartialists, that scarcely proves that their moral philosophy must therefore rest on a mistake.   For who is to say that a utilitarian altruism, while admittedly not a philosophy of a genuine Thomistic cast at all, is nonetheless a moral philosophy that rests on what is little less than a downright mistake?

A mistake, though, is just what it does rest upon, we believe, or if not a mistake, then at least a very serious oversight   To see where the exact incidence of such a mistake or oversight occurs, consider once again that transition that we earlier found the utilitarian altruists to have made in proceeding from Feature 3 of the "theory" of modern ethics to Feature 4   Apparently, the interpretation which modern ethicists have tended to place upon the Principle of Universalizability, as formulated in Feature 3, contends that if the notions of "good" or of "value" are relative to the desires and interests of human agents, then all such judgments of value will have to be written off as not being universalizable at all.   And if not universalizable, then such judgments of value cannot have any import for morals and ethics at all

What has been the response of modern ethicists in an attempt to salvage judgments of value for ethics?   We sought to show in section II above that this response has tended to take the form of Feature 4 of the "theory"—if judgments of "good" or of "value," when considered as being no more than relative to our human interests and desires (as being but "agent-relative," that is), are found not to lend themselves to being universalized, the thing to do is to resort to draconian measures, and sternly to dissociate the very notion of "good" from any kind of relativity to human desires altogether   Moreover, the effect of such a dissociation would be to turn "goods" and "values" into so many "oughts," an "ought" being

something that obligates us, like it or not. From here there follows all of those seemingly paradoxical consequences of present-day ethical impartialism that we discussed earlier—all of them consequences that are clearly alien to the ethics of Thomas Aquinas.

Consider now whether or not the transition that modern ethicists have tended to make from Feature 3 to Feature 4 of the "theory" is at all necessary. Let it be conceded that if judgments of good or value cannot be universalized, they cannot possibly be relevant for purposes of anything like morals or ethics. Yet even when conceding this much, has it as yet been established necessarily that any and every kind of agent-relativity, so far as goods and values are concerned, must preclude any and all such judgments of value from ever being universalizable? Surely not, and to see that such an inference is by no means warranted, one has only to consider that there are two quite different senses that attach to terms such as "good" or "value " There is no better way, we think, to point out the sort of ambiguity that attaches to the notion of "good" or "value" than simply to apply what we have ourselves long been wont to refer to as the *Euthyphro* test—a test that is borrowed from Plato's dialogue by that name, and that poses the question: Is a thing to be pronounced "good," simply because it is what people like or desire, or is it something that people like or desire because they see it is good—that is, truly, or objectively, good [18] With the first alternative under the *Euthyphro* test, if a thing is held to be something good or of value for no other reason than that we human beings, or at least some of us, happen to like it or desire it, then such a judgment regarding a thing's goodness or value will indeed not be universal-

---

[18] In the *Euthyphro* Plato does not word the alternatives in terms of whether a thing is considered good because it is desired, or is rather desired because it is seen to be good   Rather, he poses the alternatives by asking whether things are held to be good merely because they are beloved of the gods, or is it that they are beloved of the gods because they are good

Interestingly enough, it is Kant who has posed the alternatives most tellingly

> the expression *sub ratione boni* can mean we represent something to ourselves as good, if and because we desire (will) it   Or it can mean we desire something because we represent it to ourselves as good   Thus either the desire is the determining ground of the concept of the object as a good or the concept of the good is the determining ground of desire (will)   (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans Beck [New York The Liberal Arts Press, 1956], p 61, n 2)

izable. On the other hand, in the second alternative of the *Euthy-phro* test, if a thing is said to be desired because a human agent recognizes it to be objectively of worth or of value, then any value judgment to this effect will clearly be universalizable.

With that, the whole case for making the transition from Feature 3 of the "theory" to Feature 4 collapses   It rests on nothing less than a downright mistake. All one has to do is recognize that certain goods or values are true or objective to see that such things are good or of value in this sense only as they are desir*able*, or *ought* to be desired whether we actually do so or not. In other words, judgments regarding the goodness or value of things in this sense will be clearly universalizable. Such goods or values will not be any less agent-relative for all that, nor will they be any less values that are personal values for those who appreciate them and come to see them as being values for themselves

This is one mistake that is detectable in the "theory" There is a second mistake as well, this time a mistake that emerges in the transition to Feature 5. Recall that Feature 5 in effect rules out the possibility that goods or values can ever be the goods or values *of* or *for* an individual or individuals. In contrast, for a thinker such as Aquinas all goods are to be understood as goods *for* someone, or such things as are the goods or values *of* someone. In fact, as we suggested, Aquinas thinks there is an analogy between the relation of a good to the being of whom or for whom it is a good, and the relation of act to potency—that is, just as any actuality must always be the actuality of the particular thing that was originally only in potency with respect to that actuality, so also the good of a thing must be regarded as simply the fulfillment or the perfection of the thing for which or for whom it is a good. Just as nothing can be in potency to the actuality of a being entirely different and other than itself, so also the good of a thing can hardly be other than the good of that thing of which it is the good, and not of anything else

But now why is it that the utilitarian partisans of the "theory" are so set against the idea that goods must somehow always be conceived as being "indexed" to the beings for whom they are goods? Presumably, the only reason for such an opposition is that if goods must always be indexed to the individuals of whom or for whom they are goods, then presumably this would operate in such a way as to prevent the relevant judgments about such goods from ever

being universalizable   After all, if they are indexed always to par-
ticular individuals, how can they be universalized? Yet what is this
objection, if not an objection based on a rather curious kind of over-
sight? To take but a single, crude example, suppose that an indi-
vidual comes to see that a good such as wisdom or understanding is
truly a good for him   Granted that in the agent's eyes wisdom and
understanding have come to be indexed to that agent's own desires
and aspirations, does that mean that an individual's judgment as
to wisdom and understanding being a good *for* him is therefore a
judgment that is just not universalizable? Of course not   Instead,
the individual agent in question will recognize that the very ground
and justification for his recognizing that wisdom and understanding
are a good for him is the insight that wisdom and understanding
represent not merely a good for him, but rather a good for anyone
and everyone as well, given similar circumstances. In other words,
the supposition of someone like Sidgwick that if a judgment of "good"
or "value" is to be universalizable, the good or value that is in ques-
tion cannot possibly be a good or value of or for any individual—it
being necessary for a moral agent under such circumstances to try
to promote only "good generally," and never the good of any indi-
vidual in particular[19]—this supposition would seem to rest on little
more than superstition and mistake!

Finally, then, does the moral philosophy of the Grifinnboyle
rest on a mistake? It would certainly seem to, at least to the extent
to which the Grifinnboyle would appear to have forsaken the char-
acteristic Thomistic understanding of "good" or of "value," and to
have allowed the "theory" to turn them into little more than utili-
tarian impartialists.

Georgetown University (retired)
St. Vincent Hospital, Indianapolis

---

[19] Cf note 8, above

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MARK M. HURLEY AND STAFF

ARMSTRONG, D. M   *Universals An Opinionated Introduction.* Focus Se-
    ries   Boulder Westview Press, 1989   xii + 148 pp   Cloth, $38 50,
    paper, $11 95—This work is typical of the cautious approach to meta-
    physical problems by the new breed of Oxonian analysts   Unlike
    Wittgenstein and his early followers, they do not believe metaphysics
    deals solely with pseudo-problems that will evaporate with a clearer
    understanding of how ordinary language functions   Rather they be-
    lieve, as is the case with scientists evaluating various theoretical mod-
    els, a cost/benefit analysis of the more meaningful solutions philos-
    ophers have given to important metaphysical problems will lead to a
    clarification of the merits and weaknesses of each and hence lend
    some measure of probability to one's preferential options   This third
    approach by David Armstrong to the problem of universals falls in
    this literary genre   As a volume in the new "Focus Series," it is
    designed to provide case studies of this key philosophical problem for
    a special clientele or class of students—those advanced undergraduates
    or philosophy majors in schools where contemporary analytical writ-
    ings in the Oxford tradition are still the basis of the curriculum   As
    such it is broader in scope than his two previous works, intended to
    introduce its readers to views other than his own   Since the neo-
    metaphysicians that draw their inspiration from Oxford are cautious
    about the lasting value of their work, still less will their writings be
    suitable for courses in the history of philosophy or useful for a core
    curriculum in schools where philosophical analysis is not the dominant
    orientation   But where that approach to philosophy still prevails, as
    at Armstrong's University of Sydney, or many other Anglo-American
    universities, this work will undoubtedly fill a needed gap not covered
    by other survey courses of a more general nature
    In his two earlier works, *A Theory of Universals* and *Universals and
    Scientific Realism,* Armstrong made short shrift of nominalism and
    argued forcefully for a moderate scientific realism, not unlike C S
    Peirce's conception of Scotistic realism   In the present volume he

recognizes there is no "royal road to agreement" on this topic, and
that there is a form of moderate nominalism (not unlike that of Ock-
ham, I might note) which can be developed as an important and quite
plausible rival to the moderate realism that Armstrong himself still
opts for

The present study restricts itself to a limited number of theories,
those which admit the existence of natural classes such as properties
and relations, for only such seem plausible solutions to this age-old
debate that Peirce regarded as the most interesting metaphysical issue
discussed in the universities that originated in Europe during the
Middle Ages

In the limited space of this review I can do little more than list the
six theories and indicate why they might be of considerable interest
to those still pursuing analytic philosophy in the Oxford tradition
This has become largely an intermural dialogue with colleagues of
the same philosophical persuasion using a highly technical and ideo-
syncratic language only intelligible or of practical use to a limited
few   Armstrong readily admits that his assessment of the problem
of natural classes will be as subjective as that of the other participants
in this philosophical duel, yet he is convinced a cost/benefit analysis
such as he hopes to provide "is likely to be the best way to advance
the debate "

Armstrong introduces the reader to the problem with Peirce's token/
type distinction, identifying natural classes roughly with tokens, and
reformulating the problems of universals in terms of the factor that
distinguishes classes of tokens that are types from those that are not
Here Armstrong considers as "types" only such properties or rela-
tionships that have some degree of "naturality "   He thinks six the-
ories merit consideration as philosophically respectable answers to
the question why do we sort or classify the items in our real world
into natural classes?   They are not serially arranged but rather are
in a matrix form, where the vertical axis has three variants (logical
primitives, resemblances, and identities) and the horizontal axis, two
(ordinary particulars and tropes)   "Tropes" is the most recent in-
word, introduced by D C Williams for properties or relations that
are treated as particulars, other philosophers knew them as "abstract
particulars" (Stout and Campbell), "perfect particulars" (Bergmann),
"cases" (Wolterstorff), or "concrete properties" (in contrast with true
universals)   Armstrong sees Stout's claim that the class of rednesses
have "distributive unity" as the trope version of Quinton's view that
natural classes are primitive, and regards William's own trope theory
of resemblance as a superior version of Price's resemblance nomi-
nalism of ordinary particulars   Cook Wilson "realism" is a trope
version of the earlier Greek and medieval realism ascribed to the
common nature of ordinary particulars   Since communality has var-
ious levels or degrees of "sameness," Armstrong sees the trope theory
of realism as redundant, and in the five sections that make up the
body of his work discusses *primitive* natural classes, *resemblance*
nominalism, *particulars as bundles of universals, universals as attri-
butes,* and *tropes*   Those interested in contemporary analysis will

undoubtedly find Armstrong's "opinionated introduction," as the blurb points out, "both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy "

I remember seeing a cartoon which portrayed a little old lady, umbrella in hand, viewing a hippopotamus for the first time   "Is it male or female?" she asked a zoo-attendant sweeping the floor.   "Lady," he replied, "that should be of interest only to another hippopotamus " In a similar vein one could say that this book will be of special interest to that relatively limited philosophical clientele, still fascinated with what D C Williams called "grubbing around in the roots of being "— Allan B. Wolter, *Old Mission, Santa Barbara, California.*

BENCIVENGA, Ermanno   *The Discipline of Subjectivity An Essay on Montaigne*   Princeton Princeton University Press, 1990   xi + 132 pp. $19 95—"The discipline of subjectivity" is Ermanno Bencivenga's term for the "training" an individual must undergo "for there to be a self" (p 17), a theme he explores through a "dialogue" with Montaigne's *Essays* (p xi)   The form of this study is unconventional in that it "has a very short bibliography" (p ix), indeed, the book is devoid of reference to other studies of the *Essays*, and the bibliography is limited largely to the author's own previous writings   Bencivenga's interpretation of Montaigne's thought is nonetheless conventional in substance, in that he adheres to the commonly accepted view of Montaigne as a steadfast conservative in matters of political practice who paradoxically pursued a radical independence of private thought and judgment (pp 36, 44, 73)   Bencivenga also confronts the paradox that Montaigne, while affirming his own reliance on reason, frequently laments the tendency of human reason to lead us astray (p 50)   He attempts to resolve these dilemmas by proffering what might be termed a sociobiological explanation of the value of the individual's intellectual freedom to the community allowing a few individuals to indulge in playful philosophic speculation provides the community with a kind of "insurance" against the possibility that the context within which the community operates may be transformed in unforeseen ways, in which event some of those seemingly idle speculations may prove to be vital guides to the community's reordering (pp 79–81)   In sum, "we can have our cake and eat it, too" by "encourag[ing] the respect of tradition   and at the same time cultivat[ing] the germs of future different traditions" within an insulated intellectual "greenhouse" (pp 106-7)

Bencivenga finds a further value in the *Essays* owing to the "reversal" it promotes "in the relation between theory and practice," since Montaigne rejects "the traditional view" that the discovery of a "true theory" or "representation of reality" necessarily precedes the establishment of social practices, and demonstrates on the contrary how the entrenchment of a particular practice in a community comes before the endeavor to provide a theoretical justification for it   The

subordination of theory to practice means that philosophizing has "only pragmatic significance and promises no special insight or wisdom" (p 95)   But even to achieve this practical goal, the thinker must do "violence" to "language itself," must avoid imposing "the straightjacket of a direction on [his] vagaries," and must refrain from "expressing a firm opinion" (pp 108-12)   Regardless of whether his particular speculations bear practical fruit for others, the thinker who emulates Montaigne by defending himself against society's "training" with a self-directed "countertraining" may reasonably aspire to discover or to engender his "self" (pp 116, 118)   The process of self-creation is a never-ending one which, despite not being motivated by public considerations, may ultimately serve the interest of the "crowd" (pp 127-8)

Although Bencivenga's conversational tone is sometimes engaging, and although he displays a genuine enthusiasm for applying Montaigne's thought to contemporary concerns, the fidelity of his interpretation to the text of the *Essays* is open to question on numerous points   The chief difficulty arises from his tendency to lift particular quotations out of the text, without considering their relation to the overall argument of a chapter or to the rhetorical development of the book as a whole   Hence Bencivenga interprets Montaigne's ironic critique of philosophy as previously practiced for its "impotence" in remedying human ills as a *recommendation* that philosophers be "locked in a cave" so as to minimize their influence (pp 94-6)   He quotes Montaigne's professed admiration for Socrates' "refus[al] to save his life by disobedience to the magistrate" (p 75) while ignoring the essayist's subsequent critique of this action and the excessive reverence for law it appears to exemplify (*Essays*, transl Frame, II, xii, pp. 436-7, III, ix, p 743)   He treats Montaigne's seemingly contradictory judgments of drinking in "Of Drunkenness" as evidence of the author's "conflicting values" (p 125n), without considering the overall movement of the chapter from one "value" (temperance) towards another (unlimited imbibing, as a more salutary substitute for the spiritual "frenzy" generated by previous moral reformers)   And he cites Montaigne's attribution to "philosophy" of the advice "to have death ever before our eyes" without scrutinizing the extended critique of this advice that Montaigne sets forth in the same chapter and others (p 84, *Essays* II, vi, III, iv, III, xii)   Greater attentiveness to the structure of Montaigne's argument, such as the author indicates is necessary to understand his thought (*Essays* III, ix, 761), might have induced Bencivenga to doubt that Montaigne was a political conservative, that he believed philosophy to be incapable of attaining "special insight or wisdom," or that his "rejection of [the] public beliefs and values" of his time was "guilt-ridden" (p 128)   Rather than viewing Montaigne from the perspective of present-day philosophical controversies and personal dilemmas, it might be more fruitful to begin by considering what *distinguishes* the *Essays* from contemporary works of "philosophy," particularly its author's treatment of the religious issue (II, xii) as central to the problem of politics.—David Lewis Schaefer, *Holy Cross College*

BUTCHVAROV, Panayot   *Skepticism in Ethics*   Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1989   225 pp   Cloth, $37.50; paper, $14 95—With *Skepticism in Ethics*, Panayot Butchvarov joins a small group of practical philosophers who are attempting to define a third alternative to the two dominant approaches to practical philosophy in the twentieth century—the approach which puts practical philosophy on one or another model of empirical science ("the scientific approach in ethics") and the approach which holds that practical philosophy is interpretive (or social, or dialectical) through and through ("the neo-Wittgensteinian approach in ethics") (p 9)

Butchvarov's alternative is a realist ethical theory, where by realism with respect to *x* he means the view that *x* exists and has a nature, and that its existence and nature are independent of our awareness of it, of how we conceptualize it, and of how we speak about it   The book contains, in brief, an ethical theory, however, its main task is foundational   Specifically, the task is to provide the phenomenological, metaphysical, and epistemological foundations of an ethical theory which can withstand the challenge of ethical skepticism

Phenomenological foundations   In order to rebut phenomenological skepticism—the view that there is no such real property as goodness, and so the term "good" does not stand for anything and we are not conscious or aware of goodness in any way—Butchvarov turns to the continental philosophical tradition   Unlike others, he does not simply inspect his intuitions, but treats phenomenology more generally. First, he makes the important point that if one has a narrow phenomenology, like Hume's, then it would be reasonable to conclude that there is no such real property as good, as Hume does   However, that one ought not to have such a narrow phenomenology has been demonstrated by philosophers in the continental tradition.   Second, he turns to philosophers influenced by Husserl for rejection of "the illusion of immanence" and acceptance of the claim that all consciousness is consciousness *of* something   From there it is an easy move to the claim that ethical consciousness is consciousness of something— specifically, of ethical objects—even if the consciousness turns out to be in some sense illusory or unreal

Metaphysical foundations   What sort of property would goodness be if there is such a property?   Butchvarov's answer, offered as a revision of G E Moore's view that goodness is a nonnatural property parallel in some ways to the property yellow, is that goodness is a generic universal parallel not to yellow, but instead to the genus color   Thus cognitivism and realism about goodness are not as mysterious and difficult as some think   awareness of goodness is no more mysterious than awareness of the generic universals color or triangularity, the existence of the property goodness is no more mysterious than the existence of its species   To find the species of goodness, Butchvarov details a hierarchy of being in what he takes to be a straightforward and nonmysterious manner, then, through consideration and mild correction of ordinary ethical opinion, he details a good correlative to each level of the hierarchy   corresponding to inanimate being is the good existence, to life, the good health, to sentience, pleasure, to general

intelligence and bodily desire, satisfaction, to intellect, knowledge, to will, fortitude, to sociality, friendship

Epistemological foundations Do we have knowledge of good? Of right? That we have knowledge of the property goodness, Butchvarov takes as demonstrated Do we or can we know that the species of good are good? Utilizing what he calls the Cartesian conception of knowledge, he claims that our knowledge that they are good is self-evident in the sense that it is unthinkable that we are mistaken in judging that they are good Regarding our knowledge of right, Butchvarov is less sanguine, since, according to him, the unqualified goodness of an action—its being a right action, or an action that an agent ought to perform—is a result of the totality of the action's consequences, and we cannot know whether the total consequences of an action are good or bad.

Skepticism in Ethics is a model of comprehensiveness in the treatment of its topic Butchvarov brings to bear many important results from his previous studies of universals, of knowledge, and of being One hopes the book will become standard reading on the topic in the future —Deborah Achtenberg, *University of Nevada-Reno*

DEELY, John   *Basics of Semiotics*   Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990   160 pp   Cloth, $25 00, paper, $9 95—John Deely's new introduction to semiotics deserves the attention of philosophers because of his ambitious attempt to ground semiotics in a general philosophical framework rather than in linguistics or literary theory   By uniting the signs of brute animal communication, the signs of language, and the perceptual signs of cognition within a single framework of the logic of relations, Deely has rightly grounded semiotics in logic and epistemology rather than in the theory of language   Language is but one sign system, and must not be regarded as the paradigm for semiotics, yet this fallacy of *pars pro toto* is all but universal, not only in the *sémiologie* of French structuralism, but also in recent Anglo-American analytic philosophy, as evident in D S. Clarke's *Principles of Semiotic* (1987, p 8)   Deely's semiotic maxim, by contrast, is suitably general "There is nothing in thought or in sensation which is not first possessed in a sign" (p 124)   According to Deely, semiotics brings all of cognition and communication, from the simplest organisms to human beings, into a single point of view

Deely argues persuasively that the only philosophical framework both general enough to encompass the whole extent of semiotics and rigorous enough to make the necessary distinctions is to be found in John Poinsot's 1632 *Treatise on Signs*   Deely has devoted two decades to bringing the theoretical logic of Poinsot's semiotic to the attention of contemporary philosophers and theorists of signs   Deely's new book is not intended to be a systematic exposition of Poinsot's semiotic, rather, it is a discussion of the fundamental methods and aims of

contemporary semiotics in light of Poinsot's framework Still, the book's chief *philosophical* importance lies in its skillful exposition and discussion of the semiotic of John Poinsot

Poinsot treats semiosis as a species of ontological relation. The relation of semiosis has three terms the sign, the object signified, and the cognitive power. What makes this triadic relation ontological is that a sign refers indifferently either to physical or to merely rational beings although I cannot have a physical relation to a unicorn, I can have a semiotic relation to one As Deely makes clear (p 16), this indifference of semiosis to the natural or merely cultural objectivity of entities is not a defect of semiosis, but its essential virtue In human experience, the physical objects of nature and the rational objects of mind are inextricably intertwined the human world is a joint construct of natural entities, such as our bodies, the ecosystem, and the heavenly bodies, as well as cultural entities, such as customs, laws, and concepts Only through sign-systems are the physically real and the rationally real made to cohere as a lived world

Having defined the sign as an ontological relation, Poinsot distinguishes the formal signs of cognition from the instrumental signs of language and gesture The formal signs of percepts and concepts refer the mind to objects without first having been cognized Ideas are not, as in the tradition from Descartes to Kant, mental objects, rather, they are signs of objects Instrumental signs, by contrast, such as words, refer the mind to objects only after having first been cognized. By thus distinguishing formal from instrumental signs within the ontological relation of semiosis, Poinsot brings language and cognition into a single semiotic framework Poinsot then distinguishes three sorts of instrumental signs natural signs, such as clouds signifying rain, customary signs of habitual social practice, such as napkins on a table signifying that dinner is imminent; and stipulated signs of deliberate institution, such as neologisms Thus human experience is understood as the joint articulation of the natural, the customary, and the stipulated—a trichotomy far superior to the usual dichotomy between nature and convention

Deely's new book is an impressive effort to make the Scholasticism of John Poinsot speak to the problems of contemporary semiotics Deely is less successful in his attempt to extend the domain of semiotics beyond the realm of cognition to the realm of all causal interaction (ch 6) Because any effect is potentially a sign of its cause, Deely argues at length that the causal networks of nature, even apart from sensation or cognition, are "virtually" semiotic Aside from being incompatible with his semiotic maxim cited above, he never shows how such a semiotic treatment of physical causation throws any light on the problems of causal explanation in physics or chemistry. How does it advance our understanding of genetics to describe the DNA code as semiotic? Still, Deely's speculations concerning the possibility of a noncognitive interpretant—even if unpersuasive—are thought-provoking In the dialectic of philosophy, speculative reach can quite usefully exceed conceptual grasp —James Bernard Murphy, *Dartmouth College*

DEL CARO, Adrian   *Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche Creativity and the Anti-Romantic*   Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1989   ix + 314 pp $37 50—To everyone else, and especially to those who wish to exclude him from the charmed circle of philosophers, Nietzsche is a poetic, dithyrambic, romantic-aesthetic writer   But he insists that he is anti-romantic and engages in a long, drawn-out argument against romantic pessimism and romantic idealism   Del Caro poses a simple question that requires a complex, multidimensional answer what was Nietzsche's relation to romanticism in general and German romanticism in particular?

Sifting through the works of Bertram, Haym, Janz, Joel, and numerous German interpreters of romanticism and its relation to Nietzsche, Del Caro manages to present a study that incorporates their insights and surpasses them   In a scholarly and engaging way, Del Caro discusses Nietzsche's readings in romanticism, his infatuation with an aesthetic interpretation of existence, its justification *via* artistic transformation in *The Birth of Tragedy*, his early enthusiasm for Wagner's aim of rejuvenating German culture by means of his *Gesamtkunstwerk*, or "total artwork," and his turn against Wagner and what he came to view as Wagner's debilitating, negative, and decadent artwork   Goethe's post-*Werther* critique of romanticism as a kind of sickness strongly influenced Nietzsche's negative attitude towards romanticism while, at the same time, as Del Caro clearly shows, *some* of Novalis's exotic ideas about the power of poetry, as well as a great deal of A W Schlegel's reflections on the relation of philosophy to *Poesie*, infiltrate his thinking   Of special interest is Schlegel's anticipation of (and perhaps influence on) Nietzsche's critical judgment on the dramas of Euripides in *The Birth of Tragedy*   Before Nietzsche, Schlegel had observed that "Euripides had visited the schools of the philosophers "

Although it is shown that Nietzsche does not follow Schlegel in his idealism and his depiction of a philosophically informed *Poesie* that is joined with his recognition of the need for a "new mythology," the continuous interweaving of Schlegel's aesthetic theory and the thought of Nietzsche is an illuminating feature of Del Caro's study

After his intoxication with a Schopenhauerian-Wagnerian inspired "artists' metaphysics" in *Tragedy*, Nietzsche turns against romanticism, criticizing its debilitating effects and nihilistic tendencies   Here Del Caro unearths the work of Bonaventura, *Night Watches* (1804), as a strange anticipation within the heart of romanticism of the nihilism that Nietzsche will tirelessly dissect   Del Caro understands the emerging undercurrent of negativism in romanticism as a passive nihilism, which he contrasts with Nietzsche's ostensible "active nihilism "   Holderlin, whose *Hyperion* exposed nihilistic sentiments that his lyrical vision sought to transcend, was discovered early by Nietzsche, but was eventually seen as broken by the clash between his longing for a divine ideal and his perception of man as a "fermenting chaos "   Del Caro's detailed and rich commentary on the internal development of romanticism from the late eighteenth century to the last romantic, Wagner, is so extensive that it threatens to become a book within a book

Nietzsche was anti-romantic, Del Caro argues, because he rejected the religiously oriented sentiments of a Novalis, because he thought that the labyrinth of nihilism had to be lived through (without despairing) and thought through, because his "Dionysian classicism" opposed it, because of his challenges of *amor fati* and eternal recurrence, because he came to view art as valuable as a "stimulus to life", because he sought to "raise" man up to his "natural" being, and because he sought not a romantic poetic veiling of actuality, but a life-affirmation in the face of the negativities and sufferings of existence

Del Caro has given us a remarkable study in literary and cultural history and has endeavored to show us what Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy meant   Some may balk at the attribution of "materialism" to Nietzsche, some may question whether Nietzsche embraced "active nihilism" rather than an "overcoming of nihilism", some may miss the important role that Nietzsche's appreciation of the exact sciences played in his anti-romanticism, but few will question the breadth and scope of this enlightening scholarly study of what may be called Nietzsche's romantically expressed anti-romanticism —George J Stack, *SUNY, College at Brockport*

FISHER, Simon   *Revelatory Positivism?   Barth's Earliest Theology and the Marburg School.*   Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1988   348 pp $69 00—Many readers of this review will be aware that Karl Barth, like Rudolf Bultmann, was a student of Wilhelm Herrmann and that Barth was both indebted to and critical of aspects of Herrmann's thought   Fewer, however, will have much familiarity with the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism and its influence on the thought of Herrmann and Barth   This study is intended to fill that gap   During the time that Herrmann taught at Marburg (1879–1917), the theological school changed from a rather provincial academic setting to an international center with such distinguished teachers as Weiss, Julicher, and Otto   At the same time the Marburg philosophical faculty became one of the leading centers for the study of Neo-Kantianism and counted among its leading scholars Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp   Although Fisher believes that a case could be made for showing an enduring influence of the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy on Barth's theology, it is his intent in this book to trace the influence of this school on Barth's earliest theology, that written during the brief period that he was a pastor in Geneva immediately following his theological studies at Marburg, and before his break with theological liberalism   The first two chapters of the book are devoted to a study of Marburg Neo-Kantianism with particular reference to Cohen and Natorp, who tried to make a place for religion within the confines of a way of thinking that tended to limit knowledge claims to three spheres, logico-scientific, ethical, and aesthetic   Initially Cohen reduced religion to ethics but later sought to make a special place for religion   Natorp proposed a religion without God in which

religious feeling was identified with the hidden psychic motivation of
all human and cognitive striving   Herrmann, who is discussed in the
third chapter, regarded his own work as complementary to Cohen and
Natorp and sought to mediate between knowledge of the world rep-
resented by the Marburg philosophers and the Protestant tradition
of Christian faith   Following the discussion of Neo-Kantianism and
Herrmann, Fischer provides an extended analysis of Barth's early
work, including two unpublished manuscripts, showing the influence
of the Marburg philosophers on Barth through Herrmann and at times
directly through Barth's study of the works of Cohen and Natorp

    The book takes its title from the frequently repeated criticism that
Barth's theology is a form of revelatory positivism   This charge is
most typically associated with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who claimed that
while Barth deserved credit for beginning criticism of the concept of
religion, he put in place of religion an unbiblical positivist doctrine
of revelation   In the concluding chapter Fischer discusses the am-
biguities connected with the use of the expression "revelatory posi-
tivism" and evaluates the appropriateness of its application to the
earliest work of Barth   In opposition to the Marburg philosophers,
Barth, like Herrmann, asserted a kind of realism based on the giv-
enness of the revelation of God   In itself this does not lead to reve-
latory positivism, argues Fisher   When you add to this, however, the
claim that the given of revelation is self-authenticating and that real-
ity is taken to mean only this given, Barth's early theology, Fisher
argues, is susceptible to a charge of positivism much like the one that
Barth makes against Schleiermacher   Whether the charge can be
shown to apply to Barth's later work is said to be beyond the scope
of this study   This book makes a significant contribution towards
filling a gap in the study of the origins of Barth's theology   It should
also be of interest to those generally concerned with the dialogue
between philosophy and religion in Germany at the beginning of the
twentieth century —Eugene Thomas Long, *University of South Car-
olina*

GELVEN, Michael   *Spirit and Existence A Philosophical Inquiry*   Library
    of Religious Philosophy, no 4   Notre Dame University of Notre Dame
    Press, 1990   288 pp $29 95—This is an existential phenomenology
    of what it means to be spirit, to live a spiritual life   It is phenome-
    nological in that its approach is at once descriptive and experiential
    It is existential in that it relates its descriptions to the meaning of
    human life and presents them as possibilities rather than as facts
    It begins with a vivid description of human animality and with the
    suggestion that it is disgust with ourselves as flesh that is the origin
    of our life as spirit

        Flesh and spirit are not the same as body and mind, in that the
    latter distinction concerns what kinds of entities exist while the former
    concerns different ways of being   Accordingly, the Platonic point of
    departure is not the *Phaedo*'s arguments for the immortality and di-

vinity of the soul, but the *Republic*'s analysis of the spirited as distinct from the appetitive and rational dimensions of our being The spirited and the spiritual are not merely different, but also importantly similar. After a chapter on the paradoxes of spirit that seems to interrupt rather than to advance the argument, the description of spirit as a dimension of human existence not reducible to either the rational or the appetitive is developed in six chapters under the heading, "The Predicates of Spirit "

Consistent with the priority of ways of being over kinds of entity, these ten "predicates" are given in verbal form Thus we are told that to be spirit is to be important, to radiate with inner light, to worship, to suffer, to acknowledge mystery, to become enrapt, to be redeemable, to submit to adventure, to be able to laugh, and to be noble (p 48) The detailed descriptions of these modes of being are wonderfully subtle and concrete, subtle because of the author's skill and sensitivity as an "observer," and concrete in large part due to his effective use of literary materials at almost every turn

In these chapters we encounter the suggestions that radiance is what painters try to express, however inadequately, with halos, that worship unites fear, acknowledgement of truth, submission, and gratitude, that mystery involves a crucial distinction between knowledge and acknowledgement, and that Nietzsche has a concept of redemption, while Plato and Kant do not Suffering is said to belong to spirit when it takes on the form of sacrifice as the gift of oneself A powerful analysis of six different kinds of giving makes a major contribution to the phenomenology of sacrifice and even suggests that sacrifice is the primary category, with suffering (in some instances) becoming a mode of sacrifice

The final section of the book turns from the predicates of spirit to the question of its essence This Socratic search for a definition is the attempt to unite the plurality of predicates into a unified whole by asking what makes them possible, what their presupposition might be

This search is not to be identified with metaphysics in the sense of asking what kinds of entities exist or in seeking to distinguish appearance from reality (though the claim is made that mechanistic materialism and hedonism are theories false to human experience) It is rather an inquiry into meaning, in particular into the meaning of personal pronouns An elaborate expansion of Buber's project of distinguishing pronoun pairs lays the foundation for the suggestion that the three best candidates for the essence of spirit are nearness, transcendence, and gratitude

Although he eventually says that *"spirit is transcendent gratitude for drawing near"* (p 257), Gelven prefers that we treat each of the three candidates on its own, inviting us, as it were, to reread the chapters on the predicates of spirit from the perspective of each of them in turn Each of them brings its own illumination, but it remains unclear whether anything in the entire book casts much light on the kind of spirituality that is essentially political—the spirituality of a Socrates, a Jesus, a Gandhi, or a Martin Luther King —Merold Westphal, *Fordham University*

GORDON, David   *Resurrecting Marx   The Analytical Marxists on Freedom,
   Exploitation, and Justice*   New Brunswick, N J   Transaction Pub-
   lishers, 1990   155 pp $29 95—David Gordon attempts to achieve
   two goals in this book, only one of which is ever stated.   He explicitly
   sets out to show why three analytical Marxists, C A Cohen, Jon Elster,
   and John Roemer, fail to rehabilitate Marx's economic theories—de-
   spite the attempt made to compensate for their predictive and con-
   ceptual limitations   Gordon stresses the fact that there are too many
   structural flaws in Marx's view of capitalism to make it work on the
   basis of mere tinkering   Significantly, his subjects have recognized
   this disparity between basic Marxist beliefs—for instance, the labor
   theory of value and the growing pauperization and exploitation of the
   working class in a capitalist (or semicapitalist) economy—to try to
   hold to the substance of Marx's economics   Thus they claim to be
   bringing up to date the master through rigorous analysis—whence
   the term "analytical Marxism "   This particular designation is also
   meant to distinguish its bearers from those "soft Marxists" who, like
   Herbert Marcuse, relegate Marxism to a form of social and cultural
   criticism   Analytical Marxists maintain that *their* Marx produced
   scientific truth, in the manner of Newton and Einstein, not simply a
   moral outcry or a political protest
       But their problem, as Gordon demonstrates, is trying to find the
   "scientific" core of Marxism after dispensing with the labor theory of
   value and with anything resembling Marx's own theory of working-
   class exploitation   In one particularly amusing section, Gordon notes
   that the analytical Marxists propose workers' cooperatives as an
   agreeable *socialist* alternative to capitalist exploitation   Although
   such cooperatives are meant to be a liberating experience, Gordon
   points out, workers, if given a choice, have usually opted against such
   arrangements   Moreover, the analytical Marxists have made the
   same observation and therefore emphasize the need to ban economic
   choices for workers in the short run—in order to have them voluntarily
   cooperate in the building of a new order
       By far the most stimulating part of Gordon's study is where he
   goes beyond his subjects and tries to justify his own libertarian po-
   sition   Without disrespect to his argumentative skills, it might be
   appropriate to describe Gordon as a Lockean mugged by reality
   Though he treats society as an artifice for satisfying material needs,
   and, most importantly, for protecting economic agreements between
   consenting individuals, Gordon sees at least some defects in the views
   on the origins of property as presented by other Lockeans   For ex-
   ample, he vigorously criticizes mainline libertarian arguments about
   original entitlement to property which go back to passages in John
   Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*   Like another libertarian,
   Robert Nozick, Gordon denies that rights of property are established
   by a doubtful theory of self-ownership   He also treats gingerly
   Locke's contention that we take possession of something and forestall
   later claims to it by mixing our labor with still unassigned property
   Gordon adopts another tack, that the refusal to assign property to
   those who work for it and to protect the property already in our hands
   will necessarily cause greater unfairness than protecting present

property entitlements   Unless I am mistaken, he draws his defense
of property more from David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* than
from Lockean sources   Gordon defends, as Hume puts it, "the en-
joyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and
good fortune" as socially necessary, but he does not view that enjoy-
ment as the condition that brings individuals out of an imaginary
state of nature into civil society   Like Hume he avoids natural rights
language, while identifying justice with the protection of property
holders   Like Hume he seeks to avoid the injustice of leaving every-
thing unpossessed or of rendering possessions open to expropriation

Gordon may not agree with Joseph deMaistre's observation that
the beginning of wisdom is distrusting John Locke, nonetheless, in
the strongest parts of his work he is willing to depart from Lockean
contractualism   His defense of property has less to do with vindi-
cating natural rights and individual acquisitiveness than with pointing
out the dismal alternatives to property-holding and the right of con-
tract   His appeals to the Austrian School of Economics in explaining
why Marx could not construct a functional notion of economic value
taught this reviewer a great deal   Like Marx and Aristotle, I too had
assumed that value could be treated as a measurable quantity in eco-
nomic transactions   Like the Austrians, particularly Mises and
Rothbard, Gordon shows to what extent economic value is changing
and subjective   In this and other instances, the author nudged me
in a different direction   And throughout his work he nudges without
being overbearing, suggesting conceptual alternatives by gentle but
effective questioning   His politeness toward the objects of his critical
probing is exemplary, even while not getting in the way of his scalpel.—
Paul Gottfried, *Elizabethtown College*

GRAVE, S A *Conscience in Newman's Thought.* Oxford Clarendon Press,
1989   191 pp $39 95—The author of this book admits that Newman's
writings on the topic of conscience are scant and not extensively de-
veloped   He deals with such modest offerings in Newman by turning
almost immediately from Newman himself   So in his initial reflec-
tions he claims that there is an "ordinary" concept of conscience with
which he will be dealing   His guides here are ordinary language
philosophers, and most especially Gilbert Ryle

This is a rather inauspicious beginning   Conscience is a topic of
more than ordinary significance, of extraordinary ethical and religious
significance   To think through its possible meaning might require a
mode of more than ordinary thinking   One's hopes are dashed even
before one undertakes the adventure   It seems that we start with a
whole host of rather uncritically accepted presuppositions, engraved
in the philosophical practices of ordinary language philosophy   The
whole idea of the ordinary is itself a concept that philosophy has
always tried to think through critically

After this disappointing discussion of the "ordinary conception" of

conscience in the opening chapter, in the next two chapters Grave deals with Newman's views in relation to this ordinary conception He summarizes. "In Newman's conception, conscience determines the rightness or wrongness of actions in the concrete situations in which we find ourselves, and in doing this it is able to engage in reasoning. If the account that has been given of the ordinary conception of conscience is substantially correct, conscience undertakes no determination of right and wrong and engages in no reasoning. If this account of conscience is correct, and if the 'magisterial aspect' of conscience is taken to cover the accusatory or condemnatory operation of conscience as well as its imperatival operation, then in describing this 'aspect' of conscience, Newman has described conscience in its entirety" (pp 89–90) If this describes the entirety of conscience, the entirety seems to be a relatively blank whole.

The next chapter is perhaps the most interesting chapter in its concern with the authority of the Church and its compatibility with the claims of individual conscience   Grave recalls the story about Newman's after-dinner toast first he would drink to conscience and then to the Pope   I found that the whole effect of Grave's discussion was to produce a deflationary result there is no real tension after all. The suspicion persists that Grave's deflation is produced by a lexical juggling with the ordinary conception   The ordinary mountain gives birth to an even more ordinary mouse.

In subsequent chapters Grave deals with the "Ascription of Authority to Conscience," and with the " 'Rights' of Conscience "   The results are finally rather desultory, as the writer himself shows no embarrassment in admitting in his concluding remarks   I applaud the effort to wring something significant from not very promising material   But the author stays uninspired before material that itself is relatively uninspiring by the standards of Newman's other writings

Overall, the style of philosophizing reminded me of someone trying to clear his desk of a clutter of papers   He seeks to find the right file for each piece of paper, but becomes very unsure what to do when no file already exists for a piece   "Ordinary language" is supposed to give us the already-readied files, but philosophizing really should begin when there are no ready-made files.   Hence this book remains by and large at what I would consider to be a prephilosophical level.—William Desmond, *Loyola College in Maryland.*

GRIFFIN, David Ray, and SMITH, Huston   *Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology*   New York State University of New York Press, 1989 xiv + 216 pp   n p —*Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology* introduces, recapitulates, and develops a dialogue, the initial versions of which were presented at a forum sponsored by the Center for a Postmodern World in Santa Barbara in January, 1988, between David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith.   The book, which is part of the SUNY series in constructive postmodern thought, begins with a clarification

of the term "postmodern" (pp xi-xiv)   Both Smith and Griffin are advocates of forms of postmodernism at odds with dominant trends in postmodernism, trends which they describe as "deconstructive or eliminative." Instead, they advocate a "constructive or revisionary postmodernism " A distinctive feature of their "revisionary" postmodernism is its theological orientation

In the first essay, Griffin focuses upon and criticizes Smith's conception of the deity as wholly other   If, as Smith holds, the deity is "devoid of personal attributes" and is in every respect beyond human comprehension, then how can belief in such an ineffable being give "orientation" to life?   If all human standards of veracity must be discarded, then how can any view be said to be true?   On Smith's view, moreover, the problem of evil is insoluble or rather is soluble only by the empirically dubious strategy of denying its existence (pp 25-30)   According to Griffin, the description of God as utterly transcendent leads Smith to denigrate science and to see time and social progress as unimportant (pp 31-5, 38-40).   Griffin criticizes Smith's apparent neglect of principles and distinctions that are ineradicably constitutive of experience and thought

Griffin's own position is heavily influenced by process thought   The primordial truth is not Plotinus' One but rather creative experience itself   Griffin refers to creative experience as the metaphysical ultimate and to God as the axiological ultimate   Since creative experience presupposes the reality of time, the very notion of atemporal being is rendered problematic   God is thus not outside the temporal order and is in no way determinative of events   Since God neither knows nor has control over the future, the problem of evil can no longer be couched in traditional terms.   Instead, the reality of evil is "part of a process," the good of which would not be possible with the "possibility and virtual inevitability of evil" (p 95) It is to be combatted through communal projects in which God is an active and sympathetic participant

Smith's response to Griffin focuses on the logic of perfection and the inadequacy of "ordinary experience and the logic that governs it" (p 69)   Smith argues that the God of process theology fails to inspire the sort of awe that underlies the religious impulse   If God were subject to time, God would be imperfect and subordinate   Smith's negative theology, on the other hand, would liberate the deity from the "boundaries and limitations" necessarily attached to such personal, human attributes (p 65)   The achievement of spiritual vision requires that ordinary logic and common sense be superceded.

Although their respective views are refined and clarified over the course of the discussion, the debate produces no clear victor   Each thinker has, I believe, raised fundamental difficulties with the other's positions   Questions concerning the relationship between God and the world and concerning the nature of rationality come readily to mind   By the end of the book, both thinkers are acutely aware that they are arguing not so much about this or that position, but about first principles, even about the nature of rationality itself   Smith is suspicious of Griffin's appeal to "the universal criterion of reason", Griffin counters that Smith's notion of "multiple logics" is incoherent

and unintelligible   Conspicuously absent from the discussion of the
relationship between the deity and the world is any sustained attention
to medieval theological thought, which has enjoyed something of a
revival in contemporary philosophy of religion.   Nonetheless, the book
marks an important theological contribution to the debate over post-
modernism   The book is, furthermore, testimony to the spirit of open,
sustained debate, something which will become increasingly necessary
if we are to find our way in the postmodern world —Thomas S Hibbs,
Boston College

KEMAL, Salim   *Kant and Fine Art An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy
of Fine Art and Culture*   Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986   x + 348 pp
$57 00—This is a richly suggestive book but, like Immanuel Kant's
own work, it is not easy to bring into focus   Its basic argument is
"that aesthetic necessity is justified through the relation of fine art
to morality" as a practical relation between subjects and not simply
on epistemological grounds (p 28)   The work has the distinctive merit
of drawing heavily upon the total corpus of Kant's works, especially
the more neglected works collected in English in *On History* which
deal with the development of culture   In the process, we get a view
not only of fine art, but also of the unity of Kant's thought that extends
significantly beyond the usual epistemological and/or moral foci and
centers upon the historical development of culture   Of course, the
center of Kemal's attention is the *Critique of Aesthetic and Teleological
Judgment,* the expressed aim of which is to establish the unity of
experience in face of the tension between the clockwork universe of
the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the world of moral freedom focused
by the *Critique of Practical Reason*
    After a lengthy introduction Kemal divides the book into two major
parts, "Fine Art and Culture" and "Aesthetic Judgments and Aesthetic
Necessity "   The first part treats of the production of fine art, the
relation between fine art and culture, and the relation of fine art to
natural necessity   Kemal makes the controversial claim, in spite of
Kant's apparently opposite assertion, that fine art for Kant has a
certain priority over natural beauty for supporting our moral en-
deavors   Rudiger Bubner for one takes the priority of natural beauty
in this respect as clear, since Kant claims that interest in natural
beauty is a sign of a good soul, whereas interest in artistic beauty is
often linked to vanity
    Kemal views the rootage of fine art in genius as parallel to Kant's
claim that judgments of taste are made "without determining con-
cepts," since genius follows the irruption of nature in the artist from
which an impulse is given whose term only becomes clear with the
completion of the work   He links this transconceptuality with the
notion of aesthetic ideas, which parallel rational ideas since neither
of them has any adequate filling   The transcendence of concepts is
also linked to the autonomy of the judging subject, which cannot be

coerced by concepts but to which appeal must be made   This is crucial
for Kemal since the role of fine art is the creation of a dialogical
community of culture which respects the autonomy of judging subjects
and recognizes the subjectivity of creating subjects   The finitude of
human faculties involves the coming together of rational agents in
the construction of culture as a mode of intersubjectivity, a way of
legislating for a kingdom of ends   The rules of culture hold only
insofar as individuals choose to participate and thus they appeal to
freedom out of the objectivized sphere of cultural products   Fur-
thermore, culture brings people outside the merely privatized sphere
into a realm of publicity that is the sphere of moral practice   The
creation of a dialogical community based upon the creativity and free
assent of persons is, according to Kemal, the fundamental way in
which art supports morality   "Kant can contend that fine art pro-
motes culture by developing to the furthest extent a unity between
subjects as rational and feeling beings capable of appreciating ends
in a way that characterizes us as members of a moral species" (p 89)
    So heavily does Kemal underscore the role of culture that he sees
anthropology as grounded in culture rather than vice-versa, that is,
our understanding of humanness is a function of the development of
culture   If this is so, history bites very deeply into Kant's conception
of things   But it cannot overturn the grounding of all recognition
within the apriori structures of humanness   Science itself, whether
in its study of nature or of humanity, rests upon the interpretative
ability of humanity, whose apriori structures Kantian philosophy an-
alyzes
    The development of culture shapes individuals into genuine human
subjects, distancing them from subservience to appetite and tradition
and making them capable of thinking for themselves, thinking from
the point of view of everyone else, and thinking consistently   How-
ever, contrary to an interpretation of Kant's ethics that views the
appetites as essentially bad, Kemal cites several textual loci where
Kant indicates the goodness of the appetites and the error of wanting
to extirpate them   Ingredient in the cultural shaping of individuals
is providing them with the appetitive distance to envision ends and
to realize them, thus expanding the field for choice, but in such a way
that we can remain "men of nature" within civilization   However,
Kemal criticizes Kant for the way in which he tends to reduce art to
the illustration of moral ideas   Kemal rather emphasizes the way in
which art is a symbol of morality   by its involving a similar dis-
tancing from appetite and by its treatment of other subjects as ends
    Part 2 focuses on "Aesthetic Judgments and Aesthetic Necessity."
It is divided into two parts   "The Necesities of Taste, Fine Art, and
the *Summum Bonum,*" and "Culture and Morality   Aesthetic Neces-
sity "   Kant ascribes four moments to the judgment of taste   disin-
terested satisfaction, subjective universality, purposiveness without
a purpose, and necessity   Many commentators (such as Karl Ameriks)
conflate necessity with universality and consider the fourth moment
to be redundant   Kemal spends 120 pages on it   The issue of necessity
turns upon the notion of *sensus communis*   Initially it is presented
as the epistemological ground of the four moments   Later it is

reintroduced in terms of a consideration of the communicability of
feeling as a practical norm for creating culture   It is thus seen as a
public sense   According to Kemal, aesthetic necessity is found, not
simply through private feeling (as Kant seems to claim), but by a
process of finding agreement in others   *Sensus communis* involves a
harmonious accord, not only of an individual's cognitive faculties, but
also of a community of taste   Kant claims that appreciation of beauty
is a duty, and Kemal takes that to mean the construction of the cultural
community of freely judging moral subjects   Aesthetic necessity is
justified through cultural necessity, which is ultimately a practical
necessity based on moral imperatives (p 275)   This is also linked to
the duty to develop our faculties   "The search for a unity of faculties
is invested with a practical value because it leads to a unity between
rational and feeling individuals" (p 228)   Judging and constructing
works is more important than the experience of beauty as a private
satisfaction—even though we may think it to have subjective univer-
sality   That is one reason why Kemal considers art superior to natural
beauty in supporting our moral endeavors.

Those unfamiliar with Kant's aesthetics will find in this work much
that is illuminating alongside much that is confusing and difficult to
focus   Scholars of Kant's thought will find much that is stimulating
alongside much that is provocative and controversial   All should find
it rewarding in many ways —Robert E Wood, *University of Dallas*

LLOYD, A C   *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism*   Oxford Clarendon Press,
    1990   x + 198 pp $45 00—Much of contemporary research concerning
    the Platonic schools of late antiquity (which we label as "Neoplato-
    nist") is philological and historical in approach   This research is
    needed, since late antiquity is a period that has long been neglected
    in the historiography of philosophy, which means that many facts
    and documents still await examination and publication in reliable
    form   Much rarer (in particular in the English-speaking world) is a
    philosophical approach to Neoplatonism based on sound historical
    knowledge rather than on the clichés that until recently have masked
    ignorance.   Such an approach is proposed in the present book, whose
    important task it is to analyze the logical and metaphysical structures
    that constitute Neoplatonic philosophy   Lloyd brings together and
    develops ideas he has explored over many years   He takes account
    of a very wide range of thinkers   Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus
    play a major role, of course   But many others are also considered
    Simplicius, Philoponus, Damascius, Elias—the list extends to include
    Neoplatonists of the Byzantine period   While allowing for the dif-
    ferences between these philosophers (in particular interesting com-
    parisons are proposed between Plotinus and Proclus), Lloyd success-
    fully shows how they share and elaborate on certain theories which
    he examines systematically, bringing out the difficulties and dilemmas
    that these theories often contain   One might compare his approach
    with that of S Gersh (*From Iamblichus to Eriugena* [Leiden, 1978]),

whose interests however are not exclusively philosophical, and who, like Lloyd, stresses the importance of Aristotelian ideas in the constitution of Neoplatonic philosophy

In his first chapter, Lloyd discusses Neoplatonist attitudes toward logic. In general Plotinus' lack of interest in Aristotelian logic was not influential, Neoplatonists followed rather his pupil Porphyry's incorporation of Aristotle's *organon* in the curriculum But this raised various issues, for example, that of the relation between Aristotelian logic and the "dialectic" of which Plato speaks Chapter 2 deals with Porphyry's semantics and makes various suggestions concerning, for example, the degree to which Neoplatonists were "nominalist" or "conceptualist" with regard to universals The third chapter introduces the theory of what Lloyd calls "P-series " A P-series is a series of terms ordered as prior and posterior and whose first term is "the universal common to all the terms " The paradigm case of such a series is the number series headed by the monad But, as Lloyd indicates, Aristotle found such series in other areas the good, soul, constitutions (p 76) Inasmuch as the first term cannot be regarded as a genus (since the order is one of prior and posterior), one might speak, taking account of the commonness of the first term, of "quasigenera" in such cases In this and in the following chapters Lloyd examines the logic of such P-series as they operate in the constitution of reality (procession or emanation from a first cause) and in the constitution of knowledge, both procession and knowledge being united in a metaphysical theory of consciousness Lloyd has new suggestions to make on these and on a number of other subjects, such as the background to the Neoplatonic theory of emanation (he argues that it is Aristotelian), the Neoplatonic theory of matter, and the place of personal experience in Neoplatonism

This is not a book for the rushed reader who has little familiarity with Neoplatonism Lloyd proposes a series of tightly compressed, sometimes fairly technical analyses, obliging the reader to keep in mind a larger context and to return to individual arguments Some of his suggestions will no doubt be questioned. But this book can be expected to become a fruitful basis of discussion as the philosophical exploration of Neoplatonic metaphysics develops, a metaphysics possessed, as Lloyd shows, of considerable sophistication and elegance — Dominic J O'Meara, *Université de Fribourg*

LOCKE, John *Questions Concerning the Law of Nature* With an Introduction, Text, and Translation by Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press, 1990. x + 260 pp $29.95—For much the greater part of Western history, moral and political thinking took fundamental guidance from "natural law," a standard of justice and human flourishing resting ambiguously on the dual foundation of the rational knowledge of human nature and the revelation of divine will Modern politics and philosophy, by contrast, may be said to have emerged through the rise of a doctrine of "natural rights," which rested ambiguously on the rejection and

the transformation of natural law   In the present "postmodern age" (as fashion has labeled it), as we struggle to comprehend just what modernity was and how it got started, we urgently need to re-examine the complex fate of natural law, especially in the work of such thinkers as Hobbes, Spinoza, and above all John Locke, the father of the modern, liberal, "rights-based" theory of the state

Natural law, and its fundamental importance, is indeed frequently mentioned by Locke   But one searches in vain throughout the whole of his published writings for any sustained or coherent account of it. This incredible omission, a gaping hole in what seems the very center of his thought, has puzzled and frustrated scholars for generations Recently, however, it was to some extent remedied—provoked, in a sense, by the deadly challenge to liberalism of National Socialism Fearing the Nazi bombardment, the Earl of Lovelace—lineal descendent of the Lord Chancellor Peter King, Locke's cousin—deposited with the Bodeleian Library at Oxford the complete collection entrusted to his ancestor of Locke's correspondence, notebooks, and journals—wherein was discovered an early, perhaps unfinished treatise on natural law, composed sometime between 1660-64   The Latin text together with a translation was published by W von Leyden, its discoverer, in 1954

Given the exceptional importance of this writing, as well as certain problems of editing and translation in the von Leyden volume, the present editors deemed it worthwhile to undertake a new version   In view of the results, it is difficult not to concur   The volume presents an excellent new critical edition of the Latin text, prepared by Jenny Strauss Clay, which draws upon all three extant manuscripts, preserving the original foliation and reporting, in an elaborate *apparatus criticus*, all textual problems, variants, and authorial emendations It notes Locke's peculiarities in spelling, capitalization, punctuation, and grammar, but scrupulously resists the temptation to regularize or improve him (this in contrast to von Leyden, who is far more sparing of information while generous of emendation)   In short, this important philosophic text is rendered here with the sort of exquisite care and rigor that one rarely finds outside the field of classical philology. (The Clays are, in fact, classicists)

Based upon this revised text, a translation by Diskin Clay is presented on facing pages   "I have chosen," he reports, "to be faithful rather than elegant   I have attempted a literal rather than literary translation" (p 88)   In fact, he achieves both   His prose is forceful and precise, while also faithful to the somewhat fluid or discursive style of the original   The English text is accompanied by a large critical apparatus of its own, which—drawing upon and augmenting the extensive work of von Leyden—identifies Locke's quotations, citations, and allusions, elucidates some of his vocabulary, and discusses problems of translation or interpretation   It is fair to say that the reader who, making no use of the left-hand pages, studies the translated text, will have as unimpeded an access to Locke's original thought and expression as is possible

The volume contains three introductions, two devoted to the manuscripts and the translation and a third, written by Robert Horwitz,

fitting Locke's work, with some delicacy, into its political, theological, and philosophical context   Horwitz demonstrates, for example, that in its structure and manner of investigation this writing takes the scholastic form of a *quaestio disputata*, an insight crucial for following Locke's argument, as well as for resolving a number of basic textual problems   Indeed, the very title of von Leyden's edition—*Essays on the Law of Nature*—assumes and conveys an incorrect view of the character of Locke's untitled manuscript

For nearly three centuries this vital document lay buried in a darkened room   Having finally emerged, it deserves to be brought fully into the light   We are grateful to von Leyden for his pioneering work, which remains useful for its learned introduction and analysis   The present edition, however, represents an advance on every front   It belongs in the library of all who have a serious interest in Lockean thought or in the emergence of the modern moral perspective —Arthur M Melzer, *Michigan State University*

LOCKWOOD, Michael   *Mind, Brain and the Quantum The Compound 'I'*   Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989   xiii + 365 pp n p —At the end of this impressive work, Michael Lockwood observes "Philosophers, especially British philosophers tend, in my experience, to combine a rather complacent ignorance of science with an excessive respect for it" (p 315).   The author himself seems to be a definite exception to this generalization, since he reports (p ix) that he has spent more than twenty years "thinking about the mind body problem and the interpretation of quantum mechanics" and displays a critical attitude toward statements based on scientific research   This book outlines a common interpretive framework that may be able to resolve tensions that have long characterized understandings of human mental functioning and of microphysics   The work is addressed to both philosophers and scientists

Chapter 1 summarizes several positions on "the riddle of consciousness", the two succeeding chapters describe "materialism," "physicalism," and "functionalism "   Aspects of neuroscience, cognitive science, and experimental psychology are introduced in chapters 4, 5, and 6   In chapters 7 to 13 healthy doses of relativity and quantum physics are added to the mix.   It seems probable that most readers of this book will be experienced in at least one of the technical scientific or philosophical areas that are covered.   It seems likely that every reader will encounter a substantial amount of material that lies outside the area of his previous reading   A glossary of technical terms is included as a service, as well as a rather elaborate flow-chart to assist the reader in grasping the structure of the complex argument of the book

That chart points out that early chapters are meant to refute "functionalism" and "physicalism," to defend "causal realism," and defend and develop a "Russellian version of identity theory "   The quantum

conundrum of "Schrodinger's cat" and its recent interpretations is discussed at length (chapter 12) and "relative state theory" is introduced, defended, and developed

Chapter 14 returns the focus to the brain with the question "Is the brain a quantum computer?" It is not possible to epitomize the nuanced response that Lockwood gives to this question, since it involves strands of reasoning from every previous chapter of the book   Perhaps it is not out of place to indicate that Lockwood proposes that a generalization of the "relative state theory" developed to deal with quantum systems shows great promise for understanding human consciousness, in a way that is coherent with the well established empirical and philosophic results now available   Chapter 15 deals with time in experience and in science, and refers back to earlier discussion of the unity of consciousness   The last chapter includes a strong argument for greater interaction between philosophers and scientists His book would be an admirable resource for any group of assorted scholars wishing to develop such interdisciplinary conversation

Lockwood has done such a magnificent piece of work in presenting and interrelating complex aspects of disciplines both many and diverse that it may seem churlish to suggest that there are yet other considerations that he ought to have taken into account—rather like asking a long-term benefactor what he has done for us lately   But our author has not included significant discussion of the burgeoning recent work dealing with nonlinear dynamics in far-from-equilibrium open systems   These systems (analyzable without residue into completely deterministic "elementary steps") generate self-organization, quantum effects in macroscopic samples at room temperature, nondeterministic outcomes, and chaos   Results from this active area of science need to be taken into account in discussions of the areas of interest to Lockwood   As it happens, Lockwood's "relative state theory" seems quite consistent with these new results as well as with aspects of neural-network research not included here —Joseph E   Earley, *Georgetown University*

LOWE, Victor   *Alfred North Whitehead The Man and His Work, Volume II 1910-1947*   Edited by J B Schneewind   Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990   vii + 389 pp $38 95—Those of us who cut our teeth on Lowe's *Understanding Whitehead* felt a special loss at his death in 1988   That sense of loss is magnified by the realization that he did not live to complete the second volume of his Whitehead biography   The published text is composed of 11 chapters that were fairly complete when Lowe died, and part of a twelfth chapter   Two of these dealing with Whitehead's philosophy of physics, chapters five and six, were authored principally by Leemon McHenry

The book begins in the summer of 1910 with Whitehead's move from Cambridge to London   It ends on Valentine's Day, 1931, in Boston, at a symposium arranged to celebrate Whitehead's seventieth

birthday   Missing from the projected work are chapters covering Whitehead's remaining years on the faculty at Harvard (he retired in 1936), on the years of retirement (1936–1947), and a final chapter which was to provide a new assessment of Whitehead's philosophy In its place the editor has included an essay Lowe had published elsewhere, "Whitehead's Philosophy as I See It "

A sampling of chapter titles will provide a sense of the work's scope "Whitehead's First Years in London," "Whitehead on Education," "First Philosophical Publications," "Migration to Harvard," "A New Philosophy of Nature," "Religion," and "Gifford Lecturer "   As the titles indicate, Lowe sought to construct a historical exposition of Whitehead's texts, interspersed with a narrative of his life

This latter is severely limited by the scarcity of sources   Whitehead had asked that his papers, including all letters received, manuscripts, unpublished essays, and the letters to his wife be destroyed   Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that the biography is heavily tilted toward Whitehead's academic rather than his personal life   It is also not surprising, given the unfinished nature of this work, that volume II does not have the rich evocative texture that marked the first volume   Nonetheless, there are some glimpses of the personal life   we learn that Whitehead easily made friends with neighborhood children (p 83), that Gertrude Stein and Alice Toklas once spent six weeks as the Whiteheads' guests (and how a comment in *The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas* may have earned Stein the enmity of Evelyn Whitehead) (p 30)   Reprising a theme from volume I, Lowe reminds us that Bertrand Russell had fallen in love with Evelyn, a love that was not returned   Indeed, Evelyn went on to act as an intermediary for Russell in his affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell (p 19)

On the academic side, we learn that despite the tremendous respect Whitehead engendered, his public lectures were often not well received Someone in attendance at his inaugural Harvard lecture complained that it "plunged us into a morass of absolutely unintelligible metaphysics" (p 142)   As a Gifford lecturer, Whitehead had been preceded by Sir Arthur Eddington who had attracted capacity audiences of six hundred   A similar number turned up for Whitehead's first lecture, but in subsequent lectures the audience may have dwindled to as few as six (p 250)

With regard to the exposition of Whitehead's views, Lowe employs helpful terminological aids   He speaks of the early writings as involving a "pre-speculative epistemology," compares the "rough world" of ordinary experience and the "smooth world" of reflective thought (p 96), sorts out nicely "events" from "objects" (p 116), and argues that Whitehead's comments on education can be better understood if we keep in mind the distinction between "information" and "understanding" (p 47)   Overall, though, Whitehead enthusiasts will find that the book covers familiar ground, while novices seeking an introduction will find it too sketchy in its attempt to discuss each of Whitehead's works

The strongest, most fully developed interpretive chapter is the one on education   Indeed, one of the virtues of this book is the stress

placed on Whitehead's interest in education   The weakest chapter,
no doubt because it does not represent what would have been the final
version, is the one that deals with *Process and Reality*   On the subject
of that book, Lowe quotes a letter in which Whitehead expresses the
hope of following up *Science and the Modern World* with a text that
would be *"short* and *clear,* if I can make it so!" (p 205)   One mild
(though I think defensible) surprise is Lowe's claim that *Religion in
the Making* "as a whole is one of the best things he wrote as a phi-
losopher" (p 185)

The volume ends with a collection of letters Whitehead wrote to his
son North and daughter-in-law   These are a welcome glimpse into
the life of a thinker who made of privacy a virtual fetish —Raymond
D Boisvert, *Siena College*

MELZER, Arthur M   *The Natural Goodness of Man On the System of Rous-
seau's Thought.* Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1990   xiii
+ 308 pp   Cloth, $51 00, paper, $18 95—Rousseau asserted that "all
my ideas fit together, but I can hardly present them simultaneously",
when defending his writings against the charge of contradictoriness,
he complained that it was not he, but rather his readers, who could
not think systematically   Melzer's admirable effort to support Rous-
seau's self-description as a systematic philosopher discredits the
common view of Rousseau as a confused visionary rebelling against
"system" of all kinds   His book is indispensable to forming a just
estimation of Rousseau as a seminal philosophical writer of the West-
ern tradition, one to whom Kant, Fichte, and Hegel acknowledged
deep indebtedness   Failure to appreciate the unity of Rousseau's
thought has been partly due, Melzer notes, to the unsystematic *style*
of Rousseau's writings, none of which presents the "system" as a whole,
but which nonetheless (in Rousseau's words) are "inseparable .
and explain themselves each by the others "   Interpreters have so
often regarded Rousseau's thought as incoherent and contradictory
because they have been misled by the apparent independence of each
writing, thus "mistaking fragments for completed wholes" (pp 4–9)

Whatever the reason, interpreters have lacked access to the key
principle that unlocks Rousseau's system, the natural goodness of man
Melzer offers a compelling account of this principle and its application
in a wide range of texts in Rousseau's corpus (which he commands
thoroughly)   Natural goodness, he shows, is not a sentimental
apotheosis of feeling, and not a mere untested premise, but the result
of a very consequent reflection on the inherent difficulties in the foun-
dational principle of self-preservation (coming to Rousseau from the
Stoics and Hobbes) and in modern attempts to explicate social life
using an antiteleological version of this principle   While devoid of
cosmic orientation or perfectionism, modern self-preservation cannot
be divorced from goodness   To safeguard the element of goodness
(jeopardized by the "other-relatedness" of passion in Hobbes's doc-
trine), Rousseau proposes the hitherto most radical version of an "an-

titeleological teleology" in his account of primal self-unity (the "sentiment of existence") as the fundamental metaphysical, and not simply psychological, constituent of life (pp 35-46) (Melzer notes, however, that Rousseau leaves unclarified its metaphysical status, pp. 47-8) The absolute self-sufficiency of this unity requires divesting it of all rationality, for rationality brings other-relatedness and thus dependence

Furthermore, social life itself becomes culpable for the evils of existence, since dependence on other humans (coeval with society) stimulates rationality and destroys self-unity Thus Melzer argues that Rousseau, in express opposition to all earlier thought (classical, Christian, and Hobbesian), exculpates human nature of all blame for the evils of life, and inaugurates a typically late-modern political "immoderation" that places the onus on human institutions, holding out hopes (in this contrary to Rousseau's intention) for radical political reform Social inequality and "oppression" become the primary horrors of existence, not because they are actually the most painful subjectively but because *all* evils can be traced back to them Rousseau begins a movement of "idealistic realism" that "sublimates Hobbes into Plato" wherein the "high" (or Platonic) ideals of unity, virtue, and happiness (neglected by Hobbes and the *philosophes*) are to be recovered through an attack on rational versions of such ideals, and through a new liberation of the "low" (sentiment, the instinctive, and the body), thereby turning Hobbesian thought against itself by radicalizing it In Melzer's account, the direct heirs of Rousseau are Marx and Nietzsche (not Kant and Hegel), who advance Rousseau's program of "curing humanity" through overcoming all self-imposed dualisms of "high" and "low" (pp 23-6, 81-5, 283-92)

The recovery of goodness, so far as it is possible for socially deformed humanity, is through different versions of "formal self-unity" that abstract from substantive ends given by God or nature These divide into individualist and political forms of self-unity (the solitary dreamer or thinker and the general will) Melzer concentrates on the political solution to disunity, to which he devotes the second (and better) half of his book, first offering a penetrating account of "a new science of morality and politics" based on the general will (chs 7-10), and then a very subtle resolution of the apparent paradox of the egalitarian versus the "authoritarian" Rousseau by discussing the balance of executive and sovereign powers, a theme almost wholly ignored by earlier scholarship (chs 11-12) Melzer ably shows throughout how the radical antiteleological teleology of natural goodness is the basis for these innovations In a final consideration of Rousseau's "mission" as a whole, Melzer argues that Rousseau's writings hold out little or no prospect for improvement of European political institutions, and mostly aim to "delegitimize" political life as such, turning the inhabitants of the modern world toward new private satisfactions (ch 13) From his systematic principle Rousseau concludes that political life must in perpetuity be a realm of alienation, he is thus "a radical philosopher of decadence" (p 265)

By way of criticism and suggestions for further development, I would say (1) Melzer might qualify his distribution of blame for human evil

none to human nature, *all* to society   As Rousseau is centrally oc-
cupied with giving the causes of social life in an account of the human
faculties and their (ironically termed) "perfectibility," it is not possible
to rest with the thesis that society alone is the ground of evil   (2)
He might acknowledge that "natural goodness" is problematic more
than he does, if (as stated above) the "contradiction of society" that
destroys primal unity must in a way be latent in prerational and
prepassionate human nature itself—in its mysterious potential for a
self-alienating reason   (3) Melzer does not explore the complex re-
lation between the "I" and the sentiment of existence which contains
the problem *in nuce*, and he leaves Rousseau's account of the devel-
opment of the human faculties (the relations of reason, imagination,
and passion) mostly unstated   (4) Along these lines, one should ob-
serve how very difficult, if not impossible, the recovery of natural
goodness is even for the solitary thinker or dreamer (cf. *Reveries* 8),
in general, the individual solutions to disunity are given scant attention
although Melzer has rightly claimed they are more important to
Rousseau than the political ones   (5) In the principle of self-unity
Melzer possesses a fine means (see the remarks on pp 41, 91) to clarify
the relation between Rousseau and German idealism, and the move-
ment from nature to freedom and history, without in the least needing
to retract his correct dismissal of the "proto-Kantian" moralistic
readings of Rousseau   (6) Melzer's equation of antiteleological self-
unity with "emancipating the low" may indeed illuminate some
"Rousseauism," but it is not fair to the self-understanding of Rousseau,
whose powerful critique of many passions shows that self-unity is not
really the same as liberation of the passions and the body *tout court*
Whereas Rousseau surely sees himself in agreement with modern
"realist" critiques of premodern reason and virtue, it will not follow
that from his own perspective he is advocating the "low" against the
"high" unless he accepts the self-interpretation of premodern reason
and virtue as "high", but it is just this self-interpretation that
Rousseau (with other moderns) hopes to expose as spurious and
self-deluded

    Such criticisms and suggestions do not alter the judgment that Mel-
zer's study is a very important and ground-breaking addition to Rous-
seau scholarship —Richard L Velkley, *Stonehill College*

MOHANTY, J N   *Transcendental Phenomenology· An Analytic Account*
    Oxford. Basil Blackwell, 1989   viii + 176 pp $34 95—This book, as-
    sembled in large part from previous papers and talks, consists of three
    chapters (and a very adequate index)   The first offers distinctions
    between types of description and between descriptive and speculative
    procedures in philosophy, and then a view as to the character of "phil-
    osophical facts "   Then it turns to the charge that description is really
    interpretation   On account of the method of composition, the chal-
    lenge is met in a somewhat disjointed manner (pp 21-4, 51-64)   With
    emphasis on the question of historical and moral relativism, Mohanty

returns to the theme in chapter 3 as well   What the latter adds is
mainly a comparison of Davidson and Husserl on incommensurable
worlds/conceptual schemes, the sketch of a means for overcoming
relativism "from within," and for confirming a "belief in moral ab-
solutism as [at least] a regulative ideal" by means of "reflective inner
morality" as a particular instance of "tak[ing] up the stance of the
transcendental ego" (pp 145, 147)   Mohanty compares the conflict
in question to that between uncritical contentment with absorption
in Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* and submission (at least as a regulative ideal)
to Kantian *Moralitat* (p 145)   The palm goes to the latter, once it is
construed as something to be arrived at precisely *through* (reflection
on) the former

Philosophical facts are facts about what may equally be called lin-
guistic, ontological, or "subjective" (noetic-noematic) structures (p
10)   As for the latter, the point appears to be that while noemata
may be regarded as having some kind of (ideal) *being*, "acts and noe-
mata are not only different entities, but are *as entities* different" (p
16), that is, they don't have being in just the same sense, the discussion
is part of a treatment of generic versus analogical concepts   In any
case, noemata are, if entities, not *private* (pp 39ff)   What is not so
clear is the sense in which philosophical facts may equally be called
"linguistic "   (In chapter 2 it is held that while noemata are "mean-
ings" of a sort, only some, namely, nonperceptual ones, are equatable
with Fregean "senses", apart from that, Frege missed the extent to
which senses enter *into* acts and thus misconstrued the latter as in-
stances of "bare grasping" [p 43])   As to "essences" it is best to
regard their description as a clarification of sense or meaning (pp 33,
36ff , 56ff), phenomenology claims no infallibility in this regard (pp
29, 125)   The response to hermeneutics we may concede that nothing
is "given" that is not already interpreted, but this is compatible with
acknowledging the capacity—albeit exercised with difficulty—for ob-
jective reflection *upon* the interpretations in question by the "tran-
scendentally purified meditating philosopher" (p 24)   More is said
about the transcendental self in chapter 3, but hermeneuticians will
probably not find it all that convincing   In any case, it is important
to remember that the transcendental self is not a being distinct from
ourselves (pp 153-4)

Chapter 2's discussion of attempts (by, e g , Gurwitsch, Sokolowski)
to construe noemata as not only "senses" but the very "objects" of
consciousness (pp 69-77) is somewhat unsatisfying, perhaps the ques-
tion is clouded by associating it with, for example, Evans's view as to
the inclusion of (ordinary) objects of consciousness *within* mental
"contents "   Mohanty also criticizes Husserl's view of the noematic
"*X*-predicate" structure (pp 78-83)   Among other things, he concludes
that the "predicates" in the perceptual noema cannot be quite the
same as those in a corresponding conceptual noema   It is unclear
why he rejects the idea of predicates that are simply presented in two
different *ways*   The chapter also contains a discussion of the role of
physical and social "context" in the constitution of content and some
critical reflections on Sellars, Dretske, Fodor, and Searle —Richard
E Aquila, *The University of Tennessee, Knoxville*

MULLER, John P , and RICHARDSON, William J , eds   *The Purloined Poe
Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic Readings*   Baltimore. Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1988   xiv + 395 pp n p.—This book is an an-
thology of both previously published and unpublished material con-
sisting of four parts· "Poe and Lacan," "On psychoanalytic reading,"
"Derrida and responses," and "Other readings " The heart of the
anthology is, however, the debate between the psychoanalyst Lacan
and the philosopher Derrida   The debate concerns the interpretation
of a story written by Poe, "The Purloined Letter " To his long essay
on Poe, Lacan gave pride of place by pulling it out of chronological
order and placing it as the first essay in his *Ecrits* (French ed)   Lacan
uses Poe's story to clarify and illustrate the explanatory power of two
master concepts in his own theory the imaginary and the symbolic
Derrida, in "The Purveyor of Truth," reflects critically on Lacan's
theory and his selective use of Poe   The anthology acknowledges that
it only includes, roughly half of Derrida's original article (p 173)
Nevertheless, Derrida's article still gives the impression of a hastily
composed publication   Lacan's essay, however, gives the impression
of being overworked
   One of the great merits of the anthology's editors is in giving guid-
ance to reading the Lacan article   Their guidance is given here in
the same format as was given in their previous work, *Lacan and Lan-
guage A Reader's Guide to* Ecrits   Their guide to Lacan's article
covers 44 pages, though the article by Lacan is only 28 pages   The
guide provides three kinds of help   By way of an overview (ch 3), it
summarizes the ideas of Lacan's article   In a map of Lacan's entire
text (ch 4), we get a detailed table of contents   Finally, in "Notes to
the text" (ch 5), Lacan's concepts are clarified and his references and
allusions identified
   The second part of the anthology enriches the first part by reprinting
Marie Bonaparte's psychoanalytic interpretation of Poe and Shoshana
Felman's overview article on psychoanalytic interpretations   Therein,
Felman points out the originality of Lacan's study of Poe, whose ap-
proach is far less reductionistic than that of earlier psychoanalytic
interpretations of literature   According to Felman, the major failure
of earlier psychoanalytic approaches lay in treating literature as an
expression of unconscious wishes and processes, thereby overlooking
or even abolishing the distinction between a work of art and a symp-
tom   The reason why Lacan's interpretation of Poe is less reduc-
tionistic can be traced back to Lacan's theory of the subject the subject
is the result of a structure , That structure is determined both in
Poe's story and in Lacan's theory by the relation of the subject to the
letter   (Lacan purposefully uses the double meaning of the word
"letter ")
   The third part of the anthology centers on Derrida's critique of
Lacan   The editors provide an insightful overview of Derrida's theory
of deconstruction   They also give us a list of superior secondary lit-
erature on Derrida (p 171)   Derrida's essay criticizes Lacan for not
relating Poe's story to the other writings of Poe   Derrida also crit-
icizes Lacan for giving speech and phallus too central a place in his
theory, thus accusing Lacan of phallogocentrism   That criticism has

the advantage of opening up the theory of Lacan   Since Lacan's theory is not a theoretical structure, but rather an interpretative schema, Derrida's remarks amount to a critique of that interpretative schema Yet it is not the equivalent to an alternative schema   The article by Barbara Johnson, rightly referred to by the editors as "a classic," recaptures the essential contribution of the Derrida article   Any reader should, by the end of part 3, have a good insight into the philosophical implications of French thought, which ties the subject somewhat exclusively to language

In part 4, the editors present us with other readings of Poe, without concentrating on Lacan or Derrida   For philosophers, Muller's article, "Negation in 'The Purloined Letter' Hegel, Poe and Lacan," should be of special interest   Therein, Muller reminds us how the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness in Hegel is marked by negation, and how Freud argues that the communication between consciousness and unconsciousness occurs by means of denials (a theme generalized by Lacan under the thesis that the ego is "méconnaissance")   After an examination of Poe's story and a consideration of Poe's other works and commentators, Muller concludes "The power of negation in approaching truth permeates Poe's story, a story that shows how self-assurance is repeatedly undermined by negation Poe's work as a whole can be said to rest on negation" (p 367).

Indeed, this is a very useful anthology —Wilfried Ver Eecke, *Georgetown University*

PINKARD, Terry   *Hegel's Dialectic The Explanation of Possibility*   Philadelphia Temple University Press, 1988   xi + 236 pp $34 95—Pinkard characterizes his interpretation of Hegel's philosophy as "by no means a straightforward and noncontroversial" (p 7) reading.   This is a fair characterization as his recent exchange with Robert Pippin indicates (*Review of Metaphysics* 43, no 4 [June 1990])   The book presents Hegelian philosophy as essentially an explanatory project aiming at achieving a coherent set of beliefs about experience   "A philosophical problem arises when two basic beliefs (let me call these *categorial* beliefs) both seem to be true but seem also to be inconsistent with each other, both *seem* to be true, but it also seems that *both* cannot be true" (p 5)   Philosophical problems on this reading have the form of Kantian antinomies   Philosophical explanation takes the form of transcendental as opposed to metaphysical argumentation Metaphysical explanations answer the question "how is x possible?" by positing the existence of some entity   Transcendental explanations claim that we must conceive of experience in terms of certain categories if we are to think about it in an intelligible way (p 15)   What distinguishes a Hegelian *speculative* argument from a Kantian transcendental argument, in Pinkard's view, is that it cannot claim to present *the* conditions of the possibility of experience   A Hegelian speculative argument "cannot claim its solutions are unique or necessary" (p 15)

Pinkard distinguishes this nonmetaphysical, broadly transcendental reading of Hegelian philosophy from Hegel's own (depending on whose version of the "secret of Hegel" that one accepts) understanding of his project   Transcendental arguments do not commit us to metaphysical answers   "I shall argue that Hegel *need* take only the first type of explanation, and that he *may* take the second but *need* not do so" (p. 15)   Since Hegel, under the influence of Kant, appears to believe that his explanations are *strongly* transcendental (*the* conditions of the possibility of experience), and appears at times to make metaphysical commitments, Pinkard allows that "perhaps it would be helpful here to distinguish *Hegelian* theory from *Hegel's* theory" (p 9).

What emerges in the book is an insightful, thoroughly contemporary Hegelianism capable of entering into dialogue with philosophical positions whose lineage cannot be traced back to the transcendental turn and that are decidedly postmodern in their rejection of the universalist scope and explanatory finality that many traditional interpretations impute to Hegel's Absolute   A great virtue of the book is its capacity to present Hegelian positions to those not schooled in dialectical jargon

For example, a typical puzzle which the *Science of Logic* presents to its readers is Hegel's usage of the term "category"   He accuses partial philosophical viewpoints of having failed to rise to the level of "the category," and speaks of the "movement" of "the category" through the *Logic*   Pinkard's explanation (pp 13-14), sprung upon a distinction between the terms "concept" and "conception," is a most insightful approach to a difficult but central Hegelian theme   Also, his insistence that it is crucial to avoid an entitative reading of the term "Spirit" is a plank in any workable reading of Hegel, not just in approaches inspired by Klaus Hartmann

A familiar difficulty that confronts those who write on Hegel is that, in order to say *anything*, one must say *everything*   This demand sets up the following exegetical antinomy either one offers a wooden repetition of the System's categories, or an ideosyncratic reading devoid of the systematic requirements of Hegelian explanation   Pinkard's book masterfully avoids these difficulties by presenting a wonderfully lucid exegesis of the *Logic*, the part of Hegel's writings that can both stand on its own and must inform all the rest   It is a presentation that answers many of the questions that a reader trained in formal logic would plausibly bring to dialectical philosophy, and that frankly admits the failure of specific transitions   It is Hegel exegesis, not Hegel apologetics   Most significantly, it captures the transition in the notion of logical transition that characterizes the text's three major divisions

Hegel's Dialectic moves from this insightful presentation of the Major Logic, which is its central achievement, to three other aspects of the system philosophical psychology, social-political philosophy, and the philosophy of history   Here the reader finds specific examples of a nonmetaphysical, explanatory approach to philosophical problems that aims at categorial coherence in our understanding of what "mind" is, of agency, and of history

Of special interest to those trained in transcendental philosophy is Pinkard's explanation of "positing," a central category in German Idealism and a key to understanding in what sense it is correct to call Hegel an "idealist" His nonmetaphysical approach to Hegelian philosophy of history is also a welcome corrective to views seeing Spirit marching through time —John F Donovan, *Mt St Mary's College (Md.)*

SCHOULS, P A   *Descartes and the Enlightenment.*   Montreal McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989   194 pp $29 95—The conceptualiza-tion of periods in history is surrounded by many problems   What does it mean to identify a period by giving it a name, such as *the* Middle Ages or *the* Enlightenment?   When does a period begin and end?   Have St Thomas Aquinas and Abelard something in common because they lived in the same period?   Or Locke, Rousseau, and Kant? These and similar questions are usually studied by historians   Dif-ferent answers are given when different sets of criteria are applied Schouls uses three criteria to characterize the Enlightenment· free-dom, mastery, and progress, three preoccupations which are joined together in the ideal of autonomy   Schouls applies the triad also to the philosophy of Descartes in order to find out whether or not that philosophy forms a part of the Enlightenment and its development He analyzes the concepts of freedom, mastery, and progress in Des-cartes' philosophy and concludes that Descartes already articulated the triad and the corresponding ideal of autonomy   The eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers did little more than widely dissem-inate an inherited ideal (p 4)   Instead of Bacon, Descartes has there-fore to be considered as one of the principal founders of Enlightenment philosophy (p 173).

The emphasis on freedom gives the clue to the elaboration of the affinity between Descartes and the *philosophers* of the Enlightenment Mostly quoting Concordet, Schouls establishes an identity in thinking about the concepts of freedom, science, and progress.   Science has to be considered as the result of the universal application of rational thinking by which nature and the human self are mastered.   Locke inherited this view from Descartes and passed it on to the philosophers of the Enlightenment

Schouls defends his thesis mainly by considering the Cartesian method as a revolutionary way of thinking in science and morals Freedom of tradition and liberation of prejudice is promoted by a radically epistemological individualism (p 22)   Wisdom accordingly has its roots in egocentricity, in an individual's epistemic autonomy (pp 32-3).   Descartes' revolution in the sciences was therefore ac-companied by a revolt against the traditional Christian view of the place of man (p 37)   His concept of reason depends on this revolt According to Schouls, the free will, equivalent to Descartes' liberty of indifference, has primacy with respect to the Cartesian concept of reason   Doubt activated by will becomes therefore the Archimedean point in metaphysics (p 55)

Schouls's chief argument is produced by his analysis of the two kinds of liberties which Descartes distinguishes, namely, the liberty of spontaneity and that of indifference   The first kind is experienced when the will follows freely a clear and distinct perception of the mind, while the latter is the source of the lacks and evils in human judgment and action   Following Kenny, Schouls distinguishes two species in the liberty of indifference, one which is directed to form a balance and one which he calls the liberty of opportunity   Although Kenny calls the latter a perversion, Schouls states that this kind of "indifference" is fundamental in Descartes' philosophy   The Evil Genius, methodological doubt, and the possibility of atheism are only understandable on the basis of a liberty of opportunity   Autonomy and self-determination then follow easily   Mastery, a product of the human desire for power and perfection resulting in indefinite progress in science, is also deduced from this liberty of opportunity   This liberty is also shared by the *philosophes*   Man is thus seen as beyond Paradise and before the Fall, circumventing doctrines about original sin (p 132)

Schouls exposes his arguments in a careful, balanced way. He succeeds in refuting the arguments of those who have denied Descartes' influence on the Enlightenment   The main thesis, however, that Descartes already adhered to the ideal of autonomy, remains problematic. The medieval proofs of God's existence, the problems concerning the finite nature of man, and the doctrine of eternal laws are too easily set aside or left out   Analysis of the differences between Descartes and the Enlightenment philosophers with respect to sense-perception, the primacy of metaphysics, and the relation between reason and will could have given a better insight into the ways in which Descartes tried to reconcile his philosophical belief in God with the mathematical conception of science   The original attempt to reunite metaphysics and science cannot be fully understood from the philosophy of the Enlightenment alone   It has its roots in older traditions.

Schouls missed the chance to signify the awakening of modern thought in Cartesian philosophy in depth   He does not point out the shifts in the meaning of the concepts of freedom, mastery, and progress which took place after Descartes because he uses them in an ahistorical sense as timeless criteria —Evert van Leeuwen, *Free University, Amsterdam*

SCHUMACHER, J A. *Human Posture The Nature of Enquiry.* Albany State University of New York Press, 1989   xiii + 259 pp   Cloth, $39 50, paper, $12 95—Posture is an embodied attitude   The basic initial question is "What posture makes inquiry (the knowledge-making process) possible?"   Essentially, Schumacher argues that (a) there have been two great transitions in human cognitive history, (b) there has been a crucial recent discovery, and (c) we now ought to make a third transition   The book is divided into three parts, roughly one devoted to each of these theses in turn

The first transition is from an action-dominated to a view-dominated
consciousness   It is a shift from a body-centered orientation, from
maker's knowledge through doing, to a vision-centered approach whose
epistemic paradigm is the clear view in which distal objects are in-
stantaneously presented from without   Schumacher dates it roughly
to the late agricultural revolution and discerns its clear presence in
Plato, but it is still being culturally consolidated many centuries later
Indeed, the second transition occurs from 1700-1900 and is precisely
the generalization of this postural shift to culture and social insti-
tutions   According to Schumacher the development of Western sci-
ence has been a following-through of the epistemic ideal of disem-
bodied clear views, evident in the likes of Descartes and Newton, the
founders of modern thought   And the development of Western po-
litical economy has followed through a correlative conception of per-
sons and societies, made especially clear through the analyses of Marx,
Foucault, and others

The recent discovery is this after two millenia of pursuing the view
paradigm, contemporary physics (both relativity theory and quantum
mechanics) has demonstrated its limits and pointed in the direction
of a return to a body-centered inquiry posture   Quantum wholeness
is argued to offer a retrieval of pre-view commonsense   Correlatively,
it is argued that recent critical sociology, political economy, education,
and philosophy (such as feminist analyses and French deconstruc-
tionism) point the way toward a body-centered reconstruct of our
lives that will remove the alienation deriving from abstract view-
centeredness   Schumacher advocates this return to body-centered
life as his third great transition

Schumacher aims for nothing less than an integrated view (or grasp)
of life, from quantum mechanics through the neurophysiology of vision
and the political economy of capitalism to gender emancipation, a
conception rooted in a vision of the history of consciousness from bees
to world citizens

Though incompleteness is inevitable given the ambition, its episte-
mic partialness is of particular concern   There are some obvious
questions subsidiary to the basic initial question What is the structure
of inquiry?   How did inquiry develop historically and culturally, and
why?   What are the limits of inquiry?   What is the nature of objec-
tivity and its role in inquiry?   While this book has some interesting
things to say in connection with the second of these questions, in my
view it takes itself to have said more than it can justify concerning
the last two questions   Also, Schumacher's interpretation of physics
is at best speculative in places   More surprisingly, he says little con-
cerning the first question

But his discussion is always interesting and often illuminating   The
book is well, even quite subtly, written   (Reader, be prepared to take
the time to immerse yourself in the subtle language and attitudes of
posture which Schumacher develops)   And while Schumacher's vision
of an integrated conception is not quite as original as he portrays it
(by omission, there is for example no mention of the related views of
Steiner, Barfield, Havelock, or even McLuhan and only scant note of
Jaynes and Derrida), it does add important new arguments from

contemporary sciences   In short, the book is well worth studying —
C A Hooker, *The University of Western Ontario*

SCHWYZER, Hubert   *The Unity of Understanding*   Oxford Clarendon
    Press, 1990   172 pp $32 50—To think is to think-about objects, this
    simple fact is of course what philosophers of mind have dubbed "in-
    tentionality "   The traditional doctrine of intentionality has it that
    the mind pictures or in some sense *represents* its objects to itself
    Kant initiates a radical departure from this doctrine by insisting that
    the mind forms or in some sense *constructs* its objects   This power
    of mental construction Kant calls the "understanding" (*Verstand*)
        Hubert Schwyzer's interesting book, *The Unity of Understanding*,
    is a "study in Kantian problems," rather than simply a historical
    study of Kant's doctrines   Its task is to explore Kant's theory of the
    understanding, with an eye to Wittgensteinian issues in the philosophy
    of language-and-mind.
        Schwyzer begins with three plausibly Kantian (if not precisely
    Kant's) theses about the understanding (1) the understanding is
    "spontaneous" (that is, active independently of objects), (2) the un-
    derstanding is object-directed, and (3) the understanding is expressible
    in a public language   How can these three theses be held together
    consistently?   Schwyzer's answer to this question has two parts
    First, Kant in fact *cannot* consistently hold the three theses together,
    because of lingering vestiges of the representational (or broadly
    speaking, Cartesian) theory of mind within his theory of the under-
    standing   And secondly, although Kant cannot quite manage to ex-
    tricate himself from representationalism, his three theses point to-
    wards a radically different and more adequate model of the mind
    We are to think of the mind not as a "mirror of nature," but rather
    as an agency embedded within linguistic practices   Let me now sketch
    Schwyzer's arguments in support of this two-part account
        In chapter 2 Schwyzer examines what he calls Kant's "two-pronged
    explanation of how concepts of things are possible" (p 30)   The two
    "prongs" are (1) the notion that concepts stem originally from logical
    functions of unity laid up *a priori* in the understanding—the cate-
    gories, and (2) the notion that bare categories must obtain a temporal
    specification in order for empirical concepts to be applicable to objects
    of experience—the schematism   Schwyzer holds that although con-
    cepts must indeed possess two aspects—a categorial or "horizontal"
    aspect, and a referential or "vertical" aspect—nevertheless Kant has
    no non-arbitrary way of moving from the mere existence of categories
    to their schematization
        Schwyzer then moves beyond Kant in chapter 3 to claim that the
    two aspects of a concept are in fact complementary moments of a
    single conceptualizing ability   This dual ability is made manifest
    only in what Wittgenstein has called "language-games "   On Schwy-
    zer's view, there are as many distinct language-games as there are
    particular concepts, and each language-game is knowable *a priori*

strictly by virtue of possessing a linguistic competence for that game ·
Thus *a priori* knowledge is "knowledge-how" (mastery of a skill) rather
than "knowledge-that" (insight into the truth of a proposition)

Chapters 4 and 5 return to Kant in order to consider some impli-
cations of the Transcendental Deduction—which might be glossed as
the demonstration that objective empirical cognition necessarily in-
volves (a) judgment, (b) transcendental apperception, and (c) the cat-
egories   In other words, intentionality is propositional, self-conscious,
and rule-governed   On Schwyzer's interpretation, this is tantamount
to the claim that consciousness of objects is possible only within the
framework of a rule-governed public language (pp 97–100)   But
Kant's overall account provides nothing which guarantees the com-
municability of such a language (pp 104–6)   Transcendentalese is
thus a "private language" in Wittgenstein's sense

Schwyzer then goes on in chapter 6 and the conclusion to add the
dimension of communicability to Kant's doctrine of the understanding
This amounts to construing cognition as ineluctably bound up with
the rule-following practices characteristic of language-games

For anyone interested in both Kant and Wittgenstein, in both the
theory of intentionality and the philosophy of language, *The Unity of
Understanding* will be intriguing and suggestive   The only real dif-
ficulty I see in this study is caused by its precarious methodological
position between the history of philosophy and systematic philosophy
By his own admission, Schwyzer is not engaging in close textual study
of Kant's texts, but is instead pursuing larger philosophical issues
Yet claims are repeatedly made about "Kant's" doctrine of this or
that   In many cases, these claims are not sufficiently sensitive to
Kant's own complex philosophical intentions   For example, the ab-
solutely central (if notorious) doctrine of transcendental idealism plays
no role whatsoever in Schwyzer's presentation of Kant   Nor does the
equally important (if puzzling) theory of the transcendental imagi-
nation receive any discussion   The result is that Schwyzer's Kant
turns out to be Kant*, a mere foil for the issues Schwyzer really wants
to discuss   And whereas Kant is certainly a deep and fascinating
thinker, Kant* is not —Robert Hanna, *University of Colorado, Boulder*

SCOTT, Charles E   *The Question of Ethics Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger*
   Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1990   xii + 225 pp   Cloth,
   $29 95, paper, $12 95—The question of ethics is a question of the nature,
   value, and origin of "that body of values by which a culture under-
   stands and interprets itself with regard to what is good and bad" (p
   4)   Such a question "indicates an interruption in an ethos, an inter-
   ruption in which the definitive values that govern thought and every-
   day action lose their power and authority to provide immediate cer-
   tainty in their function" (p 4)   It arises out of a suspicion that "ethical
   concern has a pathogenic dimension [that causes] suffering in the

pursuit of human well-being" (p 1)   Thus, the question of ethics is
not a matter of questioning any particular set of values, but is rather
a matter of questioning that aspect of our existence by which we
attempt through the creation of values and rules to make our life a
better one   Such a question requires us to suspend our moral values
and to distance ourselves from our ethical concerns

Scott believes that the question of ethics arose only recently, being
first posed by Nietzsche   However, it is clear that he believes that
the question of ethics is raised necessarily by its subject   In his dis-
cussion of Nietzsche, he attempts to show how ethics and questioning
arose together   Like Nietzsche, Scott locates the origin of morality
in asceticism   Although asceticism, with its opposition to bodily
pleasure, may appear to be simple negation of the body, Scott argues
that it is actually a kind of disciplining of the body that produces a
certain power over both the body and its (meaningless) suffering
Ascetic discipline, therefore, is a kind of self-overcoming towards a
transcendental realm of value   The origin of ethics lies in this process
of self-overcoming   However, this process involves a certain dis-
placement within the self which makes possible the self-alienation
which necessarily invites questioning   The question of ethics is thus
as primordial as ethics

Once this process of self-overcoming and questioning is begun, how-
ever, it can never stop   "The law of the necessity of self-overcoming"
means that no such attempt is stable   The question of ethics must
always remain open   Therefore, the promise of ascetic practice—
final liberation—is always a chimera   Thus, the attempt to have an
ethic without ethical questioning (without, that is, a continuous pro-
cess of self-overcoming) is doomed to failure it is necessarily patho-
genic   Scott reinforces this point through his discussion of Foucault's
treatment of the constitution of the ethical subject   This discussion
not only details more fully what might be called the history of ascetics,
but it shows in detail how ethical practices are (unconsciously)
pathogenic

In the last half of the book, Scott turns to Heidegger, focusing on
the "Rector's Address," in which Heidegger apparently embraced fas-
cism   As Heidegger is one of those philosophers who, according to
Scott, does question ethics, Scott is concerned to distance Heidegger
from this embrace   Although, as Foucault points out, "Western ethics
and fascism are far more closely aligned than we want to believe" (p
3), Scott argues that this connection occurs only if one suspends the
questioning that is central to ethics   Thus, Scott takes great pains
to show that in (temporarily) embracing fascism, Heidegger was being
untrue to the questioning central to his own work   If he had been
true to that questioning, he would have adopted a more liberal position,
as manifested in "The Conversation on a Country Path" (in *Discourse
on Thinking*)

I find this last argument unconvincing   I agree with Scott that
Heidegger could not be a fascist and maintain his questioning stance,
not because his questioning would necessarily lead him to some kinder
and gentler ethos, but because it leads to no ethos at all   The brack-

eting of ethical life necessary to make possible the question of ethics ♠ cannot be undone if the questioning is to continue   Thus, in the end, Scott unintentionally adds support to Habermas's famous charge that Heidegger (like Foucault and Nietzsche) is "a young conservative "— Roger Paden, *George Mason University*

SLEIGH, R C. *Leibniz and Arnauld A Commentary on Their Correspondence*   New Haven Yale University Press, 1990   xv + 237 pp $28 50—The central metaphysical question of Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics* is how to distinguish the actions of God from those of his creatures   In his letter to Arnauld of April 30, 1687, Leibniz wrote that as long as one does not have the knowledge of what a substance is "one will have nothing on which to settle   a solid principle " Thus it seems that the answer to the question of substance is at the same time the solution to the problem of metaphysics   Alas the problem begins where the solution lies   There are four different theories of substance in Leibniz's writings, so the question arises as to which of them provides the answer to Leibnizian metaphysics

Sleigh's *Leibniz and Arnauld* may serve as an excellent guide for a reader interested in the problem   Though Sleigh's study is a commentary, the work accomplishes much more   *Leibniz and Arnauld* supplies many remarks indicating Sleigh's interpretation of some Leibnizian themes   By taking "substance" as a key term of Leibniz's philosophy, I will try to extract from Sleigh's commentary a general scheme of argument and attempt to incorporate one such theory of substance which, on Sleigh's reading of different Leibnizian texts, best fits the entire Leibnizian system

Sleigh distinguishes four different theories of substance (1) *the spiritual theory* (of the *Discourse*), (2) *the monadological theory*, (3) *the corporeal theory* (each corporeal substance is a complete entity consisting of an aggregate of other corporeal substances and the whole aggregate is phenomenal, though each substance has substantial form as an abstraction), and (4) *the modified corporeal substance theory* (all substantial forms behave like substances *in abstracto* and like substances *in concreto*)   The account of substance Leibniz seems to be committed to in the period of his correspondence with Arnauld is that of a modified corporeal theory, holding that basic properties characterizing it (extension and its modes) cannot be analyzed in terms of mere basic properties   Accordingly, nothing whose essence is extension is a substance (*negative thesis*) since every individual substance has its substantial form   Thus the *negative thesis* forms a basis for the *positive thesis*, which requires the existence of substantial forms In light of the above, Leibniz had to answer the problem of the unity and identity of individual substance, an aggregate, that is, how a substantial form can produce an entity persisting through changes of its components   Sleigh argues that Leibniz accomplished this by

introducing the doctrine of *superessentialism,* which says that each substance has all its basic properties essentially, because "nothing is permanent in things except the law itself" (Leibniz's letter to de Volder, 1704), that is, each substance has "built-in" *developmental laws* causing its states throughout history   In order to avoid the consequences of determinism and to preserve freedom and the moral character of the actions of God's creatures, Leibniz based the doctrine of *developmental laws* on the doctrine of *marks and traces* (each substance contains marks of what will be and traces of what has been), which makes desire (of the future) and memory (of the past) necessary components of the doctrine   The basis for that doctrine is *superintrinsicalness,* which led Sleigh to the thesis that the key to Leibniz's system is the "complete concept containment of truth"—a predicate is contained in the concept of a subject—which provides us with complete information about the individual substance, which, in its turn, supplies information about the world to which it belongs   (Sleigh argues here, against Couturat and Mondadori, who held that the principle of sufficient reason was the ultimate source of Leibniz's theory of truth, that the commitment to superintrinsicalness motivated Leibniz to accept the concept-containment of truth rather than vice versa, since there can be a variety of theories of truth that yield the principle of sufficient reason)

It seems that the answer to the main metaphysical question of the *Discourse* concerning the relation of actions of individual substances to those of God could be answered now by linking superintrinsicalness to superessentialism   The argument could be the following Since God is responsible for only one choice of the entire universe which contains all its features intrinsically, "the viability of the recommended theodician strategy is entirely independent of whether the elements of a possible world   have their properties intrinsically" (p 69). Sleigh remarks, however, that linking *superessentialism* with *superintrinsicalness* is, despite the apparent explanatory value for the problem of Leibnizian metaphysics, to go "against the grain of standard interpretations" (p 187) because of the lack of strong textual evidence which could support it   Thus Sleigh's solution, interesting as it is, must, as he states, remain a matter of speculation —Zbigniew Janowski, *Chicago, Ill.*

SMITH, Huston   *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind.*   Wheaton The Theosophical Publishing House, 1989   xv + 281 pp $9 95—In the preface to the second edition of *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind,* Huston Smith states that the book issues an invitation "to step outside our current Western outlook to see it in perspective" (p xi)   Smith's thesis, developed in a number of eclectic and topically diffuse essays, is that our "current outlook," the postmodern outlook, is transitional and that the wave of the future will be a return to the "perennial philos-

ophy" Smith sees postmodern thought as merely a symptom anc consequence of the inevitable breakdown of the modern worldview

In place of, and in direct contrast to, the modern obsession with uniformity and objectivity, the postmodern movement exhibits an "obsession with fragments or fractures" Deconstructionists raise the "Other   to an object for holy concern" (p 239) Yet in its presumption that the only way to attain unity or to speak about and for the whole is the way attempted in modernity, postmodern thought remains under the influence of modernity Even in its more historically conscious proponents, such as Heidegger, there is a tendency to read tenets peculiar to modern thought back into premodern thought (pp 30-6). The difficulty with postmodern thought turns out to be a difficulty at the root of modernity As Smith puts it, "once you set things up as Descartes did, there can be no solution" (p 237) Besides, the "will to order" is basic to human life, the postmodern attempt to live without any orienting vision is unworkable Metaphysics, according to Smith, is "inescapable"

The largest section of the book, entitled "Looking Around An Angle on Our Times," contains Smith's critique of modernity's "scientism" and its adverse effects upon human culture, particularly upon education Smith argues that modernity is driven by a Promethean "will to power" In its myopic preoccupation with the quantifiably measurable, it is blind to "purposes," "normative values," "qualities," and distinctively religious experience The consequences for education have been devastating (pp 96-104) The evidence and subject matter of an entire realm of human experience have become "excluded knowledge", the study of the humanities and of religions have been denigrated and deformed Yet, according to Smith, only a rejuveration of these disciplines will provide a way out of the crisis that now envelops the human race

One of the chief impediments to the revivification of these disciplines is that they have become assimilated to the language and methods of modern science In the process, they have lost their original or "primordial" inspiration, which had to do with an openness to "higher realms of being—domains of existence that begin precisely where science stops" (p 91) Smith counsels a return to the perennial philosophy, which is characterized by universality and is oriented to final, transcendent truth One of the more interesting features of Smith's account is his development of a hierarchical conception of the structure of reality (pp 52-67) The perennial philosophy does not discard science, rather, it insists that the scientific approach to reality is inherently limited and must thus be subordinated to religious accounts

Smith concludes the series of essays by developing an analogy between scientific and religious perception Just as in science "certain key perceptions   require their appropriate instruments," so too is this the case in the realm of the spirit Properly religious insight requires "purity of heart," a cleansing of the "doors of perceptior" (pp 257-63) Smith's work may itself be read as ordered to the kind of moral and intellectual conversion that the proponents of the perennial philosophy have deemed a necessary propaedeutic to the philosophic life —Thomas S Hibbs, *Boston College*

SMITH, Steven B   *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*   Chicago· The University
of Chicago Press, 1989.   xiv + 251 pp $29 95—Recently there have
been intensive debates concerning the new defenses of liberalism (pri-
marily Rawls) and those labeled the "communitarian" critics of lib-
eralism   The latter argue that the conceptions of the self and human
agency presupposed by defenders of liberalism are deficient   For a
liberal conception of the self fails to do justice to the social-historical
context in which the modern individual has emerged   Liberalism
neglects the communal-historical context of political activity   The
terms of this debate have reached a stage where such concepts as
community and communtarian are becoming increasingly vague and
ambiguous   What is badly needed is a rethinking of the substantive
issues that underlie these debates   In this respect, one can welcome
a revival of interest in Hegel's political philosophy, for many of the
issues presupposed by these current debates were thought out more
carefully and thoroughly by Hegel   Smith's lucid and thoughtful
book is especially timely   Smith seeks to show that the standard
conception of Hegel as an antiliberal thinker is too superficial   Hegel
appreciated the contributions of a liberal theory of rights and sought
to expose the precise points of weakness of liberalism   Rather than
being "against" liberalism, Hegel sought to incorporate the "truth"
implicit in a liberal theory of rights into a more comprehensive and
adequate political theory   Smith begins by adumbrating the origins
of the Hegelian project   He then carefully reviews Hegel's *immanent*
critique of the liberal theory of rights and shows how this sets the
stage for Hegel's own theory of rights—a theory that gives prominence
to the "right of recognition "   This culminates in the Hegelian *Re-
chtstaat,* which Smith translates as "the rule of law "   He completes
his study by delineating Hegel's own distinctive idea of Critical
Theory and what the controversial claim about the "end of history"
really means

   Smith has managed to do something which very few English com-
mentators on Hegel have succeeded in doing   He is able to write
about Hegel in a manner that is both forceful and persuasive without
being seduced by Hegel's own distinctive idiom   In the background
of Smith's sensitive treatment of the issues is the relevance of Hegel
for confronting *our* political questions   Consequently, this book is
important not only for scholars of Hegel but for a much wider audi-
ence—those who are concerned with the question and centrality of
rights but are dissatisfied with the abstractness and lack of historical
"thickness" of neo-Lockean and neo-Kantian defenses of liberal rights.
Smith's nonmetaphysical reading of Hegel enables one to see just how
alive and relevant Hegel's political philosophy is for us today —
Richard J Bernstein, *New School for Social Research*

SPINOZA, Baruch   *Tractatus theologico-politicus*   Translated by Samuel
Shirley.   Introduction by Brad S. Gregory   Leiden E J Brill, 1989

316 pp $82 50—The first complete English translation of Spinoza's
Tractatus theologico-politicus was published anonymously in London
in 1689 under the title *A treatise partly theological and partly political,*
though prior to it Charles Blount had incorporated a liberal translation
of chapter 6 ("On Miracles") of the *Tractatus* in his *Miracles no vio-
lations of the laws of nature* (London, 1683)   The language employed
in the 1689 translation suggested a decidedly political intention for
the work and thus certain liberties were taken with the text   Since
that time there have been translations of passages or chapters from
the *Tractatus* into English   Most recently, A G Wernham has trans-
lated and edited selections from the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and
Tractatus politicus in *The Political Works of Spinoza* (Oxford, 1965)
Still, the standard source for English language readers of Spinoza
has been R H M Elwes's two-volume translation of *The Works of
Spinoza,* published originally in 1883 and reprinted without emen-
dations in 1951 (Dover Publications)   His translation, however useful,
is far from adequate and the appearance of Samuel Shirley's trans-
lation of Spinoza's *Tractatus* is most welcome

Shirley's translation is preceded by a lengthy introductory essay
written by Brad S Gregory (pp 1–44) which "intends to sketch some
of the historical topography for Spinoza's TTP" and thus he "will help
provide contour for Mr Shirley's translation "   In the essay, Gregory
examines the life of Spinoza and the various influences which affected
his thinking   Spinoza's early questioning of rabbinical doctrine, his
contact with unorthodox religious sects (e g , Collegiants, Quakers,
and Mennonites), his interest in Biblical criticism and its sources, the
impact of Cartesianism, and the emergence of modern natural science
are among the factors considered by Gregory in his topography for
the *Tractatus*   According to Gregory, "Spinoza is a philosopher whose
works reflect a basic unity of thought" but that "does not mean there
is no development to be observed" (p 10)   In particular, the question
of the relationship between the *Tractatus* and the *Ethica ordine geo-
metrico demonstrata* is discerned, for Gregory, in the "practical im-
petus" which "motivated Spinoza to work out his philosophy as he
did" (p 11).   While the introductory essay is instructive and useful,
it cannot be substituted for a careful study of the significance of the
Tractatus, and that is made available to us through Shirley's very
sound translation

This translation surpasses that of Elwes in many respects   First,
Shirley bases his translation on the critical edition of Spinoza's works
compiled by Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg, 1925), and where appropriate
he relies on more recent scholarship   Elwes, on the other hand, used
the C H Bruder edition (Leipzig, 1843–46)   Second, Shirley supplies
all thirty-nine of the notes to the text of the *Tractatus* offered by
Spinoza whereas the Elwes edition contains only thirty-three of them
Furthermore, Spinoza supplied certain explanatory remarks concern-
ing Hebrew passages in the Bible (especially in chapter 4) which Shir-
ley has included but which Elwes omitted   Third, and most impor-
tantly, the Shirley translation is much more literal in character than
that found in the Elwes version   Accordingly, a number of errors
found in the Elwes translation are corrected by Shirley (e g , compare

p 40 in Elwes "where [the Apostle Paul] attributes righteousness to man" with p 85 in Shirley "as for [Paul's] attributing righteousness to God" the Latin is *"ubi Deo justitia tribuit"* [Bruder III/42, 23-24]); and Shirley's translation engages in none of the forced readings found in Elwes (e g , compare Bruder [III/58, 26-27], *"Haec de lege absolute considerata,"* with p 102 in Shirley, "So much for the law taken in the absolute sense," and with p 58 in Elwes, "So much about law in the abstract")

Shirley's text also contains his own explanatory notes to Spinoza's text, where they are pertinent, and an index of biblical references, references to classical authors, and a general index (pp 310-15) There is every reason to welcome Shirley's English translation of the *Tractatus* as the best one available. There is virtually nothing to criticize about it except that the price undoubtedly will prove to be prohibitive to those who would benefit most from the work those interested in the serious reading of Spinoza, especially students   Even so, considerable gratitude is owed to Shirley for his efforts on behalf of Spinoza scholarship and it will be most interesting to compare his translation with the one being prepared by Edwin Curley for the second volume of his *Collected Works of Spinoza* —Paul J Bagley, *Loyola College in Maryland*

STOUT, Jeffrey   *Ethics After Babel.* Boston Beacon Press, 1988   338 pp   n p —There are those who think that moral life and moral reflection today are in complete disarray   What is sometimes called "diversity" or "pluralism" is read as nothing but fragmented confusion, Babel "Relativism," "Incommensurability," "Nihilism" are used as polemical weapons in contemporary ethical debates   After the demise of the varieties of "foundationalism," one wonders what is left of ethics as a philosophic discipline   Furthermore, most philosophers are deeply suspicious of the very idea of a "religious ethics," or that theology has *any* role to play in the contemporary conversation about the nature and epistemological status of ethics

In this lively and challenging book, Jeffrey Stout seeks to cut a path through this thicket of confusion   He endeavors to sort out what he takes to be right and wrong in claims and counterclaims about moral skepticism, relativism, and incommensurability   He argues forcefully that one of the failures of modern moral theory has been to marginalize or ignore the contributions of religious ethics   He argues that recent debates between liberals and communitarians have become increasingly sterile and that we need to move beyond the terms of this "opposition " He sharply criticizes those like MacIntyre who think that the narrative of moral life and moral theory since the time of the Enlightenment is a story of relentless decline. But he is also critical of those who think that there is nothing wrong with contemporary liberal practices and institutions   Throughout, he defends and prac-

tices "moral bricolage," which he defines as "the process in which one begins with bits and pieces of received linguistic material, arranges some of them into a structured whole, leaves others aside, and ends up with a moral language one proposes to use " The language Stout proposes to use is one committed to the idea that there are indeed "moral truths," and that truth must be carefully distinguished from warranted assertability He thinks that those who claim that contemporary moral life is a disaster are guilty of excessive exaggeration, for there is more of an overlapping consensus on moral issues than is frequently acknowledged But he is wary of those who seem to be content with the bourgeois achievements of modern liberal societies

It is only toward the end of his study that Stout risks labeling his own position "modest pragmatism " Although Stout is sympathetic with many of Rorty's claims (and indeed he gives one of the most generous interpretations of Rorty), he also wants to distance himself from the existentialist excesses of Rorty's flirtation with an "aestheticized ironic pragmatism " Stout's "modest pragmatism" is very close to the *robust* pragmatism of John Dewey, who was constantly involved in addressing the moral conflicts of everyday life Whether one agrees or disagrees with Stout, his readings of figures as diverse as MacIntyre, Rorty, Donagan, Bellah, Gustafson, and many others are always fresh and challenging

There is, however, an ironical consequence of Stout's subtle and complex reflections Stout is working in the tradition of religious ethics He knows full well the dilemma that religious ethicists face today—that either there is *some* sense in which their religious convictions have substantive consequences for what they say about ethics or, despite appeals to these convictions, their substantive contribution to ethical discussion and moral thought doesn't differ in any significant respect from the claims of nonbelievers But by the end of this book, it is difficult to discern the difference that makes a difference between Stout's substantive claims about morals and moral discourse and the claims that might be made by a robust pragmatist like Dewey Stated in another way, a nonbeliever could agree with virtually everything Stout says in this book So it is difficult to isolate what if anything is "religious" about religious ethics Even Stout's plea for a stereoscopic view of our society and a stereoscopic social criticism does not seem to differ from similar views championed by nonbelievers (or believers who think that their religious faith is not directly relevant to their moral and political lives)

The instability of Stout's "position" becomes manifest in his judicious and sympathetic discussion of James Gustafson Stout confesses that the affinity he finds between his own views and Gustafson's is "troubling " He tells us "Gustafson's criticisms of traditional religious doctrines create a momentum that seems bound to carry us beyond his own position to atheism [to] something like Midgley's sane and sober vision of our place among the other species in a vast and largely unknown universe " But this is troubling only if one seeks to resist the momentum from religious ethics to a thoroughly secularized ethics A sensitivity to religion and religious ethics may well have the effect of hermeneutically enlarging the moral language

that we (and modern philosophers) speak, but one may wonder if there is not a similar "momentum" at work in Stout's own defense of religious ethics —Richard J Bernstein, *New School for Social Research.*

STRÖKER, Elisabeth, and JANSSEN, Paul *Phänomenologische Philosophie* Freiburg and Munich Karl Alber, 1989   408 pp DM 95—This book provides a comprehensive historical and thematic overview of phenomenological philosophy   The first half, written by Elisabeth Stroker, is devoted to Husserlian phenomenology, the second, by Paul Janssen, addresses the central German and French heirs of the phenomenological tradition Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Lévinas   The main stages in the phenomenological itinerary of each thinker are carefully reconstructed and analyzed, their aporiae considered, and—in the case of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists—their relation to Husserl's own phenomenology laid out in detail. The Stroker portion of the book also contains a useful exposition of the historical and philosophical context in which Husserl's thought emerged, and some discussion of the development of Husserlian phenomenology in America, especially in the work of Gurwitsch and Schutz

  The book has two main stated aims to provide a synoptic account of the current state of phenomenological research, and to bring out the underlying unity of the diverse outlooks and approaches generally considered "phenomenological," thereby opposing the view that there are only phenomeno*logies* but no phenomeno*logy*   Stroker makes the incisive and also highly Husserlian point that diversity can be meaningful only on the basis of unity (p 19), thus employing a strictly philosophical insight to establish the framework for the historical account   In actual execution, however, the demonstration of the essential unity of phenomenology—the features shared by, for example, Husserl, Scheler, Sartre, and Lévinas, and which make them all "phenomenologists"—is less clear-cut than one might wish, and even leaves the impression that here it is a matter more of the partial overlappings of a "family resemblance" than of universals   For example, we learn that for Scheler the method of the intuition of essences is crucial, although his particular appropriation of *Wesensschau* is not strictly Husserlian, while for Merleau-Ponty the key Husserlian inheritance is the means for capturing an experience prior to its scientific objectification, and even prior to the subject-object split   The authors themselves emphasize that the answer to the question of the essence of phenomenology is not a simple one, and indicate that such unity as is to be found is to be sought in the method   One does indeed come away from the book with the sense that all these disparate thinkers do continue to adhere to Husserl's principle of all principles—that is, that intuition is the ultimate source of all knowledge—in one form or another, and that this is what makes them all phenomenologists despite their great diversity in other respects   However, this point is not developed explicitly or in detail

  It should be emphasized that this is no mere historical synopsis,

but a very philosophical book   The level of the treatment everywhere reflects the authors' vast experience in the field, and often contains in condensed form their own considered views on central and occasionally controversial issues   The philosophical sophistication and complexity of the analysis is notably higher than, for example, that of Spiegelberg's *The Phenomenological Movement*, the standard English-language work which in some sense covers similar terrain   The extreme density of the discussion could pose difficulties for readers without specialized background in the field, and this is likely to be especially the case for an English-language audience   However, even the general philosophical reader would profit from the solid reconstructions, excellent textual and historical exegesis, and copious references   For the more specialized reader this will be an invaluable guide through the thickets of the phenomenology literature, including some fascinating but often neglected topics, as well as the most recent research —Gail Soffer, *New School for Social Research.*

WALTON, Kendall L   *Mimesis as Make-Believe On the Foundations of Representational Arts*   Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1990. xiv + 450 pp $35 00—The core of Walton's theory is the claim that *make-believe*, understood as imagination or pretense, is the common element in all representations—literature, visual arts, theater, film, and opera   He sets out to show that, taking seriously childrens games as a starting point, we can learn a lot about various kinds of representation   He suspects that make-believe may be crucially involved even in certain religious practices, in sports, in the institutions of morality, and in postulates of "theoretical entities" in science   His theory will help us see, he suggests, that "engaging in make-believe provides practice in roles one might someday assume in real life, that it enables one to come to grips with one's own feelings, that it broadens one's perspectives" (p 12)

Make-believe is set in motion by *prompters*   A stump, for example, may provoke a person to imagine that she sees a bear   The value of prompters is that they help to enrich our imaginative lives by generating for us *fictional truths*   Prompters can be artifically constructed, this is the way unusually creative persons stimulate the imaginative thoughts of others, and Walton is inclined to think that, like intending, imagining is *essentially* self-referential   "People are egocentric" (p 28)   A prompter that generates a fictional truth is a *prop*   Props function only in a social human setting, and include among them representational works of art   Fictional truths prescribe or mandate in some contexts that some propositions be imagined   "Imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true   What is true is to be believed, what is fictional is to be imagined" (p 41)   Props are important because they bestow on fictional worlds "a kind of objectivity," "an independence from cognizers," thus saving fictions from being figments of people's imaginations   Even figurative paintings "point beyond" themselves

While comparing fiction with nonfiction, Walton takes exception to
the views that treat fiction as pretended or as represented illocutionary
actions   Theorists, such as John Searle, accept the idea that fiction
is parasitic on "serious" discourse   That idea may have some plau-
sibility when applied to literature, but paintings or sculptures do not
pretend to make truth claims, they are props created for the purpose
of being used in imaginative activities   Similarly, while fiction may
be a means of communication or play a role as a vehicle of action, it
need not serve these functions   Walton insists that the primary
function of representations is to serve as props in games of make-
believe (p 89)   In the section dealing with truth and reality, he makes
an intriguing suggestion bearing on a larger philosophical issue which,
although beyond the scope of his topic, nevertheless reveals his meta-
physical perspective (akin to that also favored by Richard Rorty)
"There may be a significant sense in which facts are not found but
made, in which reality is the product rather than (simply and
straightforwardly) the target of thought and word" (p 99)

Replete with illuminating examples from many arts, the book pro-
ceeds to deal with other issues bordering on epistemology and meta-
physics, such as the nature of objects of representation, including the
distinction between representing and referring and the problematic
idea of nonactual objects   Closer to the central domain of aesthetics,
we are treated to discerning observations about appreciating repre-
sentations and about different aspects of participation, including such
psychological phenomena as "fearing fictionally," reminiscent of what
Aristotle called "catharsis "   Among the highly original parts of this
book must be counted a carefully crafted distinction between depictive
and verbal representations, which also includes penetrating remarks
about different kinds of narration   The final chapter broadens into
an exploration of some semantic and ontological questions, such as
logical form and claims of existence   Readers of this comprehensive
and demanding study will gain from it a renewed appreciation of how
questions about art quickly merge with larger philosophical issues,
even if they may not be sure whether the notion of make-believe is
as central as Walton takes it to be —Konstantin Kolenda, *Rice
University*

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible,
PETER J. CASARELLA

This paper examines the convergence and divergence between Nicholas of Cusa's theory of possibility and the Aristotelian doctrine which considers actuality to be prior to possibility   For Cusanus, deliberately enigmatic significations for God such as *possest*, a neologism derived from *posse* and *est*, refer beyond the opposition between potency and act to the point of identity prior to their differentiation   Moreover, Cusanus contends in his last dialogue that "possibility itself" appears to be the hidden ground of all actual existence   Following Werner Beierwaltes and Hans-Georg Gadamer, it is argued that Cusanus' theory approaches Heidegger's claim to disclose "the quiet power of the possible "   The paper concludes with remarks about Cusanus' relevance to Heidegger's project of overcoming the "onto-theological constitution of metaphysics "

Perception, Conjecture, and Dialectic in Nicholas of Cusa,
CLYDE LEE MILLER

This paper explores two related areas of Cusanus' thought not often connected.   Part 1 discusses perception and implicitly all human knowing as conjectural and perspectival   These ideas suggest fruitful ways to take account of partial viewpoints in working toward a provisional synthesis of the whole.   Part 2 turns to philosophical theology to explore how Cusanus capitalizes on conjectural perspectives by moving through and beyond them in his dialectical quest for the divine

---

*The Relationship Between the Epistemologies of Ramon Lull and
Nicholas of Cusa,* THEODOR PINDL-BÜCHEL

Cusanus took over not only various individual ideas from Lull's works,
but also a conception of science which was fundamental for his own thought
The author discusses the correspondence between epistemology and meta-
physics which underlies the idea of science held by both authors and then
considers human knowledge in terms of the ideas of (1) a "contract" re-
alization of the absolute and (2) an ascent to intellectual knowledge beyond
sense experience and rational discourse, also common to both authors

Problems of the Infinite Cusanus and Descartes,
    KARSTEN HARRIES

The essay shows how the themes of perspective and infinity are joined
in the thought of Cusanus and Descartes   Depending on the different
meanings given to perspective, we arrive at different interpretations of
the infinite thus from the ordinary spatial meaning of perspective we arrive
at the idea of infinite, homogeneous space, from an understanding of the
perspectival nature of language, at an understanding of the infinite richness
of each individual, from an understanding of the perspectival nature of
the principle of noncontradiction, at an understanding of the *coincidentia
oppositorum.*   In each case the problem of thinking the infinite is analogous
discursive reason suffers shipwreck and it is precisely this shipwreck that
frees one to understand the infinite

Pantheism from John Scottus Eriugena to Nicholas of Cusa,
    DERMOT MORAN

Christian Neoplatonists frequently have been accused of pantheism.
Despite claims to the contrary, the notions of "pantheism" and "panenthe-
ism" cannot be coherently distinguished from one another   Medieval au-
thors do not use either term but refer to the doctrine that God is the *forma
omnium* or *materia omnium,* or assert that God is *lapis in lapide*   The
classic exponents of this heresy are David of Dinant and Amaury of Bene
Nicholas of Cusa praises David of Dinant and criticizes Amaury   He as-
serts that God is the *forma omnium,* but he avoids pantheism by making
use of the doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and the doctrine that
created things are a *contractio* of the divine nature   This view is contrasted
with that of Thomas Aquinas   The origins of these doctrines in John
Scottus Eriugena are also examined

Introduction and Major Works of Nicholas of Cusa, LOUIS DUPRÉ

Contingentia *and* Alteritas *in Cusa's Metaphysics,*
    THOMAS P McTIGHE

Nature and Grace in Nicholas of Cusa's Mystical Philosophy,
   LOUIS DUPRÉ

Contradiction and Relations Hegel and the Tradition,
   ARDIS B. COLLINS

The principle of noncontradiction, as Aristotle originally formulated
and defended it, depends on the Aristotelian metaphysics of separate iden-
tities   This article begins by demonstrating this   It then shows how
Thomas Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa derive the differentiating content
of contradictories from a being in which these contents are one and the
same undifferentiated infinity   By taking this position, Aquinas and Cusa
demonstrate the necessity of thinking contradictories as both the same
and different   The ultimate purpose of the article is to show that Hegel's
position on contradiction, developed in the first section of the *Phenome-
nology of Spirit,* carries out the same program more thoroughly   Hegel
challenges the assumptions implicit in the principle of noncontradiction
by demonstrating that the metaphysics of separate identities must be re-
thought as a metaphysics of relational order   In the process, he also meets
the challenge of Kant's attack on traditional rationality

The Sacrament Gives Rise to Thought, J PATRICK MOHR

For Hegel, both religion and philosophy present the same content,
God   Religion presents the content in the form of *Vorstellung,* idea or
representation, and so is other-determined.   But in philosophy otherness
is overcome as the self-determination which God is and becomes explicitly
recognized in thought as form   The Christian religion, which Hegel con-
siders to be the complete or consummate religion, and which presents the
correct content which his philosophy transforms, is constituted by word
and sacrament   And the sacrament most determinative of the conscious-
ness of the Christian community, because of its constant repetition, is that
of the Eucharist, or communion   Taking seriously Hegel's claim that his
philosophy is the transformation of Christian religion, this article examines
his understanding of the symbolic form of its central sacrament in order
to show the implications of that understanding for his philosophical
thought

Hegel's Deformation of Philosophy, NOREEN O'CARROLL

Hegel is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of all
time   Yet the charge leveled against him by Eric Vogelin is that he effected

the deformation of philosophy in the classic sense   Vogelin bases his case
on Hegel's declaration of his aim in the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology
of Spirit,* which is that philosophy cast off its name "love of knowledge"
and become actual knowledge   In Vogelin's view, "philosophy" is a term
that had been originally coined to express the experience of love of wisdom
or knowledge, and while its insights can advance, it cannot advance beyond
its structure as love of wisdom   This paper is an exposition of Vogelin's
allegation—and an evaluation of its validity

Trinity and Spirit, DALE M. SCHLITT

     In this article Hegel's interpretation of the notion of Trinity as a
movement of spirit or true subjectivity is examined in order to work toward
an initial formulation of a post-Hegelian philosophical interpretation of
Trinity   The argument, at once historical and constructive, proceeds in
four steps   First, a review of the way in which Hegel sees the notion of
spirit developing from the philosophy of Descartes through the philosophies
of Kant and Fichte to his own philosophical concept of spirit   Second, a
look more directly at Hegel's dialectical interpretation of Trinity as move-
ment of spirit   Third, an indication of the problematic character of Hegel's
interpretation of Trinity and of the underlying concept of spirit with which
he works   Finally, a look with Hegel toward a philosophical formulation
of the Trinity lying beyond but also in a certain continuity with his own
position

*Transitions and Tensions in Hegel's Treatment of Determinate
     Religion,* LOUIS DUPRÉ

Absolute Spirit Revisited, QUENTIN LAUER

The Happiness of God Hegel and Thomas Aquinas,
     EMILIO BRITO

----

*Consciousness Naturalized· Supervenience without
     Physical Determinism,* DENNIS M SENCHUK

     This article defends the anti-compatibilistic contention that con-
sciousness originates flexible behaviors which are not fully predetermined
by a closed system of physical laws   Without running afoul of the com-
pellingly anti-Cartesian proposal that states of consciousness "supervene"

on physical reality, the paper endorses a dual-aspect theory of emergent conscious flexibility *as tied to* higher-level physical indeterminacy   The possibility of emergent macro-level physical indeterminacy will be urged in direct opposition to a rational reconstruction of the strongest grounds for asserting physical determinism   This possibility does not depend upon irremediably random micro-level indeterminacy and does seem to allow for more meaningful freedom of action than conceived of by compatibilists Topics include Bergson's argument for the unforeseeability of conduct, Russell's neutral monism and causal skeleton hypothesis, varieties of event determination, physicalistic reductionism, and the (natural) emergence of consciousness

Play and the Theory of Basic Human Goods,
   ANTHONY J CELANO

The article concentrates upon the meaning of the concept of play and its relevance to the ethics of basic moral goods   A small but growing number of moralists have recently asserted that they can easily identify certain actions that are universally choiceworthy   These actions are said to be so inherently good that they provide the basis for the moral life. While no one particular good can be justifiably chosen at the expense of another, they are described as desirable to anyone acquainted with the range of human opportunities   The central argument of the article examines the definition of play, and criticizes its facile inclusion in the list of basic goods   The article concludes with some criticisms of the general theory of basic moral goods

Moral Imagination, Freedom, and the Humanities, JOHN KEKES

This paper develops a conception of moral imagination according to which its function is to enlarge the field of our possibilities and correct the mistakes we tend to make in judging what our possibilities are. Thus through moral imagination we acquire moral breadth and depth   But moral imagination also increases our freedom by increasing both our possibilities and our realism about what they are   Since one traditional task of the humanities is the cultivation of moral imagination, the humanities have an indispensable moral and educational role

Knowledge is Merely True Belief, CRISPIN SARTWELL

This paper suggests the following analysis of "*S* knows that *p*" (1) "*S* believes that *p*," and (2) "*p* is true."   It advocates the view that no

further conditions, including justification conditions, are necessary for propositional knowledge. The paper does not provide much in the way of positive arguments for this position (such arguments will be developed in future papers) Rather, it argues for a suspension of burden of proof by trying to show that our practices with regard to the word "knows" do not univocally establish that some further condition is required By and large, a rather superficial appeal to such practices has been the only general type of argument provided in the literature to the effect that some third condition for knowledge is required In addition, the paper adduces cases in which true belief seems sufficient for ascriptions of knowledge, and it concludes by arguing that acceptance of the claim that knowledge is merely true belief would solve certain outstanding difficulties in epistemology

Recent Work on Ethical Relativism, ROBERT M STEWART and
    LYNN L. THOMAS

This article reviews recent proposals for relativist ethical theories Anthropological as well as philosophical concerns are addressed The relativist proposals of Renteln, Harmon, Wong, and Fisk are critically examined at some length Harmon's internalism and social logic are given sustained analytical examination A set of provisional criteria of adequacy for relativist theories is developed, involving such notions as identification, applicability and scope, cognizance of criticism, and consistency with sociocultural understandings

Necessary A Posteriori Truth, RICHARD SWINBURNE

Two sentences express the same proposition if they are synonymous; they express the same statement if they attribute the same properties to the same objects at the same time (however objects and times are picked out) Neither propositions nor statements are necessary a posteriori Suggested examples of the necessary a posteriori, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus," or "water is H_2O," only appear to be such because of a confusion between proposition and statement

What Is the Explanandum of the Anthropic Principle?
    PATRICK A. WILSON

If any of the fundamental constants or initial conditions of the universe had been even slightly different, human life could never have arisen In short, the universe seems "finely tuned" for human habitation The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life A closer look at the principle's explanandum, as it is usually construed, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. The anthropocentrism is particularly difficult to remove, even if the conception of what counts as intelligent life is broadened Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of

life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted.   Leslie's and Barrow and Tipler's attempts to avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems

Teleological Underdetermination, MARK OKRENT

Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and the Future of Self-Alienation,
    RICHARD SCHACHT

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 69, No 1, March 1991

Ratifiability, Game Theory, and the Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, ELLERY EELLS and
    WILLIAM L. HARPER

The main conclusion of this paper is that various natural developments of the recent decision criterion of *ratifiability* (based on Jeffrey 1981, 1983), as well as some natural implications of classical *game theory* (Nash 1951) for individual decision, are in conflict with Sen's (1970) seemingly plausible alpha and beta conditions, which together are sometimes called the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives   Examples are given that the authors argue tell against the alpha and beta criteria, and in favor of the ratifiability idea, and it is explained how these examples and arguments about individual decision-making derive further support from Nash equilibrium ideas in classical game theory.

Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-Order Universals,
    GRAHAM ODDIE

Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility   It is irreducibility which distinguishes a supervenience thesis from old-fashioned reductionism   The supervenience dilemma is that either the kind of determination required for economy brings reducibility, or else it is mysterious   Most of the debate has centered on first-order attributes, and so the question arises whether the introduction of monadic second-order universals might save supervenience theses from the dilemma in a natural way   It is argued that reducibility still threatens, and that even with such ontological ascent, irreducibility can be bought only by sacrificing ontological economy   Finally, a rather radical metaphysical proposal is considered, which salvages the plausible intuitions that lie behind supervenience· the demand for universalizability (or determination) without reducibility   But the proposal provides little solace to ontological misers. Throughout, the focus is on the relation between natural attributes and goodness, but the conclusions derived are perfectly general

Behaviorism, Neuroscience and Translational Indeterminacy,
    KEN WARMBRŌD

Quine's thesis of translational indeterminacy depends on the assumption of a behaviorist methodology, and it specifically excludes the relevance of neurological information to semantics and to translation Such behaviorist constraints are unreasonable because they lead to an extreme indeterminacy concerning even simple semantic matters such as the translation of truth functions   This indeterminacy is more extreme than is generally recognized and more extreme than Quine has acknowledged   Moreover, such extreme indeterminacy is avoidable provided that we adopt a methodology in linguistics which is capable of exploiting neurological information for semantic purposes   It is argued that neurological information has the capacity to eliminate the extreme indeterminacy in translating truth functions, but it still cannot eliminate indeterminacy entirely.   Hence a linguistic science informed by neuroscience must still contend with the indeterminacy problem

*Knowability, Actuality, and the Metaphysics of Context-
    Dependence,* PHILIP PERCIVAL

Fitch's proof shows that $p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp$ classically entails an absurdity, $p \rightarrow Kp$ Does this refute the antirealist thesis that all truths are knowable? Edgington argues that, on the contrary, it merely shows that this thesis should be formulated as $Ap \rightarrow \Diamond KAp$ using a rigid actual operator A. Her proposal rests heavily on the claim that an account of what it is to have the same knowledge in different possible situations should parallel accounts of what it is to have the same knowledge at different times   This paper argues that Edgington's proposal is untenable because the two cases are quite different   Connecting the discussion with the metaphysics of context-dependence, it develops two corollaries an argument from intuitive knowledge-identities across times against Prior's conception of time, and an argument from intuitive propositional-identities across possible situations against Lewis's metaphysics of modality

Atheism, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology, QUENTIN SMITH

Aristotle's Much Maligned Megalopsychos,
    HOWARD J. CURZER

Modern moral philosophers as well as Aristotle's commentators find Aristotle's *megalopsychos* rather repulsive   This article rebuts the accu-

sations that the *megalopsychos* is conceited, snobbish; ungrateful and manipulative; inactive and remote, oblivious and immoral, insufficiently concerned with honor, self-absorbed, unable to form perfect friendships; unneighborly, untrustworthy, unsympathetic, inaccessible, and insufficiently benevolent, and obsessed with and motivated by honor   This article then suggests several explanations for the contemporary prejudice against the *megalopsychos*

'Just More Theory'· A Maneuver in Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism, BARRY TAYLOR

In *Realism and Reason* Putnam challenged the metaphysical realist to show why the completeness theorem, in demonstrating that the ideal theory has a model, does not guarantee that the ideal theory is *true*, contrary to realism's claim that it might be false   One response is that the completeness-guaranteed model need not assign the "right" referents to the ideal theory's constants   Putnam replies with the "Just More Theory Maneuver," to which David Lewis gave a convincing-looking answer   This paper evaluates the maneuver and Lewis's countermove   The maneuver is stated in gory formal detail, Lewis's countermove is at first sustained, then apparently refuted   Then complications are noted, which show the vindication of the maneuver is incomplete, but which also show how Putnam can answer the realist without it

Rejection without Acceptance, CARL A. MATHESON and A. DAVID KLINE

The claim that rational theory choice is always comparative enjoys unquestioned acceptance among those working in the history and philosophy of science   It entails that no theory should be rejected without a superior competitor to take its place.   This claim is at worst obviously false and at best implausible   This paper shows that the historical record does not support the thesis that rationality is comparative there are cases of noncomparative rational rejection   Furthermore, the paper also reviews some initially plausible reasons for thinking that rationality should be essentially comparative, and finds each of them wanting   In the course of its evaluation of these reasons, it also concerns itself with the problem of defining crucial (and ambiguous) terms like "acceptance" and "rejection'· and the even more difficult problem of applying them to the history of science

Motion, Causation, and the Causal Theory of Identity, DOUGLAS EHRING

Proponents of causal accounts of physical object identity argue that a causal account is demonstratively superior to a continuity theory in dealing with certain phenomena   In particular, it has been claimed that

whereas a continuity theory has trouble with certain forms of motion (such as Armstrong's homogeneous sphere and Kripke's homogeneous disc), the causal theory has no such trouble. The project of this paper is to explore the causal theory of identity as applied to the problem of motion in the context of various leading theories of causation, including the neo-Humean, the counterfactual, the probabilistic, and the transference theory   It is argued that the causal theory is in no better position to deal with motion than continuity theory once the concept of causation is spelled out within any of these traditional theories of causation.

The Contingent A Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples,
    HEIMIR GEIRSSON

In *Naming and Necessity* Kripke gives us two types of examples of contingent a priori truths, the difference consisting in the relationship between the reference fixer and the object being named   In the first type (Neptune Type) the reference fixer is *en rapport* with the object being named, while in the second type (Meter Type) he merely stipulates that whatever object satisfies a given definite description will bear a given name Instances of these examples and further modifications of them are discussed   While the Neptune Type examples fail, it is argued that the Meter Type examples can provide us with genuine contingent a priori truths However, the example provided involves knowledge of our appearances, not knowledge of the external world.   Consequently, the traditional relationship between the a priori and the necessary is intact

―――――

Kant, Teleology, and Sexual Ethics, VINCENT M. COOKE

This paper argues for the importance of the doctrine of teleology in Kant's moral philosophy.   It takes as a case study what Kant has to say about sexual morality.   This material exhibits the way in which teleological considerations were important to Kant in reaching substantive ethical conclusions.   A selection of texts from the *Lectures on Ethics* of 1775–1780, the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* the *Critique of Judgment,* and the *Metaphysics of Morals* are analyzed in order to support the thesis of the paper

The Postmodern Flavor of Blondel's Method, FIACHRA LONG

Connecting postmodernism with the philosophy of Maurice Blondel (1861–1949) may seem strange   Yet three particular orientations of Blon-

del's developed philosophy indicate a postmodern trend   The first is Blondel's attempt to set up a post-Kantian hermeneutic of perception which denies the radical separation of speculative from practical reason   The second sets up a curious Augustinian reflection on the relation between the self and time which deconstructs the transcendental view of the self. The third demonstrates how scientific knowledge contributes to human consciousness understood in terms of the action of the mind   This last issue seems to be the most urgent in our contemporary environment, but not one totally disassociated from the other two

Eliminative Materialism and Substantive Commitments,
    MARK T. NELSON

This paper is an attempt to bring some order to a recent debate over the mind/body problem   The author formulates the dualist, identity, and eliminativist positions and then examines the disagreement between eliminativists and their critics   The author shows how the apparent impasse between eliminativists and noneliminativists can be helpfully interpreted in the context of the higher-order debate over methodological versus substantive commitments in philosophy   The author also argues that the noneliminativist positions can be defended using Chisholm's defense of what he calls "particularism "

Kierkegaardian Transitions Paradox and Pathos,
    M. JAMIE FERREIRA

This article challenges the terms of the current debate concerning "volitionalist" readings of the Kierkegaardian leap of faith by initiating an exploration of the category of transition   It highlights the relevance of the activity of imagination in two ways first, in the paradoxical transitions described in several Kierkegaardian accounts of selfhood, and second, in a variety of indications in the Climacus writings and the journals of a broadened concept of "will" or "decision "

Deconstructing Lonergan, RONALD H. McKINNEY

In this article, Bernard Lonergan's thought is "deconstructed" in accordance with the techniques proposed by Jacques Derrida in order to foster a dialogue between Lonerganian foundationalists and Derridean anti-foundationalists   Lonergan's own definition of "dialectic" is shown to be compatible with a Derridean reading   The remainder of this essay shows the warring logic at work in Lonergan's dialectical treatment of the self-correcting process of learning, language and thought, and common sense and theory   The result is an identification of the fundamental hierarchical oppositions in Lonergan's thought which contain the seeds for their own reversal

Moral Imagination, Objectivity, and Practical Wisdom,
    JONATHAN JACOBS

Nietzsche's Use of Atheism, ROBIN ALICE ROTH

Real Patterns, DANIEL C DENNETT

    Most philosophers have supposed that with regard to beliefs and other
"mental" items, there are only two stable ontological positions realism
and eliminativism   Intermediate or "mild" realism is supported here by
demonstrating first that it is the most perspicuous ontological position to
hold about *patterns* in data, and second, that the best way to treat beliefs
and their kin are as real patterns discernible in data about human activity
Conway's "Game of Life" is exploited as a model illustrating several im-
portant ontological themes   This permits the positions of Fodor, Davidson,
Dennett, Rorty, and Paul Churchland to be compared, with the conclusion
drawn that all except Davidson's and Dennett's positions are gratuitous
extremisms, and that Davidson has been misled by an analogy, his views
would be better served by adopting Dennett's milder realism

A Modal Argument for Narrow Content, JERRY FODOR

Substance· Prolegomena to a Realist Theory of Identity,
    MICHAEL AYERS

    At the core of traditional theories of substance lies a cluster of prin-
ciples substances are the ultimate subjects of predication, are real unities,
are material, endure through time, are active principles of change, and fall
into naturally bounded kinds   Together these characterizations, critically
and holistically interpreted, mark substances off sharply from nonsub-
stances   The striking logical phenomena revealed in this comparison re-
ceive at best only verbal pseudo-explanation from conceptualist theories
of identity, but are here shown to be neatly explicable on the traditional
realist assumption that substances are the only real or natural individuals,
given as such at the level of experience, while nonsubstances are abstrac-
tions sliced out of reality by the mind or by language   This explanation

supports an unfashionable distinction between theoretical and pretheoretical levels, and shows the need for a realist theory of identity to replace orthodox conceptualist theories

Arational Actions, ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE

According to the standard account of actions and their explanations, intentional actions are actions done because the agent has a certain desire/belief pair which explains the action by rationalizing it. But *arational actions*—a subset of the set of intentional actions explained by occurrent emotion—resist the ascription of any suitable belief to the agent   These actions not only challenge the standard account by forming a recalcitrant set of counterexamples to it, they also justify our questioning the semantic theory which holds that account in place and, finally, provide a rich fund of cases in which the judgments of reason cannot endorse the promptings of passion

The Indeterminacy Thesis Reformulated, KEN GEMES

It is argued that Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis and the related thesis of the inscrutability of reference presume certain notions (e g , that of incompatible, or rival, empirically equivalent translation manuals) which cannot be accommodated within a Quinean framework In particular, it is shown that Quine's own notion of the identity of theories is incompatible with the claim that there can be rival manuals fitting an individual's speech   By Quinean lights there is no fact of the matter as to whether such purported rival manuals are genuine rival manuals or merely different versions of the same manual   In the final section an alternative indeterminacy thesis is presented. Ironically, this alternative version claims that there cannot be two rival translation manuals both of which fit an individual's speech   It is claimed that this alternative does some justice to the considerations that motivated Quine's original indeterminacy thesis

Epistemic Paternalism Communication Control in Law and Society, ALVIN I GOLDMAN

Epistemic paternalism is the withholding of evidence from cognitive agents with an eye toward those agents' own epistemic good, in particular, with an eye toward their acquisition of truth   There are many instances of such paternalism in the law and elsewhere in society   Judges exclude some items of evidence from the jury, educational personnel neglect certain

viewpoints in the classroom, governmental agencies impose constraints on the advertising presented to consumers, and broadcast media decide which items to include or exclude from their programs   Under what circumstances, this paper asks, do paternalistic practices have epistemically good consequences?   Without attempting to answer this question in general, some relevant variables are discussed, such as the expertise of the controller and the cognitive shortcomings of the audience   The problem of expert identifiability is also addressed, as well as the role of extra-epistemic factors in making policy choices

Epistemology on Holiday, MARK KAPLAN

"What (if anything) justifies your belief that there is a lectern at the front of this classroom?"   To students of contemporary epistemology, it is a familiar question to which foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism offer equally familiar answers   But, for all their familiarity, the question and its answers are deeply problematic   Read them flatly, in the ordinary way, and the answers promulgate patently unacceptable methodological principles   Reinterpret the answers in such a way as to relieve them of methodological import, and you relinquish the right to adjudicate between the answers by calling upon our intuitions about the nature and extent of justified belief   But then the answers answer to nothing, epistemology is on holiday

---

Malebranche versus Arnauld, MONTE COOK

Recent interpreters of Arnauld's theory of ideas take Arnauld to be a direct realist of some sort   It might seem, then, that they would find Arnauld's theory better than Malebranche's at least to the extent that only for Malebranche's representationalism do ideas form a veil preventing our having knowledge of the external world   Nevertheless, proponents of this interpretation of Arnauld's theory of ideas have denied that the theory fares any better against this objection than Malebranche's   This article seeks to strengthen and to some extent correct the case for this assessment

Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the Subjectivity of Time, LORNE FALKENSTEIN

According to a number of early critics of Kant's Inaugural Dissertation, time cannot be a form of intuition unless it is also a (transcendentally) real determination of the subject as it is in itself   This paper contains a thorough exegesis of this view, as it is found in the work of Mendelssohn,

Lambert, and Johann Schultz, and of Kant's attempts in the February 1772
letter to Herz and the two editions of the first *Critique* to answer it   It is
demonstrated that Kant's ultimate answer (1) presupposes a double-aspect
account of the relation between things in themselves and appearances, and
(2) repudiates the view that time is imposed by the mind on its represen-
tations

Hegel, Marx, and the Concept of Immanent Critique, ANDREW BUCHWALTER

This article challenges Marx's account of Hegel's "speculative" con-
junction of reason and reality   Hegel's conjunction is best understood,
not as a mystifying rationalization of existing reality, but as a form of the
normative evaluation Marx seeks to develop in "inverting" Hegel's identity
principle   For Hegel, too, the conjunction is a principle of *immanent cri-
tique,* where the real is assessed on its own principle of rationality   With-
out denying a metaphysical dimension to Hegel's conception, this dimen-
sion, far from obstructing development of a meaningful concept of im-
manent critique, is held to condition it   Further, examination of their
receptions of modern natural law indicates that Marx's appropriation of
Hegel's identity principle, far from improving upon the original, lacks He-
gel's degree of sophistication   In conclusion, difficulties in Marxian social
criticism are attributed to an inadequate reliance on Hegel's dialectical
logic.   This paper demonstrates Hegel's continued value with regard to
dichotomies in contemporary normative theory

Plato and the Senses of Words, THOMAS A. BLACKSON

Locke on Personal Identity, KENNETH P WINKLER

The Identity Theory of Truth, THOMAS BALDWIN

F.H. Bradley held that for a judgment to be true it has to be itself
the fact judged.   This "identity" theory of truth, which derives from Hegel,
explains why Bradley held that no judgments are absolutely true and that
judgment needs to be transcended by the Absolute   The same theory of
truth occurs in the early writings of G.E Moore and Bertrand Russell,
though here in an emphatically realist context   Russell subsequently
abandoned the theory, but its influence in his thought can be pursued
throughout his later writings   David Lewis's current theory of possible
worlds, which includes an identity theory of actuality, provides a recent
revival of this old line of thought

Indicative Conditionals are Truth-Functional,
    WILLIAM H. HANSON

Many logicians' treatment of conditionals is anomalous   These logicians typically deny that many (or any) English conditionals are truth-functional, but when discussing natural deduction systems they do not question the apparent intuitive correctness of *modus ponens* (*mp*) and conditional proof (*cp*) for a broad class of conditionals   Of course they do not mention that, due to soundness and completeness results, one cannot consistently deny the truth-functionality of a class of conditionals while maintaining the joint correctness of *mp* and *cp* for the conditionals in that class   This article argues that *mp* and *cp* are correct for many perfectly ordinary English indicative conditionals and that these conditionals are therefore truth-functional   It also considers alternative versions of *cp* for indicative conditionals proposed by Stalnaker and by Anderson and Belnap and argues that they are deficient   Finally, it gives examples of English indicative conditionals that are truth-functional if the arguments presented are correct.

Ensuring Two Bird Deaths with One Throw, JOHN LESLIE

Killing a bird in your half of a symmetrical universe would guarantee that your double killed another in his half   A computer replica of you would open replica-boxes if and only if you opened real ones   This suggests morals about how to behave in such imaginary situations and also in real life when other people are significantly like you   The morals affect Newcomb's Problem, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Voting Paradox.   Do not open a box if this would mean that a scientist, after seeing your speeded-up replica opening a box-replica, had ensured that you were much poorer than if you had left it unopened   Show kindness to your fellow prisoner if his similarity to yourself then makes him significantly likely to show kindness to you   Struggle out of bed on election day, for fear that if you do not then neither will your fellow democrats.

Ceteris Paribus Laws, STEVEN SCHIFFER

You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal, Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations,
    JERRY FODOR

Scepticism and Dreaming Imploding the Demon,
    CRISPIN WRIGHT

Classes are States of Affairs, D. M. ARMSTRONG

David Lewis argues, and this article accepts, that many-membered classes are nothing more than mereological wholes composed of their singletons, that is, their unit subclasses   What, then, is a unit-class? The article argues that a unit-class is a fact or state of affairs the possession by its member of the property of unithood.   These facts or states of affairs are complex. they have constituents   But the complexity is of a nonmereological sort   Mereologically, the states of affairs are atoms   This account of unit-classes is unacceptable to Lewis because he holds that mereological composition is the only form of complexity that there is

Does Kant's Psychology of Morality Need Basic Revision?
    RICHARD F. GALVIN

The article's purpose is to provide an exposition and defense of Kant's view on the moral motive   The argument begins with a brief comparison of Kant's view with the views of his "empiricist predecessors."   The argument then considers traditional objections to Kant's position to the effect that reason cannot provide a motive for action, and concludes that Kant's opponents provide no conclusive grounds for rejecting Kant's view.   Next, the argument addresses Brandt's argument to the effect that recent research on cognitive psychology shows that those who think that one can act "out of respect for duty" are mistaken, and their psychology of morality needs revision   The article argues against Brandt by providing a detailed analysis of "reverence" that shows how reverence can serve as a motive, even given what Brandt claims must be true of motives   In the final section, this account of "reverence" serves as a foundation for a defense of Kant's view against three sets of "moral theoretic" objections

The Dogma that Didn't Bark. A Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology, JERRY A FODOR

The Ontology of Musical Works and the Authenticity of their Performances, STEPHEN DAVIES

Philosophers disagree about the ontology of musical works, some authors characterizing them as timbreless, ahistorical sound structures and

other writers characterizing them as indexed to the means of performance, the composer, and the time and place of composition. The recent move to authentic performance also is controversial in some respects This article explores the connection between the two, showing that what is required for authentic performance depends on what one takes to be constitutive of the work In practice it is agreed that authenticity involves the use of instruments and performance practices from the time of the work's composition. This favors the view that historically founded conventions determine the identity of musical works.

The Persistence of Counterexample Re-examining the Debate Over Leibniz Law, GREGORY LANDINI and THOMAS R. FOSTER

There has been much debate concerning the logical truth of Leibniz's principle that indiscernibility is sufficient for identity Refutations abound—from Kant's two water droplets and Black's symmetric spheres, to Ayer's universe in which all events eternally repeat—but defenses are just as frequent For instance, drawing on considerations from relativistic physics, Hacking maintains that the principle can neither be refuted nor established by appeal to counterexamples based on imagined possible worlds This paper challenges that opponents of the debate are guilty of equivocation. There is no "one" law of the identity of indiscernibles New formulations are given and evaluated relative to their assumed background theories of universals. logical realism, attribute realism, phenomenalism, and natural realism.

Causes and Laws, ADRIAN HEATHCOTE and D. M. ARMSTRONG

It is argued that there is no analytic or conceptual connection linking singular causation with a law of nature Nevertheless there are good a posteriori grounds for holding that, just as heat is nothing but motion of molecules, so singular causation is nothing but the instantiation of a law.

A Modal Theory of Time, JOHN BIGELOW

Randomness by Design, WILLIAM DEMBSKI

_____

Two Kinds of Agent Relativity, I L. HUMBERSTONE

"Ought"-judgments may be agent-relative in two different ways One way is to relativize the judgment so as to indicate some specific agent

as one whose duty it is to make something the case   Another involves indicating the agent conditional on whose fixed circumstances a certain obligation obtains.   This paper compares the onus-of-obligation and the "circumstantial" relativities, as well as discussing some of the issues raised by each of them separately

Is There Higher-Order Vagueness? R. M. SAINSBURY

The paper argues against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries   This conception cannot provide an adequate account of the phenomena sometimes referred to as "higher-order vagueness."   There is a detailed discussion of a number of claims made by Crispin Wright about "definitely" and its connection with higher-order vagueness   Contrary to Wright, the author argues that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp   A new conception of classification is suggested, according to which many concepts classify without drawing boundaries   Within this picture, there are no orders of vagueness, though the phenomena which suggest the description "higher-order vagueness" are real enough   The paper establishes that classification without boundaries is possible by considering the spectrum   the bands of color stand out as clearly different, yet they have no boundaries

Future Individuals, ROGER TEICHMANN

This article examines the consequences for quantified talk of the view that it is impossible to refer to future individuals because of the impossibility of backwards causation   Modification of the traditional substitutionalist account is needed to cope with statements like "There is an unnamed rabbit " A style of modification is adopted which involves an initial *propositional* quantifier and which basically runs. "Something *is* the case, which *would* be expressed by an extension of the language   On this account, "F ($\exists x$) (x starts to exist)" with "F" standing for "It will be that," comes out possibly-true, with "($\exists x$) ($F(x$ starts to exist))" necessarily false.   There are "mirror-image" results for the past tense   An assumption at the bottom of all this, that propositions exist only when they can be expressed, is defended.   Finally, a pertinent example involving quantification, the future tense, and "actually" are considered

Principia Individuationis, ARDA DENKEL

This paper discusses individuation *at a point* in time   It argues that a principle of individuation that does not assume the identity of indiscernibles fails to satisfy the indiscernibility of identicals, ruling out proposals such as matter, substratum, or position   These may be plausible as epistemic criteria, but ontically they will yield objects with inconsistent properties.   The identity of indiscernibles or its augmented versions cannot

be sufficient, however distinct indiscernibles are logically possible   It is concluded that a satisfactory principle should conjoin qualities with position   The latter is regarded as determining the object's positional properties, without any commitment to absolute space   Given a point in time an object individuates as a whole, with all of its intrinsic properties at a position   This implies that objects are compresences of *particular* qualities, and that an individuator embodying less than all of the qualities of an object can be adequate *through* time only

Visual Fictions, GREG CURRIE

Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates, HAROLD W NOONAN

Must Psychology be Individualistic? FRANCES EGAN

It has recently been argued (by Jerry Fodor and others) that explanatory psychological theories must employ individuative principles that take no account of the subject's environment or social context   These arguments are criticized as inconclusive   Turning to the alleged empirical evidence on the other side, the article criticizes Tyler Burge's claim that David Marr's theory of early vision supports the thesis that environmental or, more generally, contextual features are relevant for the individuation of psychological states, and concludes that consideration of the explanatory goals of psychology suggests that contextual features will not play such a role

Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death, FRED FELDMAN

This paper provides a new formulation of the deprivation thesis   According to this view, a person's death is bad for him if and only if his welfare level at the nearest world at which he does not then die is greater than his welfare level at the nearest world at which he does.   This provides a basis from which to answer four Epicurean questions about the evil of death: (1) How can a person's death be bad for him if he doesn't exist when it takes place?   (2) Does the deprivation thesis presuppose an illegitimate comparison between goods received in life and goods received while dead? (3) When is death bad for the one who dies?   (4) Why isn't prenatal nonexistence just as bad as death?

Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs, DAVID CHRISTENSEN

"Dutch Book" arguments are often used to show that rational degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent   Apparently similar betting-loss-based arguments ("Dutch Strategies") have been advanced to support certain additional requirements of rationality   These include plausible conditionalization principles governing change of belief, and a strange principle named "Reflection" that requires a certain confidence in one's future beliefs   This article uses examples to show that reflection, as a rational requirement, is absurd   We need not, however, take this as a general *reductio ad absurdum* of betting-loss-based arguments for requirements of rationality   Once we understand when and how betting losses indicate irrationality, we see that Dutch Strategy arguments are wholly devoid of the force of the classic Dutch Book arguments   Thus we may reject Reflection while retaining the classic Dutch Book arguments   Unfortunately, we must also abandon Dutch Strategy justifications for conditionalization

Could This Be Magic? MICHAEL JUBIEN

A common view about possible worlds is that they are abstract entities (like maximal consistent propositions) that somehow represent ways the concrete universe might have been   Such views have been attacked by David Lewis, who calls abstract worlds "ersatz" and some of their proponents "magical ersatzers"   Lewis charges that the magical ersatzers cannot give a satisfactory account of the vital representation relation   In this paper Lewis's argument against magical ersatzism is analyzed and rejected (though magical ersatzism is not endorsed)   The question whether the argument might apply to other sorts of entities, like sets, is also considered in detail   Finally, some remarks about different conceptions of propositions are offered, with special attention to the kind of conception that would fit best with magical ersatzism

---

Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism, WALLACE I MATSON and
    ADAM LEITE

Socrates and Plato have been interpreted as forerunners of modern-day cognitivism, the view that the knowledge underlying all intelligent behavior can be reduced to context-free, decision-procedure rules   A careful reading of the early dialogues, however, reveals that Socrates' aims were *anti*-cognitivist, his project of spurring the citizens of Athens to moral excellence depended on showing them that explicit definitions stating

necessary and sufficient conditions for the applicability of moral terms are *impossible,* and that rules are therefore not sufficient to generate moral expertise   The theory of Forms results from Plato's attempt to develop a conception of knowledge consistent with this claim   The doctrine of recollection is Plato's description of the educational process by which the Forms are apprehended   Seen in the light of these interpretations, a comprehensive and consistent picture of Socrates and Plato as *anti-*cognitivists emerges, with significant implications for an understanding of the Platonic corpus

The Art of Philosophy, NEIL COOPER

In this paper the author gives reasons for regarding philosophy as an art.   Philosophy has four aspects, empirical, conceptual, normative, and picture-making   It is in its fourth aspect that philosophy resembles art   Like art, philosophy needs imagination to invent new pictures (as well as analysis to destroy old ones)   The philosopher's pictures must never be gratuitous; pure edification is not enough   Rather, the right to edify has to be earned and justified by crafted arguments, for the true philosophical artist needs clarity and argument in order to do justice to the richness and diversity of the intellectual world   And it is because the philosopher is an artist that he has a special responsibility to present his thoughts as literature, while preserving both vigor and cogency   Philosophy, as at one and the same time science and art, is one of the "heirs" to the tradition of thought which started with the pre-Socratics

Capital Punishment and Realism, DAVID COCKBURN

Insofar as Amnesty International's argument against capital punishment is basically utilitarian in form, it cannot be defended.   If the appeal to the suffering of the condemned man is treated as a perception of the horror of the execution, the conclusion may, however, be very different   The utilitarian approach has close analogies with a general form of "realism" which suggests that we should think of ourselves as measuring instruments in order to overcome the coloring of our thought by our own nature   The attempt to overcome a "merely human perspective" in morality often leads, paradoxically, to strongly human-centered moralities, and may lead in the more general case to "idealism "   The objection that treating the response of the condemned man as a perception itself involves an unacceptable "idealism" rests on the confused assumption that the response can be considered independently of what it is a response to

The Neurophilosophy of Pain, GRANT GILLETT

Pain is a phenomenon that spans mental and physiological aspects of human nature.   It is often regarded as a simple *quale,* identifiable by the subject solely on the basis of its "raw feel "   Philosophical analysis of ev-

idence from neurophysiology and psychology is used to undermine this
view   A revised account, in which pain is understood as a concept applied
by thinkers to a state of bodily injury, is outlined   On this view pain has
inherent conative properties and meets criteria for intersubjectivity of
ascription   This approach coheres well with remarks on pain in the later
philosophy of Wittgenstein

Sachverhalt and Gegenstand are Dead, E. F. THOMPKINS

    The conventional view is that in the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical In-
vestigations* respectively Wittgenstein produces two fundamentally differ-
ent philosophies with a clear hiatus between them   This article argues
that partly by design but largely by default Wittgenstein reaches in the
Tractatus a position which not merely facilitates a smooth transition to
his later thinking but provides the essential foundation for it

Kant's Psychological Hedonism, A PHILLIPS GRIFFITHS

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol 50, Supplement, Fall 1990

Some Revisionary Proposals about Belief and Believing,
    RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

    A departure is proposed from those language-oriented accounts of "x
believes that P" where P is taken as a sentence (e g , Davidson, Fodor) or
a quasi-linguistic proposition (e g , Frege)   Believing is here viewed as
relating an agent and an actual or nonactual state-of-affairs, P, where
under local internal and external circumstances an agent is disposed to
act as if P obtains   Although speech acts such as first-person belief reports
are often markers of believing, they are shown to be neither necessary nor
sufficient conditions   The position therefore accommodates beliefs of non-
language users   A further revisionary proposal recommends that belief
avowals should be retroactively revised where P is impossible, analogous
to retroactive revising of knowledge avowals where P does not obtain

Noema and Meaning in Husserl, DAGFINN FØLLESDAL

    This article presents a discussion of some of the objections that have
been raised against the author's article "Husserl's Notion of Noema" in
The Journal of Philosophy   Instead of picking out some of the numerous
critics and answering them, the author concentrates on three of the twelve
theses of that article that have been particularly popular targets of attack
(1) The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of

meaning, (4) The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e, not the object toward which the act is directed), and (8) Noemata are abstract entities

---

War Demokrits Weltbild mechanistisch und antiteleologisch?
ULRIKE HIRSCH

Democritus is usually classified as a mechanistic and antiteleological thinker   The article argues that this is an anachronistic classification and doesn't meet the intention of his philosophy   The evidence of this thesis is given in the main as follows (1) the meaning of *tyche* and *physis* in Democritus' thought is developed in a detailed inquiry into the intricate material, (2) pursuing traces in the first book of Lucretius, which have not as yet received sufficient attention, a better understanding is established of the motivation of Democritus' theory of atoms and of his discussion with predecessors, and (3) the claim that Democritus cannot distinguish between *causae efficientes* and *causae finales* is illustrated by analyzing his embryology and his theory of milkteeth   Finally, an attempt is made to formulate in what respect Democritus, in explaining the world, brought forth in his own time progress in human knowledge

La prétendue intuition de Dieu dans le "De coelo" d'Aristote,
R. BODÉÜS

Does Aristotle's *De coelo* include some philosophical theology, as still recently sustained by A P Bos (1989)?   A very crucial passage (2 284b3) seems to support this view for, according to the common interpretation, Aristotle argues there that he has given a cosmic theory which fits in with the premonition of God.   Once carefully examined, however, this passage only takes for granted the consistency of Aristotle's theory with the popular etymology of the word *theos*, as advanced in Plato's *Cratylus* to point out the eternity of celestial bodies   Such a reply to Plato does not suggest, on Aristotle's side, any theological conviction at all.

"Domina et Regina Virtutum" Justice and Societas in De Officiis,
E. M. ATKINS

This article discusses the fundamental role of justice in Cicero's *De Officiis*   It is the most important of the virtues, and it helps to define and limit the other virtues   *De Officiis* defines justice as that which builds up society, a definition that contrasts with earlier accounts   Cicero's view

can best be understood in the context of the traditional *mores* and contemporary political conflicts of the Roman republic, that context within which Cicero meditated upon the philosophical ideas he read in Greek authors

The Trouble with Fragrance, JOHN ELLIS

This paper investigates the ancient Greek commentators' interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of inherence, as suggested by his remarks in chapter 2 of the *Categories* Specifically, the views of Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias are discussed with respect to their solution of the problem of fragrance, viz , how can an apple's fragrance be an accident of the apple and, contrary to Aristotle's doctrine of inherence, separate from it? The article shows that there is a development in the discussions of the commentators from solutions which imply a weak construal of inherence towards solutions which imply a strong construal. It also turns out that their solutions to the problem require a rethinking of Aristotle's psychology, in particular his theory of smell

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Loyola University and Loyola University Press are seeking manuscripts for a new series of scholarly books on the theme of Values and Ethics   Stressing mature scholarship, readability, and topical relevance, this series applies an interdisciplinary approach to the development of knowledge   Prospective authors should submit a letter of inquiry, a sample chapter, a summary outline, and a curriculum vita   Preferred manuscript length is between 350 and 500 double-spaced pages   Inquires should be addressed to Dr Perez-Woods, Chairperson, Editorial Board—Values and Ethics Series, School of Nursing—Damen Hall, Room 411, Loyola University, 6525 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626

The *European Yearbook of Philosophy*, published by Neske Verlag, welcomes papers mainly by postgraduate students on a wide range of topics from formal semantics to analytical phenomenology   The project has the purpose of encouraging collaboration among scholars in the field of analytical, rigorous, or exact philosophy, and to provide a forum for debate and the exchange of ideas   The topic of the second issue, which is to appear in 1992, will be the philosophy of language   Rigorous treatment, argumentative force, and originality are required, historical contributions should be limited to issues that illuminate contemporary discussions   Two clearly written, correction-free typed copies in English should be sent to the Editor, *European Yearbook of Philosophy*, Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, CH 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.

Atlántida, a cultural journal with a broad academic and nonprofessional audience, seeks articles of enduring worth in philosophy, history, the arts, and the social sciences   Future issues will be dedicated to the thought of Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas, among others   Information regarding the journal and submission of manuscripts may be obtained from Ediciones RIALP, Sebastián Elcano 30, 28012 Madrid, Spain

There has been a change of place and of time for the International John F Macmurray Society's conference, "God, Earth and Human Community   The Post-Modern Religious Thought of John Macmurray," which was announced in the last issue of the *Review of Metaphysics*   The conference will take place at Marquette University in Milwaukee on October 17–19, 1991   For further information, contact Stanley Harrison, Department of Philosophy, Charles S Coughlin Hall, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Washington announces the forty-third annual meeting of the Northwest Conference in Philosophy   The conference will be held at the University of Washington in Seattle on November 8–9, 1991   Papers are invited in any area of

philosophy and will be refereed by a program committee   Papers should
be no longer than twelve pages, longer papers will not be considered   In
addition to submitted papers, the program will feature several invited ad-
dresses by distinguished scholars   The theme of this year's invited papers
is applied ethics   To submit a paper, send three copies by September 1 to
Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Program Chair, Department of Philosophy DK-50,
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195   Suggestions for
session chairs and commentators should be sent to Kenneth Clatterbaugh.

The Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale
(SIEPM) will hold its Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy
in Ottawa   This congress, sponsored by the University of Ottawa and by
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, will be
held on August 18-23, 1992   The general theme is "Moral and Political
Philosophies in the Middle Ages "   Various working sections of the con-
gress will study different aspects of this theme, and special sections will
be arranged to examine the problem of the state, politics and economics,
tolerance in the Middle Ages, and sexuality, family, and respect of life
To obtain information concerning registration, activities linked to the con-
gress, accomodations, and ways of participating, please write to the Ninth
International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Ottawa, Ottawa Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada (tel 613-564-2294,
fax 613-564-7668)

The Twenty-Fourth International Congress of L'Association des So-
ciétés de Philosophie de Langue Française will take place August 28-30,
1992, in Poitiers at the Faculté des Sciences Humaines   The theme of the
congress will be "La vie et la mort "   For further information on partic-
ipating or attending, please write the President, Jean-Louis Vieillard-
Baron, professeur, directeur du Centre de Recherche et de Documentation
sur Hegel et Marx, 8 rue René Descartes, 86000 Poitiers, France

Scope Note 14, *Maternal-Fetal Conflict Legal and Ethical Issues,* by
Mary Carrington Coutts, is now available from the National Reference
Center for Bioethics Literature   This 14-page paper offers information
about the ethical, medical, and legal problems which can occur when the
pregnant woman acts in ways which may be detrimental to the health of
the fetus   It provides immediate reference to facts, opinions, and legal
precedents for scholars, journalists, medical and legal practitioners, stu-
dents, and interested laypersons   This Scope Note is available for $3,
prepaid ($5 if invoice required), from the National Reference Center for
Bioethics Literature, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University,
Washington, D C   20057 (tel   202-687-3885 or 800-MED-ETHX, fax
202-687-6770)

The Johns Hopkins University Press is pleased to announce that it
began publishing the *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* in March 1991
Appearing quarterly in March, June, September, and December, this new

VOLUME XLIV
September 1990–June 1991

ARTICLES

CRITICAL STUDY

BOOKS RECEIVED

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

NORTH AMERICAN GRADUATE PROGRAMS

The Southern Journal of Philosophy

Spindel Conference proceedings only $10.00 each

Moral Epistemology - Vol. XXIX, 1990

Heidegger and Praxis - Vol. XXVIII, 1989

Aristotle's Ethics - Vol. XXVII, 1988

Connectionism - Vol. XXVI, 1987

B-Deduction - Vol. XXV, 1986

Moral Realism - Vol. XXIV, 1985

Recovering the Stoics - Vol. XXIII, 1984

Supervenience - Vol. XXII, 1983

Rationalist Conception of Consciousness - Vol. XXI, 1982

Planned for 1991 is a conference on
"Kant's Third Critique."

Proceedings published in the Spring following the conference.

For more information please write to.

THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Philosophy
Memphis State University
Memphis, Tennessee 38152
(901)678-2669

Dissertation Essay Competition

The Publisher of the *Review of Metaphysics*, The Philosophy Education Society, Inc , announces its annual Dissertation Essay Competition   The competition is open to all participants who have been awarded the Ph D degree in philosophy in the United States or Canada during 1991   Entries must be either a chapter from a dissertation or an essay based directly upon a dissertation   Essays may be on any topic dealt with in the dissertation

Essays will be judged anonymously   The author of the prize winning essay will receive $500   It is expected that the winning essay will be published in the *Review of Metaphysics*

Participants are requested to employ the following procedure for submitting essays

■ Essays should be no more than twenty-five double-spaced typewritten pages and should be submitted in triplicate

■ Essays should be free of all identifying marks, both in the body of the paper and in the footnotes

■ Entries should be accompanied by a letter indicating the author's name, the university from which his or her degree was received, and the title of the dissertation from which the essay was taken   Entries should also be accompanied by a stamped return envelope of suitable size

■ On matters of style and form, *The Chicago Manual of Style* or a recent issue of the *Review of Metaphysics* should be consulted   A style sheet is available upon request

■ Entries must bear a postmark no later than 15 January 1992 and should be sent to the *Review of Metaphysics*, Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064   Envelopes should be marked "Dissertation Essay Competition "

■ Additional inquiries concerning the competition may be directed to the above address

The results of the competition will be announced by 1 April 1992

sustaining institutions

The American University
The Catholic University of America
The Center for Thomistic Studies
University of Colorado
University of Dallas
Dickinson College
Emory University
The Franciscan Institute
Georgetown University
The University of Georgia
Institute for Advanced Study
Institute for Philosophical Research
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
The University of Louisville
The University of Michigan
Monmouth College
Niles College
University of Notre Dame
Old Dominion University
The Pennsylvania State University
Polytechnic Institute of New York
Ripon College
University of St Thomas
Smith College
Texas Tech University
Vanderbilt University
Villanova University
Wittenberg University
Yale University